How Long Can Pakistan Troops Hold In East Pakistan?

SALEEM SAMAD

In a crucial meeting held in Washington DC, on the morning of December 6, 1971, was attended by senior officials of departments of State, Defence, Joint Chief of Staffs, CIA, USAID, and others.

The heavyweight US Secretary for State at the onset of the meeting asked Gen. Westmoreland: What is your military assessment? How long can Pakistan hold out in the east [Bangladesh]?

Gen. Westmoreland candidly said, up to three weeks. Once Pakistan Army runs out of supplies, all the troops in East Pakistan [Bangladesh] will become a hostage.

No doubt sly Kissinger was worried about the safety and security of marauding Pakistan’s troops battling in occupied Bangladesh.

The United States seriously wanted to stick with withdrawal and ceasefire not a humiliating surrender of Pakistan troops and Kissinger assured the Pakistan regime that they doing all the best they can do diplomatically.

The perturbed Kissinger believed that there would be a massacre of the disarmed troops in the hands of the Mukti Bahini (Bangladesh Liberation Forces) after enemy soldiers are disarmed.

Three days after a full-scale war between India-Pakistan on the eastern front and Bangladesh-India jointly against Pakistan in the eastern war theatre, Henry Kissinger asked how long Pakistan troops can hold in Bangladesh.

The officials discussed whether there were any possibilities of Pakistan troop evacuation. Gen. Westmoreland responded in negative.

A senior official of the State Department asked Gen. Westmoreland that assuming the Indians take over Bangladesh, how do you think it will happen.

Gen. Westmoreland: I think their primary thrust will be to cut off the seaport of Chittagong. This will virtually cut off any possibility of resupply. Then they will move to destroy Pakistan’s regular forces, in cooperation with the Mukti Bahini. They will then be faced with the major job of restoring some order to the country. I think there will be a revenge massacre — possibly the greatest in the twentieth century.

Kissinger asked shall the Indians withdraw their army once the Pakistan forces were disarmed.

Gen. Westmoreland replied that he thinks they [Indians] will leave three or four divisions to work with the Mukti Bahini and pull the remainder back to the West [Pakistan].

The officials expect that the Indians will pull out as quickly as they can. Once the Pakistan forces are disarmed, the Indians will have a friendly population. They can afford to move back to the border areas quickly.

Another official in the nerve-breaking meeting predicted that after the Indian Army has been in Bangladesh for two or three weeks, they will be accepted as a “Hindu army of occupation”.

Kissinger asked: What will India do with Bangladesh? Will they see it as an independent state or have them negotiate with Islamabad?

An official responded that India has already recognised Bangladesh as an independent country. Kissinger said then there is no hope for Pakistan to negotiate with Bangladesh.

The objective of the prudent Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s government was to force a surrender of the Pakistani troops in Bangladesh within 10 days.

In a telegram from New Delhi on December 6, US Ambassador Kenneth Barnard Keating reported that Indian Foreign Secretary Triloki Nath Kaul had expressed “disappointment, shock and surprise” that the United States had tabled the resolution it did in the UNSC.

On December 5 the Soviet representative on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) vetoed an eight-power draft resolution that called for a ceasefire and mutual withdrawal of forces, as well as intensified efforts to create the conditions necessary for the return of refugees to their homes.

However, the UN Security Council accepted on December 6 that an impasse had been reached in its deliberations on the conflict in South Asia, and referred the issue to the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 11 to 0 with 4 abstentions.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s General Yahya Khan’s administration conveyed their intentions to retreat from their eastern wing to the United Nations on 10 December 1971, and a formal surrender was submitted and accepted when the Commander of Eastern Command and Governor of East Pakistan, General Niazi, signed an instrument of surrender with his counterpart, Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, Commander of Eastern Command.

An estimated 93,000 Pakistan troops and civilians including family members made an unconditional public surrender in Dhaka on December 16, 1971, which is observed each year as Victory Day both in Bangladesh and by Indian armed forces.

The surrender was indeed the largest surrender that the world had witnessed since the end of the Second World War.

Conclusion: Despite the growing anger among the Mukti Bahini commanders to avenge the extreme barbarity unleashed by Pakistan troops, fortunately, none of the disarmed enemy troops was killed or died for being held captive in military garrisons inside Bangladesh.

Soon after the Prisoners of War (POWs) were transferred to India, as newly born Bangladesh did not have the ability to the containment of such a huge number of POWs.

Under Tripartite Agreement in April 1974 between Bangladesh, India and Pakistan signed in New Delhi enabled the repatriation of all the 79,676 uniformed POWs and 13,324 civilians to Pakistan, including the 195 officers held for suspected war crimes.

First published in The News Times, December 16, 2022

Saleem Samad, is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at <saleemsamad@hotmail.com>; Twitter @saleemsamad

Why the idea of a unified struggle with Pakistan’s exiled political leaders failed in 1971

SALEEM SAMAD

In December 1971, when the Mukti Bahini guerrillas and the Indian army captured large chunks of occupied Bangladesh, the government-in-exile in Kolkata and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi were having sleepless nights.

At the fag-end of the Liberation War, a senior leader -- Abdus Samad Azad -- took charge of the ministry of foreign affairs from Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad.

In London on December 16, 1971, the Bangladesh foreign minister organized a top-secret meeting of exiled political leaders from Sindh, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North-West Frontier Province -- NWFP) in Pakistan. Azad was not sure what the outcome of the secret meeting would be. The Pakistani leaders were living in exile to escape the wrath of the military junta in the Rawalpindi military headquarters.

The victims were mostly politicians of ethnic sub-nationalities from the minority provinces in Pakistan, and progressive left intellectuals who dared to raise their voices in favour of handing over power to the Awami League, the unconditional release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the safe return of refugees from India, and the withdrawal of troops from the eastern front.

Tajuddin Ahmed, prime minister of the provisional government, in conjunction with South Block in New Delhi envisaged opening a crucial dialogue with Pakistan’s exiled political leaders in London. Among the attendees was Khan Abdul Wali Khan (leader of the socialist National Awami Party of the NWFP, an iconic Pashtun leader, and an able son of “Frontier Gandhi” Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan).

All of the progressive leaders of Pakistan were fortunately close allies of Sheikh Mujib and had lent him their political support, which raised alarm bells among military hawks in Rawalpindi.

The agenda of the meeting was sensitive. The leaders expressed their solidarity with the creation of independent Bangladesh and were worried about the safety of Sheikh Mujib. Azad did not hesitate to spell out the exiled government’s plan. He carefully laid down whether there was any possibility to forge a joint front for armed rebellion among the ethnic sub-national people in Pakistan to break away from Pakistan and become sovereign independent nation-states, as Bangladesh had showcased.

The Bangladesh leader in his submission said the Indian army had reached the gates of Lahore and it was an opportune moment to strike. He said confidently that Bangladesh would provide logistics from friendly countries to wage armed struggles and extend political, diplomatic, and military support for a unified movement.

The ethnic leaders at the Charing Cross meeting could not believe that Bangladesh leadership would offer such a radical proposal. They doubted whether Bangladesh could provide political and military support to the ethnic armed struggles already happening in Balochistan and NWFP.

The curious leaders asked Azad about India’s mindset to back the movements of the Sindhi, Baloch, and Pashtuns. Azad quickly assured them that India’s political support could be mustered, citing India’s help for Bangladesh’s Liberation Movement. He said the Awami League leadership was willing to talk to New Delhi to secure India’s support, on the condition that the leaders would have to commit to democracy, secularism, and pluralism, and reject Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s two-nation theory.

However, the exiled leaders Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, and Khair Baksh Marri said the proposal was too little, too late. While the meeting was in progress, news broke in the British media that 93,000 Pakistan troops and civilian officers had unconditionally surrendered in Dhaka.

Several historians conclude that it was obvious the dialogue failed because the secret plan was made in haste with a poor vision and no timeline.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune 18 May 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad

Securing Bangabandhu’s return

Bangabandhu Sheikh  Mujibur Rahman with Indian diplomat Sashanka S Banerjee onboard special flight from London to Dhaka via New Delhi

SALEEM SAMAD

A few days after the Pakistan forces’ humiliating defeat in the Eastern War Theatre and the surrender of occupation troops at Dhaka on December 16, 1971, Bangladesh’s government-in-exile, as well as the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, were left worried about Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman languishing in Mianwali Jail in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s would-be president, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was in New York attending heated UN Security Council meetings, had to air dash to Rawalpindi after he was informed by General Yahya Khan that he had resigned from his office as president of Pakistan and military commander.

Bhutto had been appointed the chief martial law administrator of Pakistan.

Indira Gandhi received a top-secret message that the Rawalpindi flight carrying Bhutto was scheduled for a stopover at Heathrow Airport in London. The Indian PM hurriedly called a meeting of the war cabinet in New Delhi at her South Block office to discuss Bhutto’s journey home. She wanted a reliable point-person who would be present for Bhutto’s arrival at Heathrow, so she could get an intelligence feed.

India desperately wanted to learn what Bhutto was thinking -- whether he would release Rahman and let him return home, or carry out the Pakistan military court’s verdict of death.

The meeting was attended by Durga Prasad Dhar, head of policy planning in the Ministry of External Affairs; Ram Nath Kao, chief of RAW; PN Haksar, the prime minister’s principal secretary; and TN Kaul, the foreign secretary. 

A plan was drawn, with no guarantee of acquiring the vital intelligence of the fate of Sheikh Mujib. Incidentally, a highest ranked Pakistan bureaucrat, Muzaffar Hussain, former chief secretary of the government of East Pakistan and posted in Dhaka, had become a prisoner of war (POW) along with 93,000 military, other combatants, civil officers, and families.

Hussain was staying as a VIP guest at the official residence of DP Dhar. On the other hand, his wife, Laila Hussain, was visiting London when the war broke out in December and remained stranded. Both husband (in Delhi) and wife (in London) were communicating with each other through diplomatic channels. 

Fortunately, Sashanka S Banerjee, an Indian diplomat in the Indian mission in London, had befriended Laila Hussain. Indira knew that Laila and Bhutto had been good friends. Thus, the South Block decided to play a one-off diplomatic “summit” at the VIP lounge, the Alcock and Brown Suite, at Heathrow airport. Banerjee persuaded Laila to meet Bhutto at the airport lounge and ask him if he could help in getting her husband released from Delhi.

The two friends, Laila and Bhutto, met at Heathrow airport. The meet and greet turned out to be a historic diplomatic thriller. Bhutto responded to Laila’s emotional appeal for help in getting her husband released from Indian custody. He pulled her aside and whispered to Laila a very sensitive, top-secret message for the Indian prime minister, writes Banerjee in his memoir.

“Laila, I know what you want. I can imagine you are [carrying a request] from Mrs Indira Gandhi. Do please pass a message to her, that after I take charge of office back home, I will shortly thereafter release Mujibur Rahman, allowing him to return home. What I want in return, I will let Mrs Indira Gandhi know through another channel. You may now go.”

The Indian High Commission in London urgently shot out a priority message to the South Block, based on Laila’s encounter with Bhutto. Indira Gandhi was excited that Bhutto had sent out a positive message. 

Meanwhile, within hours, a diplomatic message came from Islamabad confirming the authenticity of Laila’s report.

Bangladesh leaders received a secret message from the South Block regarding the release of Sheikh Mujib -- the architect of Bangladesh’s independence would first land in London and then fly from there to Dhaka via Delhi. 

Bhutto dared to over-rule the death sentence handed out by a military court in Rawalpindi and released Mujib on January 8, 1972. On January 10, 1972, Mujib returned as a hero to a war-ravaged homeland -- but an independent Bangladesh.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune, 11 May 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad

How Indira Gandhi’s principal secretary PN Haksar had aided the liberation effort in 1971

SALEEM SAMAD

The genocidal campaign “Operation Searchlight” raged in occupied Bangladesh. The marauding Pakistan Army began to feel the pinch in their boots when they battled the Mukti Bahini resistance in several regions bordering India.

On the other hand, the beleaguered Awami League leaders who took sanctuary in India spent restless nights planning the pros and cons of diplomatic protocols to announce the “government-in-exile” in Kolkata and its strategies to augment the military role of the Mukti Bahini in the Liberation War.

A career bureaucrat and diplomat, Parmeshwar Narayan Haksar -- principal secretary to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi -- had already gotten the ball rolling on Bangladesh on March 2, 1971.

Prof Amartya Sen (who won Nobel Prize 27 years later) phoned PN Haksar and introduced his two friends Prof Rehman Sobhan and Dr Anisur Rahman, who were sheltered in his house. Veteran economist and academician Prof Rehman Sobhan and Dr Anisur Rahman were the first people who had escaped from Dhaka to meet Haksar in Delhi.

On the evening of April 2, Sobhan and Rahman were taken to Haksar’s residence. 

Haksar was fully briefed by the duo regarding the dream of independent Bangladesh. The logical approach to the Bangladesh struggle helped Haksar debrief Indira Gandhi.

In fact, from that evening, India’s secret role in the Bangladesh Liberation War began its journey. Haksar played a pivotal role throughout 1971, orchestrating and managing India’s response to the crisis in Bangladesh.

Sobhan himself has written that Haksar’s reactions suggested that the encounter he had with them “was [Haksar’s] first such exposure to these events of the genocidal crackdown on the Awami League, the nationalists, and the Hindus by the Pakistani army and the launch of Operation Searchlight.”

Haksar was also introduced to Tajuddin Ahmad, general secretary of Awami League, and Barrister Amirul Islam when they called on Indira Gandhi. 

On principle, the Indian prime minister agreed with the Bangladesh government-in-exile, to provide shelter for the millions of refugees who had poured into India, and also to provide military help to the Mukti Bahini.

A fortnight later, on April 17, Sobhan wrote that Tajuddin Ahmad was sworn in as the prime minister of an independent Bangladesh “at a mango grove near Kushtia…which is now known as Mujibnagar.” Tajuddin, this time as the prime minister of the exiled government, again had parleys with Indira on the night of May 6.

Haksar had urged Indira to be firm and say that India’s response to what was happening in Bangladesh should not become a subject of public debate as “such a debate would defeat the purpose of giving such comfort as we can to democratic forces in Pakistan as a whole.”

Delhi planned that the main characteristics of the war would be guerrilla tactics, with the objective of continuously keeping the Pakistan army off their balance and gradually bleeding them.

Finally, the Pakistan military surrendered in Dhaka on December 16, 1971 after a humiliating defeat in the eastern war theatre.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune on 4 May 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad

https://www.dhakatribune.com/opinion/op-ed/2021/05/04/op-ed-an-ally-for-bangladesh

Mujibnagar: An oath in secrecy

Syed Zakir Hossain/Dhaka Tribune

SALEEM SAMAD

At Kolkata Press Club on April 16, 1971, two nondescript Bangladesh officials kept journalists waiting for hours. Finally, the officials arrived in the evening and expressed an apology for being late.

Abdul Mannan, an MNA (later the first home minister of Bangladesh in 1972) remained silent, while Barrister Rahmat Ali, without waiting for an introduction, told the crowded journalists that they are requested, including the foreign press representatives, to return to the press club for an important announcement the following morning.

The following morning, Kolkata Press Club was overcrowded with local and foreign journalists accompanied by a battery of camerapersons and press photographers.

Ali announced: “Gentlemen, on behalf of the government of Bangladesh, I invite you to our country,” which jolted the journalists as the Liberation War history was unfolding.

The rally of cars carrying journalists did not know where they were going, whom they would meet, and what they would witness. Everybody was worried about what kind of dispatch they would send to their newsroom. When the vehicles stopped at a mango orchard in Meherpur, inside Bangladesh, the Kolkata journalists quickly dubbed the place as Mujibnagar.

Of course, India and the entire world was taken by surprise that Bangladesh formally announced the “Proclamation of Bangladesh Independence” and the formation of a government-in-exile to coordinate the Liberation War.

What surprised many, was that among the Kolkata media circle, none leaked the story of the secret endeavour of the Mujibnagar episode. The thoughtful journalists maintained secrecy to avoid the enemies being alerted from a single line published in an Indian newspaper.

Journalist Sukharanjan Sengupta saw a vehicle with a diplomatic number plate entering the porch on March 22. 

The curious journalist rushed towards the office of Chief Secretary Nirmal Sengupta and waited for the person to come out.

The person was nobody else but the deputy high commissioner posted in Dhaka during the crucial period. Time was ticking for Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman as New Delhi was impatiently waiting to see what emerges from the negotiation in Dhaka.

Fortunately, the journalist knew the diplomat and quickly asked whether the negotiation to resolve the political crisis will go in the favour of Sheikh Mujib or will there be a bloodbath.

The diplomat was in a rush. He frowned and said the second one and was then escorted to the Kolkata airport and to New Delhi to hold a confidential debriefing on the Bangladesh crisis with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

On March 23, the Republic Day of Pakistan, the “Joy Bangla” flag was fluttered all over the country, except for the military cantonments and a few government offices in Dhaka.

On March 25, Bangabandhu was still negotiating with the advisors of Pakistan’s military leader General Yahya Khan to avoid a bloodbath in the streets. 

However, near midnight on March 25, the Pakistan army launched the genocidal campaign “Operation Searchlight,” leaving Bangladesh no choice but to go to war.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune, 27 April 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad

Bangabandhu in Mianwali Jail

Bangabandhu was arrested and then was taken to West Pakistan shortly 
before the start of Operation Search Light on 25 March, 1971. File Photo

SALEEM SAMAD

Mohanlal Bhaskar alias Mohammed Aslam's undercover identity was blown by a double agent. He was caught and imprisoned in Pakistan from 1967 to 1974.

He and dozens of fellow Indian spies were swapped with Pakistani spies soon after the ice-breaking Simla Accord signed by Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in July 1972.

Bhaskar's mission was to gather intelligence on Pakistan's nuclear programme. He witnessed the India-Pakistan war in December 1971 from his cell in Mianwali jail as history unfolded when Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was brought there and had his grave dug, at least four times, and then quickly refilled.

Possibly the book, 'An Indian Spy in Pakistan', written by Mohanlal Bhaskar in Hindi and translated by Jai Ratan, is the only eyewitness narrative on Bangladesh's independence leader Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman which unfolded in Mianwali Jail.

He exhaustively writes two separate chapters. One on 'Turmoil in Bangladesh' and another on 'Sheikh Mujib in Mianwali Jail'.

"According to the news that had reached us, Sheikh Mujib was supposed to be in the Lyallpur Jail. The winter had just started. A helicopter landed one night in our jail compound. We couldn't see who had got down from it, for our cells were locked at that time. In the morning we [learned] that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had been brought to Mianwali […] the Lyallpur Jail."

It is presumed Mujib was brought to Mianwali Jail in early September 1971, according to Bhaskar. Sadly, the Indian spy, for reasons unknown, did not mention any date behind the events he has mentioned.

As soon as Sheikh Mujib's arrival was confirmed by prisoners, some soldiers of the East Bengal Regiment planned to dig a tunnel in the jail to smuggle him away from there, according to Bhaskar.

The attempt proved abortive as Mujib was lodged in the female ward of Mianwali Jail. The female inmates had hurriedly been shifted to another barracks.

The Indian prisoners were also shifted to barrack number 10 and the female ward was right behind their barracks.

Unfortunately, neither the Bangalee soldiers nor the Indian spies could have a glimpse of the stalwart politician. He was kept under heavy military guard.

Well, a Bangalee cook had been deployed to cook Mujib's preferred menu – fish and rice.

The following morning, when news of the Sheikh's arrival spread in the jail the Pathan prisoners climbed up the roof of the jail barracks and shouted expletives at the Sheikh. 

Armed guards quickly climbed onto the roof of the female ward and fired six rounds in the air, which terrified the Pathans. 

The Jail Superintendent on a routine round of the barracks informed the prisoners that Mujibur Rahman had been brought to Mianwali Jail to be hanged.

This news triggered sadness among the Indian and Bengal Regiment prisoners but caused a ripple of happiness among Pakistani prisoners and they cried 'Ya Ali!'.

Bhaskar recalls that, unfortunately, he could not meet the "great hero, known as the Lion of Bengal who had awakened the hungry and oppressed people of East Bengal...".

Whenever the Indian prisoners went to collect food rations, they met Mujib's cook but could not have a word with him as he was escorted by military guards.His cook was very devoted to him.

The ration clerk would ask the cook, "How's he faring?" The defiant cook would reply that Sheikh Shaheb was in fine health and with a sound mind and would keep fighting for the rights of the Bangalees till his last breath.

One day, the deputy superintendent called the eight Indian prisoners languishing in condemned cells.

He notes: "We were marched out and halted in front of the female ward where Sheikh Mujib was imprisoned. We were not told what was required of us nor did we care to find out. We were happy in the thought that we may yet be able to have a fleeting glimpse of the Sheikh. But to our chagrin, even the wooden gate leading to his barred cell had been closed."

The senior jail officer ordered them to dig an eight feet long, four feet wide and four feet deep trench and specified the exact spot where the trench was to be dug.

"We immediately guessed that Sheikh Mujib was scheduled to be hanged that night and we were digging a grave to bury his dead body. Short of asking a question which we were reluctant to do, we had no way of confirming our suspicion," he writes.

The grave was ready by nine and the prisoners returned to their cells. They waited with bated breath for the ominous news of Mujib's execution. "Our ears were all along attuned to the "house of death' but nothing happened throughout the night; everything was so quiet and still."

Bhaskar realised that the decision to hang Bangabandhu had been deferred. In the morning when the cells were unlocked, they heard some people saying that Sheikh Mujib was still alive.

There were also rumours that poison had been injected into his body, putting him to eternal sleep, after which he had been buried in the grave dug the previous evening.

In the morning when the Indian prisoners went to the ration godown for collecting their quota, they saw Sheikh Mujib's cook waiting there to get milk, tea and sugar for his morning tea.

It was indeed a relief for them, for "it meant that he was still alive."

They heard a rumour that on the night scheduled for the Sheikh's execution Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had sought an audience with President Yahya Khan and had advised him not to execute him. 

He [Bhutto] impressed upon the President that if he [Mujib] was executed the Bangalees in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) would not sit idle. The Pakistani forces stationed in East Pakistan right from the highest officer down to a soldier would become the target of the wrath of the Bangalee guerrillas. Yahya Khan on second thought decided to halt Mujib's execution.

The next day, the prisoners were again called out and asked to fill in the trench dug the previous day. "But our happiness was short-lived."

Fifteen days later, they were again called out and asked to dig a similar trench. Again, Sheikh Mujib was not hanged. This process was repeated three times and every time his hanging was deferred.

For the fourth time, Sheikh Mujib was saved from walking to the gallows. In this manner, Sheikh Mujib stayed for four months in the Mianwali Jail.

Finally, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in early January released Bangabandhu, who was to return in triumph to Bangladesh.

Even now, the days of Sheikh Mujib in Mianwali Jail remains a nightmare. Time and again they [the Pakistan authorities] would prepare the noose for his neck and dig a grave. But he did not die at the hands of his enemies.

Regrettably, he died at the hands of his "own people whom he called his children." Nobody could believe that the same people for whom he had made such huge sacrifices and suffered imprisonment and political harassment would assassinate him," laments Bhaskar.

First published in The Business Standard, 17 March 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He can be reached at <saleemsamad@hotmail.com>; Twitter @saleemsamad

Indo-Soviet Treaty turning point for Bangladesh independence

Assessing the impact of the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 on Bangladesh’s independence

SALEEM SAMAD

As Bangladesh celebrates its 50th anniversary on March 26th, the historic Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed on August 9, 1971, had a direct impact on the decisive battle in the eastern war theatre.

The treaty expedited the Bangladesh War of Independence and brought about the surrender of 93,000 Pakistan forces on December 16, 1971.

In the annals of diplomacy, the Indo-Soviet Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was a unique document that not only epitomized the special relationship between India and former Soviet Union, but also acted as a guarantor of regional peace.

The treaty was a significant deviation from India’s previous position of non-alignment in the Cold War and the prelude to the Bangladesh war, and it was a key development in a situation of increasing China-American ties and American pressure.

The Indo-Soviet treaty was later adopted as the India-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972.

As the struggle for independence in Bangladesh gathered momentum in 1971, months after holding general elections in Pakistan, and the US hegemony attempted to subvert it, the treaty restrained the evil design of Pakistan and its allies.

Following the first-ever free, fair, and credible elections in Pakistan in 1970, Pakistan’s head of state, General Yahya Khan, was utterly dissatisfied with the large victory of the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

The marauding Pakistan military unleashed a reign of terror under “Operation Searchlight” at midnight on March 25, committing genocide with the intent to cleanse the land of Bangali and Hindu populations, who were deemed as enemies of Pakistan and Islam.

Pakistan’s General Yahya Khan had said that “if India made any attempt to seize any part of East Pakistan, he would declare war and Pakistan would not be alone.”

Well, Kissinger’s surprise visit to Beijing in July 1971 was indeed a morale boost for Pakistan. On the other hand, it was frustrating for India as it felt diplomatically humbled and strategically isolated.

India could see the US-China-Pakistan axis as an emerging threat to regional geopolitical interests. China committed unqualified support to its “all-weather” friend Pakistan against India to stop interference in the domestic affairs of Pakistan.

During the parley between Kissinger and China’s Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, Beijing indicated that if war breaks out between India and Pakistan over Bangladesh, China would make military intervention against India on behalf of Islamabad.

The US sympathized with Pakistan for obvious reasons. The US believed a victory for India would be considered as an expansion of Soviet hegemony in South Asia. In this backdrop, Delhi and Moscow moved closer to ink the historic treaty to neutralize the emerging Washington-Beijing–Islamabad axis and defend their vital geopolitical interests.

In an editorial, Pravda, a leading Soviet national daily, underlined the significance of the treaty, saying the treaty had effectively “restrained” Pakistan and its allies from embarking on a course of “military adventurism” in the sub-continent and would continue to act as a “deterrent” against such hegemonic goals. The treaty also signalled a clear warning to China’s hegemonistic ambitions in the continent.

Following the rising struggle for independence in erstwhile East Pakistan and the influx of millions of refugees from there to India, the possibility of war between New Delhi and Islamabad was looming large in Asia.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune, 16 March 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of Ashoka Fellow (USA) and Hellman-Hammett Award. Email saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad

"How long can Pakistan hold out in the east (Bangladesh)”

SALEEM SAMAD

A conversation between Henry Kissinger and General Westmoreland about the birth of Bangladesh

Three days after a full-scale war between India and Pakistan in the eastern frontier and Bangladesh-India jointly against Pakistan in the eastern theatre, Henry Kissinger asked how long could the Pakistan troops hold in Bangladesh.

The meeting held in Washington DC, in the morning of December 6, 1971, was attended by senior officials of departments of state, defence, joint chief of staffs, CIA, USAID, and others.

US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, at the onset of the meeting asked Gen Westmoreland: “What is your military assessment? How long can Pakistan hold out in the east” (Bangladesh war zone)?

Gen Westmoreland candidly said up to three weeks. Once the Pakistan Army runs out of supplies, all the troops in East Pakistan [Bangladesh] will become hostage. The officials discussed whether there were any possibilities of Pakistan troop's evacuation. Gen Westmoreland responded in negative.

A senior official of the State Department asked Gen Westmoreland that assuming the Indians took over Bangladesh, how did he think it would happen?

Gen Westmoreland replied, “I think their primary thrust will be to cut off the seaport of Chittagong. This will virtually cut off any possibility of resupply. Then they will move to destroy the Pakistan regular forces, in cooperation with the Mukti Bahini. They will then be faced with the major job of restoring some order to the country. I think there will be a revenge massacre — possibly the greatest in the twentieth century.”

Kissinger asked whether the Indians would withdraw their army once the Pakistan forces were disarmed.

Gen Westmoreland replied that he thought they [Indian] would leave three or four divisions to work with the Mukti Bahini, and pull the remainder back to the West.

The officials expected that the Indians would pull out as quickly as they could. Once the Pakistan forces were disarmed, the Indians would have a friendly population. They could afford to move back to the border areas quickly.

Another official predicted that after the Indian Army had been in Bangladesh for two or three weeks, they would be accepted as a “Hindu army of occupation.”

Kissinger asked: “What will India do with Bangladesh? Will they see it as an independent state or have them negotiate with Islamabad?”

An official responded that India had already recognized Bangladesh as an independent country. Kissinger said then that there was no hope for Pakistan to negotiate with Bangladesh. The objective of the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s government was to force a surrender of the Pakistani troops in Bangladesh within 10 days.

In a telegram from New Delhi on December 6, US Ambassador Kenneth Barnard Keating reported that Indian Foreign Secretary Triloki Nath Kaul had expressed “disappointment, shock and surprise” that the United States had tabled the resolution it did in the UNSC.

On December 5, the Soviet representative on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) vetoed an eight-power draft resolution that called for a ceasefire and mutual withdrawal of forces, as well as intensified efforts to create the conditions necessary for the return of refugees to their homes.

The United States sriously wanted to stick with withdrawal and ceasefire, not a surrender of Pakistan troops. Kissinger assured the Pakistan regime that they were doing the best they could do diplomatically.

The resolution, which was tabled by Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua, Sierra-Leone, and Somalia, garnered a vote of 11 to 2 with 2 abstentions but was not adopted because of the negative vote of the Soviet Union (USSR). However, the UN Security Council accepted on December 6 that an impasse had been reached in its deliberations on the conflict in South Asia, and referred the issue to the General Assembly.

An estimated 93,000 Pakistan troops and civilians made an unconditional public surrender in Dhaka on December 16, 1971, which is observed as Victory Day each year.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune, 22 December 2020

Saleem Samad, is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at <saleemsamad@hotmail.com>; Twitter @saleemsamad

After Bangladesh, next Balochistan

The Baloch population has become a minority in its own homeland

SALEEM SAMAD

Akbar Shahbaz Khan Bugti or Nawab Bugti, a defiant Baloch nationalist, was murdered by the Pakistan Army on orders of Pakistan’s President General Pervez Musharraf. Nawab Bugti, born in 1927, chieftain of the rebellious Bugti tribe, was the tallest Baloch leader who was the federal minister, governor, and chief minister of Balochistan.

Armed militants of the Marri and Bugti tribes, the fiercest tribes, waged armed struggles and politically challenged the forcible inclusion of the resource-rich province into Pakistan in March 1948.

Nawab Bugti was assassinated in a military raid ordered by General Musharraf. In a fierce battle with militants, Bugti’s fortified cave in Bhamboor hills fell after the helicopter gunship fired missiles into the cave. Bugti and 35 of his compatriots were martyred on August 26, 2006.

Musharraf was charged by an anti-terrorism court and then acquitted by a Pakistan court in Bugti’s assassination. His death sparked a countrywide anti-Pakistan protest by Baloch students and youths. Police had to quell ethnic riots in different cities and towns.

Balochistan is a region mostly populated by ethnic Balochs, as well as Pakhtuns or Pashtuns. It is the least populated region, and also the largest province of Pakistan. For decades, disgruntled Balochis have been protesting the forcible conversion of the Baloch population into a minority in their own homeland.

Since the death of Bugti, the restive Balochistan has experienced appalling human rights abuse. Anytime someone speaks up, protests, or writes on the rights abuses in Balochistan, the next day a dead body is dumped to warn of the consequences of challenging the state. Journalists who have published about Balochistan’s issues faced violent backlash from the state security apparatus.

The United Nations, International Court of Justice, and human rights organizations may not be able to fathom the plight of the families of the missing persons. Baloch mothers, sisters, widows, and their children are suffering from severe spiritual and mental distress.

Military regimes in Pakistan envisaged eradicating ethnic identities by changing provincial demographics and pursuing Islamization, or the substitution of a common Muslim identity for ethnic ones.

At the end of the 1970s, Balochistan became one of the two focal points of the dictator’s Islamization strategy (the other being the North-West Frontier Province, now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa).

The period between the end of the Bhutto regime and the military coup of Pervez Musharraf witnessed major developments in the Balochistan policy. Zia-ul-Haq used Islamization as a weapon against the insurgency in Balochistan, said Frederic Grare in his research publication Balochistan: The State Versus the Nation.

In 1970, when Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was on a whirlwind tour for the election campaign in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta -- he was given a tumultuous welcome, said Zahirul Islam Khan Panna.

Z I Khan Panna, a leading human rights lawyer, was a law student at Karachi University and was hand-picked by Bangabandhu to be his fixer for the election campaign in Pakistan.

Panna met Nawab Bugti in Karachi in June 1970, and handed over an English copy of the Six-Point program, as desired by Sheikh Mujib. Bugti was indeed a great admirer of Mujib and told his Baloch nationalist leaders that the Six-Point was a Bible to resolve the longstanding deprivation and political neglect of Balochistan.

Sher Mohammad Bugti, spokesperson of the Baloch Republican Party (BRP) spoke from Geneva, where he and BRP’s key leaders are living in exile. He lamented that the “Balochistan atrocity is worse than Bangladesh” in 1971, which was perpetrated by marauding Pakistan military.

Baloch nationalists are fighting two fronts, he said. One is Pakistan and the second is China. The Chinese Communist Party is singing the same tune as Pakistan on the Baloch issue on the mega Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Gwadar Port, which is located in Balochistan.

Bugti’s party senior leaders urged Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to support their cause and help bifurcate Balochistan from the deep state hawks of Pakistan -- like Indira Gandhi helped Bangladesh in 1971.

Brahamdagh Bugti, the grandson of the slain Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti is presently the president of BRP. He rejected the possibility of holding any negotiations with Pakistan authorities, suggesting an internationally supervised referendum in Balochistan to bury the crisis once and for all.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune on 7 September 2020

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of the Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He can be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad

Should China apologize to Bangladesh?

SALEEM SAMAD

Chinese wolf-warrior diplomacy was on the lookout for ‘friends’ in South Asia to create political pressure on India. China brought together their all-weather friend Pakistan, new ally Nepal, debt-trap Sri Lanka under its folds, except Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Bhutan.

China seems desperate to take diplomatic and economic ties with Bangladesh to a new height.

Since 1991 after a democratic government took power the China-Bangladesh relationship was intertwined for the partnership for economic development.

The new pro-Islamist regime of Khaleda Zia reached out to China to shrug off Indian influence which was an extended strategic gain for both countries.

China and Pakistan was the major military hardware supplier to Bangladesh military forces, which was also needed for United Nations Peacekeeping operations. The weighing scale plummeted under the growing influence of the China-Pakistan axis and penetrated deep into politics, bureaucracy, and economic development of the country.

In subsequent years, China emerged as the major economic partner in mega infrastructure development in Bangladesh and the cheering politicians began to beat their chest like King Kong.

Sheikh Hasina, a woman prime minister for successive fourth term has told her government officials that Bangladesh will give second-thought regarding multi-billion dollar development projects with China.

The world media reports have caught the attention of the Bangladesh leaders regarding several third-world countries were caught in debt-trap in South Asia, Africa, and the Pacific Ocean Islands. What happened was the country’s national exchequer failed to repay the huge loan invested in mega projects. China in a bid to salvage the debt-trap government took a 99-years lease of maritime ports and other facilities. End of the story!

Not very long Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of assassinated Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh has reassured the Indian journalists that India is an ‘organic’ friend of Bangladesh and have jointly shed blood during the brutal independence in 1971.

She also said that China is a development partner and there is no conflict of interest. In 1971, the marauding Pakistan troops in eastern war theatre in desperate attempted to keep the two wings of Pakistan united. Pakistan troops and their Islamic militia continued to commit genocide and rape as a weapon of war.

Pakistan troops were in a quagmire. In the monsoon rain in floodplain delta coupled with Mukti Bahini guerilla’s hit and run operations gave the soldiers a hard time. Fortunately, Pakistan an ally of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) received unlimited military supply and political support for the war to suppress the people.

Like the Pakistan media, Chinese media were tight-lipped of the genocide committed by marauding soldiers. China should admit the responsibility for the genocide perpetrated by Pakistan’s military hawks in Bangladesh.

For each victim of genocide, China delivered gifts via the Rawalpindi hawks which were “Made in China” bullets in brass that were pumped into the martyrs who wanted an independent Bangladesh.

China ignored world opinion on the Bangladesh liberation war in 1971. CCP closed their ears not to hear the cries and agonies of 10 million refugees who fled to neighboring India. Many countries in the world do not have 10 million populations!

On the other hand, on request of the Bangladesh government in exile, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, chairman of the pro-China left-leaning National Awami Party’s appeal to the CCP for political support for Bangladesh went unanswered. Instead, China increased the supply of arms and ammunition.

After independence, China continued to politically and diplomatically harass the newly emerged independent nation.

The architect of Bangladesh’s independence, Sheikh Mujib after three weeks of the historic surrender of 93,000 Pakistan armed forces and para-military forces in Dhaka, had returned from the prison of Pakistan.

He took charge of a war-ravaged nation with a promise to feed the hungry people and task to rehabilitate the millions of refugees slowly trickled back home from camps in India. This phenomenon created a challenge for the new government. By April 1972, one after another, including the United States, Canada, Great Britain, European countries, allies of the Soviet Union, Japan, Australia, and scores of countries recognized the war-torn nation of 75 million. The trouble started when Bangladesh applied for membership to the United Nations in 1972. China spontaneously twice vetoed Bangladesh membership in the United Nations as the country desperately needed international food aid and budget for rehabilitation of the returnees from Indian refugee camps. China deliberately vetoed the application because two United Nations resolutions regarding the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians held in India had not yet been implemented. Chinese move was certainly to keep Pakistan in good humor.

To withstand Asian-giant China, Sheikh Mujib to add diplomatic clouts joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), The Commonwealth, and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), which indeed strengthened Bangladesh foothold in the global arena.

However, Pakistan recognized Bangladesh in 1974 under duress of the leaders of Islamic nations weeks before the OIC conference.

Even after diplomatic recognition by Pakistan, China continued to intimidate the government of Sheikh Mujib.

Overtly the pro-Beijing communist parties in the country received political blessings from CCP. The left parties despite divided into several factions opposed the liberation war, rejected independent Bangladesh, and expressed dissent on the government of Sheikh Mujib, blaming him a stooge of India.

The pro-Chinese extremist groups remained underground and their parties deliberately had prefix “East Pakistan (Purbo Pakistan)” or” East Bengal (Purbo Bangla)”.

Not to anybody’s surprise, the left extremist raised their heads above the ground and made the unconditional suspension of armed struggle during the military junta on the behest of the CCP’s.

Mujib in his book ‘Amar Dekha Nayachin’ (New China As I Saw) had visited China twice. First in 1952 and second in 1957. During his visit, he met both Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other CCP’s key leaders. He was confident that the Chinese leaders would listen to his request to recognize Bangladesh.

Stubborn Mujib opened diplomatic channels to win the heart of CCP. Pakistan’s veteran envoy to Beijing (1969-1972), Ambassador Khwaja Mohammad Kaiser, a member of Nawab clan in old Dhaka after his tenure in Beijing opted to return home.

Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai confided to Ambassador Kaiser that he understood his difficulties. Well, Kaiser returned to Beijing, as Bangladesh Ambassador in 1984 for two years.

Mujib had also despatched a journalist and poet Faiz Ahmed to China. Faiz had friends in high places among CCP leadership when he was working in Radio Peking (now Beijing) Bangla Service in the 1960s. Faiz was Mujib’s play card game partner in Dhaka prison during 1966-1969. There he heard of Faiz’s relationship with the Chinese political leaders.

He traveled to Beijing via Hong Kong and met the CCP senior leaders. Unfortunately, he returned home with an empty hand. Despite the missions reached a dead end, Mujib did not lose hope.

Finally, China recognized Bangladesh, but not an elected government of Sheikh Mujib, but after his brutal assassination on 15 August 1975. China recognized the regime governed by coup leaders.

China was among the last countries to recognize independent Bangladesh on 31 August 1975.

The ‘dirty dozen’ army officers, mostly liberation war veterans who spearheaded the mutiny remained in power for 84 days. Expect for few fugitives most of the leaders were captured and rewarded the death penalty.

CCP’s anti-people policy during the bloody birth of Bangladesh, overtly providing military aid to Pakistan which augmented genocide with Chinese bullets should apologize. CCP should also apologize for harassing Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

First published in The South Asian Digest, Montreal, Canada on 12 August 2020

Author is an independent journalist, media rights defender in Bangladesh. Recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter: @saleemsamad

Indira Gandhi visited Bangladesh after the Indian troops pulled out

Photo: Rajib Dhar/Dhaka Tribune

SALEEM SAMAD
The road to recognition for Bangladesh as an independent nation

Just a day after he was released from Pakistani prison, among the first few phone calls to Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was one of course from Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi on January 8, 1972 from a hotel in London.

Indira told him that she had changed her mind, and after discussion with British Prime Minister Edward Heath, a special flight was arranged to bring Sheikh Mujib to India with a stopover at Delhi on his return to newly independent Bangladesh.

Indira feared that an Indian civil or military aircraft could be intervened by enemies during over-flight over hostile territories and feared the plane could be shot down. Heath agreed with Indira’s concern about Mujib’s safety and security.

While meeting with British Prime Minister Edward Heath at 10 Downing Street, he told Mujib that the UK would give diplomatic recognition to a newly born Bangladesh only after Indian troops were withdrawn by March 31, 1972. However, Britain recognized Bangladesh on February 4.

Boarding a British Air Force aircraft, Sheikh Mujib was accompanied by an Indian diplomat Sashanka Shekhar Banerjee, stationed in London, who was selected by Indira.

Sashanka had secretly met Mujib along with Tofazzal Hossain Manik Miah, editor of Dainik Ittefaq, a couple of times in Dhaka, while he was second secretary of the Indian High Commission (1962-66).

The day was December 25, 1962. On a Christmas holiday, Sheikh Mujib appealed to India for her support to the cause of Bangladesh’s independence struggle.

Sashanka in his book India, Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh Liberation & Pakistan claims to have received a letter in December 1962 from Sheikh Mujibur Rahman addressed to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru asking for Indian assistance in bringing about East Pakistan’s independence from Pakistan.

Again, the Bangla-speaking diplomat was contacted when he was posted as First Secretary in London (1969-72) over the telephone from Delhi by Bangabandhu’s two trusted emissaries Nuruddin Ahmed, then treasurer of Awami League, and former bureaucrat Ruhul Quddus (co-accused in infamous Agartala Conspiracy Case) in mid-March of 1971. Initially, he refused to speak on the phone, until Ruhul Quddus mentioned the codename “Parashmoni” (given by Mujib).

Bangabandhu through his emissaries in a secret mission to India, conveyed to the Indian prime minister that genocide and killing of mass people was looming in Bangladesh. 

To resist the military blitz of the marauding Pakistan Army, would the Indian government come forward in aid of the people of Bangladesh by providing them with military hardware and training?

In a rare episode of history on March 15, 1971, Indira Gandhi sends Mujib a secret message which reads: “We wish doctors will take care of your health and that of your Awami League family of East Pakistan.” It was well understood by Mujib what Indira wanted to say.

They were also requested to convey to Mujib that India would extend financial and logistical support for helping organize the Bangladesh government in exile in Kolkata.

During the long battle for independence, the Indian Army would also join the war alongside the Mukti Bahini, the Indian officials told the emissaries on behalf of Indira Gandhi.

While on board the British aircraft heading to Delhi, Mujib requested Sashanka to send a cable to Indira before he reached Delhi. He conveyed the wishes of Edward Heath to Indira regarding the withdrawal of Indian troops.

Bangabandhu wanted to discuss the troop’s withdrawal issue with Indira during their official talks in Delhi.

The independence hero was given a tumultuous welcome at Delhi, the Indian President VV Giri and Indira Gandhi were present at the airport.

After the official parley, a joint communiqué stated that the two countries had agreed to shorten the deadline of the troop’s pullout from June 30 to March 31. This was the first diplomatic success by Mujib.

When Mujib was preparing to return to Dhaka, Indira asked the Indian Army Chief Sam Manekshaw to finalize logistics for a troop pullout from Bangladesh.

Mujib’s request to shift the prisoner of war (POW) of surrendered Pakistan armed forces to India was also agreed.

To express gratitude to the people of West Bengal in India for providing shelter to ten million war refugees and offering hospitality to the Bangladesh exile government, Mujib paid a visit to Kolkata on February 6.

After a public meeting in Kolkata, Mujib officially invited Indira for a state visit to Bangladesh. She accepted the invitation, but on condition that the date would be after a total troop pullout. The first head of government who visited Bangladesh was Indian PM Indira Gandhi, who arrived in Dhaka on March 17.

The troop pullout issue was in the back of Mujib’s mind. He was anxious to send a message to the world leaders that Bangladesh was an independent country, and not how some Muslim countries described the country, as “occupied by India.”

When Indira visited Bangladesh, the young country was recognized by Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, and most European countries including the UK, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, and France. ?

First published in the Dhaka Tribune on 24 March 2020

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellow (USA), and Hellman-Hammett Award. Twitter @saleemsamad. Reach him at saleemsamad@hotmail.com

Bangladesh declared war against India on Dec 3

Photo: Courtesy Anwar Hossain Foundation

SALEEM SAMAD
And how a dream became reality

After nearly nine months of a brutal war of independence was coming to an end in early December, the foot soldiers of Mukti Bahini liberated large swathes of occupied Bangladesh backed by the mighty Indian Army, while the ragtag Pakistan soldiers were on the backfoot, converging to the nearest military garrisons.

Pakistan, in desperation, declared “Operation Chengiz Khan” and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) bombers began bombardment of six Indian military bases on December 3, 1971. The strike caused little damage.

The Indian armed forces in anticipation of air-strikes had kept their planes in bunkers.

A day before the Pakistan attack on Indian airfields, Indira Gandhi addressed her last public meeting in Kolkata after visiting the refugee camps in the city. Moments after the air-strikes in India’s western war theatre, few top military brasses briefed Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi regarding the PAF attacks on India.

Lieutenant General Sam Manekshaw, chief of the Army Staff of the Indian Army, paused for a moment in silence and advised her (Indira) to delay the declaration of war against Pakistan.

She was told that a surprise was waiting at the eastern theatre. Soon, Indira informed her senior aides that India would not declare war against Pakistan. Instead, Bangladesh would strike Pakistan targets in the east. 

She explained to her aides that the imminent declaration of war would jeopardize the diplomatic efforts mustered around the Bangladesh cause -- the genocide and millions of refugee issues. On the eve of a formal war between India and Pakistan, telephones started to ring at the Mukti Bahini headquarters on December 2. The two-month-old Bangladesh Air Force was entrusted to strike targets deep inside occupied Bangladesh.

Earlier on September 28, 1971, Bangladesh Air Force was formed with three fighter pilots defected from PAF and six civil pilots from Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), and another 60 strong ground technical crew also from PAF.

The formation of the Bangladesh Air Force, dubbed “Kilo Flight,” began its journey with three vintage aircraft on October 8, 1971.

Indian civilian authorities and the Indian Air Force gave one American-made stubborn DC-3 Dakota (donated by the Maharaja of Jodhpur), one Canadian-built DHC-3 Otter plane, and one French Alouette III helicopter for the newborn “Kilo Flight.”

The pilots and ground crew gathered for a special mission on September 28 at Dimapur in Nagaland, where they took advantage of the lack of night-fighting capability of the PAF to launch hit-and-run attacks on sensitive targets inside occupied Bangladesh.

After months of intensive training, the formation was activated for combat.

The first sortie was scheduled to take place on November 28 but was postponed by Indian high commands to December 2, which invited frustration among the “Kilo Flight” crews, eagerly waiting to strike inside Bangladesh. Meanwhile, the three civilian aircraft were renovated, suitable for guerrilla warfare operations.

The Otter boasted seven rockets under each of its wings and could deliver 10 of the 25-pound bombs manually through a makeshift door in the bottom of the plane. The helicopter was rigged to fire 14 rockets from pylons attached to its side and had .303 Browning machine guns installed.

It was fitted with a one-inch (25mm) steel plate welded to its floor for extra strength.

The Dakota was also modified, but for technical reasons, it was used to ferry exiled government officials and supplies only.

The Otter took off from Kailashsahar with a two-member crew -- Flight Lt Shamsul Alam and co-pilot Akram Ahmed -- for a mission against targets in Chittagong, the vital seaport, to disrupt logistics and supplies of Pakistani troops.

The second unit -- a helicopter sortie from Teliamura base in adjoining Tripura state -- was piloted by Flight Lt Sultan Mahmood and Flight Lt Badrul Alam and made a deadly strike at Godnail fuel depot, Narayanganj. The smoke from the flames was seen from the capital Dhaka for days.

Two sorties on crucial targets on December 3 completely demoralized the Pakistan military.

Well, the Indians commenced air-strikes from December 4 in the eastern theatre and, by December 7, the lone airfield at Tejgaon airport was disabled and knocked out of operation.

The 13 days was the shortest war in military history, followed by a historic surrender ceremony, and in fact, the second surrender after WWII.

On December 16 in 1971, a dramatic push led to the fall of Dhaka. The jubilant Mukti Bahini chanting “Joy Bangla” and Indian troops riding battle tanks marched into the capital. Indira Gandhi at Ramlila Grounds in New Delhi. on December 12, 1971. said: “The Bangladesh of their dream has today become a reality.” 

First Published in the Dhaka Tribune 16 December 2019

Saleem Samad, is an independent journalist, media rights defender, also recipient of Ashoka Fellow and Hellman-Hammett Award.

Bangladesh and India give enclave residents a state after 70 years

Land swap ends this midnight