ULFA: A tale of militancy and impunity

Elusive ULFA-I leader Paresh Baruah rejects peace talks and hiding near Myanmar-China border

A timeline of the United Liberation Front of Assam’s activities in Bangladesh during the Khaleda Zia regime

SALEEM SAMAD

There was uproar among the political and diplomatic circles in Bangladesh, India, as well as Britain after declassified documents said that a British diplomat in Dhaka had met with North East Indian secessionist leaders of the outlawed United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 30 years ago.

The secret parley with British High Commissioner David Austin took place on October 2, 1990, with three top ULFA functionaries -- Anup Chetia (real name Golap Barua), Siddhartha Phukan (Sunil Nath), and Iqbal (Munin Nabis).

Shortly after receiving the secret memo, the British foreign office in London cautioned its envoy in Dhaka to snap contacts with the banned outfit, which would jeopardize their historical relationship with India.

The ULFA decided to meet the envoy because the British have century-old investments in the Assam tea gardens. So they thought it would be easier to twist the arm of the UK government to help pursue their radical policy.

The declassified documents said the British diplomat was shown photographs of the outfit’s training camp in Assam, among other images and leaflets, and finally promised a tour of its militant camps. One of the photos was of the ULFA military Commander-in-Chief Paresh Baruah at the China border with a Chinese army liaison officer. Baruah is still believed to be in China.

The diplomat found the China link of the ULFA “new and interesting.” Claims of Chinese help to northeast insurgency are not new.

The meeting was presumably arranged with the British High Commission by unnamed officials of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), just two months before the demise of General HM Ershad’s dictatorial regime.

The rogue intelligence officials were able to convince the democratically elected government of Khaleda Zia to lend political support to separatist groups in the seven-sisters in North-East India.

Her party advocated anti-Indian policy, which attracted several rightist parties, and most importantly, Islamist parties.

In mid-1991, with tacit blessings of the Pakistan spy agency ISI, the separatist leaders of Assam, Tripura, Nagaland, Mizoram, and Manipur opened their headquarters in Dhaka, while their foot soldiers set up camps in Bangladesh-India no-man’s-land, dotted in the northern and eastern frontiers.

In the border regions, for months and years, militants in uniform were seen buying groceries and essential commodities from village markets inside Bangladesh.

The covert operation, aided and abetted by ISI, functioned with impunity under the shadow of the Pakistan embassy in Gulshan. Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, who was also the defense minister, had full knowledge of the clandestine operation.

The ULFA and other militant groups had accounts in several private banks in Dhaka, Sylhet, and Chittagong. However, those bank accounts were frozen after Sheikh Hasina returned to power in January 2009.

The militant leaders lived in spacious apartments in Uttara, Shyamoli, Mohammadpur, and Shantinagar with their families. The unmarked shelters were guarded 24/7 by armed security with walkie-talkies provided by intelligence agencies.

The elusive ULFA military chief Paresh Baruah invested millions of US dollars in real estate, shipping, textile, power, and medical care in Bangladesh, according to a classified document of National Security Intelligence (NSI).

Not surprisingly, Paresh Baruah had direct contacts with Hawa Bhaban run by Tarique Rahman, former State Minister for Home Affairs Lutfozzaman Babar, and of course rogue intel officers, as well as ISI operatives in Dhaka.

India’s special operations unit, separately based in Guwahati, Assam and Agartala, Tripura, had made several attempts to capture the fugitive Paresh Baruah so that he could face justice in India.

ULFA’s founding member and general secretary Anup Chetia was detained by Bangladesh police on December 21, 1997, from his Shyamoli residence in Dhaka under the Foreigners Act and the Passports Act for illegally possessing foreign currencies and a satellite phone.

From his prison cell, Chetia thrice applied for political asylum in 2005, 2008, and 2011. His plea was rejected by authorities, possibly due to diplomatic pressure from New Delhi.

Sheikh Hasina, after becoming prime minister for the second time, decided not to allow foreign militants and terrorists to use Bangladesh territory against any neighbours.

Anup Chetia was released along with two other ULFA compatriots from Kashimpur High-Security Central Jail to be deported to India after 18 years.

Unfortunately, the two neighbours did not sign an extradition treaty. The North-East separatist leaders were handed over to India, including ULFA chairperson Arabinda Rajkhowa.

Presently, the deported ULFA leaders are smoking peace pipes in Delhi to end the four-decade-old militancy for a “sovereign” Assam in India.

First published on  Published in the Dhaka Tribune, 21 September 2020

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He can be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad

More people-to-people contact between two neighbours Bangladesh - India would allay misconception

For a greater understanding
More people-to-people contact between India and Bangladesh would go a long way in allaying the misconceptions that many in Assam harbour against Bangladeshi migrants.

NAVA THAKURIA

Bangladesh, Assam, border terrorism, NRC, West Bengal, Digital Security Act, Mamata Banerjee, Bangladeshi migrants

People from Bangladesh are often perceived as trouble makers and unwanted guests in Northeastern states, especially Assam. One of the Bangladesh-bordering states (apart from West Bengal, Meghalaya and Tripura), Assam has witnessed a massive uprising against illegal migrants from that country and its implications are still visible.

But lately, India and Bangladesh have reached a steady bilateral relationship after many decades of diplomatic hiccups. The governments in New Delhi and Dhaka now regularly share common issues in an atmosphere of confidence and friendship. The mutual trust has been further heightened after resolving half-a-century- old border demarcation disputes. Duty-free trade, joint venture infrastructure projects, commerce, tourism, visa regime, communication through road, rail, river and air were a few areas of discussion between both nations. The talks on sharing of water from 56 international rivers are also in progress.

With authentic intelligence sharing by both New Delhi and Dhaka, cross-border terrorism has reduced to a great extent. At least the rigorous crackdowns on separatist militants hailing from Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya and Tripura by various Bangladeshi government agencies have made the country almost free from those armed leaders and their cadres.

Interacting with a group of Guwahati- based scribes through video conferencing from Dhaka recently, senior Bangladeshi journalist and political commentator Saleem Samad said that there should not be any North-eastern separatist leader running their militant camps from Bangladesh. Many leaders including United Liberation Front of Assam president Arabinda Rajkhowa were silently handed over to Indian agencies by Dhaka in the recent past.

“Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is committed to making Bangladesh free from cross-border terrorism. Because of Dhaka’s relentless crackdown on terrorism, the North-eastern militants have fled the country. Many of the separatist leaders were pushed back into India. The only fugitive on the run is Paresh Barua (supreme leader of Ulfa-Independent), who also faces capital punishment in Bangladesh,” said Samad.

The special correspondent at the Asian Age, published from Dhaka, also insisted that New Delhi should officially acknowledge efforts of the Hasina government, which has led to a significant decrease of budget for the five-decade-long anti-insurgency operation and deployment of law-enforcing agencies in the various troubled North-eastern localities. The anti-insurgency budget can now be diverted to infrastructure development, human development and industrial parks in the region.

A keen observer of socio-political situations in South Asia and a regular contributor to different Indian media outlets, Samad, however, admitted that the recent rise of Islamist extremism has been posing a serious threat to his Muslim majority country along with its neighbouring Indian states like West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. He narrated how secularist bloggers and LGBT activists are increasingly becoming the target of radicalised Muslims forces in the populous country, which has otherwise slowly, but steadily marched on the path of becoming a country of one nationality (Bangladeshi), one language (Bangla) and one religion (Sunni Muslim).

Citing how a network of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh was busted in West Bengal few years ago, Samad urged the North-eastern region to remain alert about jihadi elements after the ongoing crackdown on Islamist forces. He revealed that thousands of Bangladeshi youths had joined various militia groups in Syria, Iraq, Chechnya, Indonesia, Philippines, Afghanistan, and Pakistan et al to fight alongside the jihadis there. He also expressed concern over the new Digital Security Act 2018, which has already come under fire from journalists, including editors, rights defenders and anti-corruption advocates. International rights watchdogs have condemned the draconian law, which looks to criminalise freedom of press, speech and expression in that country.

Claiming that no visiting Indian political leader had ever spoken about illegal Bangladeshi migrants in India during parleys with their Bangladeshi counterparts, Samad pointed out that for the people of Bangladesh the issue of the National Register of Citizens updation in Assam remains an internal affair of India. “Though Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee made a hue and cry about the Assam NRC draft, Bangladeshi politicians and the civil society are still reluctant to comment on the sensitive matter. Even Dhaka-based media outlets had little coverage about the process and its larger implications,” said Samad.

It may be noted that Banerjee termed the massive citizenship scanning process in Assam, which is being monitored by the Supreme Court of India, as anti-Bengali but her views were not endorsed by anybody in Assam including those Bengali-speaking inhabitants in the Barak valley. Assam chief minister Sarbananda Sonowal termed the release of the NRC draft as historic.

He expressed his heartfelt appreciation and gratitude to the Supreme Court, congratulated the 55,000 government officials engaged in the process and the people living across the Barak and Brahmaputra valleys, plains and hills of the state. It may be noted here that the first NRC in India was prepared in 1951 following a census the same year. Assam has been preparing a new NRC following the direction of the apex court of the country. Earlier, the first NRC draft in Assam was released on 31 December 2017.

The background for the NRC is traced to the Assam Accord, which was signed in 1985 by the Centre with leaders of Assam movement. The historic memorandum of understanding, signed by leaders of All Assam Students Union and Gana Sangram Parishad in presence of then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi drew the curtain on the six-year-long Assam agitation that erupted in 1979. The Accord reposed responsibility on New Delhi to detect and deport all migrants (read East Pakistani and Bangladeshi nationals), who entered Assam after the midnight of 24 March 1971. In other words, the agitating leaders agreed to accept all residents of Assam prior to the dateline as Indian nationals.

One can see that the influx of millions of illegal Bangladeshis is a vital socio-political issue for Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Manipur. The region shares an international border of 5,182 km (about 99 percent of its total geographical boundary) with Tibet (now under China), Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh. Its border with Bangladesh is as long as 1,596 km. During the interaction, Samad strongly advocated more people-to-people contact between Assam and Bangladesh.

He even lamented how the state had missed the bus despite being so closely located, while other states like Bengal and Tripura launched multiple projects to improve rail, road and river connectivity with Bangladesh. Stressing on regular direct bus and air links between Guwahati and Dhaka, the Bangladeshi journalist said that improved trade and commerce along with cultural ties would help in erasing many misconceptions and suspicions prevailing on both sides. He also claimed more students and patients would move from both sides and that would obviously boost tourism.

First published in The Statesman, Kolkata on 15 October 2018

Nava Thakuria is the Guwahati-based Special Representative of The Statesman.

Bangladesh Arms Trafficking: Residual Networks

Veronica Khangchian

In perhaps, the single biggest arms seizure since the April 2, 2004, Chittagong arms haul case where 10 truckloads of weapons had been seized, a huge arms cache was recovered by the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) of Bangladesh, over several days, from the Satchari National Park in the Chunarughat Sub-District of the Habiganj District in Bangladesh, adjoining the West Tripura District in the Indian State of Tripura. Officials disclosed that they recovered 184 rocket shells (40mm) and 153 chargers for rocket launchers abandoned inside one bunker on a hillock in the reserve forest, some 130 kilometers from the capital, Dhaka, during the raid on June 3, 2014. Another six more empty bunkers were located on the same day. On June 4, the RAB found another two bunkers and recovered 38 rocket shells, four machine guns, 95 rocket chargers, 1,300 rounds of machine gun ammunition, and over 13,000 bullets of different calibres. RAB recovered more arms and ammunition, including four machine guns in a bunker on June 8, and also found oil used for cleaning firearms. Another two empty bunkers were also located. As it resumed a search operation deep into the reserve forest on the eight consecutive day, RAB made additional recoveries, including one machine gun barrel, 633 rounds of ammunition, and 54 anti-tank shells, from three newly discovered bunkers, on June 9.

The area from where the arms were recovered was once the base camp of the now-defunct Indian insurgent outfit, the Tripura-based All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF). The camp was later captured by insurgents belonging to the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT). The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), with its principal theatre of operations in the Indian State of Assam, abutting Tripura, and ATTF had earlier smuggled a huge quantity of Chinese-made weapons from the Southeast Asian grey market by sea, landed them around Cox's Bazar or Chittagong, and transported these to rebel bases such as Satchari, from where arms were smuggled into India's troubled northeast.

However, some confusion prevails over the present recoveries. Indian security agencies are yet to ascertain whether these belong to any militant outfit active in India's Northeast. Media reports have speculated on the distant possibility of ULFA 'chief' Paresh Baruah asking ATTF to store the weapons in its one-time bases, and this cannot be ruled out. Reports also indicate that ATTF leader, Ranjit Debbarma (now in Tripura jail), who had close ties with Paresh Baruah, had stocked the cache in collaboration with ULFA militants. A June 4 media report suggested that the arms and ammunition belonged to ULFA leader Baruah. Information gleaned by Indian intelligence agencies from Debbarma, and provided to Bangladesh authorities, led to the recovery of the ammunition on June 3, three kilometers off the border. According to the report, arms smuggled from China by Baruah were kept in the Satchari Forest and were sent to Indian militants at opportune moments.

However, Bangladesh State Minister for Home, Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal, asserted that the haul was based on intelligence collected by local Bangladesh agencies. RAB Media Wing Director Habibur Rahman added that the arms and ammunition recovered in the Satchari Forest were apparently similar to those recovered in Chittagong in 2004, and to a truckload of ammunition recovered at Bogra in June 2003.  It is significant, moreover, that investigators of the Bogra ammunition haul had determined that the ammunition was bound for the Satchari Forest, and had also confirmed its linkages with NLFT and ULFA.

Earlier, a Bangladesh Court had arrived at a significant verdict in the Chittagong arms haul case, nearly 10 years after the incident. On January 30, 2014, a Chittagong District Court awarded the death penalty to 14 accused, including Motiur Rahman Nizami, Ameer (chief) of the Jamaat-e-Islami (Jel), Lutfozzaman Babar of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the then Minister of State for Home, and ULFA-I 'commander-in-chief' Paresh Baruah (in absentia), for smuggling 10 truckloads of arms into Chittagong District in 2004, during the tenure of the BNP-led Government. Investigations revealed that the weapons were manufactured in China and were being shipped to ULFA. The condemned also include former Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) Director Major General (Retd) Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury; former Director General of National Security Intelligence (NSI) Brigadier General (Retd) Abdur Rahim; and three other NSI officials – Director (Security) Wing Commander Shahab Uddin Ahmed; Deputy Director Major (Retd) Liakat Hossain; and Field Officer Akbar Hossain Khan. Others awarded the death penalty in the case are former Additional Secretary (Industry) Nurul Amin; the then Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Ltd. (CUFL) Managing Director Mahsin Uddin Talukder; CUFL General Manager (Administration) K.M. Enamul Hoque; and three businessmen, Hafizur Rahman Hafiz, Deen Mohammad and Haji Abdus Subhan.

In the initial stages of the trial, which commenced in 2005, only some small fry, mostly labourers, truckers and trawler drivers, were implicated, leaving out the big shots as the then BNP-led Government allegedly tried to cover up the involvement of the state machinery, including its Ministers and high officials of intelligence agencies. However, after an Army-backed caretaker Government took charge on January 11, 2007, ahead of the country’s General Elections, the Court of Chittagong Metropolitan Judge ordered further investigations on February 14, 2008. In June 2011, Muniruzzaman Chowdhury, Senior Assistant Superintendent of Criminal Investigation Department, submitted two supplementary charge-sheets, accusing 11 new suspects. While Paresh Barua and former Secretary of the Industries Ministry, Nurul Amin, have been absconding ever since the recovery of the arms, the other nine are behind bars. Baruah and Amin were sentenced in absentia. The verdict of the Special Tribunal observed that the role of the then Prime Minister Khaleda Zia in the incident was 'mysterious', and pointed to the direct involvement of then Ministers and top military and civil officials. Judge S.M. Mojibur Rahman also argued that the smuggling of such a huge volume of weapons and ammunition was not possible without Government support, and noted, “They [the intelligence officials] were involved in the conspiracy to destroy the entire nation by putting the country’s existence at stake.”

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed has now promised separate investigations into the role of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and her party (BNP) in the Chittagong arms haul case, declaring, ‘The trial of 10 truckloads of arms haul is over. We will now probe afresh the conspiracies behind it, from where the arms came, how it was brought to Bangladesh and who had funded it." The Prime Minister added that Bangladesh had become hotbed of activities of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) after the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in August 1975.

Analysts note that the death sentence awarded to Paresh Barua will have little impact on the outfit as Barua and most of his cadres have already shifted base out of Bangladesh. Intelligence officials in Assam, however, feel that the elusive insurgent leader will be under greater pressure to come forward for talks, should Myanmar act as Bangladesh did, and evict insurgents from India's north-east, including Barua and his cadres, from its soil. The Assam Police have intelligence inputs that Barua is currently operating out of his base along the Myanmar-China border. Officials in Bangladesh argue that the death sentence would at least ensure that Baruah would not be able to enter Bangladesh without the court’s intervention.

Significantly, the verdict comes at a time when ULFA-I is facing a crisis. Sources indicate that not more than 10 hardcore members of the outfit are inside Assam, and that the group has no more than 180 cadres in camps in Myanmar. Senior leaders who were in the Mon District of Nagaland have been called back to Myanmar after the outfit awarded the death sentence to 'operational commander' Pramod Gogoi alias Partha Pratim Asom. On March 16, 2014 [the party's 'Army Day'], ULFA-I asked its members to re-strengthen the outfit, fearing that certain members had a nexus with the SFs. At least eight ULFA-I cadres, including Pramod Gogoi, were executed on the instructions of ULFA-I's 'commander-in-chief', Paresh Baruah, for 'conspiring’ with Police and Security Forces to engineer a mass surrender of cadres over the preceding four months. Seven cadres had also been executed in December 2013, while they were trying to flee the Myanmar base to surrender to the Police. 'Operational commander' Pramod Gogoi was executed on January 15, 2014 in the Mon District. ULFA-I is said to have a total of around 240 cadres at present.

Significantly, the Goalpara Police recovered a stock of ammunition and detonators from ULFA-I along the Assam-Meghalaya border in the Goalpara District on January 27, 2014. The Police disclosed that a group of ULFA-I militants had entered Hatigaon, a village under the Agia Police Station, with arms and explosive materials, which they stored inside a rubber plantation. Goalpara Superintendent of Police (SP) Nitul Gogoi stated, “We got the information that a group under the leadership of Drishti Rajkhowa brought the ammunition from Bangladesh.”

Coordination between the Meghalaya based Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), one of the biggest procurers of arms in Meghalaya, and ULFA-I, remains a concern. In the latest incident, on June 26, 2014, a militant identified as Dharma Kanta Rai, who was on ‘deputation’ from the ULFA-I to the GNLA, was killed during a rescue operation mounted by West Garo Hills Police at Darekgre near Rongmasugre village in West Garo Hills District, to free four abducted persons from the GNLA and ULFA. The abductions had been carried out on June 25 from Kantanagre village in West Garo Hills District. The deceased ULFA-I cadre was reportedly an improvised explosive device (IED) expert, used by GNLA to target Police movements.

Worryingly, media reports indicate that a large proportion of weapons and ammunition that reach the mushrooming in Meghalaya, are from the armory of insurgent groups presently engaged in peace parleys with the Government. These groups include the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the pro-talks faction of ULFA (ULFA-PTF). According to sources, these frontline militant outfits never divulged the exact composition of their arsenal and, according to one source, “80 to 90 per cent of these arms lie unused for five to six years and just before their life span lapses, these militant groups prefer to dispose of these weapons.”

Further, despite dramatically improving relations between India’s Border Security Force (BSF) and Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB), Northeast insurgent groups continue to maintain some 45 hideouts in Bangladesh, mostly belonging to ATTF and NLFT (21 camps), according to BSF Special Director General B.D. Sharma. He added, on June 20, that the insurgents could not be fully wiped out from Bangladesh soil because deployment of BGB was thin compared to requirements, and that, “They are now raising new forces and we hope that the situation would improve soon. Besides, the terrain and riverine border also come in the way of maintaining effective border vigil.” However, Mohammed Latiful Haider, Additional Director General, BGB, has denied the existence of any camps of Indian militant outfits in the country. The denial came on June 25, after the first day of a border coordination conference held between senior BSF and BGB officials at Kadamtala, at BSF North Bengal Frontier Headquarters near Siliguri, under the Darjeeling District of West Bengal.

Bangladesh has now clearly declared that it would not allow its territory to be used against India. The assurance, reiterated to Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj on her first foreign visit on June 26, 2014, came as the External Affairs Minister promised to put extra energy into bilateral ties. Swaraj stated that New Delhi sought a comprehensive and equitable partnership with Bangladesh for a secure and prosperous South Asia.  With recent developments, and agreed cooperation between India and Bangladesh, a further significant improvement can be hoped for.

First published South Asia Intelligence Review, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 12, No. 52, June 30, 2014

Veronica Khangchian is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Crime and politics in Bangladesh: Bang bang club

More trials for Bangladesh’s deflated opposition

TEN years after they arrived, the weapons have found their victims. In April 2004 police in Chittagong, the main port city of Bangladesh, intercepted a shipment of rifles, submachine guns with silencers, 25,000 hand grenades and more, worth some $5m. Made in China, the arms may have been shipped with help from Pakistani spies set on causing trouble for India. The weapons were intended for rebels in Assam state in India’s north-east, where insurgencies rumble on.

For years in Bangladesh the legal case went nowhere. Those involved in the arms shipment were ignored. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), under Khaleda Zia, then prime minister, showed no interest in prosecutions. Only after the Awami League, the current government, took office in 2009 did prosecutors begin to consider the crime seriously. On January 30th a trial court sentenced 14 men—most of them from or affiliated to opposition parties—to death on smuggling charges related to the arms haul.

Assuming the sentences are upheld by the higher courts, they carry great political as well as legal weight. By implication, they embroil Mrs Zia’s son, Tarique Rahman. He is judged by many to be the BNP’s next leader—though he is living in London while corruption cases pile up against him at home. Among those sentenced to hang is Lutfuzzaman Babar, a long-time flunky of Mr Rahman’s. This week the prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, vowed that her government would work to prove that, in the light of Mr Rahman’s influence at the time, he knew all about the weapons.

Others sentenced to death include a former head of Bangladesh’s military intelligence, another high-ranking Bangladeshi spy, plus (in absentia) a leader of an Assamese insurgent group who is on India’s most-wanted list. Of major political significance, the court also found guilty Motiur Rahman Nizami, who leads Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party and a close ally of the BNP. He has already been indicted by a separate court, looking at war crimes committed in Bangladesh’s war of secession from Pakistan in 1971. He faces the prospect of being sentenced to death twice over.

Jamaat has promised protests against the smuggling verdicts. Though the party has a reputation for street violence, its capacity to create trouble seems diminished in recent months. Many Jamaat activists have either been arrested or shot dead. The BNP also looks utterly broken, unable to persuade followers to return to disruptive street protests against Sheikh Hasina, whether over court cases or elections.

By contrast, the prime minister looks increasingly content. Her Awami League won a general election on January 5th that was boycotted by the BNP and Jamaat. Aid donors and other observers who worried about the poll’s credibility now seem to be coming to terms with five more years of Sheikh Hasina. The official aid agencies of Britain and America have funded an opinion survey suggesting that the Awami League would have won the election even without the boycott. That is a handy fillip for the government.

India, Bangladesh’s giant neighbour, will be pleased with things, too. It is especially close to Sheikh Hasina and the avowedly secular Awami League, and it endorsed the January election. Those who set foreign policy in Delhi are anxious to prevent Bangladesh becoming, as it was before, a haven for insurgent groups that operate in India. They want Bangladesh to resist the sort of Islamist extremism prevalent in Pakistan. And they want it to help limit the flow of illegal Bangladeshi migrants flooding into India for work.

Sheikh Hasina shares India’s aims, while doing everything to flatten the opposition at home. It bodes ill for democratic government. But the state of the opposition—pinned down in court, on the streets and in parliament—suggests a modicum of outward calm may prevail for a while.

First published in the Economist, February 8th 2014

Pakistan, time to face the truth about Bangladesh

SMITA PRAKASH

There was some buzz again last week that Dr Manmohan Singh was contemplating a visit to Pakistan next month, before he hangs his boots. It is one of those rumours which in the past nine years has been neither denied by the foreign office nor confirmed. And the ‘news’ gained ground when a visiting bunch of Pakistani journalists reported that all that was left was a fixing of dates. Meanwhile it appears that the Prime Minister might instead be traveling to Myanmar to attend the summit of BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation). The interesting grouping consists of Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan and Nepal. Look East Sir, look East.

Pakistan is too occupied with ‘peace talks’ with the Taliban — which it calls a stake holder in its domestic political process — to bother with the Indian Prime Minister. Try figuring this out: the Taliban has asked Imran Khan to negotiate on its behalf in the peace talks with the government!

Last week, that Pakistani ‘social worker of repute’ Hafiz Saeed, no wait, ‘Professor’ Hafiz Saeed said in a rally that India was exerting pressure on the Bangladeshi government to hang Jamaat leaders. He was referring to the death sentence handed down by a Chittagong court to 14 men, including Bangladesh Jamaat chief Motiur Rahman Nizami, in the sensational 10 truck arms smuggling case of 2004. ULFA chief Paresh Barua was also given the death penalty in absentia.

In April 2004, Bangladesh police had seized 4,930 types of sophisticated firearms, 27,020 grenades, 840 rocket launchers, 300 rockets, 2,000 grenade launchers, 6,392 magazines and 1,140,520 bullets when they were being loaded on to 10 trucks headed to North East India. Barua, then in Bangladesh, worked closely with the ISI and the BNP, especially Khaleda Zia’s son Tarique Rehman. Both Barua and Tarique fled Bangladesh when the Awami League government came to power.

The ISI has always maintained its links with the Jamaat in Bangladesh, either through Bangladesh’s National Security Intelligence during BNP rule or lately through various non-state actors. Three Myanmar born Pakistani Taliban operatives were caught in Dhaka last month on a ‘jihad mission’.

Not just the ISI, Pakistan’s politicians too are vocal in their support for trans-national jihadi terrorists. Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Chaudhary Nisar described the capital punishment to Bangladesh’s war criminal Abdul Qadir Mollah as ‘judicial murder’. Mollah, known as the ‘Butcher of Mirpur’, and his Al Badr cohorts smashed to death a two year old on the floor, slit the throats of his pregnant mother and two sisters, and raped his two other sisters, one of whom died from her wounds. The one who survived testified against Mollah. 43 years later, Mollah was convicted and hanged for killing 344 civilians in 1971. A few days later, Pakistani politician Javed Hashmi (PTI) called Mollah as Shaheed-e-Pakistan. These are the kind of men that Pakistan’s leaders call heroes.

More than four decades after losing half of its country, Pakistan has still not come to terms with the fact that Bangladesh is systematically going ahead with bringing to trial the war crimes accused of 1971. And during that process, historical facts are coming to the fore once again. Pakistanis have been fed on a diet of lies about their history and their leaders are quite content to perpetuate that state of ignorance.

The denial runs deeper as evidenced from a report in Pakistani newspaper, The Nation (Jan 24, 2014) which denounces a Bollywood film to be released this month as an Indian conspiracy to defame Pakistan rather than an artistic interpretation by a private Indian film producer. The article says, “Based on anti-Pakistan propaganda, ‘The Bastard Child’, (now renamed ‘Children of War’) a Hindi language movie, has recently been released in India to tarnish the image of Pakistan and its armed forces around the world.”

“The movie, which has been made on the subject of 1970-1971 events in East Pakistan, depicts Pakistan Army in East Pakistan as an occupation army. It screens alleged atrocities committed by Pakistan Army personnel in East Pakistan, which ignited flames for its separation… Notwithstanding, peace endeavours initiated by government of Pakistan, India does not spare any opportunity to prick Pakistan. It quotes “sources” saying “This propaganda movie is an attempt to bring bad name to Pakistan.” If the YouTube trailers of the film provoked this extreme reaction, it is quite clear that the film will be banned in Pakistan, depriving yet another generation from knowing the truth about 1971.

First published in Mid-Day, India, January 3, 2014

Smita Prakash is Editor, News at Asian News International. You can follow her on twitter @smitaprakash

Bangladesh-India: Treaty of Hope

SANCHITA BHATTACHARYA

On October 7, 2013, Bangladesh's Cabinet ratified the Extradition Treaty with India. Disclosing this, Bangladesh Cabinet Secretary Mosharraf Hossain Bhuiyan stated that the Cabinet meeting was chaired by Bangladesh Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, and that the treaty would now require the approval of the Parliament in order to come into effect, following the exchange of documents after legal procedures by both countries. The Indian Cabinet had already ratified the treaty. On October 23, 2013, the instruments of ratifications were exchanged, and the Treaty came into effect. The Extradition Treaty had been inked on January 29, 2013.

Some of the significant aspects of the treaty include:

Article 5: Nothing in this Treaty shall preclude the extradition by the Requested State of its nationals either in respect of a territorial offence or in respect of an extra-territorial offence.

Article 11(1): In case of urgency, one Contracting State may request the other Contracting State to provisionally arrest the person sought. Such request shall be made in writing and transmitted to the Central Authority of the Requested State through diplomatic channels.

Article 17(1): When a request for extradition is granted, the Requested State shall, upon request and so far as its law allows, hand over to the Requesting State articles (including sums of money) which may serve as proof or evidence of the offence.

Article 18: Each Contracting State shall, to the extent permitted by its law, afford the other the widest measure of mutual assistance in criminal matters in connection with the offence for which extradition has been requested.

However, according to Article 6, persons accused of political crimes [offence of a political character] would not come under the purview of the Treaty. Further, offenders accused of small crimes, with a maximum penalty of imprisonment for less than one year, are also outside the scope of the Treaty. Article 8 states that the signing countries also reserve the right to refuse extradition.

Apart from its specific provisions, the Treaty well enhance the already-much-improved Indo-Bangladesh security ties. India hopes that the Treaty will facilitate the extradition of Anup Chetia alias Golap Barua, 'general secretary' of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and other criminals taking shelter in Bangladesh. Chetia has been in a Bangladesh jail since his arrest in 1997. A Bangladesh court jailed Chetia for seven years for illegal entry. Although his sentence has expired, he is still in Bangladesh custody. Chetia sought political asylum in Bangladesh thrice, in 2005, 2008 and in 2011, after being arrested from Dhaka's Mohammadpur area in 1997.

In addition to Chetia, National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) leader Thulunga alias Tensu Narzery and many other insurgents from India's insurgency-wracked north-east have been hiding in Bangladesh, and are now under imminent threat of deportation.

Bangladesh on the other hand, wants India's help in arresting and extraditing Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's killers. The suspects, Captain (Retired) Abdul Mazed and Risalder (Retired) Moslehuddin, are believed to be hiding in India. The treaty will also clear the way to bring back criminals like Subrata Bain and Sazzad Hossain to Bangladesh from India. Bain and Hossain are currently lodged in Delhi's high-security Tihar Jail. Bain was charged with carrying Fake Indian Currency Note (FICN), illegal arms and for illegal immigration into India. Hossain is wanted in cases of murder in Bangladesh. The Awami League government of Bangladesh contends that Bain and Hossain were involved in attacks that targeted its top leadership. Bain is an accused in the August 21, 2004, grenade attack on a rally of Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in Dhaka.

Further, with an over 4,000 kilometre the porous border between the two countries, mainly along India's insurgency-plagued north-eastern States, and reports suggesting that both Indian and trans-border terrorists are taking advantage of security gaps in the Indian State of West Bengal, the treaty will be crucial for both countries to take effective action against serious offenders for a wide variety of crimes, including terrorism, smuggling, human trafficking, organised crime, and white-collar crime. The treaty has also extended the scope of mutual cooperation on security and border related issues. It can be hoped, moreover, that it will help the enforcement agencies on both sides to secure their common goals of protecting their respective citizens and eliminating cross-border safe havens for criminals.

In addition, India has also operationalised the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in Criminal Matters with Bangladesh. The Legal Assistance Treaty assume importance in combating transnational organized crimes, trans-border terrorism, and other serious offences such as human and drug trafficking, money laundering, counterfeit currency, smuggling of arms and explosives, etc. Keeping in mind the regional challenges of terrorist funding and the recent Rohingya problem, such cooperation will create strong instruments of 'official hindrance' to anti-governmental formations and non-state actors with radical political agendas.

The India-Bangladesh relationship has been on a sustained upswing since Sheikh Hasina came to power in January 2009. With remarkable transformations in the domestic scenario, Dhaka sought to repair relations with Delhi, and to stamp out the anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh.

These gains, of course, remain tenuous. Recent developments, including the political turmoil in Bangladesh, and evidence that the US has revaluated its position on the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) - Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) combine, with an assessment in its favour, suggest that the outcome of the General Elections due before January 24, 2014, are deeply uncertain. A restoration to power of the BNP-Jamaat combine in Dhaka would lead to the inevitable resurgence of Islamist extremist radicalization and the anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh, and the rapid erosion of the gains of the past years in India-Bangladesh relations. Significantly, the Extradition Treaty has several loopholes, particularly including the clause that allows the signatory states to refuse extradition, which would allow an uncooperative Government to subvert the letter and spirit of the agreement. As with much else, South Asia remains a region of extreme uncertainty.

First appeared on South Asia IntelligenceReview, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 12, No. 19, November 11, 2013

Sanchita Bhattacharya is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management