Can Bangladesh shun political Islam?

SALEEM SAMAD

For millions of people in an impoverished Bangladesh, it seems to have ushered a political blessing. The nation which fought a bloody war of independence in 1971 against Pakistan to establish secularism and democracy was obliterated by subsequent military juntas and pro-Islamic governments.

The first constitution has enshrined secularism, democracy, socialism, and nationalism as the key political philosophy of the independence of Bangladesh, which reflects the spirit of the independence war when the eastern province severed from Pakistan in 1971.

After the assassination of the architect of Bangladesh independence Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in a military putsch in 1975, the military-backed government of General Ziaur Rahman, a former Mukti Bahini commander, with a swagger stick doctored the constitution’s guiding principle and scribbled “Bismillah’ir Rahman’ir Rahim (Faith in Allah)” in 1979 to establish legitimacy of his military government.

After Mujib’s daughter Sheikh Hasina, leader of the Awami League swept to power in 2008 pledged to restoration of secularism and the trial of war criminals.

The Supreme Court in its landmark verdict forbids political parties that advocate political Islam. The apex court also asked to reinstate the four key principles in the constitution.

In separate voluminous judgements in July and August of 2010, the apex court pulled down the Fifth Amendment of 1979 and Seventh Amendment of 1986, including provisions that allowed religious-based politics, which was legitimized by tyrannical rules from 15 August 1975 to 9 April 1979 and 24 March 1982, and 10 November 1986 respectively.

The court in a ruling said the Seventh Amendment retroactively legitimized the very acts that successfully engineered the coups by former Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. Husain Muhammad Ershad unseated an elected government of President Justice Abdus Sattar in March 1982.

General Ershad in a bid to woo moral support of majoritarian Sunni Muslims had rewritten the constitution which determines “Islam as state religion” of a once secular nation.

The higher court judges noted, “The proclamation of martial law and its regulations and orders and all actions under this law shall remain illegal until Qayamat (the Last Day of Judgment). “The martial law was beyond the mandate of the constitution and will be invalid for eternity,” and said, “a usurper is a usurper.” It is deemed that the judgement squarely blamed both the military leaders have acted as a usurper to grab the state power.

The apex court’s verdict on the Fifth Amendment said, “The perpetrators of such illegalities should also be suitably punished and condemned so that in future no adventurist, no usurper, would dare to defy the people, their constitution, their government, established by them with their consent.”

The court dubs the “extra-constitutional adventurers” as predators of democracy who ushered military regimes.

General Zia was assassinated in a military coup d’état in 1982 and General Ershad was ousted in 1990, after a bloody pro-democracy revolution. He served a prison sentence for corruption but is a key ally coalition of the ruling party and died last year of old age complications.

Excited by hearing the superior court verdict Shahriar Kabir, a secularist, researcher and staunch advocate for the trial of the war criminals said the people’s mandate in the last general election for the restoration of secularism and trial of perpetrators responsible for the crime against humanity in 1971.

“Religious based politics was prohibited after brutal birth of Bangladesh. We have seen youths belonging to Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) were engaged as henchmen of marauding Pakistan military. They raised Al-Badr, a death squad to kidnap and murder hundreds of intellectuals who could not escape for their safety and security,” he explained.

All the JeI leaders of the secret militia group Al-Badr were handed down maximum punishment for war crimes and crimes against humanity by the International Crimes Tribunal.

The journalist and film-maker Kabir said General Zia, after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in a bid to gain political support, withdrew the ban on religious politics and allowed Islamic parties to regain grounds.

The Bangladesh Nationalist Party founded by assassinated General Rahman, presently led by his widow, Begum Khaleda Zia appealed the apex court’s first ruling on the Fifth Amendment last January and lost her in a crucial legal battle which was detrimental to her party.

Notwithstanding, Bangladesh is a Sunni Muslim-majority nation, most people practice a moderate version of Sunni Islam. In the long run, the country’s politicians want the country to transform into a secular democracy rather than “Islam as State Religion”.

Pending a verdict from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, the Bangladesh Election Commission has struck off the name of Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) as a political party. Officially the Islamist party was unable to participate in the 2014 and 2018 general election. Unfortunately, the Islamist party failed to satisfy the Election Commission that it is a Bangladesh origin party, upholds the Bangladesh constitution, and expresses solidarity with the independence of Bangladesh.

JeI handbook and various published documents, the party did not accept the state constitution and demanded to override it with Quran and Sharia Law upon 164 million secular and moderate Muslim majority nation. Unfortunately, the party failed to muster moral support of the majority.

Besides, the party didn’t recognise Bangladesh independence. JeI was politically, morally, and physically supported by the marauding Pakistan military.

Regarding banning of Islamic parties, Sheikh Hasina told the Jatiya Sangsad (parliament) said the Islamic parties will not be banned, while “Bismillah’ir Rahman’ir Rahim” and state religion Islam will remain in the constitution.

Social justice activist Kabir is visibly disturbed regarding the delay in banning of religious-based political parties, especially JeI which opposed the independence of Bangladesh.

He said the prime minister’s statement in parliament has confused the nation and contradicts the verdict of the superior court. The Islamic parties would continue to function and overtly campaign against the war crimes trial.

First published in The South Asian Digest on 6 August 2020

Author is an independent journalist, media rights defender in Bangladesh. Recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award

Why Pakistan skipped IPU Assembly

SALEEM SAMAD

It was predicted that Pakistan would stay away from participating at the ongoing 136th Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in capital Dhaka. Pakistan, on Friday last announced to boycott of the mega parliamentarian assembly, alleging a "malicious propaganda" by Bangladesh, and unfriendly attitude.

The last minute pull-out of 10-member delegation led by Pakistan national assembly speaker Ayaz Sadiq was due to participate in the IPU assembly in Dhaka. Further to slay the slain, Pakistan took the issue of Bangladesh observing "Genocide Day" on March 25 to memorialize genocide of three million people and sexual abuse of 400,000 women during the Liberation War in 1971.

Sadiq's statement was not a surprise Bangladesh government. He said the Pakistan national assembly members noted with disappointment the actions and "negative public statements" coming out of Bangladesh despite Pakistan's "restraint and overtures" to the country.

The bilateral relation between the two countries has been in roller-coaster since the independence of Bangladesh and surrender of Pakistan armed forces in eastern front in December 1971.

The boycott of the IPU conference is another sign of strain in Bangladesh-Pakistan ties. The relationship further plummeted when Pakistan has officially protested the sentencing and hanging of Jamaat-e-Islami leaders for war crimes committed during the bloody war in 1971.

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's government strongly reacted to Pakistan's reactions in regard of the judicial verdicts, which her administration stated tantamount to meddling in internal affairs of Bangladesh and also asked Islamabad to apologize for atrocities committed by marauding Pakistan army during the Liberation War.

However, diplomatic relations between two countries enjoyed best of ties during the two military regimes of General Ziaur Rahman (1975-1981) and General HM Ershad (1982-1990). The bilateral relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan had risen and shined during the regimes of Begum Khaleda Zia (1991-1996 and 2001-2005), when dreaded Pakistan spy agency ISI was given legitimacy for covert operation against India.

ISI operatives in a bid to destabilize the north-eastern states, had provided weapons, training and helped money laundering of funds to run the separatist groups, who were engaged in violent actions against the Indian authority. The Pakistan spy agency was also active in raising militant groups from among the Rohingya Muslims to wage war against Myanmar for a separate state.

Since Sheikh Hasina came to power in 2009, her government was able to neutralize the ISI operations in Bangladesh and all the separatist leaders of Indian north-east were deported to India. Once the Pakistan's covert operations were blocked and regular seizure counterfeit Indian currency smuggled into India, Pakistan began tirade against Bangladesh.

Bangladesh also with other South Asian countries including India, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Bhutan pulled out of the 19th SAARC Summit to be hosted by Pakistan in November 2016, citing incitement in terrorism in the region.

This episode further angered Islamabad and blamed Dhaka taking cue from New Delhi and adopts an anti-Pakistan posture, writes an editorial in a Pakistan newspaper published on April 1.

Speaker Ayaz Sadiq, quoted in an influential newspaper "Aaj News" expressed grief that "all such dedicated efforts, unfortunately, fell in vain and Pakistan was time and again targeted and maligned…. It was, therefore, decided, with a heavy heart, not to undertake a visit to Bangladesh at this time."

First published in The Asian Age, April 3, 2017

Saleem Samad, an Ashoka Fellow (USA), an award winning journalist and is Special Correspondent, The Asian Age

Gen Zia betrayed Col Taher?

JSD was not ready for Nov 7 Sepoy Mutiny

SALEEM SAMAD

The Biplobi Sainik Sangstha (Revolutionary Sepoy’s Organisation) was never heard of in early 1970s. The clandestine organisation’s hard-core members were mostly Junior and Non-Commissioned Officers of Bangladesh Army. The recruits of the secret group were loyal to dismissed Maj Mohammad Abdul Jalil, Commander of Sector 9 of Mukti Bahini.

The secret group began its journey on January 1, 1973 at the staff quarters of Havildar Bari of Armoured Corps. The members were drawn from serving Junior and Non-Commissioned Officers. On the founding day of the ‘Bangladesh Revolutionary and Suicide Commando Force’ they took solemn oath by touching the Holy Qur’an.

The underground Biplobi Sainik Sangstha’s members held secret meetings at Ahsanullah Hall of Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET). The political wisdom, mission and visions of the revolution were tutored by Sirajul Alam Khan, political theorist and founder of the Jatiya Samjtantrik Dal (JSD) and Dr Akhlaqur Rahman, an economist.

Days after Maj Jalil was imprisoned on March 17, 1974, he send secret message to the underground organisation’s leader Corporal Altaf Hossain to contact Col Abu Taher (Bir Uttam) and seek directives from the former commander of Sector 11.

Corporal Hossain was the key person to organise the soldiers in various cantonments and motivate them to join the revolution.

On June 20, 1974, a secret meeting presided by Col Taher was organised at Sergeant Abu Yusuf Khan’s residence at Elephant Road. The retired Sector Commander told the dedicated group that his friend Maj Gen Ziaur Rahman, who was Deputy Chief of Army Staff has expressed solidarity with the group and will support their revolution.

The statement has raised the morale of the junior officers. Since then the activities of the Revolutionary Commando Force were held openly.

On the other side, most soldiers of Sector 11 and loyal to Taher joined ‘Biplobi Sainik Sangstha’ also many soldiers in Comilla Cantonment where he (Taher) once served as Commanding Officer also joined the group. He advocated for ‘People’s Army’ and through ‘class struggle’ drew political support of the soldiers.

Soon the Revolutionary Commando Force and other smaller groups among the soldiers merged into Biplobi Sainik Sangstha, after the crisis created following the assassination of the Father of the Nation Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in a military putsch.

Taher knew his limitation and was not a protagonist of the revolution. He decided to use Zia’s image among the soldiers to expedite the revolution. In a bid to garner more support of the soldiers he included in the Sainik Sangstha a 12-point demands for the realisation of 18 months of unpaid wages of repatriated soldiers from Pakistan. This was debated by former Mukti Bahini soldiers and was not discussed at the high command of the JSD.

Taher also formed strategic alliance with the pro-Peking (now Beijing) left groups and parties who participated in the Liberation War to form liberated areas in rural regions, so that the radical groups can create pressure on the capital Dhaka.

JSD radical political philosophy was similar to the Sainik Sangstha revolution to overthrow the autocratic regime to establish a pro-people, farmers, soldiers, workers and students national government.

On November 6, JSD party forum held an emergency standing committee meeting at a residence in Kalabagan. The meeting was attended by Sirajul Alam Khan, Aklaqur Rahman, Monirul Islam, Hasanul Haque Inu and Khair Ejaz Masud and others, writes Mohiuddin Ahmed in his recent book “Jashoder Utthan Poton: Osthir Somoyer Rajniti, Protoma Prokashon.

The agenda for discussion was to organise an indefinite shut down (hartal). A show down of strength was planned at Paltan Maidan on November 9. JSD leaders expected that thousands of industrial workers from Adamjee, Tejgaon and Tongi would participate and block the capital Dhaka for days, until the government collapse and form a national government with all parties, minus the BAKSAL leadership. Unfortunately the plan was abandoned, due to abrupt Sepoy Mutiny.

While the meeting was in progress, Taher walked in and sat to listen to the discussion. Surprisingly the Sepoy Mutiny was not in the agenda. Possibly the key leaders had no knowledge that a mutiny was brewing.

After a while, a young military officer in civilian dress barged into the meeting room, without causing any alarm among the key leaders sitting there. He whispered in the ears of Taher and handed over to him two small pieces of papers.

Once the officer departed, Taher drew the attention of the meeting and read out one message which came from Gen Zia. Which reads: “I am interned, I can’t take the lead. My men are there. If you take the lead, my men will join you.”

Those present at the meeting have never met Zia and does not know him. The first reaction came from Akhlaqur Rahman, who refused to accept Gen Zia as their leader. All the leaders had one question, whether Zia should be trusted? Taher promptly responded and confidently said, “If you trust me, then you can also trust Zia. He will be under my feet.”

He also informed the meeting that he has instructed the Sainik Sangstha to begin the revolution. Immediately all the members in the room were baffled by the announcement. The meeting tried to influence Taher to withdraw the call for mutiny. He said it was impossible to reach the decision as the communication is a one-way traffic. 

The second message was from the command centre of the soldiers planning the mutiny at midnight following November 6. It reads: “Khaled Mussaraf men are moving fast. The iron is too hot. It is time to hit.”

Taher took the floor and said like what happened in the Bolshevik Revolution – Tonight or never. Sirajul Alam Khan did not say yes or no to the plan. The leaders continued to pursue Taher and frustrated the meeting abruptly ended without any plan, Mohiuddin writes.

F Rahman Hall at Dhaka University was converted into a clandestine command centre for the November 7 Sepoy Mutiny led by Col Abu Taher, commander of Gono Bahni (People’s Army).

A nervous mutineer Subedar Mehboob rang the shot an hour early than determined at 1 O’clock. The single shot at midnight from a rifle, triggered the revolution of soldiers. Thousands of soldiers joined the mutiny broke the military armoury to loot weapons and boarded trucks and jeeps and took control of strategic points.

A contingent rushed to Gen Zia’s residence to free him from house-arrest in Dhaka Cantonment hours after Maj Khaled Musharraf's coup d'etat on November 3. Taher drove in a military jeep with few JSD leaders and met Zia. “You have saved the nation,” he admired Taher amidst cheering soldiers.

Zia asked Taher of the whereabouts of Sirajul Alam Khan. It was presumed that Zia wanted to meet the top leaders of JSD, which never happened.

Since the meeting held on the eve of November 7, Sirajul Alam Khan, Akhlaqur Rahman and many senior leaders opted to maintain low profile. Possibly they believed that the mutiny would fail, and it failed.

Mohiuddin in his book writes that despite request by Taher, Zia refused to go to the radio station on an excuse that his statement could be recorded and broadcast. At the radio station Shamsuddin Ahmed, a young Turk of the Gana Bahini read out a statement which announced the Sepoy Mutiny. Unfortunately, the announcer did not mention the name of Taher or other JSD leaders or even his name.

On November 23, 1975, Zia also ordered the arrest of JSD leaders. A large police contingent surrounded the house of Col Taher's brother Sergeant Abu Yusuf Khan and took him to the police control room.

When Col Taher heard about his brother’s arrest, he rang Gen Zia but was told that he was not available. Instead Maj Gen HM Ershad, the Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrator, spoke with him. Ershad said it was a police matter and they knew nothing about it, writes Talukder Maniruzzaman in “Bangladesh in 1976: Struggle for Survival as an Independent State,” published in Asian Survey in February 1977.

The following day Taher was arrested 16 days after freeing Ziaur Rahman and was taken to Dhaka Central Jail. He was accused of 'instigating indiscipline' in the army and attempting to expand the original mutiny of November 7, 1975 towards a goal of "socialist revolution" and to kill some of the army officers.

Abu Taher's Last Testament: Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution by Lawrence Lifschultz published in Economic and Political Weekly, India in August 1977: “It became very clear to me that a new conspiracy had taken control of those we had brought to power on November 7 in 1975.”

“On November 24, 1975, I was surrounded by a large contingent of police. The police officer asked me to accompany him for discussion with Zia. I said I was surprised and I asked him why there was need of a police guard for me to go to Zia. Anyway they put me in a jeep and drove me straight to this jail. This is how I was put inside this jail by those traitors who I saved and brought to power.”

“In our history, there is only one example of such treachery. It was the treachery of Mir Zafar who betrayed the people of Bangladesh and the subcontinent and led us into slavery for a period of 200 years. Fortunately for us it is not 1757. It is 1976 and we have revolutionary soldiers and a revolutionary people who will destroy the conspiracy of traitors like Ziaur Rahman,” the statement concluded.

The Supreme Court has recently described the execution of Taher through an order of a military tribunal in 1976 as ‘outright murder’. It says the hanging of Taher was ‘illegal’ and a case of ‘cold blooded assassination’.

Saleem Samad, an Ashoka Fellow (USA) is an award winning investigative reporter based in Bangladesh. Email

Bangladesh: Democracy Stumbles

The country is once again in the grip of authoritarianism and political violence, the roots of which run deep.

Photo Ben Hayes: Secularist demand to expedite trial of war criminals at Shahbag Square

NISHA SHARMEEN ALI

The announcement of the schedule for elections to the tenth Jatiya Sangsad (national parliament) on November 25 has stoked an already volatile political situation in Bangladesh. The ready reaction of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party-led opposition alliance to the chief election commissioner’s televised speech to the nation, during which he announced that the general elections will be held on January 5, 2014, came in the form of what was initially a 48-hour countrywide blockade of road, rail and water ways, subsequently extended to 71 hours, beginning from November 26. The blockade ended on November 30, but the BNP commenced another 72 hour countrywide blockade the next day, which was ultimately extended until the evening of December 5. The alliance has called for yet another blockade to begin on Saturday, December 7.

In the meantime, there has been widespread violence and vandalism: vehicles are torched, public and private property destroyed. The death toll as reported on December 4 had reached 40 and scores more have been wounded. Many of the casualties were caused by an explosion of crude bombs and arson attacks on public transport. According to Samanta Lal Sen, the coordinator of the burn and plastic surgery unit at Dhaka Medical College Hospital, the premier public hospital in the country, several of the victims of political violence, admitted with severe burn injuries in the last one month, had died and quite a few are in a critical condition.

The BNP-led alliance has been engaged in street agitation for months now in its demand that Sheikh Hasina resign as prime minister, given that her Awami League government completed its term on October 25. The opposition alliance claims that polls conducted under the government will not be free, fair or transparent. While the two sides continue their finger-pointing over the ongoing political impasse and social disorder, arising out of the failure of the ruling and opposition political alliances to reach a consensus on election-time government, there have reportedly been informal contacts between the feuding camps, supposedly geared towards a dialogue. Still, publicly at least, the two camps have thus far produced only contradictory statements about what the media has dubbed as “clandestine” meetings between the general secretaries of the Awami League and the BNP.

A History of Acrimony

Mutual mistrust, acrimony and recrimination between the two major political parties have come to mark Bangladeshi national politics, especially since the ouster of HM Ershad’s military regime in 1990 and the subsequent restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1991. In any case, intense political unrest has marked almost every election cycle in Bangladesh since the country won independence in 1971. For instance, during the 2001 elections, which the BNP won, approximately 400 people were reportedly killed and more than 17,000 injured, primarily in street clashes between members and supporters of competing political camps. The next election cycle in 2007 also resulted in several deaths and injuries, leading to an extra-constitutional takeover by a military-backed interim government. The elections to the ninth Jatiya Sangsad (national parliament) were eventually held in December 2008, with a 14-party alliance led by the Awami League scoring an electoral landslide victory.

The seeds of the political unrest and uncertainty over the forthcoming general elections were planted in June 2012, when the Awami League-dominated parliament pushed through the Fifteenth Amendment to the constitution, scrapping the provision that parliamentary elections must be held under a non-partisan caretaker government, headed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court. Ironically, in 1996, the Awami League and its opposition allies forced the then BNP-led government, through prolonged street agitation, to incorporate that particular provision in the form of the Thirteenth Amendment. Subsequently, two parliamentary elections, in 1996 and 2001, were held under caretaker governments.

After being elected in 2001, the BNP-led government increased the retirement age for the Supreme Court chief justice, apparently to have a person perceived loyal to it as the head of the caretaker government for the next elections scheduled for 2007. Then the main opposition party, the Awami League refused to accept the former chief justice in question as the chief adviser to the caretaker government and took to the streets. Amidst the consequent political stalemate, marked by sustained violence across the country, scope was created for the military-backed interim government to take over and rule for two years unconstitutionally, after declaring a state of emergency.

Elections or no elections, violence has become a major feature of Bangladesh politics. Numerous political leaders and activists have been killed by rivals or by their own party colleagues. Data from different human rights organizations suggests that the total number of deaths resulting from political violence in 2013 is substantially higher than in recent years, according to a report published in New Age on November 7. Ain O Salish Kendra reported that political violence had claimed the lives of 289 people in the first nine months of the current year while the figure was 84 for the whole of 2012. According to a monthly report by rights organization Odhikar, at least 27 people were killed and 3,433 injured in political violence in October alone.

This political violence may very well have had its origins in the early days of independent Bangladesh. The Awami League, which had presided over the political struggle for the country’s liberation and come to embody the people’s democratic aspirations, proved autocratic in power. In 1975, its head and then president Sheikh Mujibur Rahman introduced BAKSAL, which banned all opposition parties and compelled the country to adopt a one-party system. President Ziaur Rahman, the military general-turned-politician and founder of the BNP, restored the multiparty system in the late 1970s.

Military Intervention

Meanwhile, the path for military intervention in the political process may have been paved during the rule of the post-independence AL government. Notes Professor Amena Mohsin of Dhaka University in her published research paper: “The Mukti Bahini (liberation forces), which formed the nucleus of the Bangladesh army in the immediate aftermath of the liberation war was divided along the regular Bengali forces of the then Pakistan army and those recruited by the Awami League. After the liberation of Bangladesh, Mujib paid little attention for rebuilding the armed forces; this was a cause of major discontent among the army.” The discontent deepened when Mujib created Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (National Defence Force). Rakkhi Bahini was generally viewed as a parallel institution and a threat to the interests of the army. The army was also apparently fed up with the discrimination, and disenchanted with the AL government’s unchecked rule, which had encouraged unbridled looting, illegal land grabbing and civil disorder. It was also carrying the legacy of the Pakistan army, which had its own track of deep engagement in politics. On August 15, 1975, Mujib was assassinated by a group of Bangladeshi military officers.

General Ziaur Rahman (popularly known as Zia) became president in 1977, following the resignation of the interim government president, Justice Sayem, on the grounds of illness. Many believed this was a Zia ploy to take control of the state with army backing. Although Sayem had promised early elections, Zia kept delaying them. The years of anarchy had left most of Bangladesh’s state institutions in a shambles, with constant threats of military coups amidst strikes and protests. Gaining total power, Zia banned political parties, censored the media, re-imposed martial law and commanded the army to arrest opposition forces. Ironically, Zia himself was assassinated in a military coup in 1981.

The country remained in the grip of military and quasi-military rule from 1975 till 1990, when Ershad’s regime, which had seized power through a military coup in 1982, was overthrown by a popular uprising. For the first time in the political history of Bangladesh, all major political parties joined forces to oust the rule, yet the role of the army in politics had become entrenched. The end of the autocratic regime and the election of the BNP in 1991 did not bring stability in the political arena and the military remained a major factor. Meanwhile, the student wings of the political parties have been encouraged to use arms, and continuous hartals (general strikes) emerged as a common phenomenon. Bangladesh politics became increasingly weaponized and street-centric.

A Hybrid Regime

In 2004, when the BNP was in power, AL president Sheikh Hasina was speaking at a rally in front of the party’s Bangabandhu Avenue office in Dhaka when grenades were hurled, in what was an apparent assassination attempt. Twenty people were killed and 300 injured. Since then, grenades have been found inside Dhaka Central Jail, Dhaka Medical College Hospital and at various cultural hubs. Disorder was rife during BNP’s last stint in power and the state was unable to protect the political rights and civil liberties of its citizens. The situation is unchanged, if not worse, during the Awami League-led government, which is characterized by negligible checks and balances. Not surprisingly, Bangladesh continues to be categorized under “hybrid regimes” in the Democracy Index by The Economist Intelligence Unit, meaning that democratic structures such as elections exist but the state has remained fundamentally authoritarian.

Clearly, the political system of Bangladesh needs a review. Can it transition to a full democracy or will it remain a hybrid regime? It is not easy to build a sturdy democracy. Even in established democratic states, the system can corrode if not nurtured and protected. The Global Corruption Barometer 2012, the largest worldwide survey on public views on corruption, says 50 per cent of Bangladeshis surveyed in 2010 considered the government’s measures effective in curbing corruption. After two years, that had declined to 26 per cent. According to the survey, Bangladeshis see the political parties and the police as the most corrupt institutions, followed by the judiciary, parliament and civil administration. People have reason to lose faith, given the extent of nepotism and graft. This erosion in faith persists with the two major political parties refusing to desert confrontational politics and work towards a transparent, accountable, and participatory democratic system.

Now, as the Awami League continues to evince no interest in accommodating the BNP’s demands by clinging to power beyond its tenure, while the opposition resorts to violent street agitation, there are fears of a repeat of the January 2007 intervention by the army. Were that to occur, Bangladesh would once again be going backwards on the path towards democratization.

First published in The Diplomat, December 06, 2013

Nisha Sharmeen Ali is a Dhaka-based journalist

The Queenmaker of Bangladesh

TAHMIMA ANAM

Call Bangladesh the land of the resurrected. Here, a dictator can be overthrown, disgraced and imprisoned, and still make a comeback.

More than two decades after being ousted, Hussain Mohammed Ershad is now being called the “Queenmaker.” Thanks to recent political maneuvering, he is in a prime position to tip the scales between the two main contenders in the general election to be held in January: Sheikh Hasina, the prime minister, and Khaleda Zia, former prime minister, leader of the opposition and Ms. Hasina’s longtime foe.

Mr. Ershad came to power in 1983, as the head of a military-backed government. By late 1990, after nearly a decade without free and fair elections, a massive popular uprising — led by the two most powerful opposition parties, the Awami League (Ms. Hasina’s party) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (Ms. Zia’s) — was putting pressure on Mr. Ershad to step down. His government fell after the army withdrew its support. Within weeks, Mr. Ershad was in jail on corruption charges.

More than 20 years later, Mr. Ershad’s influence is on the rise again. Though Ms. Hasina and Ms. Zia once cooperated in the movement to restore democracy, they have become bitter opponents in the intervening years, as power has shifted back and forth between the Awami League and the B.N.P. Now, on the eve of another election, Mr. Ershad is the accidental arbiter in the enduring rivalry between the co-architects of his downfall.

Bangladesh is deeply divided. Ms. Hasina’s record in many areas — development, infrastructure, health care, the trial of war criminals from the 1971 liberation war — boasts important victories, and those go far beyond anything Ms. Zia achieved when she was prime minister, in 1991-1996 and 2001-2006.

But Ms. Hasina’s decision to stand by allegedly corrupt ministers and her consistent repression of her political opponents have damaged her standing. Especially controversial, Ms. Hasina has scrapped the so-called caretaker government that had overseen national elections since Mr. Ershad’s fall. In its place she has appointed a special election-time cabinet formally open to all parties and placed herself at its helm.

Ms. Zia looks even worse. Her last term in office was marred by allegations of corruption (some involving her immediate family), and she reigned over an unprecedented spate of violence by religious extremists, including the Islamic terrorist Bangla Bhai. While in the opposition, Ms. Zia has been obstinately uncooperative. She has boycotted Parliament since losing the election in 2008. Now she is threatening to boycott the January election unless the caretaker framework is reinstated. In the meantime, she has called a series of strikes and demonstrations that have brought the country to a standstill. She has refused to join Ms. Hasina’s interim cabinet.

Mr. Ershad, for his part, has accepted to join the new cabinet. He has also agreed to run in the election, a move that will lend the process the credibility that Ms. Hasina badly wants and Ms. Zia is trying to deny her. And if Ms. Zia does stick to her boycott, the Jatiya Party of Mr. Ershad will likely become the country’s new main opposition party, vastly increasing its current influence.

And so it is that while the two leading ladies of Bangladeshi politics quarrel, Mr. Ershad’s clout is growing. In fact, it is almost tempting to forget the dark spots in his past. Mr. Ershad’s rule is sometimes looked upon as a dictatorship of the benign sort. The 1982 coup that brought him to power was bloodless (conveniently, his predecessor had already been assassinated). And the years of democracy that have followed his downfall have been tainted by so much corruption, cronyism and repression that his regime can seem innocuous by comparison.

But nostalgia underestimates the damage the man did to Bangladesh. Mr. Ershad institutionalized corruption on a large scale, undertaking building projects that enriched him and his cronies. In 1988, his government amended the Constitution, ignoring its foundational secular principles to declare Islam the country’s state religion. The return to politics of this dictator, whose fall was so hard-won, sends a message of impunity.

Democracy in Bangladesh has taken another hit, in other words. Politicians are unaccountable. The electoral process is sketchy. Yes, Bangladeshis have held on to the right to vote, but it is, in effect, the right to vote only for warring factions determined to destroy each other.

A few weeks ago, in a bid to convince her to end the strikes, Ms. Hasina made a telephone call to Ms. Zia. The transcript of the conversation, which was circulated online, reads like a parody.

Ms. Hasina: “We don’t want to quarrel.”

Ms. Zia: “You are quarrelling.”

Ms. Hasina: “You are the only one doing the talking. You are not allowing me to talk.”

Ms. Zia: “Why would I do that? You are asking questions, I am replying.”

Ms. Hasina: “I am not getting a chance to speak.”

Amid that bickering, Ershad doesn’t need to do much talking at all.

Published in The NewYork Times, November 26, 2013

A version of this op-ed appears in print on November 27, 2013, in The International New York Times.

Tahmima Anam is a writer and anthropologist, and the author of the novel “A Golden Age.”

Some things must never be forgotten

Hiranmay Karlekar

A long struggle against daunting odds has kept the values and memories of Bangladesh's Liberation War alive. This is a remarkable achievement

The mass upsurge in Bangladesh, demanding death sentence to those guilty of crimes against humanity during the country's Liberation War in 1971, has erupted suddenly. The legacy of the liberation struggle and memories of the atrocities, mass murder and rape by the war criminals and the Pakistani Army, which galvanised the young demonstrators, had, however, been kept alive by a group of dedicated people working against daunting odds. Many who had collaborated with the Pakistani Army, mainly leaders of the Jamaat-e-Islami, its auxiliaries like al Badr, al Shams and the Razakars, had been arrested after Bangladesh's liberation on December 16, 1971. Some had gone underground. A few, like Golam Azam, perhaps the most hated of them all, had fled to Pakistan just prior to it.

While Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's grant of an amnesty to War Criminals in November 1973, had enabled them to return to public life, the military dictatorships running Bangladesh after his assassination on August 15, 1975, promoted them to undermine the influence of the Awami League-led secular and democratic elements. Thus Major-General Zia-ur Rahman, Begum Khaleda Zia's husband, who became Chief Martial Law Administrator on November 19, 1975, and President on April 27, 1977, allowed Golam Azam to return to Bangladesh in July, 1978, on a Pakistani passport and two weeks' visa. Allowed to stay on, he was secretly made Amir of the Jamaat when it was revived in May 1979. Abbas Ali Khan acted as officiating Amir. Islami Chhatra Sangha was rechristened Islami Chhatra Shibir. Both organisations became active as the military dictatorships headed by Zia-ur Rahman and HM Ershad sought to progressively Islamise Bangladesh and wipe out the values and memories of the liberation war including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's historic role.

Counter-efforts began simultaneously. On March 21, 1981, the Chairman of the Central Command Council of the Muktijoddha Sangsad (Freedom Fighters' Council) , Lt-Col (Retd) Qazi Nur-Uzzaman, announced the programme of an anti-al Badr/Razakar week to be observed from May 1, 1981. He demanded the trial of all traitors including Golam Azam, adding that the Muktijoddha Sangsad would try them by forming a People's Court if the government did not. On March 25, 10 opposition parties, including Awami League, expressed concern over the activities of communal parties and met to discuss a programme of action. Awami League leaders said at a public meeting on April 5 that no longer would there be any mercy for Razakars and activists of al Badr. In a statement on April 16, Bangladesh Lekhak Shibir (Bangladesh Writers' Camp) expressed grave concern over the re-emergence of “merchants of religion” like Razakars and organisations like al Shams and al Badr and the Jamaat. Accusing the BNP Government of supporting the criminals, it endorsed the Muktijoddha Sangsad's campaign against the murderous political forces they represented and urged people to carry forward the movement in association with organisations of the toiling masses. An important landmark was the establishment of the Muktijuddher Chetana Vikas Kendra (Centre for Developing the consciousness of the Liberation War) in 1984 to identify the collaborators and war criminals in the administration.

General HM Ershad's declaration in June 1988, of Islam as Bangladesh's state religion and the Jamaat's formal election of Golam Azam as its national Ameer in December 1991, triggered strong reactions. The first led to the formation of the Shairachar o Sampradayikata Protirodh Committee (Committee to Resist Despotism and Communalism) and the latter, Ekattorer Ghatak Dalal Nirmal Committee (known popularly as Nirmul Committee). The latter tried Golam Azam at a people's court in Dhaka on March 26, 1992, which sentenced him to death before a gathering of about half-a-million people who had collected in the teeth of the Government's furious opposition.

The late Jahanara Imam, one of whose sons, Rumi, a freedom fighter, was savagely murdered by the Pakistanis in1971, was Nirmul Committee's first convener. The momentum the committee generated has survived her passing. Shahriar Kabir's meticulously documented and devastating workm Ekattorer Ghatak O Dalara Key Kothaye (Who and Where The Killers and Agents of Seventy-One), made an important contribution. It, along with similar other publications, made sure that nothing was forgotten.

First published in The Pioneer, 28 February 2013

Why Bangladesh Should Not Be Audited By International Bodies

SALEEM SAMAD

Bangladesh for obvious reasons is under renewed scrutiny by global watchdogs, think tanks, and the international press. This is not just because of more than a year of emergency rule, but also due to recent dramatic political developments toward democratic transitions in several countries, including Thailand, Nepal, and Pakistan. Expectations have risen for Bangladesh.

Around Bangladesh, political observers see optimistic developments, perhaps light at the end of the tunnel. The Nepalese are preparing to change their century-old kingdom into a republic. Thai military generals have vowed to not interfere in the polity and have returned to the barracks, though they’ve left behind institutions for influencing internal security. In Pakistan, after decades of military subjugation, there is a change of heart—forced in no small part by a change of heart in the US administration—among the Generals, who have conceded their failure to manage the country.

An overall estimate

Global watchdogs are keenly observing the reforms agenda in Bangladesh toward a transition to democracy. And none of them seems happy. Despite a year of anti-corruption and anti-crime drives by the interim government, Bangladesh is still placed toward the bottom on the list of world’s most corrupt nations. The Global Integrity Report 2007 stated that Bangladesh’s caretaker government had failed to deliver the wishful target it had set about reducing corruption and increasing accountability. Accountability at all levels—executive, legislative, judicial—was rated as very weak, even though laws were strong. The Global Integrity Report pointed out that the military is routinely involved in government affairs.

Similarly, Washington based Freedom House in its Freedom In The World 2008 report says that Bangladesh experienced a reversal due to the introduction of emergency rule in January, the suspension of scheduled elections, and the curtailment of civil liberties and press freedom were identified as a severe blow on good governance and democracy.

Religious freedom has never improved since previous military rulers declared Islam the state religion two decades ago. Persecution of religious minorities like the Hindus, Ahmadiyya Muslim, Buddhists, Christians and cultural minorities (animists) in Modhupur, Sylhet and Chittagong Hill Tracts have continued unabated. It was expected that after the military returned to power in early 2007, the status of religious freedom may improve. But the predators remain loose, and even in 2008, Bangladesh remains in the watch list of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom.

So far, no notable initiative has been taken by the quasi-military government to ensure transparency in governance. With no real improvement in weak institutions, the Failed States Index, published by Foreign Policy / Fund for Peace, placed Bangladesh among the 20 most unstable and highest risk countries, next to Burma, Uganda, Nigeria, and Ethiopia.

The slide in human rights

More troubling are the problems regarding human rights and democracy. In its “Human Rights Report 2007,” local watchdog Odhikar has written flatly: “Human rights situation deteriorated sharply in Bangladesh in 2007.” This not just because fundamental rights remain suspended, but also because the anti-corruption and anti-crime drives are being used “as nothing more than a tool to reform the political parties to its [i.e., the government’s] liking.”

Amnesty International made a high profile visit to Bangladesh in January. The delegation, headed by Amnesty’s Secretary General, made similar observations about “new patterns of manipulating due process.” It also noted with concern the “creeping role of the armed forces in a range of functions, with no clear rules of accountability.”

In February, a group of British and European parliamentarians visited Bangladesh in order to encourage the return to democracy through holding free and fair elections. They also expressed “deep concern over the human rights abuses.”

The same month, Human Rights Watch published a scathing criticism of severe abuses by “Bangladesh’s notorious military intelligence agency.” It pointed out that “the government has routinely used torture to extract confessions,” and that it has protected abusers. Its Asia director asked, “Are they reformers, or do they just say they are reformers?”

In March, the US Department of State submitted to Congress its annual report on human rights in different countries. It gave similar conclusions about Bangladesh’s record in 2007: “The government's human rights record worsened, in part due to the state of emergency and postponement of elections.” It noted how the government has restricted freedom of press, freedom of association, the right to bail, and due process, with political discrimination and “serious abuses, including custodial deaths, arbitrary arrest and detention, and harassment of journalists.”

Law, order, justice

It will be incorrect to think that all of these are new. DGFI, the dreaded security service at the center of many waves of abuse, operated unhindered during the elected governments of Khaleda Zia (1991-1996, 2001-2007) and Shiekh Hasina (1996-2001). Like in Pakistan, interference by state security agency jeopardised the transition of democracy, even after last military dictator General Ershad quit power in 1990 in the face of violent street protests.

The last elected government headed by BNP gave unprecedented powers to elite law-and-order agencies, using them politically and frequently. The current government also uses the same techniques. “Joint Forces,” a combination of uniformed military officers, the anti-crime squads and elite police are given the responsibility in implement the government’s anti-crime campaign, in which hundreds of suspects have been tortured and killed in custody. The differences between then and now are twofold: whatever rights people had before have all been extinguished, and there is no accountability whatsoever for the government’s actions.

The judiciary is yet to demonstrate that it is independent of government influence, or that the security agencies are not intimidating the magistrates and judges. Most of the District Magistracy and Speedy Trial Court judgements are glaring examples of government interference. The judgements are arbitrary, illogical and mysterious, based often on forced confessions and fictitious estimates—and each and every one of the 61 verdicts given in the high profile cases so far has gone in favour of the government. As a dismayed newspaper editorial observed recently: “the prosecution, i.e. the present regime, has been able to ensure a near-perfect conviction success rate … Even the best prosecution lawyers around the world cannot boast such a conviction success rate" (New Age, 25 February 2008).

To conclude, Bangladesh’s present military-driven government has made many promises and taken many initiatives but failed to perform neutrally and satisfactorily, with good governance, transparency, and accountability.

Supporters of the government usually respond to this allegation in two ways. First, they accuse all critics of “tarnishing the image of the country,” as if performance is nothing and image is everything. Second, they say that it is too early to judge them: they have not been given a fair chance or enough time to clean up all the mess that Bangladesh was in. The first accusation has no substance. To the second accusation we say, the job of the caretaker government, by Constitution, is to hold elections toward a return to democracy. Their job is not to fix everything in the country, and claiming to fix everything an ominous excuse to hold on to power.

First Published in CounterCurrents.org 10 July 2008

Saleem Samad, an Ashoka Fellow is a Bangladesh born journalist presently living in exile in Canada. He edits www.DurDesh.net streaming from Toronto and specialises in conflict, terrorism, security and intelligence issues in South Asia. He could be reached by email saleemsamad@hotmail.com