A number that irks Bangladesh authorities

SALEEM SAMAD

Bangladesh authorities were pissed off with Odhikar, a human rights organisation, its boss Adilur Rahman Khan and its Director Nasir Uddin Elan for the last several years.

The government was angry because Odhikar was frequently quoted by the United Nations, the United States and the European Union for its authoritative research, monitoring and documentation on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances of opposition, critics, dissidents, human rights defenders and even journalists were victims.

Some of the victims have returned, but maintained dead silence over their captivity]. A significant number were found dead and the rest have disappeared forever.

Each year, the family members grieve in silence about the disappearances of their loved one, the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances is organised by Mayer Dak on 30 August each year.

Mayer Dak, a network of family members believed to have been forcibly disappeared by state and non-state actors. The Mayer Dak is taken from Argentina’s popular platform Mothers’ Call. Its defiant coordinator Sanjida Islam, is also harassed and intimidated by state security apparatus and law enforcement agencies.

The government officials, the governing Awami League have a scripted message, playing the same record again and again. The content of the message is a mix of denial. A conspiracy theory to overthrow the democratically elected regime of Sheikh Hasina and to undermine the massive development of the country.

The government is too sensitive to the use of “enforced disappearances” and instead likes to say “missing” persons. Then who is responsible for the “missing” persons? In this regard, the government again prefers to remain silent and dumb.

Many top ministers said most of the “missing” persons are due to the inability to repay loans from lenders, family disputes over properties, secret multiple marriages, and migrants missing on dangerous journeys in the sea.

The apologetic officials do not understand that such an explanation is shrugging responsibility for the disappeared persons. The sincerity of the government in international media and rights groups were questioned, as the authorities refused credible probes.

Such attitude of the government has encouraged the police stations to refuse to register cases of disappearances, missing or kidnapped persons by their immediate family members.

This has encouraged criminal gangs to kidnap victims for ransom, as they very well know the police will not accept complaints and will not launch a hunt for the missing persons.

The Centre for Governance Studies (CGS) published a study by Ali Riaz, a distinguished professor at Illinois State University, USA which stated that as many as 86 per cent of the Human Rights Defenders (HRDs) in small towns and grassroots are intermittently faced obstacles in their work from the state and governing party.

The CGS study “Who Defends the Defenders” said the obstacles the HRDs face come from law enforcement agencies, state intelligence agencies, and government officials have been identified by 42.3 per cent of the respondents. While 23.7 per cent of ruling party activists were identified as troublemakers.

Threats, harassment, intimidation or persecution forced 28.6 per cent of respondents to scale down their work and 10.7 per cent have relocated in fear of harassment, said Ali Riaz quoting the findings of the research.

After the publication of the HRD study, CGS is often harassed and intimidated.

The government has been harassing and intimidating the rights organisation Odhikar for the past 12 years. The two rights defenders were under surveillance, their phones were tapped and bank accounts were scrutinised.

The government cancelled Odhikar’s NGO registration and permission to receive foreign funds.

Rights organisations Ain O Shalish Kendra (ASK) and BLAST (Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust) were harassed by the NGO Affairs Bureau (under the Prime Minister’s Office) causing immense delays in approval of their projects and sometimes denied.

The government seems allergic to rights organisations and human rights defenders. What do the authorities want to hide?

In a glaring example of an orchestrated campaign against the HRD, on 14 December 2022, the American Ambassador Peter Haas visited the home of Sanjida Islam, coordinator of Mayer Dak to hear the agony and trauma of the family whose loved ones became victims of enforced disappearances.

Barely 30 minutes of the discussion. Due to security concerns, suddenly the meeting was cut short and security staff hurriedly escorted the ambassador to his vehicle. The crowd of pro-government ‘Mayer Kanna’ (Cry of Mothers) and local Awami League supporters was swelling in front of the residence of Islam making hue and cry.

The crowd mobbed the Ambassador and wanted to hand down a statement, which was declined. His security whisked the envoy safely from the area.

Commenting on the incident a US embassy spokesperson Jeff Ridenour said, “We have raised this matter at the highest levels of the Bangladeshi government, as well as with the Bangladesh embassy in Washington, D.C.”

Meanwhile, the Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dr. AK Abdul Momen expressed his annoyance and said that ‘Mayer Kanna’ went against the [diplomatic] norm by trying to submit a memorandum [statement] to the US ambassador. “Our country does not have the culture to stop a foreign ambassador on the road to submit a memorandum,” he remarked.

Despite all odds, Odhikar did not cease monitoring despite the government’s sensitivity to the issue, the extra-judicial deaths and enforced disappearances. The data with sensitive information was uploaded and updated on Odhikar’s website in both English and Bangla, which was also annoying for the regime.

The information was used by major international media, rights groups and human rights annual country documents of American and European governments.

Such sensitive information in the public domain caused outrage among bureaucrats, political leaders, and policymakers, which had dented the government’s international reputation.

Despite the global outcry, the authorities did not bother to investigate the wrongdoings of the state actors and non-state actors.

Instead blamed Odhikar for disseminating disinformation, misinformation, fake news, hoax news, mal-information, and rumour and of course fake news.

Coming to the issue of numbers, Odhikar has been banned and two leaders of the organisation were sentenced to two years in prison in September.

The crime of Adilur Rahman Khan and Nasir Uddin Elan was that ten years ago Odhikar published a number of people killed on 5 and 6 May 2013. The midnight police crackdown brutally suppressed the Islamist protest.

Thousands of members of a hardline Sunni Muslim organisation, Hefazat-e-Islam (Defender of Islam) occupied downtown Motijheel Commercial Area unless the government accepted their demands to declare Bangladesh an Islamic Republic, scrap the secular constitution, and change the national flag and the national anthem. Also implement Shariah laws and a host of other Islamic dogma, which incidentally match with the Wahabi creeds advocated by the Taliban and Islamic State (ISIS).

The Human Rights Watch said at least 58 people were killed in police action. Amnesty International put the figure at 44. It said 3 members of law enforcement and 41 civilians were killed in the violence on May police mayhem.

Well, the Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) and Home Affairs Ministry contradicted each other. Police said the figure was only 11, while the Home Ministry said 28 dead. Both DMP and the ministry never published the names of the dead people.

Odhikar, several times changed the figure and finally concluded that the death stood at 61. The organisation never published the names of the victims and their addresses.

Khan defending himself in the court said it’s a moral obligation that the privacy of the immediate family members be protected from the wrath of law enforcement agencies.

He said that Odhikar did not publish the names and addresses for fear of being harassed and intimidated by law enforcement agencies in forcing the victim’s families to sign a paper stating that the person is living in the Gulf countries or another story.

In a ‘white paper’ published by the “People’s Commission” formed by Ekattorer Ghatok Dalal Nirmul Committee (committee against the collaborators of 1971) challenged the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Hefazat-e-Islam’s claim that thousands of people have been killed, which were exaggerated and incomplete.

The “People’s Commission” got a list of 79 names from Hefazat-e-Islam.

“Awami League leadership and Bangladesh authorities mock victims and routinely obstruct investigations, making clear that the government has no intention of meaningfully addressing enforced disappearances by its security forces,” said Brad Adams, Asia Director, Human Rights Watch.

Bangladesh has not ratified the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

The curious question arises, why did the government target Odhikar? Why did authorities not list Hefazat-e-Islam, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International for disseminating misinformation or disinformation? The question is left to the readers to respond.

First published in the Northeast News, 2 October 2023

Saleem Samad is an award-winning independent journalist and media rights defender based in Bangladesh. A recipient of the prestigious Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at <saleemsamad@hotmail.com>; Twitter @saleemsamad

Bangladesh Human Rights Watch World Report 2014

Bangladesh tumbled backwards on human rights in 2013. The government led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, which has long claimed to be liberal and democratic, engaged in a harsh crackdown on members of civil society and the media. In August, it jailed prominent human rights defender Adilur Rahman Khan on politically motivated charges. “Atheist” bloggers were arrested, as was a newspaper editor. The government increasingly accused those who criticized its actions or policies, ranging from the World Bank to Grameen Bank founder and Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, of being involved in plots against it.

On many occasions the government employed violent and illegal measures against protesters, including against followers of the Hefazat-e-Islami movement and those demonstrating against deeply flawed war crimes trials which ended in death sentences against many accused.

Dire conditions for workers in the garment and other industries remained largely unreformed in spite of promises of improvements following the tragic collapse of the Rana Plaza garment factory in April and the deaths of over 1,100 workers. The government finally dropped frivolous charges against several labor rights leaders. The courts also ordered all charges to be dropped against Limon Hossain, a young man wrongfully shot and maimed by security forces in a botched operation in 2011.

Elections scheduled for January 2014 led to increased tensions. Although the Awami League campaigned for a caretaker system while in opposition to guard against fraud and manipulation, once in power it abolished the system, leading to opposition party threats to boycott the elections and increasing the chances of violent confrontations between security forces and protesters.

Crackdown on Civil Society, Media, and Opposition

In February, Bangladesh was gripped by large-scale protests, political unrest, and violence after the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) sentenced a leader of the Jamaat-e-Islaami party, Abdul Qader Mollah, to life in prison instead of death. Hundreds of thousands of people throughout Bangladesh took to the streets in peaceful protests to demand that Mollah be hanged. The situation took a more violent turn after the ICT, on February 28, sentenced another Jamaat leader, Delwar Hossain Sayedee, to death for war crimes. Following this verdict, Jamaat supporters took to the streets. Jamaat supporters were responsible for a number of deaths, but the security forces killed many more with often indiscriminate attacks on protesters and bystanders.

At the same time, the government began a crackdown on critics. Several bloggers who criticized the government for appearing to appease Islamic extremism were arrested.

In April, the law minister announced that the government would increase its control over social media, blogs, and online news websites. On February 16, the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission shut down the Sonar Banglablog, known to be operated by Jamaat activists, for spreading “hate speech and causing communal tension.” In a further attack on free speech, on April 11 the police arrested Mahmdur Rahman, the editor of an opposition news outlet, Amar Desh. Rahman was subsequently charged with sedition and unlawful publication of a hacked conversation between the ICT judges and an external consultant initially published by theEconomist magazine. On April 14, police raided the offices of another opposition newspaper, Daily Sangram, and its editor was subsequently charged for printing Amar Desh.

In August, Adilur Rahman Khan of Odhikar, a leading human rights group, was arrested under the Information and Communication Technology Act for allegedly false reporting about killings by government security forces when they dispersed the May 5-6 demonstration by Hefazat, a fundamentalist group demanding greater adherence to Islamic principles. Police raided Odhikar’s offices on the night of August 11, seizing computers which may contain sensitive information on victims and witnesses. Khan was denied bail several times and kept in prison for two months before being granted bail in October on appeal.

In October, parliament passed a bill amending the Information and Communication Technology Act to increase the length of sentences, according the police greater powers to arrest, and making certain offenses non-bailable.

At time of writing, the ICT, set up to prosecute war crimes during the country’s independence war in 1971, had handed down eight convictions, five of which resulted in death sentences. While human rights organizations have long called for fair trials of those responsible, the trials fell short of international human rights standards. In December 2012, theEconomist published damning evidence of collusion between judges, prosecutors, and the government showing that judges were instructing the prosecution on the conduct of the trials, the questioning of witnesses, and written submissions. The revelations led to the resignation of the ICT’s chief judge, but defense motions for retrials were rejected.

Although the ICT had the authority to order measures for victim and witness protection, it summarily dismissed credible claims of witness insecurity. In the Delwar Hossain Sayedee case, judges dismissed credible evidence that an important defense witness was abducted from the courthouse gates and did not order an independent investigation into the allegation. Contradictory statements by key prosecution witnesses were not taken into account in several cases, and judges severely limited the number of defense witnesses. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court reversed the life sentence given to Abdur Qader Mollah and imposed the death penalty after the government pushed through retrospective amendments to the ICT Act, in clear violation of Bangladesh’s obligations under article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The amendment allowed the prosecution to appeal against the life sentence handed down by the trial judges, which the ICT Act had not previously allowed.

Human Rights Watch and the Economist, journalists and television show guests were issued orders by the ICT to show cause for contempt for critical remarks and reporting on the tribunal.

Unlawful Violence Against Protesters

Bangladeshi security forces frequently used excessive force in responding to street protests, killing at least 150 protesters and injuring at least 2,000 between February and October 2013. While large numbers of protesters were arrested, Bangladeshi authorities made no meaningful efforts to hold members of the security forces accountable. At least 90 protesters were killed by security force gunfire during the clashes among the Shahbagh movement, Jamaat-e-Islaami supporters, and security forces in March and April.

In response to the May 5-6 Hefazat protests, the police, the paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), and the Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB) fired indiscriminately into crowds and brutally and unlawfully beat protesters, leading to approximately 50 deaths. At least a dozen members of the security forces and police officers were also killed, as well as three members of the ruling Awami League party.

Labor Rights and Conditions of Workers

Bangladesh has long had notoriously poor workplace safety, with inadequate inspections and regulations. This issue was spotlighted in April, when the Rana Plaza building, which housed five garment factories, collapsed. The building had been evacuated the day before due to cracks in the structure, but the workers had then been ordered back to work. More than 1,100 workers died.

Under domestic and international pressure, on July 15, 2013, the Bangladeshi parliament enacted changes to the Labour Act. The amendments, which did away with the requirement that unions provide the names of leaders to employers at the time of registration and allow workers to seek external expert assistance in bargaining, failed to lift a number of other restrictions on freedom of association. The law also provided exemptions to export processing zones where most garments are made. Even after Rana Plaza, Bangladeshi law remains out of compliance with core International Labour Organization standards, including Convention No. 87 on freedom of association and Convention No. 98 on the right to organize and bargain collectively.

The government also undertook to have more regular inspections of factories in 2013, but inspections which were due to start in September remained stalled by administrative delays.

In a welcome move, the authorities dropped charges against the leaders of the Bangladesh Centre for Worker Solidarity, who had been hampered and harassed in their work for years by frivolous criminal charges.

Tannery workers in the Hazaribagh neighborhood of Dhaka, one of the world’s most polluted urban sites, continue to face highly toxic working conditions. Some 150 leather tanneries operate in the area, producing leather primarily for export and discharging 21 thousand cubic meters of untreated effluent into the nearby Buriganga River each day. The government's planned relocation of the tanneries to a dedicated industrial zone, delayed numerous times since 2005, was again put off in mid-2013.

The Department of the Environment fined two tanneries for their failure to treat waste in 2013, the first time environmental laws have been enforced against Hazaribagh tanneries. Enforcement of environmental and labor laws is otherwise lacking, with negative consequences for the health and well-being of tannery workers and local residents.

Women’s Rights

Leading human rights groups in the country had discussions with doctors to revise medico-legal protocols for the treatment and examination of rape victims to exclude degrading practices like the two-finger test to draw conclusions about a woman’s “habituation to sex.” Such groups are challenging the practice as a violation of the fundamental rights to life and health with dignity in the High Court Division of the Bangladesh Supreme Court.

Key International Actors

India, Bangladesh’s most influential international interlocutor, remained largely silent on the human rights situation. Bangladesh and India continued to hold talks on issues linked to their shared border including illegal trade and the use of excessive force by Indian border guards leading to deaths and injuries to Bangladeshi and Indian nationals.

Bangladesh’s donors were more vocal, pressing the government to end its crackdown on critics. Donors were swift in denouncing the arrest of Adilur Rahman Khan, with members of the international community observing court proceedings. However, donors were largely silent on the lack of fair trials at the ICT.

Following the Rana Plaza collapse, over 70 European companies signed an international accord designed to better protect Bangladeshi workers by requiring regular inspections of factories and making the results public. However, American buyers refused to join this accord and signed a separate agreement which has been criticized for not allowing workers to freely form unions.

The government publicly agreed to allow international monitors to observe the January 2014 elections. The international community, in particular the US, have been vocal in calling for the various parties to come to an agreement well beforehand in order to avoid contentious and potentially violent protests and a non-credible election result.

First published by Human Rights Watch, January 21, 2014

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/bangladesh

Bangladesh has little to celebrate after the most violent election day in its history

With 21 people dead, along with further human rights abuses and an absence of opposition, serious questions must now be asked of this government

AISHA GANI

My cousin Amna (not her real name), a student at Anwer Khan Modern Medical College in Dhaka, is currently resitting her crucial exams and missed all her classes in the past two weeks because of the recent instability in Bangladesh. "My friends are afraid and nobody wants to come into college," she told me. It was not safe for her to travel back to the capital, with violent clashes between protesters and police on the streets, strikes and road blockades, and buses being petrol-bombed. "Bangladesh is very dangerous at the moment. People didn't want to go out during election time. There is horror every day."

I think about when I visited Bangladesh, navigating the dusty alleyways with Amna, hailing a rickshaw and picking up hot parathas and halwa en route to Dhanmondi lake to watch the sun rise. It was Victory day in Bangladesh. But now there is nothing to celebrate after the most recent elections. The country is still being choked by a toxic political culture in which winner takes all, and where there is no room for reconciliation with the opposing side. Sheikh Hasina was sworn in as prime minister this weekend, with the backdrop of putting the opposition leader, Khaleda Zia, under house arrest and banning 21 political parties. The absence of opposition parties raises concerns about the credibility of the elections.

The Hasina regime's record of human rights abuses and the level of corruption is serious, and it is disconcerting that pro-government newspapers and elite commentators overlook this. Moreover, their support for the Shahbag movement, whose demands include hanging those accused at the domestic war crimes tribunal, banning opposition political parties and arresting editors who are critical of them, is deeply disturbing. Although the Bangladeshi novelist Tahmima Anam argued in the Guardian that Bangladesh doesn't have to go back to being a basket case, the only way to prevent this is to have a real democracy, stop the political point-scoring, stop seeking revenge, and focus on unity and working towards a more pluralist society.

This was the most violent election day in Bangladesh's history, with 21 people killed as they headed to the polls, and in the run-up to the elections there have been night raids on the homes of opposition supporters. Yet human rights abuses by the regime's security forces are nothing new. Last year, the offices of human rights activists were ransacked for reporting on abuses by the government's security forces against protesters, while activists Adilur Rahman Khan and Naseeruddin Elan of the Bangladeshi human rights group Odhikar were arrested and are now appearing before a cyber crimes tribunal. There have also been violent attacks on journalists, including the murder of a blogger. And it is the same government security forces that charged with batons and opened fire on protesters who were demanding compensation for the loss of their loved ones after the Rana Plaza factory tragedy, in which more than 1,100 people died.

Much of the current instability is happening because Hasina slashed open some old wounds of the nation: the prime minister had made a manifesto pledge to hold accused "war criminals and collaborators [of Pakistan]" on trial – despite a previous general amnesty in 1973 which had been granted by Hasina's father, Sheik Mujibur Rahman. It was an election winner for Hasina's Awami League party against the Bangladeshi National party (BNP), who had been successful in elections in 2001 when they made a partnership with Jamaat-e-Islami. In 2010, Hasina's government set up the "international" war crimes tribunal and most of those on trial are long-standing members of Jamaat-e-Islami. Last month, Abdul Quader Mollah was the first defendant to be hanged. This war crimes tribunal has been condemned as unjust by the international community, including the UN and Amnesty. It has been marred by scandals including the abduction of defence witnesses by police from the court, to the exposure of partiality and collusion between judges, prosecution and the state.

Are these shackles of war and political grudges what we want the next generation of Bangladeshis to inherit? Grave crimes were committed and have to be addressed. There has to be restorative justice for the victims of the war, and as I have argued elsewhere, there can be truth and reconciliation even after 40 years. But has justice been done with unfair trials, division and more spilt blood? Serious questions must be asked of the government; and with steps taken to eliminate the opposition, is Hasina's regime taking an even more authoritarian direction? There are suggestions that there was less than 10% voter turnout in the elections. The EU, US and Commonwealth nations did not send observers to monitor the polls, which were not deemed to be "transparent, inclusive and credible". While allies have not previously said much of consequence on the country's human rights record, and usually heap platitudes on Bangladesh's progress, the real test will be how they interact with this government in the future, and whether they will legitimise the corruption that they have just called out.

First published in The Guardian, 15 January 2014

Aisha Gani is a Guardian digital journalism trainee and is currently working on the G2 desk. You can follow her on Twitter - @aishagani

Bangladesh: Democracy Stumbles

The country is once again in the grip of authoritarianism and political violence, the roots of which run deep.

Photo Ben Hayes: Secularist demand to expedite trial of war criminals at Shahbag Square

NISHA SHARMEEN ALI

The announcement of the schedule for elections to the tenth Jatiya Sangsad (national parliament) on November 25 has stoked an already volatile political situation in Bangladesh. The ready reaction of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party-led opposition alliance to the chief election commissioner’s televised speech to the nation, during which he announced that the general elections will be held on January 5, 2014, came in the form of what was initially a 48-hour countrywide blockade of road, rail and water ways, subsequently extended to 71 hours, beginning from November 26. The blockade ended on November 30, but the BNP commenced another 72 hour countrywide blockade the next day, which was ultimately extended until the evening of December 5. The alliance has called for yet another blockade to begin on Saturday, December 7.

In the meantime, there has been widespread violence and vandalism: vehicles are torched, public and private property destroyed. The death toll as reported on December 4 had reached 40 and scores more have been wounded. Many of the casualties were caused by an explosion of crude bombs and arson attacks on public transport. According to Samanta Lal Sen, the coordinator of the burn and plastic surgery unit at Dhaka Medical College Hospital, the premier public hospital in the country, several of the victims of political violence, admitted with severe burn injuries in the last one month, had died and quite a few are in a critical condition.

The BNP-led alliance has been engaged in street agitation for months now in its demand that Sheikh Hasina resign as prime minister, given that her Awami League government completed its term on October 25. The opposition alliance claims that polls conducted under the government will not be free, fair or transparent. While the two sides continue their finger-pointing over the ongoing political impasse and social disorder, arising out of the failure of the ruling and opposition political alliances to reach a consensus on election-time government, there have reportedly been informal contacts between the feuding camps, supposedly geared towards a dialogue. Still, publicly at least, the two camps have thus far produced only contradictory statements about what the media has dubbed as “clandestine” meetings between the general secretaries of the Awami League and the BNP.

A History of Acrimony

Mutual mistrust, acrimony and recrimination between the two major political parties have come to mark Bangladeshi national politics, especially since the ouster of HM Ershad’s military regime in 1990 and the subsequent restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1991. In any case, intense political unrest has marked almost every election cycle in Bangladesh since the country won independence in 1971. For instance, during the 2001 elections, which the BNP won, approximately 400 people were reportedly killed and more than 17,000 injured, primarily in street clashes between members and supporters of competing political camps. The next election cycle in 2007 also resulted in several deaths and injuries, leading to an extra-constitutional takeover by a military-backed interim government. The elections to the ninth Jatiya Sangsad (national parliament) were eventually held in December 2008, with a 14-party alliance led by the Awami League scoring an electoral landslide victory.

The seeds of the political unrest and uncertainty over the forthcoming general elections were planted in June 2012, when the Awami League-dominated parliament pushed through the Fifteenth Amendment to the constitution, scrapping the provision that parliamentary elections must be held under a non-partisan caretaker government, headed by the chief justice of the Supreme Court. Ironically, in 1996, the Awami League and its opposition allies forced the then BNP-led government, through prolonged street agitation, to incorporate that particular provision in the form of the Thirteenth Amendment. Subsequently, two parliamentary elections, in 1996 and 2001, were held under caretaker governments.

After being elected in 2001, the BNP-led government increased the retirement age for the Supreme Court chief justice, apparently to have a person perceived loyal to it as the head of the caretaker government for the next elections scheduled for 2007. Then the main opposition party, the Awami League refused to accept the former chief justice in question as the chief adviser to the caretaker government and took to the streets. Amidst the consequent political stalemate, marked by sustained violence across the country, scope was created for the military-backed interim government to take over and rule for two years unconstitutionally, after declaring a state of emergency.

Elections or no elections, violence has become a major feature of Bangladesh politics. Numerous political leaders and activists have been killed by rivals or by their own party colleagues. Data from different human rights organizations suggests that the total number of deaths resulting from political violence in 2013 is substantially higher than in recent years, according to a report published in New Age on November 7. Ain O Salish Kendra reported that political violence had claimed the lives of 289 people in the first nine months of the current year while the figure was 84 for the whole of 2012. According to a monthly report by rights organization Odhikar, at least 27 people were killed and 3,433 injured in political violence in October alone.

This political violence may very well have had its origins in the early days of independent Bangladesh. The Awami League, which had presided over the political struggle for the country’s liberation and come to embody the people’s democratic aspirations, proved autocratic in power. In 1975, its head and then president Sheikh Mujibur Rahman introduced BAKSAL, which banned all opposition parties and compelled the country to adopt a one-party system. President Ziaur Rahman, the military general-turned-politician and founder of the BNP, restored the multiparty system in the late 1970s.

Military Intervention

Meanwhile, the path for military intervention in the political process may have been paved during the rule of the post-independence AL government. Notes Professor Amena Mohsin of Dhaka University in her published research paper: “The Mukti Bahini (liberation forces), which formed the nucleus of the Bangladesh army in the immediate aftermath of the liberation war was divided along the regular Bengali forces of the then Pakistan army and those recruited by the Awami League. After the liberation of Bangladesh, Mujib paid little attention for rebuilding the armed forces; this was a cause of major discontent among the army.” The discontent deepened when Mujib created Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (National Defence Force). Rakkhi Bahini was generally viewed as a parallel institution and a threat to the interests of the army. The army was also apparently fed up with the discrimination, and disenchanted with the AL government’s unchecked rule, which had encouraged unbridled looting, illegal land grabbing and civil disorder. It was also carrying the legacy of the Pakistan army, which had its own track of deep engagement in politics. On August 15, 1975, Mujib was assassinated by a group of Bangladeshi military officers.

General Ziaur Rahman (popularly known as Zia) became president in 1977, following the resignation of the interim government president, Justice Sayem, on the grounds of illness. Many believed this was a Zia ploy to take control of the state with army backing. Although Sayem had promised early elections, Zia kept delaying them. The years of anarchy had left most of Bangladesh’s state institutions in a shambles, with constant threats of military coups amidst strikes and protests. Gaining total power, Zia banned political parties, censored the media, re-imposed martial law and commanded the army to arrest opposition forces. Ironically, Zia himself was assassinated in a military coup in 1981.

The country remained in the grip of military and quasi-military rule from 1975 till 1990, when Ershad’s regime, which had seized power through a military coup in 1982, was overthrown by a popular uprising. For the first time in the political history of Bangladesh, all major political parties joined forces to oust the rule, yet the role of the army in politics had become entrenched. The end of the autocratic regime and the election of the BNP in 1991 did not bring stability in the political arena and the military remained a major factor. Meanwhile, the student wings of the political parties have been encouraged to use arms, and continuous hartals (general strikes) emerged as a common phenomenon. Bangladesh politics became increasingly weaponized and street-centric.

A Hybrid Regime

In 2004, when the BNP was in power, AL president Sheikh Hasina was speaking at a rally in front of the party’s Bangabandhu Avenue office in Dhaka when grenades were hurled, in what was an apparent assassination attempt. Twenty people were killed and 300 injured. Since then, grenades have been found inside Dhaka Central Jail, Dhaka Medical College Hospital and at various cultural hubs. Disorder was rife during BNP’s last stint in power and the state was unable to protect the political rights and civil liberties of its citizens. The situation is unchanged, if not worse, during the Awami League-led government, which is characterized by negligible checks and balances. Not surprisingly, Bangladesh continues to be categorized under “hybrid regimes” in the Democracy Index by The Economist Intelligence Unit, meaning that democratic structures such as elections exist but the state has remained fundamentally authoritarian.

Clearly, the political system of Bangladesh needs a review. Can it transition to a full democracy or will it remain a hybrid regime? It is not easy to build a sturdy democracy. Even in established democratic states, the system can corrode if not nurtured and protected. The Global Corruption Barometer 2012, the largest worldwide survey on public views on corruption, says 50 per cent of Bangladeshis surveyed in 2010 considered the government’s measures effective in curbing corruption. After two years, that had declined to 26 per cent. According to the survey, Bangladeshis see the political parties and the police as the most corrupt institutions, followed by the judiciary, parliament and civil administration. People have reason to lose faith, given the extent of nepotism and graft. This erosion in faith persists with the two major political parties refusing to desert confrontational politics and work towards a transparent, accountable, and participatory democratic system.

Now, as the Awami League continues to evince no interest in accommodating the BNP’s demands by clinging to power beyond its tenure, while the opposition resorts to violent street agitation, there are fears of a repeat of the January 2007 intervention by the army. Were that to occur, Bangladesh would once again be going backwards on the path towards democratization.

First published in The Diplomat, December 06, 2013

Nisha Sharmeen Ali is a Dhaka-based journalist

Politician's disappearance fuels Bangladesh crisis

THE NIGHT watchman was dozing in a wooden chair just after midnight on a deserted Bangladeshi street when he was startled by a scream. A group of men were pulling two people from a car and forcing them into a black microbus; "The two guys were shouting, 'Save us,'" before the car pulled away, Lutfar Rahman said.

The abductions of an opposition politician and his driver last month have sparked Bangladesh's biggest crisis in years, raised hostilities between the most prominent leaders of its fragile democracy and highlighted a series of seemingly political disappearances.

The opposition has blamed the government, launched nationwide strikes and fought with police in street clashes that have killed five people and injured scores. Homemade bombs have exploded on the streets of Dhaka, including one inside a compound housing government ministries. The government has charged 44 top opposition leaders in connection with the violence.

On Wednesday, the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its 17 allies would demonstrate across the country to restart its paused protests.

No one has claimed responsibility for Elias Ali's abduction, and no ransom has been demanded, the usual practice of criminal gangs in Bangladesh.

Security forces told the High Court this week they had no role in Ali's disappearance, and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina accused the opposition of hiding Ali to create an excuse to cause mayhem.

Hasina, however, later pledged to do everything possible to find Ali, when his wife and children met her seeking her intervention.

"The conflict is pushing Bangladesh toward a dangerous situation," said Adilur Rahman, secretary of Odhikar, a rights group.

Hasina and her archrival Khaleda Zia have alternated in power since a pro-democracy movement ousted the last military regime in 1990. Zia leads Ali's Bangladesh Nationalist Party.

The abductions of Ali and his driver as they returned home from meeting supporters at a hotel April 17 also has highlighted an increasing number of disappearances that Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have blamed on security forces.

At least 22 people have disappeared this year, according to a local human-rights group, Ain-o-Salish Kendra. Odhikar reports that more than 50 people have disappeared since 2010. Many of the disappeared were politicians.

During her visit to Bangladesh last week, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton raised Ali's disappearance and the killing of labor leader Aminul Islam with the government, reflecting international concern over the issue.

Islam, who recently led a campaign for higher wages for the country's 3 million garment workers, was found dead along a highway April 5. His family blames the killing on law enforcement agencies.

Even before Ali's disappearance, tensions were high between Hasina and Zia over the conduct of the general election due in 2014.

Hasina has scrapped a constitutional provision requiring the government to step down before polls and transfer power to a neutral caretaker administration to oversee the voting within 90 days. The government says it acted to comply with a court ruling that the caretaker provision was undemocratic, but it means Hasina will be overseeing the next balloting.

Zia has refused to take part in any election overseen by Hasina, fearing fraud. The government says it is open to discuss alternatives, but the opposition says they will sit across the table only if the previous sytem will be restored. The government rejects that.

A similar dispute in 2006 prompted the powerful military to declare a state of emergency that remained until the 2008 election. Both Hasina and Zia were put behind bars during the emergency rule.

Many businessmen also were jailed pending tax evasion and fraud trials, and some fled to avoid arrest. But the cases were withdrawn or not heard when the political government took office.

"We don't want to return to any emergency rule," said A.K. Azad, president of the Federation of Bangladesh Commerce and Industry. "What we want is our leaders to work together so there is no more strikes and clashes."

Ali, 50, has lived dangerously since becoming a student at Dhaka University, considered a breeding ground of Bangladesh's politicians.

He was recruited into a student political group by the country's last military dictator Hussein Muhammad Ershad, according to friends. He then joined a group allied with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, sparking feuding and occasional gunfights among rival factions of Zia's party.

He was briefly arrested, later elected to Parliament and then swept out in 2008 by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's Awami League party.

The opposition, which suspended its street protests in a gesture of goodwill during Clinton's visit, has vowed to resume strikes if Ali is not found.

His family wonders if he is even alive.

"We have left his fate to Allah," said Ali's teenage son, Abrar Elias, "The Almighty is our last resort."

First published by Associated Press, published on May 09, 2012 by Fox News

Why Bangladesh Should Not Be Audited By International Bodies

SALEEM SAMAD

Bangladesh for obvious reasons is under renewed scrutiny by global watchdogs, think tanks, and the international press. This is not just because of more than a year of emergency rule, but also due to recent dramatic political developments toward democratic transitions in several countries, including Thailand, Nepal, and Pakistan. Expectations have risen for Bangladesh.

Around Bangladesh, political observers see optimistic developments, perhaps light at the end of the tunnel. The Nepalese are preparing to change their century-old kingdom into a republic. Thai military generals have vowed to not interfere in the polity and have returned to the barracks, though they’ve left behind institutions for influencing internal security. In Pakistan, after decades of military subjugation, there is a change of heart—forced in no small part by a change of heart in the US administration—among the Generals, who have conceded their failure to manage the country.

An overall estimate

Global watchdogs are keenly observing the reforms agenda in Bangladesh toward a transition to democracy. And none of them seems happy. Despite a year of anti-corruption and anti-crime drives by the interim government, Bangladesh is still placed toward the bottom on the list of world’s most corrupt nations. The Global Integrity Report 2007 stated that Bangladesh’s caretaker government had failed to deliver the wishful target it had set about reducing corruption and increasing accountability. Accountability at all levels—executive, legislative, judicial—was rated as very weak, even though laws were strong. The Global Integrity Report pointed out that the military is routinely involved in government affairs.

Similarly, Washington based Freedom House in its Freedom In The World 2008 report says that Bangladesh experienced a reversal due to the introduction of emergency rule in January, the suspension of scheduled elections, and the curtailment of civil liberties and press freedom were identified as a severe blow on good governance and democracy.

Religious freedom has never improved since previous military rulers declared Islam the state religion two decades ago. Persecution of religious minorities like the Hindus, Ahmadiyya Muslim, Buddhists, Christians and cultural minorities (animists) in Modhupur, Sylhet and Chittagong Hill Tracts have continued unabated. It was expected that after the military returned to power in early 2007, the status of religious freedom may improve. But the predators remain loose, and even in 2008, Bangladesh remains in the watch list of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom.

So far, no notable initiative has been taken by the quasi-military government to ensure transparency in governance. With no real improvement in weak institutions, the Failed States Index, published by Foreign Policy / Fund for Peace, placed Bangladesh among the 20 most unstable and highest risk countries, next to Burma, Uganda, Nigeria, and Ethiopia.

The slide in human rights

More troubling are the problems regarding human rights and democracy. In its “Human Rights Report 2007,” local watchdog Odhikar has written flatly: “Human rights situation deteriorated sharply in Bangladesh in 2007.” This not just because fundamental rights remain suspended, but also because the anti-corruption and anti-crime drives are being used “as nothing more than a tool to reform the political parties to its [i.e., the government’s] liking.”

Amnesty International made a high profile visit to Bangladesh in January. The delegation, headed by Amnesty’s Secretary General, made similar observations about “new patterns of manipulating due process.” It also noted with concern the “creeping role of the armed forces in a range of functions, with no clear rules of accountability.”

In February, a group of British and European parliamentarians visited Bangladesh in order to encourage the return to democracy through holding free and fair elections. They also expressed “deep concern over the human rights abuses.”

The same month, Human Rights Watch published a scathing criticism of severe abuses by “Bangladesh’s notorious military intelligence agency.” It pointed out that “the government has routinely used torture to extract confessions,” and that it has protected abusers. Its Asia director asked, “Are they reformers, or do they just say they are reformers?”

In March, the US Department of State submitted to Congress its annual report on human rights in different countries. It gave similar conclusions about Bangladesh’s record in 2007: “The government's human rights record worsened, in part due to the state of emergency and postponement of elections.” It noted how the government has restricted freedom of press, freedom of association, the right to bail, and due process, with political discrimination and “serious abuses, including custodial deaths, arbitrary arrest and detention, and harassment of journalists.”

Law, order, justice

It will be incorrect to think that all of these are new. DGFI, the dreaded security service at the center of many waves of abuse, operated unhindered during the elected governments of Khaleda Zia (1991-1996, 2001-2007) and Shiekh Hasina (1996-2001). Like in Pakistan, interference by state security agency jeopardised the transition of democracy, even after last military dictator General Ershad quit power in 1990 in the face of violent street protests.

The last elected government headed by BNP gave unprecedented powers to elite law-and-order agencies, using them politically and frequently. The current government also uses the same techniques. “Joint Forces,” a combination of uniformed military officers, the anti-crime squads and elite police are given the responsibility in implement the government’s anti-crime campaign, in which hundreds of suspects have been tortured and killed in custody. The differences between then and now are twofold: whatever rights people had before have all been extinguished, and there is no accountability whatsoever for the government’s actions.

The judiciary is yet to demonstrate that it is independent of government influence, or that the security agencies are not intimidating the magistrates and judges. Most of the District Magistracy and Speedy Trial Court judgements are glaring examples of government interference. The judgements are arbitrary, illogical and mysterious, based often on forced confessions and fictitious estimates—and each and every one of the 61 verdicts given in the high profile cases so far has gone in favour of the government. As a dismayed newspaper editorial observed recently: “the prosecution, i.e. the present regime, has been able to ensure a near-perfect conviction success rate … Even the best prosecution lawyers around the world cannot boast such a conviction success rate" (New Age, 25 February 2008).

To conclude, Bangladesh’s present military-driven government has made many promises and taken many initiatives but failed to perform neutrally and satisfactorily, with good governance, transparency, and accountability.

Supporters of the government usually respond to this allegation in two ways. First, they accuse all critics of “tarnishing the image of the country,” as if performance is nothing and image is everything. Second, they say that it is too early to judge them: they have not been given a fair chance or enough time to clean up all the mess that Bangladesh was in. The first accusation has no substance. To the second accusation we say, the job of the caretaker government, by Constitution, is to hold elections toward a return to democracy. Their job is not to fix everything in the country, and claiming to fix everything an ominous excuse to hold on to power.

First Published in CounterCurrents.org 10 July 2008

Saleem Samad, an Ashoka Fellow is a Bangladesh born journalist presently living in exile in Canada. He edits www.DurDesh.net streaming from Toronto and specialises in conflict, terrorism, security and intelligence issues in South Asia. He could be reached by email saleemsamad@hotmail.com