How Long Can Pakistan Troops Hold In East Pakistan?

SALEEM SAMAD

In a crucial meeting held in Washington DC, on the morning of December 6, 1971, was attended by senior officials of departments of State, Defence, Joint Chief of Staffs, CIA, USAID, and others.

The heavyweight US Secretary for State at the onset of the meeting asked Gen. Westmoreland: What is your military assessment? How long can Pakistan hold out in the east [Bangladesh]?

Gen. Westmoreland candidly said, up to three weeks. Once Pakistan Army runs out of supplies, all the troops in East Pakistan [Bangladesh] will become a hostage.

No doubt sly Kissinger was worried about the safety and security of marauding Pakistan’s troops battling in occupied Bangladesh.

The United States seriously wanted to stick with withdrawal and ceasefire not a humiliating surrender of Pakistan troops and Kissinger assured the Pakistan regime that they doing all the best they can do diplomatically.

The perturbed Kissinger believed that there would be a massacre of the disarmed troops in the hands of the Mukti Bahini (Bangladesh Liberation Forces) after enemy soldiers are disarmed.

Three days after a full-scale war between India-Pakistan on the eastern front and Bangladesh-India jointly against Pakistan in the eastern war theatre, Henry Kissinger asked how long Pakistan troops can hold in Bangladesh.

The officials discussed whether there were any possibilities of Pakistan troop evacuation. Gen. Westmoreland responded in negative.

A senior official of the State Department asked Gen. Westmoreland that assuming the Indians take over Bangladesh, how do you think it will happen.

Gen. Westmoreland: I think their primary thrust will be to cut off the seaport of Chittagong. This will virtually cut off any possibility of resupply. Then they will move to destroy Pakistan’s regular forces, in cooperation with the Mukti Bahini. They will then be faced with the major job of restoring some order to the country. I think there will be a revenge massacre — possibly the greatest in the twentieth century.

Kissinger asked shall the Indians withdraw their army once the Pakistan forces were disarmed.

Gen. Westmoreland replied that he thinks they [Indians] will leave three or four divisions to work with the Mukti Bahini and pull the remainder back to the West [Pakistan].

The officials expect that the Indians will pull out as quickly as they can. Once the Pakistan forces are disarmed, the Indians will have a friendly population. They can afford to move back to the border areas quickly.

Another official in the nerve-breaking meeting predicted that after the Indian Army has been in Bangladesh for two or three weeks, they will be accepted as a “Hindu army of occupation”.

Kissinger asked: What will India do with Bangladesh? Will they see it as an independent state or have them negotiate with Islamabad?

An official responded that India has already recognised Bangladesh as an independent country. Kissinger said then there is no hope for Pakistan to negotiate with Bangladesh.

The objective of the prudent Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s government was to force a surrender of the Pakistani troops in Bangladesh within 10 days.

In a telegram from New Delhi on December 6, US Ambassador Kenneth Barnard Keating reported that Indian Foreign Secretary Triloki Nath Kaul had expressed “disappointment, shock and surprise” that the United States had tabled the resolution it did in the UNSC.

On December 5 the Soviet representative on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) vetoed an eight-power draft resolution that called for a ceasefire and mutual withdrawal of forces, as well as intensified efforts to create the conditions necessary for the return of refugees to their homes.

However, the UN Security Council accepted on December 6 that an impasse had been reached in its deliberations on the conflict in South Asia, and referred the issue to the General Assembly adopted by a vote of 11 to 0 with 4 abstentions.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s General Yahya Khan’s administration conveyed their intentions to retreat from their eastern wing to the United Nations on 10 December 1971, and a formal surrender was submitted and accepted when the Commander of Eastern Command and Governor of East Pakistan, General Niazi, signed an instrument of surrender with his counterpart, Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, Commander of Eastern Command.

An estimated 93,000 Pakistan troops and civilians including family members made an unconditional public surrender in Dhaka on December 16, 1971, which is observed each year as Victory Day both in Bangladesh and by Indian armed forces.

The surrender was indeed the largest surrender that the world had witnessed since the end of the Second World War.

Conclusion: Despite the growing anger among the Mukti Bahini commanders to avenge the extreme barbarity unleashed by Pakistan troops, fortunately, none of the disarmed enemy troops was killed or died for being held captive in military garrisons inside Bangladesh.

Soon after the Prisoners of War (POWs) were transferred to India, as newly born Bangladesh did not have the ability to the containment of such a huge number of POWs.

Under Tripartite Agreement in April 1974 between Bangladesh, India and Pakistan signed in New Delhi enabled the repatriation of all the 79,676 uniformed POWs and 13,324 civilians to Pakistan, including the 195 officers held for suspected war crimes.

First published in The News Times, December 16, 2022

Saleem Samad, is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at <saleemsamad@hotmail.com>; Twitter @saleemsamad

Securing Bangabandhu’s return

Bangabandhu Sheikh  Mujibur Rahman with Indian diplomat Sashanka S Banerjee onboard special flight from London to Dhaka via New Delhi

SALEEM SAMAD

A few days after the Pakistan forces’ humiliating defeat in the Eastern War Theatre and the surrender of occupation troops at Dhaka on December 16, 1971, Bangladesh’s government-in-exile, as well as the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, were left worried about Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman languishing in Mianwali Jail in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s would-be president, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was in New York attending heated UN Security Council meetings, had to air dash to Rawalpindi after he was informed by General Yahya Khan that he had resigned from his office as president of Pakistan and military commander.

Bhutto had been appointed the chief martial law administrator of Pakistan.

Indira Gandhi received a top-secret message that the Rawalpindi flight carrying Bhutto was scheduled for a stopover at Heathrow Airport in London. The Indian PM hurriedly called a meeting of the war cabinet in New Delhi at her South Block office to discuss Bhutto’s journey home. She wanted a reliable point-person who would be present for Bhutto’s arrival at Heathrow, so she could get an intelligence feed.

India desperately wanted to learn what Bhutto was thinking -- whether he would release Rahman and let him return home, or carry out the Pakistan military court’s verdict of death.

The meeting was attended by Durga Prasad Dhar, head of policy planning in the Ministry of External Affairs; Ram Nath Kao, chief of RAW; PN Haksar, the prime minister’s principal secretary; and TN Kaul, the foreign secretary. 

A plan was drawn, with no guarantee of acquiring the vital intelligence of the fate of Sheikh Mujib. Incidentally, a highest ranked Pakistan bureaucrat, Muzaffar Hussain, former chief secretary of the government of East Pakistan and posted in Dhaka, had become a prisoner of war (POW) along with 93,000 military, other combatants, civil officers, and families.

Hussain was staying as a VIP guest at the official residence of DP Dhar. On the other hand, his wife, Laila Hussain, was visiting London when the war broke out in December and remained stranded. Both husband (in Delhi) and wife (in London) were communicating with each other through diplomatic channels. 

Fortunately, Sashanka S Banerjee, an Indian diplomat in the Indian mission in London, had befriended Laila Hussain. Indira knew that Laila and Bhutto had been good friends. Thus, the South Block decided to play a one-off diplomatic “summit” at the VIP lounge, the Alcock and Brown Suite, at Heathrow airport. Banerjee persuaded Laila to meet Bhutto at the airport lounge and ask him if he could help in getting her husband released from Delhi.

The two friends, Laila and Bhutto, met at Heathrow airport. The meet and greet turned out to be a historic diplomatic thriller. Bhutto responded to Laila’s emotional appeal for help in getting her husband released from Indian custody. He pulled her aside and whispered to Laila a very sensitive, top-secret message for the Indian prime minister, writes Banerjee in his memoir.

“Laila, I know what you want. I can imagine you are [carrying a request] from Mrs Indira Gandhi. Do please pass a message to her, that after I take charge of office back home, I will shortly thereafter release Mujibur Rahman, allowing him to return home. What I want in return, I will let Mrs Indira Gandhi know through another channel. You may now go.”

The Indian High Commission in London urgently shot out a priority message to the South Block, based on Laila’s encounter with Bhutto. Indira Gandhi was excited that Bhutto had sent out a positive message. 

Meanwhile, within hours, a diplomatic message came from Islamabad confirming the authenticity of Laila’s report.

Bangladesh leaders received a secret message from the South Block regarding the release of Sheikh Mujib -- the architect of Bangladesh’s independence would first land in London and then fly from there to Dhaka via Delhi. 

Bhutto dared to over-rule the death sentence handed out by a military court in Rawalpindi and released Mujib on January 8, 1972. On January 10, 1972, Mujib returned as a hero to a war-ravaged homeland -- but an independent Bangladesh.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune, 11 May 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad

Pakistan: Getting away with genocide

Anwar Hossain's photo of skull in 1971-Photo: Anwar Hossain

How the 195 Pakistani officers escaped prosecution for their war crimes

SALEEM SAMAD

Many believed that another Nuremberg trial would commence once Bangladesh accused 195 Pakistan military officers of war crimes and other related crimes.

Pakistan’s Attorney General, fearing for the officers, filed a petition, “Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War” (Pakistan versus India) on May 11, 1973, seeking the intervention of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Hague, Netherlands.

Pakistan instituted proceedings against India concerning the 195 POWs; according to Pakistan, India proposed to hand over to Bangladesh, who was suspected of acts of genocide and war crimes.

Pakistan’s application was filed in ICJ, instituting proceedings against India in respect of a “dispute concerning charges of genocide against 195 Pakistani nationals, prisoners of war, or civilian internees in Indian custody.”

India stated that there was no legal basis for the court’s jurisdiction in the matter and that Pakistan’s application was without legal effect. Pakistan hurriedly informed the court that negotiations had taken place, and requested to discontinue the application in July 1973. Accordingly, the case was removed from the list in December 1973.

On July 2, 1972 -- eight months after the POWs issue, Pakistan’s President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed the historic Simla Agreement. The crucial negotiation was held following the brutal birth of Bangladesh in 1971 and nearly 93,000 Pakistani forces and civilians were taken as POWs. The deal enabled India to agree to release all the POWs.

Earlier on Sheikh Mujib’s requests in March 1972 and for their safety and well-being, the POWs were transported to India. India treated the war prisoners in accordance with the Geneva Convention, 1925, but used this issue as a tool to coerce Pakistan into recognizing the sovereignty of Bangladesh after three countries reached a compromise in 1974.

Bangladesh was processing formalities to bring charges against the 195 prisoners for war crimes in their special courts established in Dhaka. To punish the 195 war criminals, Bangladesh enacted the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act (ICT Act 1973), to authorize the investigation and prosecution of the persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other crimes under international law committed in 1971.

Once Mujib announced that Bangladesh would put the war crimes suspects on the docks, the military hawks in Rawalpindi interned almost all the Bangla-speaking officers and soldiers in the army, navy, air force, border guards, police, and civil bureaucrats as POWs.

Bhutto also announced that several officers and civil bureaucrats would be tried for sedition and other crimes according to the Pakistan Army Act of 1952. This news alarmed Mujib who immediately sought help from friendly countries to exert diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.

Thus, both Bangladesh and India succumbed to the political blackmail of Pakistan. The three countries signed a historic “Bangladesh-India-Pakistan: Agreement of Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees” on April 9, 1974.

Dr Kamal Hossain, then Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, stated in the agreement: “The excesses and manifold crimes committed by those prisoners of war constituted, according to the relevant provisions of the UN General Assembly resolutions and international law, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, and that there was universal consensus that the persons charged with such crimes as the 195 Pakistani prisoners of war should be held to account and subjected to the due process of law.”

The negotiators of the Tripartite Agreement failed to have included a guarantee clause of the military trial of the war crimes suspects. Therefore, the 195 returned safely to Pakistan without being produced in any tribunal in Bangladesh nor were they charged under the Pakistan Military Act.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune, 23 March 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He can be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad

America’s political motives further complicated Bangladesh’s Liberation War

Photo: BIGSTOCK

SALEEM SAMAD

Pakistan’s acceptance of Bangladesh’s independence during the height of the Liberation War in 1971 would have shed more bloodletting in the restive region.

The supposedly brokered ceasefire by China and America would have surely collapsed, as the Mukti Bahini, the East Bengal guerrillas, would not have obeyed the call.

By October, the Pakistani junta had deliberately transferred back to Pakistan the amphibian battle tanks, the newly-installed radar at Dhaka was dismantled, as were the squadron of fighter aircraft, which were brought from China.

For many in Karachi, where the military hardware was unloaded in the port, they understood that it was a matter of weeks. The eastern province was to become an independent country, but it was worried about thousands of soldiers and officers, civil administration, business entrepreneurs, and Pakistan civilians in the eastern province.

Henry Kissinger, the double-edge former US secretary of state, in an interview by Jeffrey Goldberg published in The Atlantic, said talks between America and China would have collapsed if the US had publicly condemned human rights violations and atrocities by the Pakistan army against the people of then East Pakistan.

Months before the violent crackdown Operation Searchlight by the Pakistan military, Pakistan emerged as the interlocutor most acceptable to Beijing and Washington, and exchanges were conducted from Islamabad.

Goldberg’s question was whether the opening to China was worth the sacrifices and deaths experienced in the India-Pakistan Bangladesh crisis, to which Kissinger retorted that Bangladesh demonstrates how this issue has been confused in our public debate. There was never a choice between suffering in Bangladesh and the opening to China.

He did not hesitate to state that Pakistan deployed extreme violence and gross human rights violations when Bangladesh was battling to achieve independence.

“The US diplomats witnessing the Bangladesh tragedy were ignorant of the opening to China. Their descriptions were heartfelt and valid, but we could not respond publicly,” he said.

By the time of the Bangladesh crisis in 1971 -- when Pakistan imposed martial law to crush the territory’s bid for independence -- Nixon felt he owed Pakistan’s military dictator, General Yahya Khan, a debt of gratitude for his government’s role in facilitating Kissinger’s secret trip to China, ignoring reports of Pakistan’s military atrocities against Bangladeshi civilians. 

The US actively supported Pakistan, to the extent of violating congressional restrictions on supplying arms to Pakistani troops.

“In November, the Pakistani president agreed with Nixon to grant independence the following March,” Kissinger said.

But the following December, “India, after having made a treaty including military provisions with the Soviet Union, and in order to relieve the strain of refugees, invaded East Pakistan,” he said, adding that the US had to navigate between Soviet pressures, Indian objectives, Chinese suspicions, and Pakistani nationalism.

“By March 1972 -- within less than a year of the commencement of the crisis  -- Bangladesh was independent; the India-Pakistan War ended, and the opening to China completed at a summit in Beijing in February 1972,” said Kissinger.

In his book World Order, Kissinger describes India as “a fulcrum of twenty first century order: An indispensable element, based on its geography, resources, and tradition of sophisticated leadership, in the strategic and ideological evolution of the regions and the concepts of order at whose intersection it stands.”

But in 1971, when Pakistan’s erstwhile eastern wing fought to become Bangladesh, Kissinger made a U-Turn and scorned India as “a Soviet stooge, supported with Soviet arms” over its support for Bangladesh independence.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune on 19 October 2020

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He can be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com. Twitter @saleemsamad

The nation seeks official list of martyred intellectuals

Postal stamp in memory of martyred intellectuals. (From top left) Dr Harinath Dey, Dr Lt Col A F Z Rahman, Mamum Mahmud, Mohsin Ali Dewan; (from bottom left) Dr Lt Col N A M Jahangir, Shah Abdul Majid, Muhammad Akhter and Meherunnesa. PHOTO: COURTESY

SALEEM SAMAD

To this day the nation does not have a list of intellectuals abducted and murdered by the marauding Pakistan army and their local henchmen who joined in the plunder, genocide, and rape during the brutal birth of Bangladesh in 1971.

Last week Faruq Faisel, son of martyred journalist Mohsin Ali Dewan approached Mohammad Jahangir Hossain, director general of Jatiya Muktijuddho Council (Jamuka) under the Ministry of Liberation War Affairs.

He described that his father was abducted by the Pakistan army accompanied by armed militia, the Razakars, from his home in Bogura on June 3, 1971. He was the editor of weekly Uttar Bongo Bulletin, published from Bogura and was first elected president of Bogura Press Club. He was also principal of Sherpur Degree College and also established Bogura Law College, Shah Sultan College, and Joypurhat College. His body was never found.

Faruq sought the Jamuka chief’s advice regarding formalities to enlist Mohsin Ali Dewan’s name in the official document of martyred intellectuals. He was surprised to hear that the government does not have any policy to list murdered intellectuals.

Faruq Faisel, presently the regional director for Bangladesh and South Asia of international media rights organisation Article 19, was shocked to learn this from the DG of Jamuka. The government has not published a gazette notification regarding the documentation and compilation of a list of intellectuals who were singled out by the Pakistan army and killed.

Earlier, in a statement in the parliament on February 6, 2014, Liberation War Affairs Minister AKM Mozammel Huq informed that a complete list would be published by June 2014. The list has not seen the light of the day.

The intellectuals were abducted, tortured and killed by Pakistan army and their henchmen Al Badr, the secret death squad who were recruited from among the hardcore members of Islami Chhatra Sangha. The student outfit was rechristened as Islami Chhatra Shibir in 1977, with a similar ideology of Islami Chhatra Sangha.

Most of the senior level Al Badr commanders were indicted for crimes against humanity and tried at the International Crimes Tribunal. The tribunal handed down the death penalty to the leaders of Islami Chhatra Sangha held responsible for the death of intellectuals.

Thousands of intellectuals mostly university, college and school teachers, academics, politicians, filmmakers, physicians, poets, writers, journalists, engineers, sportsmen, lawyers, lyricists, singers, eminent personalities who had been deemed threats by the Pakistan army were abducted, tortured and executed.

The Bangladesh Post Office has issued dozens of commemorative stamps valued at Taka 2 in the memory of the martyred intellectuals.

It is widely speculated that the killings of intellectuals were orchestrated by Major General Rao Farman Ali. After the liberation of Bangladesh, a list of Bengali intellectuals (most of whom were executed on December 14) were found in pages of his diary, left behind at the Governor’s House (now Bangabhaban).

Various names of martyrs often appear in the media quoting different sources including Banglapedia, which listed 1,111 martyred intellectuals. Filmmaker Zahir Raihan, after going through General Ali’s diary, documents, and daily newspapers, claimed to have found 20,000 names. Unfortunately, he was abducted and went missing without a trace since January 1972.

The killing of the intellectuals virtually began following the army crackdown in Dhaka on the night of March 25. The Pakistan army during Operation Searchlight targeted victims and killed them systematically.

An initiative was undertaken by the Ministry of Liberation War Affairs to prepare a countrywide list of the Razakars, Al Badrs, Al Shams and other henchmen of Pakistan military, which we highly appreciate.

Besides preparing a complete list of the collaborators of the Pakistan army for crimes against humanity during the birth of Bangladesh, the concerned authorities should have also taken the initiative to document the names of our martyred intellectuals as a national priority.

First published in The Daily Star, 14 December 2019

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellow (USA) and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could reached at <saleemsamad@hotmail.com>; Twitter @saleemsamad

The Bangladesh Paradox

File photo: Voters long queue during parliamentary election in a small town in Bangladesh

WILLIAM B MILAM

Bangladesh is in crisis mode again. Every five years, as predictable as its annual monsoon, but not nearly as monotonous, comes the quinqennial political crisis. These occur because the Constitution mandates a general election every five years, and elections bring on crisis because incumbent parties spare no effort, no matter how legally or morally questionable, to win re-election. The opposition’s scruples are no less reprehensible, however lacking they are in constitutional mechanisms to manipulate to their advantage. Violence, and sometimes extreme violence, is at the top of the election tool box of both parties.

And yet, no incumbent party has ever been re-elected in the era of electoral politics, because in every election, the record of the party in power is such that the voters are desperate to give the opposition a chance to show it can do better. The voters are always disappointed. In Bangladesh politics, as in all politics in all countries, hope repeatedly triumphs over experience. This year is the same: the polls show that a free and fair election would bring the opposition to power; and the government has done all in its power, and perhaps if the Constitution and Supreme Court are read literally, a lot that is not legally in its power, to remain in office.

Currently, the political impasse over election procedures has led the opposition to threaten to boycott the election and to launch a violent blockade of Dhaka. The opposition assumes that an election without the participation of the other half of the polity would be regarded by, at least, half the voters and by the outside world, as illegitimate. The loss of life is mounting, not just among the party apparatchiks, but among innocent bystanders, yet the government shows no signs of agreeing.

Business leaders and most of civil society, as well as the international community, are crying for an agreement between the two party leaders. Many in civil society want a ‘recess’ from politics, the elements of which range from: 1) postponing the election for a few months until things are worked out; to 2) a ‘reset pause’ which is a euphemism for a military intervention and a technocratic government devoted to rebuilding institutions and reforming the parties.

It didn’t work before, so why would it work now? The answer to that lies, probably in a riddle called ‘The Bangladesh Paradox’. That paradox is that Bangladesh defies modernisation theory, which remains the intellectual foundation of much development activity. Simply put, this theory is that political development is linked to high sustained rates of economic growth, lowered rates of poverty, marked improvement in social indicators such as education, literacy, public health. In other words, a rising tide of income and social advancement raises all boats, and through growth and advancement of the middle class, democratic structures and institutions, and thus democracy itself, will follow inevitably.

There is no empirical evidence for this conclusion and, in fact, much evidence against it (China, Malaysia, among others). Bangladesh has achieved GDP growth of five-six per cent for almost 20 years; its social indicators are better than India (and grossly better than Pakistan) and probably only surpassed in South Asia by Sri Lanka. So, why has it marched backward on the authoritarian/democratic axis towards a more authoritarian state? The primary reason is surely that formal democracy, lacking the checks and balances of real democracy, has hollowed out its institutions by turning them into mechanisms for the ruling party (either one) to extract the growing economic rents to be had from an expanding economy.

The reaction of most outsiders to the present crisis is that things will work out as they always have. In past crises, the incumbent party always had to give up and the opposition took office, to restore balance if not functionality. But history does not always repeat itself. If the government actually goes forward with its planned one-party election, the ensuing violence could bring it down and/or make another election necessary, which the opposition would probably win. That is, sadly, the best-case scenario. The alternative is worse, a government which, because of the perverted institutions of the state, is in a position to eliminate the opposition as a force to be reckoned with, and move towards a one-party state. This election, Instead of deja vu all over again, could be the tipping point to something entirely new on the subcontinent.

Published in The Express Tribune, December 10, 2013

William B Milam served as US ambassador to Pakistan from 1998 to 2001. He is also Senior Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.

War crimes trials are a defining moment for Bangladesh

In Bangladesh, a moderate Muslim nation of 160 million people, a revolution is unfolding to keep the country’s secular character alive.

MOZAMMEL H. KHAN

In Bangladesh, a moderate Muslim nation of 160 million people, a revolution is unfolding to keep the country’s secular character alive. For two months now, hundreds of thousands of people from young men and women, aging former guerrilla fighters and grandmothers who still carry the scars of genocide, have occupied Shahbag Square in the capital, Dhaka. The collective anger of a nation, simmering below the surface for more than 40 years, has been called the country’s second war of liberation.

The roots of this resentment lie in the genocide of the Bengali people (of the then-East Pakistan, separated from West Pakistan by 1,600 km) that started in March 1971. The Pakistan Army wanted to overturn the verdict of the only general election in Pakistan, won by the East Pakistani party led by the charismatic leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

The Pakistani occupation army and its accused Bengali collaborators, the mullahs of the Jamaat-e-Islami party, imposed a nine-month war of horrors on the Bengalis. The Bengalis fought back in what they saw as a war of liberation. The genocide resulted in an estimated 3 million killed and 200,000 women raped by the occupation forces and their Bengali accomplices, before the Pakistani Army’s humiliating surrender to combined Indian and Bangladeshi guerrilla forces in December 1971.

The government of the newly created state, Bangladesh, started trials of the Bengali collaborators, mostly members of the Jamaat-e-Islami, under a newly enacted law, the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act of 1973. However, the trials were stopped following the tragic assassination of the president and founding father in 1975.

It was not until 2008 when the current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Rahman’s daughter, campaigned on a promise to set up tribunals to try the 1971 collaborators for war crimes. She was swept into power in the fairest election in the country’s history, winning all but 30 seats in a 300-member parliament. In 2010 the war crimes trials finally began.

Among the first to be convicted was a senior leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Abdul Quader Mollah (incidentally my own roommate in college days). But instead of the death sentence, Mollah was given life imprisonment with the possibility of a future pardon, if a change of guard takes place at the helm of the state. Hearing that his life had been saved, Mollah turned to the news cameras and, with a huge grin on his face, waved a victory sign to the crowd.

While Mollah was euphoric, liberal and secular Bangladeshis were infuriated. How could a man pronounced guilty of war crimes, accused of raping and shooting 344 civilians to death during the 1971 war, not receive the maximum punishment, the death sentence?

Within hours of the judgment, which was handed down on Feb. 5, ordinary students and bloggers used Facebook and Twitter to rally their contacts. Soon an impromptu gathering of hundreds, then thousands, and soon hundreds of thousands collected at Dhaka’s Shahbag Square.

For weeks, they have been there and despite the gruesome murder of one of the leaders, have kept their movement peaceful. The protesters wanted the government to amend the law to make it possible for the prosecution to appeal the decision of the tribunal, which the parliament did, to bring equity to the law, since only the defendants were able to appeal. In addition, they want a ban on Jamaat-e-Islami as a collaborator that took active part of the genocide.

The mullahs of the Jamaat-e-Islami, on the other hand, label the leaders of the uprising as atheist and anti-Islamic, even though religion and personal faith have no part in the current resurrection of patriotism.

For the first time ever in the Muslim world, there has been a popular uprising against the fascism of an Islamist party that garnered only 3 per cent of votes in the last general election. One would have expected the western intelligentsia to be thrilled at this development and for the media to report from the square. Instead, there have been many distorted reports criticizing the war crimes trials in such major publications as The Economist of London.

The uprising back home has touched the hearts and souls of Bangladeshis around the world, including the estimated 50,000 people of Bangladeshi origin who live in the Greater Toronto Area. Over the past few weeks, rallies organized by Bangladeshi students and attended by hundreds have been taking place in Toronto every weekend to support the historic demonstrations in Shahbag Square, where the spirit of the liberation war is being rekindled.

First published in TheToronto Star, April 16 2013

Mozammel H. Khan teaches engineering at the Sheridan Institute of Technology and Advanced Learning and is the Convener of the Canadian Committee for Human Rights and Democracy in Bangladesh

A trial for the future of Bangladesh

Bangladesh independence activists demand trial of war criminals

HAROON HABIB

The war crime tribunals were set up to address a deep-seated national demand for justice, but they are facing a hostile campaign by vested interests at home and abroad

December is a landmark month for Bangladesh. It is the month of the liberation of the country from Pakistan in 1971. And it is also a reminder of a great national tragedy — it was during the same month that year that the marauding Pakistani army and their local agents systematically eliminated hundreds of secular intellectuals just before the liberation on December 16, 1971. It capped a nine-month orgy of violence against civilians in which three million people were killed, 400,000 women were raped and 10 million people fled for bordering Indian States as refugees.

This year, as the country celebrates four decades of its independence, it also faces the task of completing a historic trial against the perpetrators of those horrific crimes.

The trial was long overdue. The events following the bloody coup in 1975 in which Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was assassinated, and the divisive politics thereafter, caused many delays in reckoning with the cruelties. When Sheikh Hasina came to power, this was on her agenda. The move towards justice began on March 25, 2010, under a domestic law framed in 1971. But the path is yet not easy.

In the crucial last year of its tenure, the Hasina government faces, on the one hand, street protests by opposition parties positioning themselves ahead of the elections, and on the other, organized opposition against the trial by the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami, the party that had opposed Bangladesh’s independence, supported by the Khaleda Zia-led Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

Jamaat-e-Islami and its militant students wing, Islami Chatra Shibir, have chosen the route of organized street violence. Their aim is clear — they want their key leaders, now on trial in war crimes tribunals, to be set free. Jamaat cadres — no one can forget that the party sided with Pakistan army in all conceivable ways to foil the national quest for freedom — have gone as far as to attack the police, snatching their rifles and setting on fire dozens of police vehicles in Dhaka and across the country. They also attacked the Law Minister's motorcade.

The spate of attacks across the country has left several hundred policemen injured, many of them hospitalized with serious injuries. The government sees these as ominous signs of a plot to destabilise the country and foil the trial. The manner in which the police came under attack was somewhat unprecedented, and astonishingly, in most cases, the police lost the battle to the attackers.

Neither have the arrests of a few hundreds Jamaatis stopped the violence. Jamaat, which has grown over the years to become the most organized cadre-based party both in terms of its funding and structure, launched the offensive from November, continuing it into the nationally sensitive month of December. In the backdrop of sustained street violence, secular, pro-liberation forces are seriously concerned that if such violence in the name of democracy is not checked, it may emerge as a single biggest threat to country’s liberal polity and security. There have been calls for a ban on Jamaat, but there are concerns too that proscription might send the party underground, with more dangerous consequences.

The main opposition BNP has not condemned the actions of its Islamist ally. Rather, it has been providing vital support to Jamaat’s game plan, to the extent that even BNP sympathizers are concerned that the “poisonous weed” of Jamaat’s theocratic and medieval political and social agenda might ultimately eat up the very vitals of what remains of the party’s remaining liberalism.

Alongside the unrest for the release of those on trial, Bangladesh has been witness to a separate set of violent protests by BNP and Jamaat for restoration of the caretaker government system. Pro-government activists, such as the Awami League student wings, have only added to a volatile situation by taking it upon themselves to thwart the opposition protests.

A number of cases in the war crimes courts are awaiting verdict, but the trial process has come under an increasingly hostile campaign at home and abroad. The head of one tribunal stepped down on December 11 after a controversy over his leaked Skype conversations with an expatriate war crimes expert. The tribunal chief’s e-mail and Skype accounts were hacked and the private conversations were published by a pro-opposition newspaper. The resignation, just ahead of case judgments, came as a big shock to vast majority of people who want justice done, but were celebrated as a “victory” by the Jamaat and BNP.

A total of 10 accused — most are Jamaat leaders — are presently in the dock. Jamaat has reportedly deployed significant sums of money to influence the US policymakers against the war crimes trial. Law minister, Shafique Ahmed, alleged that the government has evidence to show that Jamaat has appointed lobbying firms in the U.S. and the U.K. to frustrate the trial. The minister alleged publicly that Mir Kashem Ali, a Jamaat leader now facing trial, and also the key person behind the fast growing Islamic Bank, as also the head of Jamaat’s media house, had paid $25 million to the U.S. lobbying firm Casadian Associates.

These challenges to the war crimes trials have, in one sense, reawakened the “pro-liberation” forces, making them aware that there is no room for complacency. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who sees a conspiracy to malign her government at home and abroad, has vowed to move ahead with the trial to fulfil a national obligation.

While the Hasina government can take credit for some unique achievements towards secularising Bangladesh and improving relations with India, some high profile scams, including alleged corruption in the Padma bridge construction, the high prices of essentials, and the bad image of some ministers and field level activists, have all seen its popularity come down. The opportunity is being utilised by those who want this government to collapse even ahead of the next election, so that the vital war crime trial suffers a setback. The scrapping of the caretaker government system, and the U.S. displeasure over the government’s treatment of the Nobel Laureate and Grameen Bank founder Muhammed Yunus have complicated the scenario for Prime Minister Sheikha Hasina.

It is to be hoped that the fast developing situation will not impede the landmark trial, vital for healing a deep national wound. The trial is not only crucial for Bangladesh, but also for the region. If it stalls, there is every possibility of a resurgence of religious extremism in Bangladesh that is bound to affect its neighbours. Born out of a national war fought against religious bigotries and military chauvinism, Bangladesh cannot allow on its soil the tragedies being experienced by Afghanistan and Pakistan.

First published in The Hindu, Chennai, India, December 24, 2012

Haroon Habib, is a journalist based in Bangladesh, news correspondent for The Hindu  and independence war veteran