Why Pakistan Army blames the 1971 debacle on the politicians?

SALEEM SAMAD

The outgoing Pakistan Chief of Army Staff (COAS), General Qamar Javed Bajwa in one of the several farewells meetups categorically said “1971 was not a military, but a political failure. Our army fought courageously in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).”
He lamented that those fallen martyrs of the Pakistan Army were never honoured and people have forgotten them and politicians never mention their sacrifice.
He made a desperate attempt to “correct” the narrative of 1971 and stated facts regarding the debacle, and said the number of [Pakistan] soldiers fighting [in eastern war theatre] was not 92,000 but 34,000 while the others were in different government departments.
Quoting his speech he said, “Against these heavy odds, our army fought bravely and gave exemplary sacrifices which were acknowledged by Indian Army chief Field Marshal Manekshaw.”
By ‘against these heavy odds’, General Bajwa meant that 34,000 Pakistani soldiers were confronted by an Indian Army of 250,000 soldiers and 200,000 members of the Mukti Bahini.
Such mind-blogging narratives of Bajwa have also shaken the political and military historians in Pakistan.
Shouldn’t you feel that Gen Bajwa needs to update his knowledge of the political history leading to the liberation war in 1971 and the humiliating defeat of the marauding Pakistan armed forces in the eastern war theatre?
The brutal birth of Bangladesh experienced the genocide of three million, rape as a weapon of war of tens of thousands of women, and brutal murder of thousands of intellectuals committed by the occupation Pakistan military and their henchmen recruited to kill, torture, rape and of course loot to frustrate the war of independence.
When the dreadful ‘Operation Searchlight’ was launched at midnight on 25th March 1971 in Dhaka and later spread to the rest of the country, the Pakistan military perpetrated the genocidal campaign under the military dictator General Yahya Khan.
Apologetic General Shaheb was a school student in 1971. But while in the military academy and later when he was climbing the ladders of his career in Rawalpindi GHQ. he must have read the Justice Hamidoor Rahman Commission Report regarding the debacle in 1971.
He need not read any documents or books published in Bangladesh on the 1971 war. It is believed that he must have come across scores of books penned by senior military officers of Pakistan, as well as by Indians who were on the battleground.
Does any of the documents and books claim that it was a failure of the politicians? In the helms of affairs were senior military hawks in Rawalpindi GHQ along with the civil bureaucrats in Islamabad.
Pakistan was sans political government since 1958 and continued till 1972. A political government took charge after an election in 1977 under a fresh constitution.
Pakistan lived under military rule since 1958 when General Ayub Khan led a bloodless coup and became the self-styled President of the country. He abrogated the 1956 historic constitution and accused many senior and junior ministers of the United Front mostly from East Bengal (now Bangladesh) of corruption and were tried in kangaroo military courts.
The 1970 elections, incidentally were held under a Martial Law regime, which arbitrarily denied the handover of political power to an elected majoritarian party Awami League.
Therefore the outgoing Pakistan COAS blaming the debacle on the shoulders of politicians was from his fairytale dream.
The military hawks in Rawalpindi were the mastermind of the crackdown and was cleared from the headquarters of the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), according to Major General Khadim Hussain Raja’s book ‘A Stranger In My Own Country’.
The book describes that during January and early February 1971, military dictator General Yahya had visualised the possibility of a military crackdown accompanied by the suspension of all political activity.
The top commanders in Dhaka had the opinion that it would be sheer ‘lunacy’ to attempt the operation at that time.
On 27 February 1971, Gen Raja gave formal orders to brigade commanders to be prepared for Operation Blitz into action.
Soon both Lieutenant General Yaqub Khan and Admiral S.M. Ahsan were denied access to President Yahya when he arrived in Dhaka for a series of parleys, primarily with Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
The two top brasses Admiral S.M. Ahsan, Governor of East Pakistan and Lieutenant General Yaqub Khan, Commander of the Eastern Command in Dhaka were unceremoniously removed by Rawalpindi GHQ for dilly-dally in executing the crackdown.
The duo instead appealed to President Yahya to forget about the “military solution” to the political impasse and hold dialogue with Sheikh Mujib, chief of Awami League to discuss the Six-Point, which was found scribed in the ‘Strategy, Diplomacy, Humanity: Life and Work of Sahabzada Yaqub’ as a threat to security and sovereignty of Pakistan.
He states that “I am convinced there is no military solution, which can make sense in the present situation. I am consequently unable to accept the responsibility for implementing a mission namely, a military solution, that would mean civil war and large-scale killings of unarmed civilians and would achieve no sane aim. It would have disastrous consequences,” Sahabzada Yaqub concluded.
The military hawks, according to Brigadier A. R. Siddiqi’s book ‘East Pakistan the Endgame’ understands that in March, the Rawalpindi was growing impatient for the delay of the crackdown.
The military dictator angry with General Yakub replaced him and appointed Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, who was known as the “Butcher of Balochistan”. The message of the replacement was loud and clear.
In midst of the dialogue, the infamous Operation Searchlight was launched. Several historians explain that military hawks kept in mind the dreadful operation and the parley was a ploy.
The plan for Operation Searchlight was quickly adopted by Yahya Khan and implemented when he was still in Dhaka. How can Bajwa attribute the humiliating defeat to a “political failure”?

First published in The News Times, November 28, 2022
Saleem Samad, is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at <saleemsamad@hotmail.com>; Twitter @saleemsamad

Why Did Pakistan Crackdown In Bangladesh, Balochistan In March?

SALEEM SAMAD

It may be coincidental that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has a weakness for the month of March!

The Islamic nation-state possibly felt the month of March was a ‘holy’ month or lucky month for the ruthless crackdown in Balochistan and after 23 years sadistically repeated it in Bangladesh.

Maybe the fortune-tellers to the military hawks in Rawalpindi decide their evil actions on the particular month of March. Whatever the motive, the evil axis occurred in March.

The regime in Rawalpindi launched fierce genocidal ‘Operation Searchlight’ in Bangladesh on the night of 25 March 1971.

In the nine months to freedom, 3 million martyrs were victims of genocide, and more than 400,000 women were raped as a weapon of war. Possibly the world’s largest war refugee was created in living history. More than 10 million war refugees took shelter in neighbouring India.

The Pakistan junta did not realise they will experience a humiliating defeat in December 1971. After the Second World War, another formal surrender occurred when 93,000 Pakistan troops signed the instrument of surrender at Dhaka on 16 December 1971.

Before the crackdown in Bangladesh in March 1971, Pakistan’s invasion of the largest princely states Balochistan on 27 March 1948 killed several thousand innocent Baloch. Their struggle for independence still rages in the rugged terrain of Balochistan.

However, the Pakistan official narratives claim that the State of Kalat acceded to Pakistan on 27 March after Mohammad Ali Jinnah sent a confidential letter to ‘Khan of Kalat’.

Jinnah was legal adviser to ‘Khan of Kalat’ and with his full knowledge, the Pakistan military attacked and invaded Quetta, the capital of Balochistan.

Well, history says differently. Balochistan became an independent country on 4 August 1947, much ahead of the independence of Pakistan on 14 August 1947.

The declaration of independence of Balochistan was announced on 11 August 1947, three days before Pakistan was created. Unfortunately, the independence of Balochistan was short-lived and lasted for 252 days.

Before the partition of India and Pakistan, Balochistan consisted of four princely states of Kalat, Lasbela, Kharan and Makran under the British Raj. Two of these provinces, Lasbela and Kharan, were ‘fiduciary states’ placed under Khan of Kalat’s rule by the British, as was Makran which was a district of Kalat.

In the notorious month of March, many political events occurred. On 23 March 1956, the road to military rule was paved when General Iskander Mirza was sworn in as the first President of Pakistan.

On 25 March 1969, in a bloodless coup d’état Pakistan Army chief General Yahya Khan took over power from General Ayub Khan, a dictator of a decade and proclaim Martial Law and dissolved the assemblies.

Pakistan first tried to trick the leaders of Balochistan into joining the renegade part of India in the name of ‘Muslim’, but when both Houses of Balochistan unanimously refused to annexe with Pakistan angered the hierarchy, then based in Karachi.

After the bloody independence of Bangladesh, the Pakistan troops were still Prisoners of War (POWs) in India, the Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to rejuvenate the demoralised Pakistan troops, gave responsibilities to “Butcher of Bengal” General Tikka Khan, then army chief to crack down on Baloch separatists and dissidents.

Subsequently, the military operation against separatists commenced in Balochistan in 1973 and the armed nationalist movement was brutally suppressed. The fiercest Baloch people have been struggling against Pakistan’s occupation and fought in 1948, 1958, 1962 and 1974.

What is more frustrating for Pakistan is that it failed to defeat the Baloch liberation struggle despite killing thousands of Baloch nationalists. More than 20,000 were victims of enforced disappearances and “dumping”. Those captured were brutally tortured and bullet-ridden bodies of thousands of Baloch political prisoners are found on the roadside.

The brutal torture of state forces includes gouging the eyes of the victims, cutting their tongues, noses, amputating their limbs, drilling holes in their bodies and many other inhuman and brutal mediums of torture. Pakistan junta is still paying an enormous price for the crackdown in Balochistan.

First published in The News Times, 9 March 2022

Saleem Samad, is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at <saleemsamad@hotmail.com>; Twitter @saleemsamad

The last 10 days of East Pakistan

COURTESY OF ANWAR HOSSAIN FOUNDATION

SALEEM SAMAD

On March 15, 1971, Yahya Khan arrived in Dhaka amid growing political unrest and no light at the end of the tunnel. His mission was to halt the “civil disobedience movement” called by Awami League leader Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Rawalpindi GHQ insisted that Yayha Khan needed to make a final bid to ensure Pakistan’s integrity after meeting Sheikh Mujib. The following day, Sheikh Mujib met Yahya Khan at Bailey Road. 

Mistrust and suspicion between Mujib and Yahya had heightened to such an extreme level that their first meeting had to take place in the bathroom of the Presidential Suite. The Awami League leader refused to hold parleys in the President’s House drawing-room on suspicion that it could be bugged, writes Ian Talbot, author of Pakistan: A Modern History.

In an hour-long parley, President Yahya wanted to justify the cancellation of the maiden National Assembly session on March 1, 1971, whilst Sheikh Mujib remained defiant on his demand to withdraw the martial law.

Meanwhile, the non-cooperation movement coupled with street agitation continued.

Yayha was dragging his feet on the withdrawal of the martial law promulgation. He argued that if martial law was abrogated, there would be a “constitutional vacuum.” Mujib quickly said that he would request his advisers to sit with the president’s advisers to work out a formula that would resolve the so-called “constitutional vacuum.”

On Mujib’s advice, Dr Kamal Hossain met the president’s principal staff officer Gen SGM Peerzada and argued that under no circumstances did the postponement of the national assembly session, scheduled to be held in Dhaka, have any justification.

On March 17, Mujib-Yahya’s closed door parley resumed again. As usual, neither the Hawks in Rawalpindi nor the Awami League’s party office issued any media statement. Thus the media was publishing speculative news in Dhaka and Karachi.

Meanwhile, the Awami League rejected the formation of a 5-member probe body to determine why the army was called into action and the reasons behind the killing of agitating people during the shutdown.

Instead, the Awami League formed an alternative 3-member enquiry committee consisting of Captain Mansur Ali, Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad, and Abidur Reza.

On March 19, a third round of parley between Mujib-Yahya was held and it was decided that there would be another meeting the following day. Representatives from both sides had a separate meeting to formulate the basis of discussion for the impending meeting to break the political impasse. Failing to negotiate, President Yahya and Sheikh Mujib were at a standstill along with their advisors on March 20 for two hours. In fact, it was to be their last meeting. Yahya Khan was shrewdly leading towards an inclusive meeting to prove that the dialogue had entered a dead end.

On the call of Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani to observe “Swadhin Purba Bangla Dibash” on the Republic Day of Pakistan on March 23 -- except the government buildings and military garrisons –– all over the country, the independent Bangladesh flag was hoisted.

While the dialogue was in progress, the Rawalpindi Hawks secretly prepared its infamous genocidal plan -- “Operation Searchlight” -- which was launched at midnight on March 25. Hours later, Sheikh Mujib was detained and flown to Karachi.

First Published in the Dhaka Tribune, 1 June 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He can be reached at <saleemsamad@hotmail.com>; Twitter @saleemsamad

Why the idea of a unified struggle with Pakistan’s exiled political leaders failed in 1971

SALEEM SAMAD

In December 1971, when the Mukti Bahini guerrillas and the Indian army captured large chunks of occupied Bangladesh, the government-in-exile in Kolkata and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi were having sleepless nights.

At the fag-end of the Liberation War, a senior leader -- Abdus Samad Azad -- took charge of the ministry of foreign affairs from Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad.

In London on December 16, 1971, the Bangladesh foreign minister organized a top-secret meeting of exiled political leaders from Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North-West Frontier Province -- NWFP) in Pakistan. Azad was not sure what the outcome of the secret meeting would be. The Pakistani leaders were living in exile to escape the wrath of the military junta in the Rawalpindi military headquarters.

The victims were mostly politicians of ethnic sub-nationalities from the minority provinces in Pakistan, and progressive left intellectuals who dared to raise their voices in favour of handing over power to the Awami League, the unconditional release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the safe return of refugees from India, and the withdrawal of troops from the eastern front.

Tajuddin Ahmed, prime minister of the provisional government, in conjunction with South Block in New Delhi envisaged opening a crucial dialogue with Pakistan’s exiled political leaders in London. Among the attendees was Khan Abdul Wali Khan (leader of the socialist National Awami Party of the NWFP, an iconic Pashtun leader, and an able son of “Frontier Gandhi” Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan).

All of the progressive leaders of Pakistan were fortunately close allies of Sheikh Mujib and had lent him their political support, which raised alarm bells among military hawks in Rawalpindi.

The agenda of the meeting was sensitive. The leaders expressed their solidarity with the creation of independent Bangladesh and were worried about the safety of Sheikh Mujib. Azad did not hesitate to spell out the exiled government’s plan. He carefully laid down whether there was any possibility to forge a joint front for armed rebellion among the ethnic sub-national people in Pakistan to break away from Pakistan and become sovereign independent nation-states, as Bangladesh had showcased.

The Bangladesh leader in his submission said the Indian army had reached the gates of Lahore and it was an opportune moment to strike. He said confidently that Bangladesh would provide logistics from friendly countries to wage armed struggles and extend political, diplomatic, and military support for a unified movement.

The ethnic leaders at the Charing Cross meeting could not believe that Bangladesh leadership would offer such a radical proposal. They doubted whether Bangladesh could provide political and military support to the ethnic armed struggles already happening in Balochistan and NWFP.

The curious leaders asked Azad about India’s mindset to back the movements of the Sindhi, Baloch, and Pashtuns. Azad quickly assured them that India’s political support could be mustered, citing India’s help for Bangladesh’s Liberation Movement. He said the Awami League leadership was willing to talk to New Delhi to secure India’s support, on the condition that the leaders would have to commit to democracy, secularism, and pluralism, and reject Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s two-nation theory.

However, the exiled leaders Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, and Khair Baksh Marri said the proposal was too little, too late. While the meeting was in progress, news broke in the British media that 93,000 Pakistan troops and civilian officers had unconditionally surrendered in Dhaka.

Several historians conclude that it was obvious the dialogue failed because the secret plan was made in haste with a poor vision and no timeline.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune 18 May 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad

Declare Mujibnagar Day on April 17 as Republic Day of Bangladesh

Photo: SYED ZAKIR HOSSAIN

SALEEM SAMAD

On the 50th birth anniversary of Bangladesh, the nation was perhaps expecting that the government would declare April 17 as the country’s Republic Day. This is the day when the cabinet of the government-in-exile took an oath of office and accepted the challenge to lead the War of Liberation to achieve independence.

The venue was discreetly decided at Baidyanathtala, Meherpur in eastern Bangladesh (less than a kilometre from the Indian border). The site was secured by the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) and mounted anti-aircraft artillery to thwart any air attacks by marauding Pakistan fighter jets.

A day earlier, the Ansar saw hundreds of BSF soldiers and vehicles pour in and secure the area. The following morning, April 17, the leaders of government-in-exile, Indian officials, scores of journalists, international photographers, and TV camera persons also arrived with senior BSF officers accompanied by hundreds of additional troops.

At 11 am the ceremony began with recitation from the Qur’an and playing of the national anthem. The oath-taking ceremony was conducted by Abdul Mannan, MNA, and the proclamation of independence was read out by Professor Mohammad Yusuf Ali.

The assignment of portfolios was assigned among the ministers on April 18. The incumbents of the government were: Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (interned in Pakistan jail), president of Bangladesh. Syed Nazrul Islam (Vice President and also Acting President), Tajuddin Ahmad (Prime Minister), Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad (Foreign Affairs and Law Minister), Muhammad Mansur Ali (Finance Minister), AHM Qamaruzzaman (Home, Relief and Rehabilitation Minister), and Muhammad Ataul Gani Osmani (Commander-in-Chief of the Bangladesh Forces or Mukti Bahini). The guard of honour was given to Syed Nazrul Islam, the acting president of Mujibnagar.

The government-in-exile had an elaborate structure of administrative departments, agencies, and activities. Even though elaborate agencies were established, the government’s main work remained coordinating the Liberation War and boosting popular support in occupied Bangladesh.

Soon the government-in-exile operated from 8 Theatre Road, Kolkata. Tajuddin Ahmad supervised the military operations of the Mukti Bahini, held coordinating meetings with officials of Indira Gandhi, the Eastern Command of the Indian Army, the foreign dignitaries, the international NGOs in aid of the 10 million war refugees, and of course, smoothing the inner-conflicts within the hierarchy.

The Shadhin Bangla Betar Kendra broadcast was a moral inspiration for the millions of people who were either languishing in refugee camps across the borders of Bangladesh or living in hellish conditions in occupied Bangladesh.

The production of documentary films, postage stamps, propaganda posters, regular press briefing in Kolkata, definitely made a dent in telling the world of the genocide in Bangladesh and the war crimes committed by the marauding Pakistan troops.

Tajuddin Ahmad was an intimate colleague and a trusted comrade of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and enjoyed the recognition and full support of the Indian leadership -- which was an important resource that lent authority to his position, writes acclaimed economist Rehman Sobhan in his book Untranquil Recollections.

Well, the government-in-exile earned credibility and gave an alternative dichotomy to General Yayha Khan’s military regime in Rawalpindi.

Nonetheless, most historians interpret that the able stewardship of the Mujibnagar government, which was a symbolic icon of the nationalist struggle, had essentially lifted the morale of the revolution.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune, 20 April 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at <saleemsamad@hotmail.com> Twitter @saleemsamad

Narendra Modi came, he saw, but he did not conquer

Narendra Modi speaks on the occasion of Bangladesh's 50th Independence Day - FOCUS BANGLA

The expectations of the common people in Bangladesh were left unfulfilled

SALEEM SAMAD

Fifty years ago, in 1971, India added colours of victories and feathers on Bangladesh’s hat.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently came, saw, but couldn’t conquer the hearts and minds of the people of Bangladesh. His Bangladesh visit was to mark the 50th anniversary of Bangladesh’s nationhood, despite the coronavirus pandemic.

Possibly, Modi couldn’t fulfil the expectations of the “aam janata” of the country.

The agitation spearheaded by the left alliance and its student group protested Modi’s visit. Quickly, the Islamist groups voiced their protests, followed by the rightist parties.

The Islamists blamed India for the persecution of the Muslims in India, especially in Kashmir.

None was surprised as to why the Islamists, right and left elements, failed also to mention the Uighur Muslims facing ethnic cleansing in China, the crimes against humanity in Balochistan under Pakistan occupation, and the humanitarian crisis in Yemen caused by the proxy war by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against Iran.

Nothing to deny about the fact that the two South Asian neighbours, Bangladesh and India, share a common history, and linguistic and cultural heritage. The two neighbours’ strategic locations complement each other and offer an opportunity to further develop economic ties.

Nevertheless, the brutal birth of Bangladesh shattered the so-called myth of the contentious “two-nation theory,” a dream of the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in less than 25 years.

East Bengal, a Muslim majority region, decided to be wedded into weird bondage with a country separated by nearly 2,026 kilometres. But elites and military rulers of Pakistan frowned at the fish-and-rice-eating Bangalis as second-class citizens.

After nine months of birth pangs, the country was liberated from the yoke of the marauding Pakistan troops.

India is the world’s largest democracy, but it was not economically stable in the 70s, and had to bear the burden of providing shelter, food, and health care to more than 10 million refugees.

As the war unfolded in the eastern theatre, India embraced new enemies, including China, the United States, and the Arab countries, as she stood shoulder to shoulder with Bangladesh.

The good offices of Indian civil administration, diplomacy, and armed forces played a pro-active role in creating a nation.

The military and diplomacy of the countries mentioned above tilted towards Pakistan, which further encouraged their evil plans to commit genocide, with the intent towards ethnic cleansing of Bangalis as a nation.

The military hawks in Rawalpindi GHQ deliberately targeted Hindus after declaring them as Kufrs or Kafirs -- enemies of Islam.

To augment military aid to the Liberation War, to muster support from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, India signed the historic Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation on August 9, 1971.

The Indo-Soviet treaty had a direct impact on the decisive battle, which expedited Bangladesh independence and brought about the surrender of occupation Pakistan forces in mid-December 1971.

Indira’s efforts in September to win the hearts of the West and international bodies in favour of the Bangladesh cause had indeed melted the ice.

Months after the war, a joint communiqué surprised many that the two countries (Bangladesh and India) had agreed to pull out the victorious Indian army. Never in military history has a victorious army withdrawn so quickly.

It was hailed as the first diplomatic success by the independent hero Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, popularly known as Bangabandhu.

Yet another request by Sheikh Mujib to shift the 93,000 prisoners of war (POW) of Pakistan armed forces and civilians to India was also agreed upon.

For a justifiable relationship of the newly emerged nation, a controversial Bangladesh-India Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Peace for 25 years was signed between visiting Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her counterpart Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on March 19, 1972. The treaty, however, was bitterly criticized by the opposition, stating it as a treaty of the hegemony of India.

Well, the relations between the two neighbours were on rough seas. The border killings of Bangladesh nationals by the Indian Border Security Force (BSF), water-sharing of the Teesta rivers, and tilted trade imbalance remained major bottlenecks to the improvement of the relationship.

Besides issues of shared interests between two counties, Modi offered prayers at two temples in Satkhira and Gopalganj, which evoked curiosity in both Bangladesh and India.

His visits to Hindu temples is likely to pay dividends to influence elections in West Bengal. Meanwhile, violence raged in Brahmanbaria for the third consecutive day, leaving 12 dead, including in Chittagong and Narayanganj.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune, 31 March 2021

Saleem Samad, is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He can be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com. Twitter @saleemsamad

Bangabandhu in Mianwali Jail

Bangabandhu was arrested and then was taken to West Pakistan shortly 
before the start of Operation Search Light on 25 March, 1971. File Photo

SALEEM SAMAD

Mohanlal Bhaskar alias Mohammed Aslam's undercover identity was blown by a double agent. He was caught and imprisoned in Pakistan from 1967 to 1974.

He and dozens of fellow Indian spies were swapped with Pakistani spies soon after the ice-breaking Simla Accord signed by Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in July 1972.

Bhaskar's mission was to gather intelligence on Pakistan's nuclear programme. He witnessed the India-Pakistan war in December 1971 from his cell in Mianwali jail as history unfolded when Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was brought there and had his grave dug, at least four times, and then quickly refilled.

Possibly the book, 'An Indian Spy in Pakistan', written by Mohanlal Bhaskar in Hindi and translated by Jai Ratan, is the only eyewitness narrative on Bangladesh's independence leader Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman which unfolded in Mianwali Jail.

He exhaustively writes two separate chapters. One on 'Turmoil in Bangladesh' and another on 'Sheikh Mujib in Mianwali Jail'.

"According to the news that had reached us, Sheikh Mujib was supposed to be in the Lyallpur Jail. The winter had just started. A helicopter landed one night in our jail compound. We couldn't see who had got down from it, for our cells were locked at that time. In the morning we [learned] that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had been brought to Mianwali […] the Lyallpur Jail."

It is presumed Mujib was brought to Mianwali Jail in early September 1971, according to Bhaskar. Sadly, the Indian spy, for reasons unknown, did not mention any date behind the events he has mentioned.

As soon as Sheikh Mujib's arrival was confirmed by prisoners, some soldiers of the East Bengal Regiment planned to dig a tunnel in the jail to smuggle him away from there, according to Bhaskar.

The attempt proved abortive as Mujib was lodged in the female ward of Mianwali Jail. The female inmates had hurriedly been shifted to another barracks.

The Indian prisoners were also shifted to barrack number 10 and the female ward was right behind their barracks.

Unfortunately, neither the Bangalee soldiers nor the Indian spies could have a glimpse of the stalwart politician. He was kept under heavy military guard.

Well, a Bangalee cook had been deployed to cook Mujib's preferred menu – fish and rice.

The following morning, when news of the Sheikh's arrival spread in the jail the Pathan prisoners climbed up the roof of the jail barracks and shouted expletives at the Sheikh. 

Armed guards quickly climbed onto the roof of the female ward and fired six rounds in the air, which terrified the Pathans. 

The Jail Superintendent on a routine round of the barracks informed the prisoners that Mujibur Rahman had been brought to Mianwali Jail to be hanged.

This news triggered sadness among the Indian and Bengal Regiment prisoners but caused a ripple of happiness among Pakistani prisoners and they cried 'Ya Ali!'.

Bhaskar recalls that, unfortunately, he could not meet the "great hero, known as the Lion of Bengal who had awakened the hungry and oppressed people of East Bengal...".

Whenever the Indian prisoners went to collect food rations, they met Mujib's cook but could not have a word with him as he was escorted by military guards.His cook was very devoted to him.

The ration clerk would ask the cook, "How's he faring?" The defiant cook would reply that Sheikh Shaheb was in fine health and with a sound mind and would keep fighting for the rights of the Bangalees till his last breath.

One day, the deputy superintendent called the eight Indian prisoners languishing in condemned cells.

He notes: "We were marched out and halted in front of the female ward where Sheikh Mujib was imprisoned. We were not told what was required of us nor did we care to find out. We were happy in the thought that we may yet be able to have a fleeting glimpse of the Sheikh. But to our chagrin, even the wooden gate leading to his barred cell had been closed."

The senior jail officer ordered them to dig an eight feet long, four feet wide and four feet deep trench and specified the exact spot where the trench was to be dug.

"We immediately guessed that Sheikh Mujib was scheduled to be hanged that night and we were digging a grave to bury his dead body. Short of asking a question which we were reluctant to do, we had no way of confirming our suspicion," he writes.

The grave was ready by nine and the prisoners returned to their cells. They waited with bated breath for the ominous news of Mujib's execution. "Our ears were all along attuned to the "house of death' but nothing happened throughout the night; everything was so quiet and still."

Bhaskar realised that the decision to hang Bangabandhu had been deferred. In the morning when the cells were unlocked, they heard some people saying that Sheikh Mujib was still alive.

There were also rumours that poison had been injected into his body, putting him to eternal sleep, after which he had been buried in the grave dug the previous evening.

In the morning when the Indian prisoners went to the ration godown for collecting their quota, they saw Sheikh Mujib's cook waiting there to get milk, tea and sugar for his morning tea.

It was indeed a relief for them, for "it meant that he was still alive."

They heard a rumour that on the night scheduled for the Sheikh's execution Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had sought an audience with President Yahya Khan and had advised him not to execute him. 

He [Bhutto] impressed upon the President that if he [Mujib] was executed the Bangalees in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) would not sit idle. The Pakistani forces stationed in East Pakistan right from the highest officer down to a soldier would become the target of the wrath of the Bangalee guerrillas. Yahya Khan on second thought decided to halt Mujib's execution.

The next day, the prisoners were again called out and asked to fill in the trench dug the previous day. "But our happiness was short-lived."

Fifteen days later, they were again called out and asked to dig a similar trench. Again, Sheikh Mujib was not hanged. This process was repeated three times and every time his hanging was deferred.

For the fourth time, Sheikh Mujib was saved from walking to the gallows. In this manner, Sheikh Mujib stayed for four months in the Mianwali Jail.

Finally, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in early January released Bangabandhu, who was to return in triumph to Bangladesh.

Even now, the days of Sheikh Mujib in Mianwali Jail remains a nightmare. Time and again they [the Pakistan authorities] would prepare the noose for his neck and dig a grave. But he did not die at the hands of his enemies.

Regrettably, he died at the hands of his "own people whom he called his children." Nobody could believe that the same people for whom he had made such huge sacrifices and suffered imprisonment and political harassment would assassinate him," laments Bhaskar.

First published in The Business Standard, 17 March 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He can be reached at <saleemsamad@hotmail.com>; Twitter @saleemsamad

Indo-Soviet Treaty turning point for Bangladesh independence

Assessing the impact of the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 on Bangladesh’s independence

SALEEM SAMAD

As Bangladesh celebrates its 50th anniversary on March 26th, the historic Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed on August 9, 1971, had a direct impact on the decisive battle in the eastern war theatre.

The treaty expedited the Bangladesh War of Independence and brought about the surrender of 93,000 Pakistan forces on December 16, 1971.

In the annals of diplomacy, the Indo-Soviet Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was a unique document that not only epitomized the special relationship between India and former Soviet Union, but also acted as a guarantor of regional peace.

The treaty was a significant deviation from India’s previous position of non-alignment in the Cold War and the prelude to the Bangladesh war, and it was a key development in a situation of increasing China-American ties and American pressure.

The Indo-Soviet treaty was later adopted as the India-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972.

As the struggle for independence in Bangladesh gathered momentum in 1971, months after holding general elections in Pakistan, and the US hegemony attempted to subvert it, the treaty restrained the evil design of Pakistan and its allies.

Following the first-ever free, fair, and credible elections in Pakistan in 1970, Pakistan’s head of state, General Yahya Khan, was utterly dissatisfied with the large victory of the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

The marauding Pakistan military unleashed a reign of terror under “Operation Searchlight” at midnight on March 25, committing genocide with the intent to cleanse the land of Bangali and Hindu populations, who were deemed as enemies of Pakistan and Islam.

Pakistan’s General Yahya Khan had said that “if India made any attempt to seize any part of East Pakistan, he would declare war and Pakistan would not be alone.”

Well, Kissinger’s surprise visit to Beijing in July 1971 was indeed a morale boost for Pakistan. On the other hand, it was frustrating for India as it felt diplomatically humbled and strategically isolated.

India could see the US-China-Pakistan axis as an emerging threat to regional geopolitical interests. China committed unqualified support to its “all-weather” friend Pakistan against India to stop interference in the domestic affairs of Pakistan.

During the parley between Kissinger and China’s Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, Beijing indicated that if war breaks out between India and Pakistan over Bangladesh, China would make military intervention against India on behalf of Islamabad.

The US sympathized with Pakistan for obvious reasons. The US believed a victory for India would be considered as an expansion of Soviet hegemony in South Asia. In this backdrop, Delhi and Moscow moved closer to ink the historic treaty to neutralize the emerging Washington-Beijing–Islamabad axis and defend their vital geopolitical interests.

In an editorial, Pravda, a leading Soviet national daily, underlined the significance of the treaty, saying the treaty had effectively “restrained” Pakistan and its allies from embarking on a course of “military adventurism” in the sub-continent and would continue to act as a “deterrent” against such hegemonic goals. The treaty also signalled a clear warning to China’s hegemonistic ambitions in the continent.

Following the rising struggle for independence in erstwhile East Pakistan and the influx of millions of refugees from there to India, the possibility of war between New Delhi and Islamabad was looming large in Asia.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune, 16 March 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of Ashoka Fellow (USA) and Hellman-Hammett Award. Email saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad

Imran Khan's tantrum, much ado about nothing

Pakistan PM Imran Khan at UNGA in 2019 - Photo AFP

Imran Khan did not impress many with his speech at the UN General Assembly

SALEEM SAMAD

Anybody would have mistaken Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan’s speech at the UN General Assembly as the one he delivered in 2019. Retrofitted with pandemic era phrases, Khan spelled out what was effectively an abridged version of last year’s rant on India.

The video broadcast beamed from Islamabad was framed against a flag festooned backdrop and a painting of Muhammad Ali Jinnah on the wall behind him. Khan sat at a desk amidst a haze of green coloured props and rattled off a bucket list of macro-level grievances.

Khan’s tantrum speech last Friday was no dif.ferent from last year’s wide swipe at the world, talking about “corrupt elites,” tree planting schemes, Islamophobia, RSS, Modi, Jammu and Kashmir, and then Kashmir again.

Ranting that India “sponsors Islamophobia,” he called India’s Hindu-nationalist government a sponsor of hatred and prejudice against Islam while denouncing its moves to cement control of Muslim-majority Kashmir.

Reiterating the threats of climate change posed by global warming, Khan lamented that his country is severely affected by the climate crisis. As part of its efforts to mitigate the impact of climate change, Pakistan will plant 10 billion trees over the next three years.

Hours later, an Indian diplomat turned the mirror on Pakistan after Khan concluded his speech at the UN -- dripping with vitriol -- and recalled its record of genocide committed during the brutal birth of Bangladesh in 1971.

Indian UN Mission’s First Secretary Mijito Vinito, a Nagaland-born diplomat, articulated his statement in response to the acclaimed cricketer and said: “The only crowning glory that this country [Pakistan] has had to show to the world for the last 70 years is terrorism, ethnic cleansing, majoritarian fundamentalism, and clandestine nuclear trade.”

The young diplomat, in a strongly-worded reply to Pakistan’s call to outlaw those who incite hate and violence, said that it left others wondering whether Khan was referring to himself. There was a ripple of mild laughter among the diplomats in the hall, as well as embarrassment for the friends of Pakistan.

In July, Imran Khan referred to the dreaded Al-Qaeda terrorist leader Osama Bin Laden as a “martyr” in Pakistan’s parliament. A leaked intelligence document surfaced in the media, which detailed that UN-listed terrorists had received pensions from state coffers.

Recently, Khan in a telephonic tête-à-tête with Sheikh Hasina urged her opinion about Article 370 revoking the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir. She quickly responded that the Kashmir issue is an “internal affair” of India. To stop Khan from dragging her into the discussion of the J&K issue again, she asked that Pakistan seek public apology for the war crimes committed in the Bangladesh Liberation War.

Well, most South Asian leaders are not in a mood to listen to Khan’s sugar-coated sermons for a peaceful solution to the J&K crisis.

Except few Muslim countries, no one seemed to lend their ears when he made frantic appeals that India must rescind Article 370 which granted special status to the state of J&K and end its military siege and other human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune,  28 September 2020

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He can be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com. Twitter @saleemsamad

Pakistan looking to ‘secularize’ terrorism

SALEEM SAMAD

Amid the coronavirus pandemic taking a heavy toll of human lives globally, the General Head Quarters (GHQ) of the dreaded Pakistan army in Rawalpindi is attempting to “secularize terrorism” in restive Kashmir.

Rawalpindi has given birth to another jihadist terror network, The Resistance Front (TRF). The GHQ has developed the expertise in recruiting and abetting Islamic militias to fight and kill innocent people in a bid to establish “Naya Pakistan” of Imran Khan.

From Afghanistan to Bangladesh, Balochistan to Kashmir, Iran to India, the deep state has been engaged to destabilize the region, which the South Asian nations have strongly reacted to in regional forums.

Pakistan’s maiden brutal operation “Raiders in Kashmir” was in autumn 1948. Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s blue-eyed boy Brigadier Akbar Khan, Burma war front veteran, pushed hundreds and thousands of ferocious tribesmen and unleashed a reign of terror in the picturesque valley for 5 days.

Presently the so-called “Azad Kashmir” is also known as Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) and rest of Jammu and Kashmir is Indian Administered Kashmir. 

Thus Kashmir remained in GHQ’s terror map.

Shabir Choudhry, a political activist from POK has written to British Leader of Opposition, Keir Starmer, informing that Pakistan continued to violate the UN Security Council’s resolutions on Kashmir. 

The withdrawal of the Pakistan army never materialized; instead, it infiltrates “jihad warriors” to commit violence and terrorism on the other side of Line of Control (LoC).

Rawalpindi’s skill in creating fright among the people was imported to brutally suppress the nation during the brutal birth of Bangladesh in 1971.

The hawkish General’s terrorism model was developed in the terror lab in POK and was transplanted in the Eastern War Theatre, a delta with the long monsoon season.

The shadowy lobby in Eastern Command of the Pakistan army in Dhaka implemented their sadistic plan to raise several terror groups and also brought in the paramilitary Rangers and Mujahid militias to implant fear-mongering among the local people.

Besides forming the “Shanti Committee” by staunch supporters of Islamic Pakistan with political leaders, the occupation forces also established the infamous razakars and raised 50,000 militias. The paramilitary East Pakistan Civil Armed Force (EPCAF) was attached to border security force East Pakistan Rifles (EPR), while the Al Badr and Al Shams units contributed another 5,000 militia each.

The strengthening of the groups of armed militias was mostly recruited locally to resist the Mukti Bahini’s onslaught and neutralize the dream to achieve independence of the people in towns and villages.

Al Badr was a secret death squad recruited largely from Islami Chhatra Sangha (later rechristened as Islamic Chhatra Shibir), a youth organization of the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami.

The secret death squad was responsible for enforced disappearances of nationalist supporters, savage torture, and brutal extrajudicial killings of thousands of intellectuals, teachers, and professionals all over the country.

To come out clear from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) -- the anti-terror financing watchdog -- Rawalpindi not only overnight floated TRF, but also the Joint Kashmir Front, Jammu Kashmir Ghaznavi Force, and other such new groups.

Well, the new terror group TRF has created waves in cyberspace streaming from Rawalpindi since October 2019. 

Pakistan’s spy agency ISI’s pandora’s box was exposed, like a chameleon, to secularize terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir by doing away with Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Hizbul Mujahideen, which had gained notoriety, and merging them into one common non-Islamist label to make it look like an indigenous rebel movement with a modern outlook.

The Pakistani deep state’s idea of “bleeding India through a thousand cuts” is being experimented with for the last several decades, even as Islamabad gets little diplomatic or proxy military success in the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which has been relatively peaceful ever since the abrogation of Article 370, concluded an Indian conflict researcher Aditya Raj Kaul.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune, 19 May 2020

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. Twitter @saleemsamad; he can be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com

The nation seeks official list of martyred intellectuals

Postal stamp in memory of martyred intellectuals. (From top left) Dr Harinath Dey, Dr Lt Col A F Z Rahman, Mamum Mahmud, Mohsin Ali Dewan; (from bottom left) Dr Lt Col N A M Jahangir, Shah Abdul Majid, Muhammad Akhter and Meherunnesa. PHOTO: COURTESY

SALEEM SAMAD

To this day the nation does not have a list of intellectuals abducted and murdered by the marauding Pakistan army and their local henchmen who joined in the plunder, genocide, and rape during the brutal birth of Bangladesh in 1971.

Last week Faruq Faisel, son of martyred journalist Mohsin Ali Dewan approached Mohammad Jahangir Hossain, director general of Jatiya Muktijuddho Council (Jamuka) under the Ministry of Liberation War Affairs.

He described that his father was abducted by the Pakistan army accompanied by armed militia, the Razakars, from his home in Bogura on June 3, 1971. He was the editor of weekly Uttar Bongo Bulletin, published from Bogura and was first elected president of Bogura Press Club. He was also principal of Sherpur Degree College and also established Bogura Law College, Shah Sultan College, and Joypurhat College. His body was never found.

Faruq sought the Jamuka chief’s advice regarding formalities to enlist Mohsin Ali Dewan’s name in the official document of martyred intellectuals. He was surprised to hear that the government does not have any policy to list murdered intellectuals.

Faruq Faisel, presently the regional director for Bangladesh and South Asia of international media rights organisation Article 19, was shocked to learn this from the DG of Jamuka. The government has not published a gazette notification regarding the documentation and compilation of a list of intellectuals who were singled out by the Pakistan army and killed.

Earlier, in a statement in the parliament on February 6, 2014, Liberation War Affairs Minister AKM Mozammel Huq informed that a complete list would be published by June 2014. The list has not seen the light of the day.

The intellectuals were abducted, tortured and killed by Pakistan army and their henchmen Al Badr, the secret death squad who were recruited from among the hardcore members of Islami Chhatra Sangha. The student outfit was rechristened as Islami Chhatra Shibir in 1977, with a similar ideology of Islami Chhatra Sangha.

Most of the senior level Al Badr commanders were indicted for crimes against humanity and tried at the International Crimes Tribunal. The tribunal handed down the death penalty to the leaders of Islami Chhatra Sangha held responsible for the death of intellectuals.

Thousands of intellectuals mostly university, college and school teachers, academics, politicians, filmmakers, physicians, poets, writers, journalists, engineers, sportsmen, lawyers, lyricists, singers, eminent personalities who had been deemed threats by the Pakistan army were abducted, tortured and executed.

The Bangladesh Post Office has issued dozens of commemorative stamps valued at Taka 2 in the memory of the martyred intellectuals.

It is widely speculated that the killings of intellectuals were orchestrated by Major General Rao Farman Ali. After the liberation of Bangladesh, a list of Bengali intellectuals (most of whom were executed on December 14) were found in pages of his diary, left behind at the Governor’s House (now Bangabhaban).

Various names of martyrs often appear in the media quoting different sources including Banglapedia, which listed 1,111 martyred intellectuals. Filmmaker Zahir Raihan, after going through General Ali’s diary, documents, and daily newspapers, claimed to have found 20,000 names. Unfortunately, he was abducted and went missing without a trace since January 1972.

The killing of the intellectuals virtually began following the army crackdown in Dhaka on the night of March 25. The Pakistan army during Operation Searchlight targeted victims and killed them systematically.

An initiative was undertaken by the Ministry of Liberation War Affairs to prepare a countrywide list of the Razakars, Al Badrs, Al Shams and other henchmen of Pakistan military, which we highly appreciate.

Besides preparing a complete list of the collaborators of the Pakistan army for crimes against humanity during the birth of Bangladesh, the concerned authorities should have also taken the initiative to document the names of our martyred intellectuals as a national priority.

First published in The Daily Star, 14 December 2019

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellow (USA) and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could reached at <saleemsamad@hotmail.com>; Twitter @saleemsamad

Bangladesh: Failed Coup

AJIT KUMAR SINGH

Bangladesh has taken firm steps to quell violent Islamist extremist groupings operating on and from its soil, but it is clear that these groups have not abandoned their ideology or their objectives, and that they retain significant capacities, though pressure by intelligence and enforcement agencies has pushed them underground. The introduction of the 15th Amendment Bill of the Constitution on June 30,2011, which gives Islam the status of the 'State Religion', may well expand the spaces for radical Islamist politics in the country, legitimizing extremist formations and radical political parties such as the JeI. These are the very forces that have repeatedly jeopardized stability and development in Bangladesh in the past, and the state will have to remain extraordinarily vigilant if they are not to return to prominence in the proximate future.
HuJI-B: Potent Threat, SAIR, August 1, 2011

HuT's radical ideology, the propagation of hatred against 'infidels' and 'deviants', and the flirtation with violence and terrorism hold significant potential dangers within the far from stable South Asian environment.
HuT: Extremist Spectre, SAIR, October 24, 2011

In nearly three years of almost consistently positive news from Bangladesh, the revelation that a coup plot had been foiled by Dhaka has sent shock waves through the region, and underlined the dangers of residual Islamist extremism within the country.

On January 19, 2012, it was disclosed that the Bangladesh Army had discovered and neutralized a plot by some serving and retired Army officers, at the instigation of some Bangladeshi civilians at home and abroad, capitalizing on the sentiments of the Islamist extremists. The conspiracy was intended to overthrow the Awami League (AL) led civilian Government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed.

Revealing the details of the plot, Brigadier General Muhammad Mashud Razzaq, Director of the Personnel Services Directorate, and Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Sazzad Siddique, acting Judge Advocate General of the Army, in a Press briefing on January 19, 2012, circulated a statement saying that “around 14 to 16 mid-level officers were believed to have been involved in the bid”, which came to notice when Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Ehsan Yusuf on December 13, 2011, instigated a serving Major (not named) to join him in executing his plan. The Major revealed the plot through the chain of command. Two retired officers, Ehsan Yusuf and Major Zakir, were arrested. Another plotter, a serving Major, Syed Mohammad Ziaul Haque alias Major Zia, is on the run. Meanwhile, a Court of Inquiry was constituted on December 28, 2011, to unearth further information about the plot.

Though it will take time to unravel all the facts, the revelation that at least two plotters have already admitted their links with the banned Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT, ‘Party of Liberation’) has once again brought focus on Islamist fundamentalist groups that continue to maintain their strong presence in the country’s military establishment. Indeed, on January 8, 2012, HuT had circulated provocative leaflets, based on the fugitive Major Zia's internet message, throughout the country. Zia had sent out two e-mails containing imaginary and highly controversial contents, styled “Mid-level Officers of Bangladesh Army are Bringing down Changes Soon (sic)”. The Bangladesh Security Forces (SFs) on January 20, 2012, arrested another five HuT cadres in connection with the failed coup attempt.

This is the second attempt military revolt by hardliners under the Hasina Government since it came to power after the elections of December 2008. On February 25 and 26, 2009, shortly after the Government took charge, members of the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), since renamed the Bangladesh Border Guards, staged a mutiny against their commanding officers, killing more than 74 persons, including 52 officers, SF personnel and six civilians, including the Director General of the BDR and his wife. The mutineers, backed by the Islamists, wanted to create a rift between the Hasina Government and the military, in order to overthrow the civilian Government. They failed in the face of an effective and concerted response by the military top brass.

Interestingly, Sajeeb Wazed, an Information Technology specialist, political analyst and advisor to Sheikh Hasina, along with Carl Ciovacco, in an article titled 'Stemming the rise of Islamic Extremism in Bangladesh' published in the Harvard International Review on November 19, 2008, had underlined the ‘astronomical growth’ of Islamists in the military, claiming that madrassas (religious seminaries) supplied nearly 35 percent of Army recruits. Indeed, the seminaries in Bangladesh have emerged as the principal medium for fundamentalists to propagate radical ideologies.

The radicalization process has been rooted in Bangladeshi politics since the bloody coup of August 15, 1975, which killed the country’s founding father, Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Sheikh Hasina’s father). The coup leaders used Islam as an instrument to legitimize and secure their power. Succeeding regimes have collaborated with radical and fundamentalist Islamic political organizations. Indeed, the principal political parties, in their efforts to oust the military from power, maintained tactical relationships with fundamentalist political organizations, giving them unbridled power, which radicalised society and the polity to the core. The AL was guilty of such alliances in the past, though, in its current tenure, it has acted with determination and consistency against Islamist extremist elements in the country.

On April 2009, the AL Government blacklisted 12 extremist organisations – Harkat-ul Jihad Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Shahadat-e-al-Hiqma (SAH), Hizbut Touhid, Islami Samaj, Ulema Anjuman al Baiyinaat, HuT, Islamic Democratic Party, Touhid Trust, Tamir-ud-Deen, Alla’r Dal. Four of these 12 groups, including HuJI, SAH, JMJB and JMB, had already been banned during the earlier Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JeI) coalition regime.

Later, on March 25, 2010, the AL Government set up a special tribunal for the trial of "war criminals" of Liberation War of 1971. Five of the Jamaat's top leaders, including its 'chief' Motiur Rahman Nizami and Secretary General Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojahid, were jailed in this connection. Subsequently, on January 11, 2012, former JeI 'chief' Gholam Azam was sent to jail by the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT), which, on January 9, 2012, had accepted formal charges against Azam and present 'chief' Nizami for their alleged involvement in war crimes.

Further, on June 27, 2011, 666 members of the 24th Border Guards Battalion were tried before the BDR Tribunal, a military court. All but nine were found guilty and sentenced to terms ranging from four months to seven years in prison.

In June 2011, the Government passed the Constitution (15th Amendment) Bill, 2011, restoring secularism as a ‘fundamental pillar’ of the Bangladesh Constitution.

An extremist backlash was almost inevitable.

Meanwhile, on January 19, 2012, Prime Minister Hasina accused the "desperate" opposition of "plotting" against her Government. Criticizing the BNP, she declared, "They are desperate to spoil the democratic process. They are threatening the Government to protect the war criminals." It is widely reported that the BNP is vehemently opposing the trial of war criminals to support its ally, JeI, and some of its own leaders. Notably, a former BNP Minister Abdul Alim and a BNP lawmaker Salahuddin Qader Chowdhury, have been accused of war crimes.

Though there is no conclusive report of direct BNP involvement in the attempted coup, some developments raise a finger of suspicion. Indeed, Abdul Hye Sikder (a former leader of the cultural wing of BNP) wrote a provocative article in Amar Desh, a vernacular daily, instigating the anti-Government sentiment of the Islamist forces within and outside the Bangladesh Armed forces. Apparently referring to BNP chairperson Khaleda Zia's remarks at a Chittagong rally on January 9, 2012, that 'even army personnel are being abducted', Brigadier Razzaq, while disclosing details of the coup plot, hinted at possible BNP involvement, stating, "Even a large political party sang along imaginary, misleading and propagandist news to bring allegations, which created unexpected and provocative debate among the Army and conscious citizens."

HuT has been gradually gaining grounds in Bangladesh, and is currently regarded as the strongest anti-state organisation in Bangladesh. Another such group, Hizbut Touhid, established in 1994 at Korotia village in the Tangail District, and led by Bayezid Khan Panni alias Selim Panni, who claims himself to be the Imam-uz-Zaman [Leader of the Age], has also extended its base. The Hizbut Touhid, which aspires to establish the ‘world leadership’ of the Imam-uz-Zaman, declares itself against democracy and democratic institutions, which it regards as ‘rules of evil’.

According to SATP data, the SFs have arrested 213 HuT cadres since March 10, 2000, (till January 22, 2012), out of which 96 have been arrested since the Hasina Government came to power in January 2009. 107 Hizbut Touhid cadres have also been arrested by the current Hasina regime. Nevertheless, these groups, in alliance with the JeI, continue to constitute a major threat for the Hasina Government, though the dangers have, in some measure, been minimised by sustained SF action.

These dangers have not, however, seized to exist, and even a group like the JMB, which was decimated in the aftermath of the serial bombings of August 2005, is reported to be exerting visible efforts to engineer a revival. Quoting Abu Talha Mohammad Fahim aka Bashar, a son of detained JMB chief Saidur Rahman, officials of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) disclosed that the reorganisation attempts under the directives of JMB’s acting 'chief' Sohel Mahfuz, were being intensified.

The failed coup is a reminder that Islamist Forces in the country, while they have weakened, have not been entirely contained. Despite the tremendous gains of the past three years, the threat of an Islamist resurgence, of coup attempts, of terrorism and of engineered political violence, will persist as long as these groupings continue to have a base in the country.

First appeared in SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 10, No. 29, January 23, 2012

Ajit Kumar Singh, a Research Fellow with Institute for Conflict Management, India

Freedom Fighter or Terrorist? The US Can't Decide about Bangladeshi Immigrant Sachin Karmakar

Photo: Willie Davis - Sachin Karmakar’s application for asylum was granted in only 13days. But now the government considers him a terrorist 

Welcome to America, freedom fighter. Now go stuff yourself 

ELIZABETH DWOSKIN 

 IN THE spring of 1971, Sachin Karmakar was a 19-year-old college student who found himself swept up in the short and bloody war that marked the birth of the nation of Bangladesh. Before it could secede from Pakistan, the fledgling nation was subject to a brutal crackdown by the Pakistani army, resulting in the death of 3 million Bangladeshis. The country's Hindu minority was especially vulnerable to attack. Ten million fled to India. Karmakar's father, a Hindu, was among the slain. Karmakar remembers traveling by foot to India on a highway strewn with beheaded and mutilated corpses. Like many other students, he had joined the Mukti Bahini, a pro-independence group whose name translates to "freedom fighters." By the end of the year, India had sent thousands of troops to help, and the People's Republic of Bangladesh was born. In the following decade, Karmakar became a captain in the Bangladeshi national army and a wealthy importer of Australian wheat. He also became well-known in the country as a leading advocate for the nation's religious minorities. In 2001, when radical Islamists came to power in Bangladesh, Karmakar again found himself in danger. Vigilante groups targeted Hindus and Buddhists for rape and murder. Karmakar himself was threatened with death by the local police; his mansion and office were ransacked; and the president of the country eventually declared him to be the equivalent of an enemy of the state. Karmakar was told by the national police chief that if he didn't leave Bangladesh, he'd be jailed. He knew that jail meant torture, even death. Within a week after receiving that warning, Karmakar had moved to Jackson Heights, Queens, leaving behind a wife and daughter. "I'd sooner jump off the Empire State Building than live in another Muslim country," he says. Karmakar's persecution by radical Islamists and his long record of promoting the rights of religious minorities were both so well-documented that his request for political asylum in the United States was approved just 13 days after he applied for it. His case officer, he says, told him it was the fastest approval she'd ever granted. Which helps explain why Karmakar was so shocked when he received a letter in February that informed him that the government intended to deny him a "green card," the permit necessary for him to live and work permanently in the U.S. and to apply for citizenship. The reason? Because he had been a member of Mukti Bahini, an "undesignated terrorist organization," said the letter from an immigration official in Texas. The irony was not lost on Karmakar. The government intended to deny him a green card for having been a freedom fighter, which was part of the reason he was welcomed into this country in the first place. A day after Karmakar received his notice, a similar letter arrived at the Bronx home of an Afghani restaurant owner named Mohammed Rasul. When the Russians invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Rasul was working in his father's clothing shop in Kandahar and getting ready to finish high school. After the invasion, all he remembers is fighting. Homegrown groups of Muslim freedom fighters, called "mujahideen," formed to fight the Russians, whom they saw as illegitimate occupiers. The mujahideen enjoyed widespread support in Afghanistan—and significant financial and military backing from the United States. For years, Rasul recalls, not a day passed that a violent skirmish didn't break out on the street. Rasul says people had no choice: If you didn't join the Soviet army, you could be killed. But if you joined, the mujahideen might kill you. "We were always afraid," says Rasul, now 50. "Anyone who could get out, did." Rasul says he was never a fighter, but when the mujahideen emerged from their hideouts in the hills and came to town, his father would give them clothes, money, and food. In 1985, Rasul came to the U.S., in part with the help of an American policy that aided the immigration of people who had been part of U.S.-backed anti-communist struggles. Two years later, Rasul took over Colony Fried Chicken, a storefront in the South Bronx, from another Afghani. He applied for asylum, but didn't get it until 1998, after the Taliban had come to power in Afghanistan. An immigration officer determined that because Rasul had supported the mujahideen, his life would be in danger in a Taliban-run state. After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. overthrew the Taliban regime and installed a former mujahideen fighter, Hamid Karzai, to lead the country's transitional government. Rasul opened his letter when he got back home after working the 12-hour shift he does six days a week. Like Karmakar, he learned that he was being denied a green card. The reason? His support of the mujahideen, which immigration officers deemed "terrorist activity." Rasul, struggling with English, tries to explain the letter's twisted logic. Before, he had been rewarded for helping the mujahideen. "Now, mujahideen is terrorist?" he asks. "Is Mr. Karzai terrorist?" Karmakar and Rasul weren't alone. In February, a similar case had received national attention: The Washington Post profiled an Iraqi Kurd who had worked as a translator for the U.S. army, was granted a special visa to enter the U.S., but was then denied a green card. And now, more information is surfacing about how many other people are caught in this strange catch-22. In September, the Department of Homeland Security—which oversees Immigration Services—told human rights advocates that about 400 people who had come to the U.S. from places around the world, and had been granted the protection of asylum or refugee status, were now being denied green cards because of information contained in their asylum applications. In other words, these refugees from around the world were being denied green cards based on the same information that had won them asylum to begin with. Many of the refugees had taken up arms against their leaders in U.S.-supported struggles: A Cuban who tried to overthrow the Castro regime was denied a green card for being a member of "a counterrevolutionary group"; others—such as members of the Democratic Unionist Party of Sudan, a partner in U.S. negotiations in the war-torn region—had been persecuted for their involvement in democratic opposition movements to dictatorial regimes; the Montagnards and the Hmong, who had fought for the U.S. during the Cold War, suddenly became terrorists—even though, just two months before, Congress had specifically issued a waiver for these ethnic groups. Some people weren't actually members of any political group at all: An Afghani in Long Island was denied a green card because he had noted on his asylum application, filed more than a decade prior, that he had "scrubbed pots and pans" for the mujahideen. "People's hearts were stopping," says Anwen Hughes, senior counsel for Human Rights First. For days after the round of letters hit mailboxes around the country, she fielded nonstop calls from immigrants and their lawyers. "These are law-abiding people who have been here for years," says Melanie Nezer, an attorney with the refugee-rights group HIAS of America. "These are people we've already put through our procedures and our security clearances, and we decided that they had been persecuted. We gave them asylum and said, 'Welcome to the United States.' And now, our new law calls them terrorists, and we can't figure out how to remove the label." Today, most of the people who received letters earlier this year are still in a kind of legal limbo. They've been put there by a government definition of "terrorism" that is so broad that it conflicts with other U.S. foreign policy priorities and, as a circuit court judge put it in 2006, "sweeps in not only the big guy, but also the little guy who poses no risk to anyone." Ironically, this circuit court judge's decision was cited in Sachin Karmakar's letter, as if someone in Immigration Services knew that what he was doing made little sense, but could do nothing about it. Sachin Karmakar is in his tiny office below an East Village photocopy center. Stacks of Joy Bangla, a weekly newspaper that he started publishing last January, are piled up on the left corner of his desk, as are unopened envelopes containing letters from avid readers. Like many Bangladeshis, the small 57-year-old is a political junkie who reads about a dozen local newspapers each day. Using a print shop owned by ultra-Orthodox Jews, Karmakar distributes about 2,000 copies each week and leaves them in the storefronts and restaurants of Jackson Heights. In addition to the standard rundown of community events and Bangladeshi politics, the pages of Joy Bangla are filled with information about a single topic: the evils of Muslim fundamentalism. Karmakar includes news briefs identifying the connections between senior Bangladeshi politicians and homegrown militant groups. He pens editorials encouraging the residents of Jackson Heights to do things like oppose the OPEC cartel (it funds terrorism) and stand up for the State of Israel (a bastion of democracy in an extremist region). Because of his views on terrorism, he has spoken on a panel sponsored by conservative think tank America's Truth Forum with former CIA director James Woolsey. Karmakar picks up the letter from Homeland Security and repeats the reasons given for his denial: He has "received military training"; he has "fought with the intention to cause death or serious bodily injury to the Pakistani army." He is shocked: Apparently, those were terrorist acts. "I was in a war zone. There was no place to be neutral," he says. "I am being punished for exercising my God-given right to defend myself." And he can't understand why being a member of a group that had disbanded decades ago would disqualify him for a green card now. "For a person who has taken a stand against a barbaric form of fundamentalist Islam, it's a pretty insulting letter to get," he adds. An ardent supporter of America and its institutions, Karmakar was looking forward to getting his green card and starting the process of becoming a citizen. Receiving the letter hasn't dampened his faith in the country, but his first reaction, he admits, was to suspect that somehow Muslim fundamentalists had managed to sabotage the immigration process. He's since changed his mind. "This whole thing is just some mistake," he says. But he doesn't sound entirely sure about it. The U.S. government's definition of "terrorism" has always been broad. In the Immigration Act of 1990, terrorists were considered to be anyone who used a "firearm, explosive, or dangerous device" to "endanger the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property." After the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the Patriot Act and made the definition more complex, dividing terrorist groups into three categories. Tier I and Tier II are well-known terrorist groups, such as the FARC of Columbia, Al Qaeda, or the Taliban. The list of groups is available on a public State Department list. Then, there are the Tier III "undesignated groups," whose names are not listed anywhere. As Tier III is defined, any "two or more individuals . . . whether organized or not" can be considered a terrorist group, and Homeland Security has the right to make decisions about the groups in an ad hoc fashion. (Hughes, the Human Rights First attorney, points out that the definition is so loose that a victim of domestic violence who used a weapon against her attacker could qualify as a terrorist.) As Karmakar and Rasul discovered in February, some DHS officers at service centers in Nebraska and Texas decided that the Bengali Mukti and the mujahideen were Tier III terrorist groups. The Tier III clause is only one part of the Patriot Act that has ended up causing major problems for people fleeing persecution: The law also says that anyone who provided a type of "material support" to a terrorist organization could be labeled a terrorist and be denied admission to the country on those grounds. This includes people who were forced to give support, such as a nurse from Colombia who was denied asylum because she had been kidnapped by paramilitary FARC guerillas who had forced her, at gunpoint, to give medical care to the wounded. In 2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, which made the Patriot Act even stricter: A person can now be deported for giving that kind of support. After protests from human rights groups, Homeland Security decided last December that it would make an exception for people who were extorted by Tier I groups like the FARC (but not the Taliban or Al Qaeda, for some reason). But that leaves out cases like the one of a Sri Lankan man who was kidnapped by the Tamil Tigers and forced to pay a ransom, and who is now tied up in court on the grounds that he gave material support to a known terrorist organization. "If this were really a national security concern, I would understand," Nezer says. "But there's not one person who thinks that any of these people are a threat. Not even [Homeland Security]. If they did, they would be charging and arresting them." Advocates say the piecemeal approach—by which people are charged with terrorism and then, when they protest it, are told that the government will go back and look to see if a mistake was made—is bogging down the entire immigration system. They say the obsession with definitions is having real human consequences: Individuals being persecuted by their governments are barred from entering the country as refugees. And people like Karmakar and Rasul, who haven't seen family members in years, cannot bring them to the U.S. or visit them without hurdles. For the first time since moving to America, Karmakar says he felt his rights were being threatened in a way that reminded him of what happened to him back in Bangladesh. Just over a year ago, a high-level DHS official, Igor Timofeyev, promised Congress that the problems with refugees and asylees would be resolved "in three weeks." "I honestly thought this would take a couple months to iron out," explains Nezer, who started advocating against the broadened definitions of terrorism four years ago. "But it's gotten more and more absurd, and the number of groups just keeps growing." For Ali Riaz, a Bangladeshi expert at Illinois State University, Karmakar's so-called mistake is going to have serious consequences for foreign policy. "If part of the U.S. government is describing what happened in 1971 as a terrorist act, it is going to be a major issue in Bangladesh," he says. "It's practically questioning the very existence of Bangladesh and compromising the relationship with the third-largest Muslim country in the world. If Georgians fought back from Russia, would the U.S. government call it a terrorist act? Because the same thing happened 30 years ago in Bangladesh. If Homeland Security thinks there is no repercussion for this outside the United States, they are living in a fool's paradise." Responding to protests and congressional testimony from human rights organizations, in December 2007, Congress voted to give Homeland Security secretary Michael Chertoff the authority to make exceptions for some groups that were getting caught in the categories. The exceptions were arbitrary: The Hmong and some anti-Castro fighters were included in the July waiver; mujahideen were not. Homeland Security reports that it has issued waivers to around 7,500 people, many of whom only got the waivers after they had already been denied green cards or asylum because of their supposed terrorist activity. Then, in February, DHS sent out a blast of letters to people who were already refugees and asylees. In April, the government agreed to reopen the cases. In July, 10 more groups got exceptions, and the government admitted that the majority of people who got letters would have been eligible for them. In September, advocates met with high-level officials at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, a branch of Homeland Security. Nezer, who was present at the meeting, which was attended by around 20 people, says officials told her the cases were still held up and that there was no foreseeable end in sight. She says that officials in Immigration Services appear to understand the problem, and she suspects that the stalemate is coming directly from higher levels in the refugee policy department of Homeland Security. "We have to make sure that our national security interests are at the forefront of everything we do, but we are committed to keeping our asylum and refugee processing system open for the intended purpose that it was instated, and that our humanitarian concerns and the goodwill of this nation will move forward," says Chris Rhatigan, USCIS spokeswoman. Asked whether these two purposes have ever been at odds, Rhatigan said that wasn't the case, but added that the government must err on the side of caution. When questioned as to whether the government didn't already have the information needed to judge affiliations prior to denying green cards to hundreds of people, Rhatigan explained that the process involves discussions with the State Department. (Partha Mazumdar, a State Department expert on Bangladesh, says that the United States has never considered the Mukti Bahini to be a terrorist organization.) "We're told that making decisions about these groups is a very long and difficult process," Nezer says. "For the Montagnard waiver, they told us, in meeting after meeting, 'This is very complicated.' And then when the waiver comes out, it's a paragraph long." Nezer believes that the problem is much simpler than the government admits and could easily be solved—the new Obama administration could fix things in less than a month, if it wants to. Mohammed Rasul is serving fried chicken to his customers in the South Bronx. They stream in steadily throughout the day—high-schoolers on their lunch break, moms, older folk lounging around the sidewalk. Mostly everyone is African-American. They order from a menu that is displayed along the wall and organized into sections: chicken nuggets, chicken combo, chicken breast, and just chicken. "I used to have a people problem, but now I have a government problem," says Rasul, 50. He serves the chicken in paper boxes with American flag decorations, passing it under a Plexiglas wall that divides the tidy kitchen from the waiting area on the other side of the counter. By "people problem," he's referring to when he first took over the restaurant, when drug dealers would loiter in front of the store and often toss beer bottles into the windows. When the word "Taliban" came into the American vocabulary, people called him that, too. But now, he feels he has won the neighborhood's trust. He knows many customers' orders by heart, and if an order takes too long in the kitchen, he'll usually throw an extra piece of chicken into the box. He belongs to a union and wakes up early to take his kids to a special-education elementary school in Queens. Since he received his letter from Homeland Security, he says, his nerves are shot. "I don't know what's going on with that American government. You're thinking I'm terrorist? Where is your witness, and where is your proof? Is it only because my name is Mohammed and my religion is Muslim? I swear I don't know who is Osama. I heard about him on TV." He sits down for a short break between customers. "I work too hard in this country. I'm tired from my life." Unlike Karmakar, it took Rasul 10 years of working through the immigration system to obtain asylum. Now, it seems as if he is starting all over again. "Who is the big man in America who decided this?" asks Rasul. "Where is he so that he can look at me face-to-face? I want him to look in my heart and tell me that I am a criminal." # First published in Village Voice, November 12, 2008