Remembering the forgotten reports of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission

SALEEM SAMAD

Judge Hamoodur Rahman, along with two Pakistan High Court judges, worked tediously for five years and was able to submit the final reports on the Pakistan military’s failure since they launched the notorious “Operation Searchlight.” 

However, the report lies buried, with little or no accountability; the report never saw the light of day and was kept as highly classified documents in fear of backlash. 

The Hamoodur Rahman Commission (also known as the War Enquiry Commission), assessed Pakistan’s military involvement from 1947 to 1971. The commission was set up on December 26, 1971. 

When the Mukti Bahini and the Indian army threw their full might, the occupation forces had to negotiate an instrument of surrender on December 16, 1971. The surrender at Dhaka, according to war historians, was the largest surrender of the military after the historic surrender of Germany, Italy, and Japan, which brought an end to WWII.

The Commission interviewed 213 persons of interest that included former president Yahya Khan, politician Nurul Amin, Abdul Hamid Khan (Chief of Army), Abdul Rahim Khan (Chief of Air Force), Muzaffar Hassan (Chief of Navy), Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, senior commanders, activists, journalists, and various political leaders.

The Commission also interviewed Gen Tikka Khan, Gen AAK Niazi, and Gen Rao Farman Ali who were responsible for the horrific war crimes in Bangladesh.

In 1974, the Commission again resumed its work and interviewed 300 freed POWs and recorded 73 more bureaucrats’ testimonies that served on government assignments in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).

The report recognized the atrocities and systematic massacre at Dhaka University which led to recommendations of holding public trials for civilian bureaucrats and court-martials for the senior officers. It is theorized that the first report is very critical of the Pakistan military’s interference in politics and misconduct of politicians in the country’s political atmosphere.

The military headquarters in Rawalpindi and Bhutto himself maintained that the first report should be classified to “save [the military’s] honour”. The report was marked Top Secret because Bhutto told Indian journalist Salil Tripathi in 1976 that he was concerned that it would demoralize the military and might trigger unrest.

Both the first and the supplementary report lashed out at the Pakistan Army for “senseless and wanton arson, killings in the countryside, killing of intellectuals and professionals and burying them in mass graves, killing of officers of East Pakistan Army and soldiers on the pretense of quelling their rebellion, killing East Pakistani civilian officers, businessmen and industrialists, raping a large number of East Pakistani women as a deliberate act of revenge, retaliation and torture, and deliberate killing of members of the Hindu minority.”

The report also did not hesitate to accuse military dictator General Yahya Khan of being a womanizer, debaucher, and an alcoholic. He was forced to step down after Pakistan’s defeat in December 1971.

Rahman asked Bhutto for the feedback and status of the report. Bhutto remained silent for a while and replied that the report was missing. It was either lost, or stolen, and was nowhere to be found, he remarked.

Justice Rahman also asked the Chief of Army Staff General Zia-ul-Haq on the fate of the report who also commented that the original report was nowhere to be found, and nobody knew where the report went missing -- either at the Army GHQ or the National Archives of Pakistan.

In the 1990s, curiosity over the report grew when a Pakistan daily newspaper leaked the classified report which was lying at the army HQ in Rawalpindi. 

The trials of Gul Hassan, Abdul Rahim Khan, and Muzaffar Hassan were held in the light of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission’s recommendations. 

In December 2000, 29 years after the report was compiled, the War Report was finally declassified by Pakistan’s military dictator Pervez Musharraf. Subsequently, Bangladesh officially requested a copy of the report through diplomatic channels.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune on 13 April 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad

Pakistan: Getting away with genocide

Anwar Hossain's photo of skull in 1971-Photo: Anwar Hossain

How the 195 Pakistani officers escaped prosecution for their war crimes

SALEEM SAMAD

Many believed that another Nuremberg trial would commence once Bangladesh accused 195 Pakistan military officers of war crimes and other related crimes.

Pakistan’s Attorney General, fearing for the officers, filed a petition, “Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War” (Pakistan versus India) on May 11, 1973, seeking the intervention of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in the Hague, Netherlands.

Pakistan instituted proceedings against India concerning the 195 POWs; according to Pakistan, India proposed to hand over to Bangladesh, who was suspected of acts of genocide and war crimes.

Pakistan’s application was filed in ICJ, instituting proceedings against India in respect of a “dispute concerning charges of genocide against 195 Pakistani nationals, prisoners of war, or civilian internees in Indian custody.”

India stated that there was no legal basis for the court’s jurisdiction in the matter and that Pakistan’s application was without legal effect. Pakistan hurriedly informed the court that negotiations had taken place, and requested to discontinue the application in July 1973. Accordingly, the case was removed from the list in December 1973.

On July 2, 1972 -- eight months after the POWs issue, Pakistan’s President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed the historic Simla Agreement. The crucial negotiation was held following the brutal birth of Bangladesh in 1971 and nearly 93,000 Pakistani forces and civilians were taken as POWs. The deal enabled India to agree to release all the POWs.

Earlier on Sheikh Mujib’s requests in March 1972 and for their safety and well-being, the POWs were transported to India. India treated the war prisoners in accordance with the Geneva Convention, 1925, but used this issue as a tool to coerce Pakistan into recognizing the sovereignty of Bangladesh after three countries reached a compromise in 1974.

Bangladesh was processing formalities to bring charges against the 195 prisoners for war crimes in their special courts established in Dhaka. To punish the 195 war criminals, Bangladesh enacted the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act (ICT Act 1973), to authorize the investigation and prosecution of the persons responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other crimes under international law committed in 1971.

Once Mujib announced that Bangladesh would put the war crimes suspects on the docks, the military hawks in Rawalpindi interned almost all the Bangla-speaking officers and soldiers in the army, navy, air force, border guards, police, and civil bureaucrats as POWs.

Bhutto also announced that several officers and civil bureaucrats would be tried for sedition and other crimes according to the Pakistan Army Act of 1952. This news alarmed Mujib who immediately sought help from friendly countries to exert diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.

Thus, both Bangladesh and India succumbed to the political blackmail of Pakistan. The three countries signed a historic “Bangladesh-India-Pakistan: Agreement of Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees” on April 9, 1974.

Dr Kamal Hossain, then Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, stated in the agreement: “The excesses and manifold crimes committed by those prisoners of war constituted, according to the relevant provisions of the UN General Assembly resolutions and international law, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, and that there was universal consensus that the persons charged with such crimes as the 195 Pakistani prisoners of war should be held to account and subjected to the due process of law.”

The negotiators of the Tripartite Agreement failed to have included a guarantee clause of the military trial of the war crimes suspects. Therefore, the 195 returned safely to Pakistan without being produced in any tribunal in Bangladesh nor were they charged under the Pakistan Military Act.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune, 23 March 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He can be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad