Narendra Modi came, he saw, but he did not conquer

Narendra Modi speaks on the occasion of Bangladesh's 50th Independence Day - FOCUS BANGLA

The expectations of the common people in Bangladesh were left unfulfilled

SALEEM SAMAD

Fifty years ago, in 1971, India added colours of victories and feathers on Bangladesh’s hat.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi recently came, saw, but couldn’t conquer the hearts and minds of the people of Bangladesh. His Bangladesh visit was to mark the 50th anniversary of Bangladesh’s nationhood, despite the coronavirus pandemic.

Possibly, Modi couldn’t fulfil the expectations of the “aam janata” of the country.

The agitation spearheaded by the left alliance and its student group protested Modi’s visit. Quickly, the Islamist groups voiced their protests, followed by the rightist parties.

The Islamists blamed India for the persecution of the Muslims in India, especially in Kashmir.

None was surprised as to why the Islamists, right and left elements, failed also to mention the Uighur Muslims facing ethnic cleansing in China, the crimes against humanity in Balochistan under Pakistan occupation, and the humanitarian crisis in Yemen caused by the proxy war by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates against Iran.

Nothing to deny about the fact that the two South Asian neighbours, Bangladesh and India, share a common history, and linguistic and cultural heritage. The two neighbours’ strategic locations complement each other and offer an opportunity to further develop economic ties.

Nevertheless, the brutal birth of Bangladesh shattered the so-called myth of the contentious “two-nation theory,” a dream of the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in less than 25 years.

East Bengal, a Muslim majority region, decided to be wedded into weird bondage with a country separated by nearly 2,026 kilometres. But elites and military rulers of Pakistan frowned at the fish-and-rice-eating Bangalis as second-class citizens.

After nine months of birth pangs, the country was liberated from the yoke of the marauding Pakistan troops.

India is the world’s largest democracy, but it was not economically stable in the 70s, and had to bear the burden of providing shelter, food, and health care to more than 10 million refugees.

As the war unfolded in the eastern theatre, India embraced new enemies, including China, the United States, and the Arab countries, as she stood shoulder to shoulder with Bangladesh.

The good offices of Indian civil administration, diplomacy, and armed forces played a pro-active role in creating a nation.

The military and diplomacy of the countries mentioned above tilted towards Pakistan, which further encouraged their evil plans to commit genocide, with the intent towards ethnic cleansing of Bangalis as a nation.

The military hawks in Rawalpindi GHQ deliberately targeted Hindus after declaring them as Kufrs or Kafirs -- enemies of Islam.

To augment military aid to the Liberation War, to muster support from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, India signed the historic Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation on August 9, 1971.

The Indo-Soviet treaty had a direct impact on the decisive battle, which expedited Bangladesh independence and brought about the surrender of occupation Pakistan forces in mid-December 1971.

Indira’s efforts in September to win the hearts of the West and international bodies in favour of the Bangladesh cause had indeed melted the ice.

Months after the war, a joint communiqué surprised many that the two countries (Bangladesh and India) had agreed to pull out the victorious Indian army. Never in military history has a victorious army withdrawn so quickly.

It was hailed as the first diplomatic success by the independent hero Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, popularly known as Bangabandhu.

Yet another request by Sheikh Mujib to shift the 93,000 prisoners of war (POW) of Pakistan armed forces and civilians to India was also agreed upon.

For a justifiable relationship of the newly emerged nation, a controversial Bangladesh-India Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Peace for 25 years was signed between visiting Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her counterpart Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on March 19, 1972. The treaty, however, was bitterly criticized by the opposition, stating it as a treaty of the hegemony of India.

Well, the relations between the two neighbours were on rough seas. The border killings of Bangladesh nationals by the Indian Border Security Force (BSF), water-sharing of the Teesta rivers, and tilted trade imbalance remained major bottlenecks to the improvement of the relationship.

Besides issues of shared interests between two counties, Modi offered prayers at two temples in Satkhira and Gopalganj, which evoked curiosity in both Bangladesh and India.

His visits to Hindu temples is likely to pay dividends to influence elections in West Bengal. Meanwhile, violence raged in Brahmanbaria for the third consecutive day, leaving 12 dead, including in Chittagong and Narayanganj.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune, 31 March 2021

Saleem Samad, is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He can be reached at saleemsamad@hotmail.com. Twitter @saleemsamad

Indo-Soviet Treaty turning point for Bangladesh independence

Assessing the impact of the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 on Bangladesh’s independence

SALEEM SAMAD

As Bangladesh celebrates its 50th anniversary on March 26th, the historic Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed on August 9, 1971, had a direct impact on the decisive battle in the eastern war theatre.

The treaty expedited the Bangladesh War of Independence and brought about the surrender of 93,000 Pakistan forces on December 16, 1971.

In the annals of diplomacy, the Indo-Soviet Treaty on Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was a unique document that not only epitomized the special relationship between India and former Soviet Union, but also acted as a guarantor of regional peace.

The treaty was a significant deviation from India’s previous position of non-alignment in the Cold War and the prelude to the Bangladesh war, and it was a key development in a situation of increasing China-American ties and American pressure.

The Indo-Soviet treaty was later adopted as the India-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1972.

As the struggle for independence in Bangladesh gathered momentum in 1971, months after holding general elections in Pakistan, and the US hegemony attempted to subvert it, the treaty restrained the evil design of Pakistan and its allies.

Following the first-ever free, fair, and credible elections in Pakistan in 1970, Pakistan’s head of state, General Yahya Khan, was utterly dissatisfied with the large victory of the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

The marauding Pakistan military unleashed a reign of terror under “Operation Searchlight” at midnight on March 25, committing genocide with the intent to cleanse the land of Bangali and Hindu populations, who were deemed as enemies of Pakistan and Islam.

Pakistan’s General Yahya Khan had said that “if India made any attempt to seize any part of East Pakistan, he would declare war and Pakistan would not be alone.”

Well, Kissinger’s surprise visit to Beijing in July 1971 was indeed a morale boost for Pakistan. On the other hand, it was frustrating for India as it felt diplomatically humbled and strategically isolated.

India could see the US-China-Pakistan axis as an emerging threat to regional geopolitical interests. China committed unqualified support to its “all-weather” friend Pakistan against India to stop interference in the domestic affairs of Pakistan.

During the parley between Kissinger and China’s Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, Beijing indicated that if war breaks out between India and Pakistan over Bangladesh, China would make military intervention against India on behalf of Islamabad.

The US sympathized with Pakistan for obvious reasons. The US believed a victory for India would be considered as an expansion of Soviet hegemony in South Asia. In this backdrop, Delhi and Moscow moved closer to ink the historic treaty to neutralize the emerging Washington-Beijing–Islamabad axis and defend their vital geopolitical interests.

In an editorial, Pravda, a leading Soviet national daily, underlined the significance of the treaty, saying the treaty had effectively “restrained” Pakistan and its allies from embarking on a course of “military adventurism” in the sub-continent and would continue to act as a “deterrent” against such hegemonic goals. The treaty also signalled a clear warning to China’s hegemonistic ambitions in the continent.

Following the rising struggle for independence in erstwhile East Pakistan and the influx of millions of refugees from there to India, the possibility of war between New Delhi and Islamabad was looming large in Asia.

First published in the Dhaka Tribune, 16 March 2021

Saleem Samad is an independent journalist, media rights defender, and recipient of Ashoka Fellow (USA) and Hellman-Hammett Award. Email saleemsamad@hotmail.com; Twitter @saleemsamad