Bangladesh-India: Treaty of Hope

SANCHITA BHATTACHARYA

On October 7, 2013, Bangladesh's Cabinet ratified the Extradition Treaty with India. Disclosing this, Bangladesh Cabinet Secretary Mosharraf Hossain Bhuiyan stated that the Cabinet meeting was chaired by Bangladesh Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, and that the treaty would now require the approval of the Parliament in order to come into effect, following the exchange of documents after legal procedures by both countries. The Indian Cabinet had already ratified the treaty. On October 23, 2013, the instruments of ratifications were exchanged, and the Treaty came into effect. The Extradition Treaty had been inked on January 29, 2013.

Some of the significant aspects of the treaty include:

Article 5: Nothing in this Treaty shall preclude the extradition by the Requested State of its nationals either in respect of a territorial offence or in respect of an extra-territorial offence.

Article 11(1): In case of urgency, one Contracting State may request the other Contracting State to provisionally arrest the person sought. Such request shall be made in writing and transmitted to the Central Authority of the Requested State through diplomatic channels.

Article 17(1): When a request for extradition is granted, the Requested State shall, upon request and so far as its law allows, hand over to the Requesting State articles (including sums of money) which may serve as proof or evidence of the offence.

Article 18: Each Contracting State shall, to the extent permitted by its law, afford the other the widest measure of mutual assistance in criminal matters in connection with the offence for which extradition has been requested.

However, according to Article 6, persons accused of political crimes [offence of a political character] would not come under the purview of the Treaty. Further, offenders accused of small crimes, with a maximum penalty of imprisonment for less than one year, are also outside the scope of the Treaty. Article 8 states that the signing countries also reserve the right to refuse extradition.

Apart from its specific provisions, the Treaty well enhance the already-much-improved Indo-Bangladesh security ties. India hopes that the Treaty will facilitate the extradition of Anup Chetia alias Golap Barua, 'general secretary' of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and other criminals taking shelter in Bangladesh. Chetia has been in a Bangladesh jail since his arrest in 1997. A Bangladesh court jailed Chetia for seven years for illegal entry. Although his sentence has expired, he is still in Bangladesh custody. Chetia sought political asylum in Bangladesh thrice, in 2005, 2008 and in 2011, after being arrested from Dhaka's Mohammadpur area in 1997.

In addition to Chetia, National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) leader Thulunga alias Tensu Narzery and many other insurgents from India's insurgency-wracked north-east have been hiding in Bangladesh, and are now under imminent threat of deportation.

Bangladesh on the other hand, wants India's help in arresting and extraditing Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's killers. The suspects, Captain (Retired) Abdul Mazed and Risalder (Retired) Moslehuddin, are believed to be hiding in India. The treaty will also clear the way to bring back criminals like Subrata Bain and Sazzad Hossain to Bangladesh from India. Bain and Hossain are currently lodged in Delhi's high-security Tihar Jail. Bain was charged with carrying Fake Indian Currency Note (FICN), illegal arms and for illegal immigration into India. Hossain is wanted in cases of murder in Bangladesh. The Awami League government of Bangladesh contends that Bain and Hossain were involved in attacks that targeted its top leadership. Bain is an accused in the August 21, 2004, grenade attack on a rally of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in Dhaka.

Further, with an over 4,000 kilometre the porous border between the two countries, mainly along India's insurgency-plagued north-eastern States, and reports suggesting that both Indian and trans-border terrorists are taking advantage of security gaps in the Indian State of West Bengal, the treaty will be crucial for both countries to take effective action against serious offenders for a wide variety of crimes, including terrorism, smuggling, human trafficking, organised crime, and white-collar crime. The treaty has also extended the scope of mutual cooperation on security and border related issues. It can be hoped, moreover, that it will help the enforcement agencies on both sides to secure their common goals of protecting their respective citizens and eliminating cross-border safe havens for criminals.

In addition, India has also operationalised the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in Criminal Matters with Bangladesh. The Legal Assistance Treaty assume importance in combating transnational organized crimes, trans-border terrorism, and other serious offences such as human and drug trafficking, money laundering, counterfeit currency, smuggling of arms and explosives, etc. Keeping in mind the regional challenges of terrorist funding and the recent Rohingya problem, such cooperation will create strong instruments of 'official hindrance' to anti-governmental formations and non-state actors with radical political agendas.

The India-Bangladesh relationship has been on a sustained upswing since Sheikh Hasina came to power in January 2009. With remarkable transformations in the domestic scenario, Dhaka sought to repair relations with Delhi, and to stamp out the anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh.

These gains, of course, remain tenuous. Recent developments, including the political turmoil in Bangladesh, and evidence that the US has revaluated its position on the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) - Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) combine, with an assessment in its favour, suggest that the outcome of the General Elections due before January 24, 2014, are deeply uncertain. A restoration to power of the BNP-Jamaat combine in Dhaka would lead to the inevitable resurgence of Islamist extremist radicalization and the anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh, and the rapid erosion of the gains of the past years in India-Bangladesh relations. Significantly, the Extradition Treaty has several loopholes, particularly including the clause that allows the signatory states to refuse extradition, which would allow an uncooperative Government to subvert the letter and spirit of the agreement. As with much else, South Asia remains a region of extreme uncertainty.

First appeared on South Asia IntelligenceReview, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 12, No. 19, November 11, 2013

Sanchita Bhattacharya is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Indo-Bangladesh Relations: Continuous Consolidation

S. BINODKUMAR SINGH

On January 28, 2013, Bangladesh Home Minister Muhiuddin Khan Alamgir and his Indian counterpart Union Home Minister (UHM) Sushil Kumar Shinde signed a landmark Extradition Treaty at Dhaka, the Bangladesh capital, to combat terrorism and facilitate suppression of crime by making further provision for the reciprocal extradition of offenders. Significantly, however, Article 6 of the Treaty says that "it would not be applicable in case the offence is of a political character."

Earlier, as a precedent, the two countries had signed the Agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters, Transfer of Sentenced Persons and Combating International Terrorism, Organized Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking, during Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's visit to New Delhi between January 10 and 13, 2010.

In the intervening time, to reduce the incidents of border killings and smuggling of arms and drugs, human trafficking and other illegal activities along the Indo-Bangladesh border, Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) and India's Border Security Force (BSF) on March 13, 2012, started "coordinated patrolling" and "night coordinated patrolling" at 120 border points selected by two different teams of the BGB and the BSF under the India-Bangladesh Coordinated Border Management Plan (CBMP), which had been jointly signed on July 30, 2011, at Dhaka.

Notably, since the Sheikh Hasina led Awami League (AL) Government (it is in alliance with five other parties) came to power in Bangladesh in January 2009, the state initiated a decisive campaign against radical forces on the domestic front, and also acted relentlessly against various militant formations operating in India's North East, which had long been sheltered on Bangladeshi soil. Since Hasina assumed power, security cooperation between Bangladesh and India has been dramatic, resulting in the arrest of some of the top northeast insurgent leaders by Indian Security Forces after they were 'pushed back' into India. Prominent among those held in Bangladesh and 'handed over' to India were: All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) 'chairman' Ranjit Debbarma (January 23, 2013); Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) 'Chairman' Champion R. Sangma (July 30, 2012); United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) 'captain' Antu Chaudang and 'second lieutenant' Pradeep Chetia (February 5, 2011); United National Liberation Front (UNLF) 'chairman' R. K. Meghen alias Sanayaima (November 30,2010); Anti-talks faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) 'chief' Ranjan Daimary alias D R Nabla (May 1, 2010); ULFA 'chairman' Arabinda Rajkhowa alias Rajiv Rajkonwar' and 'deputy commander-in-chief' Raju Baruah (December 4, 2009); ULFA 'foreign secretary' Sashadhar Choudhury and 'finance secretary' Chitraban Hazarika (November 4, 2009).

India has also been requesting Bangladesh to hand over Anup Chetia alias Golap Barua, 'general secretary' of the ULFA, who was arrested in Dhaka along with two other ULFA militants on December 21, 1997, for illegally carrying foreign currencies and a satellite phone, and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Even after spending more than 15 years in various prisons the Bangladesh, he continues to remain behind bars. However, despite the fresh Extradition Treaty, Bangladesh Home Minister Muhiuddin Khan Alamgir on January 28, 2013, stated that Bangladesh would not be able to send back Anup Chetia under the treaty as he had prayed for political asylum in the Supreme Court, adding, "The Supreme Court will first have to dispose of his prayer for political asylum. After that, we will decide whether to treat this person or any other persons under this extradition treaty or in some other way."

Other North East militant leaders on Bangladeshi soil, whose expatriation India seeks, include National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) leaders Bishwamohan Debarman and Subir Debbarma, and NDFB leader Thulunga alias Tensu Narzary.

Bangladesh has unambiguously demonstrated its will to end the operation of Northeast Indian terrorist and insurgent groupings from its soil. Nevertheless, Indian intelligence inputs suggest that at least 55 camps of NE militants continue to operate in Bangladesh, and there is certainly some unfinished business at hand.

Similarly, Dhaka has been demanding that India arrest and hand over Bangladesh's founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's two convicted killers, Abdul Mazed and Moslehuddin Khan (who were at the rank of Captain and Risaldar, respectively, at the time of the assassination), and are believed to be hiding in India.

In addition, there are several other criminals operating with impunity across the Indo-Bangladesh border, and the Extradition Treaty should help the two countries break this criminal nexus. 

As cooperation on the security front strengthened, the resultant increase in trust has led to positive developments on other issues of bilateral concern as well, despite hurdles. These include the historic agreement signed on September 6, 2011, during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Dhaka, to settle land boundary issues, including the exchange of 162 'enclaves' which are in 'adverse possession'. Though the Teesta Water Sharing Deal, could not be concluded because of last-minute objections raised by West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee on the draft of the agreement, India's Water Resources Minister Harish Rawat, on November 7, 2012, during a meeting with visiting Bangladesh Agriculture Minister Motia Chowdhury at New Delhi, expressed interest in inking a provisional Teesta Water Sharing Agreement, until a permanent settlement was found.

On July 3, 2012, moreover, Dhaka gave its letter of consent for the renewal of Transit and Transshipment Rights to India, for the continuation of transshipment of bulk cargoes, with retrospective effect from April 1, 2012 to March 31, 2014. The PIWTT, which was renewed annually till then (July 3, 2012), as was agreed in the Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade (PIWTT, 1972), was suspended on October 26, 2011, after Dhaka refused to issue the letter of consent because of the failure to reach an agreement on the Teesta Deal.

In addition, following up on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on India-Bangladesh Energy Cooperation signed on September 6, 2011, at Dhaka, the first Joint Working Group (JWG) meeting on renewable energy was held in New Delhi on August 3, 2012, where Bangladesh and India briefed each other on the present status and growth potential of renewable energy. Similarly, a high-level Indian delegation led by Power Secretary P. Uma Shankar visited Dhaka on January 29, 2013, to sign a deal for the proposed 1,320 megawatt coal-fired power plant at Rampal in the Bagerhat District of Khulna Division in Bangladesh, and the purchase of power by Bangladesh from India.

Significantly, at the time of the signing of the Extradition Treaty, the two sides also inked a liberalized visa agreement, the Revised Travel Arrangement (RTA), to remove restrictions on visits of businesspersons, students, patients, senior citizens above 65 years and children below 12 years.

Conspicuously, Indo-Bangladesh relations have witnessed a strong positive surge since 2009, and this has had a transformatory impact on the trajectory of terrorism and extremism in both the countries, visibly improving the general security environment in the region, and creating a strong foundation of trust. Much, however, remains to be done and, in this, India needs to be the more proactive, both because it is by far the larger partner, and also because Dhaka appears to have done much more in the recent past than Delhi.

This equation becomes the more crucial as Bangladesh approaches another General Election in which the present Opposition, backed by a very substantial radicalized constituency, will attempt to cast improving relations with India as a 'betrayal' of Bangladeshi interests. As disruptive political mobilization in Bangladesh - of which significant evidence is already visible - gathers force in the run up to the Elections, it will require dramatic and demonstrable successes in the delivery of quantifiable benefits to Dhaka, both to consolidate the relationship and, crucially, to diminish the impact of vicious propaganda that could, otherwise, jeopardize the remarkable gains of the past four years.

Original article published in SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 11, No. 31, February 4, 2013

S. Binodkumar Singh is Research Associate with Institute for Conflict Management