Weaponizing Media Regulation

S. BINODKUMAR SINGH

On May 16, 2020, Police arrested two people from the Lamchari village of Matlab Dakkhin upazila (sub-District) in Chandpur District in a case filed under the Digital Security Act (DSA). The arrestees – Sumon Biswas and Adhir Chandra Mallik – had been allegedly making derogatory comments about Islam, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the Bangladesh Police on Facebook for the preceding few days.

On May 6, 2020, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) arrested cartoonist Ahmed Kabir Kishore, writer Mushtaq Ahmed, and two others – Didarul Islam Bhuiyan, an activist of a platform called 'Rashtrachinta', and Minhaz Mannan Emon, a businessman – under DSA, allegedly for making anti-Government posts on Facebook, from the capital, Dhaka city. A total of 11 persons were accused in the case filed under DSA. The seven others accused in the case were Tasnim Khalil, Shahed Alam, Saer Zulkarnain, Ashiq Imran, Phillipp Schuhmacher, Shapan Wahid and Asif Mohiuddin. These seven live outside Bangladesh.

On May 5, 2020, Mahtab Uddin Talukder, Sunamganj District correspondent of private television channel SATV, was arrested from his residence under the DSA for posting a status on his Facebook page allegedly defaming Sunamganj-1 Constituency’s ruling Awami League (AL) Member of Parliament (MP) Moazzem Hossain Ratan. The MP had been interrogated by Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) officials on February 18, 2020, for his alleged involvement in money laundering and the casino business.

Among various provisions of the Digital Security Act, the followings are the more alarming:

Section 17 Punishment for Illegal Entrance in Critical Information Infrastructure, etc.-(1) If any person intentionally or knowingly in any Critical information infrastructure - a. Illegally enters, or b. By means of illegal entrance, harms or destroys or renders inactive the infrastructure or tries to do so, then the above activity of that person will be an offense under the Act. (2) If any person of Sub Section (1) - a. Commits any offense within the Clause (a) then, the person will be penalized by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years or by fine not exceeding BDT 2.5 million or with both. b. Commits any offense within Clause (b) then, the person will be penalized by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or with fine not exceeding BDT 10 million or with both. (3) If any person commits the offense mentioned in sub-section (1) for the second time or recurrently commits the offense then, he will be punished with lifetime imprisonment or with fine not exceeding BDT 50 million or with both.

Section 29 Publishing and distributing defamatory information, etc.-(1) If a person publishes or distributes any defamatory information mentioned in section 499 of the Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) via a website or any other electronic format, they will get a maximum penalty of 3 years in jail or BDT 5 lakh in fine, or both.

Section 32 Offence and penalty for breach of Official Secrets-(1) If a person commits a crime or assists someone in committing a crime under the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (Act No XIX of 1923) via a computer, digital device, computer network, digital network or any other digital media, they will get a maximum penalty of 14 years in jail or BDT 2.5 million in fines, or both. (2) If a person commits a crime mentioned in the sub-clause 1 for a second time or repeatedly, they will be sentenced to life in prison or a maximum fine of BDT 10 million, or both.

• In addition to the sweeping provisions themselves, it is the protracted jail sentences prescribed that are a cause of worry and source of intimidation. According to the International Federation for Human Rights, there have been more than 1,000 cases filed under the DSA since it was introduced in 2018.
• Indeed, the Sampadak Parishad (Editors' Council), a nationwide professional association of newspaper Editors, has been protesting against the DSA since it came into effect on October 8, 2018. The Editors' Council identified fundamental flaws in the DSA:
• In trying to make a law to prevent crimes through digital devices and provide security in the digital sphere, the act ends up policing media operations, censoring content and controlling media freedom and freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed by our constitution.
• The act gives unlimited power to the police to enter premises, search offices, bodily search persons, seize computers and networks, servers, and everything related to the digital platforms. According to the Act, the police can arrest anybody on suspicion without warrant and do not need any approval of any authorities.
• The act suffers from vagueness and uses many terms that can be misinterpreted and used against the media.
• DSA will create an atmosphere of fear and intimidation which will make journalism and especially investigative journalism virtually impossible.
• Other than media professionals, the law will create panic among all users of computers, computer networks, etc.

On June 18, 2019, Asia Internet Coalition, a Coalition of which Facebook, Google, Amazon, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Yahoo!, among others, are members, pointed out that Bangladesh’s DSA creates several obstacles to the conducive use of the internet ecosystem due to several vague obligations, unchecked powers, disproportionate penalties, and unworkable compliance requirements.

DSA has become a custom-made judicial weapon for silencing ‘troublesome’ journalists and has created an environment of fear and intimidation under which normal functioning of journalists has become extremely risky, if not impossible. Not surprisingly, since the enactment of DSA, self-censorship has reached unprecedented levels because editors are reluctant to risk imprisonment or the closure of their media outlets.

Further, blocking access to news websites and consequently stifling press freedom is another developing phenomenon in Bangladesh. In December 2019, authorities in Bangladesh blocked access to Netra News, a Sweden-based investigative journalism portal, within three days of the outlet carrying allegations of corruption against Obaidul Quader, the country’s Minister of Road Transport and Bridges, and General Secretary of the ruling AL. In March 2019, the Bangladesh Government blocked Al Jazeera's English news website hours after it published an article detailing the alleged involvement of Tarique Ahmed Siddique, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's Security Adviser and head of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), the country's military intelligence agency, in the disappearance of three men as part of a business dispute involving his wife. In December 2018, the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) had ordered 54 news portals to be blocked to prevent spread of propaganda ahead of the December 30 National Election. In November 2017, Indian news website The Wire was cut off after it published a story on the alleged role of the DGFI in the disappearance of an academic, Mubashar Hasan.

Meanwhile, radical Islamist militants continue to murder journalists and bloggers who dare to defend an overly secular vision of society. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), a total of at least 36 journalists and bloggers have been killed since the commencement of the 2013 Shahbagh Movement. The last incident of killing was on June 11, 2018, in which Shahzahan Bachchu (60), an outspoken proponent of secular principles and owner of a publishing house 'Bishaka Prokashoni' was gunned down in his ancestral village, Kakaldi in Munshiganj District.

Unsurprisingly, Reporters Sans Frontières, in its 2020 World Press Freedom Index dropped Bangladesh to 151st out of 180 countries – the lowest ranking it has ever received. It was at the 150th position in 2019 and 146th in 2018.

Legitimate concerns regarding the abuse of the Internet and social media, particularly by extremist and terrorist formations as well as by unscrupulous political and criminal elements, do require legislation for the regulation of these media. But the sweeping provisions of DSA, and the use against journalists carrying out legitimate investigations and reportage, cannot be part of a legitimate response to these concerns. The arbitrary arrests and a crackdown on freedom of expression under the draconian DSA raise critical questions of intent and accountability of the Government. Ensuring the freedom of the Media, as well as the safety of media professionals and the civil discourse, both from state intimidation as well as from the threat from radical Islamist forces, even as the state is empowered to act against intentional malfeasance, must be the objective of both legislation and practice with regard to regulation of the Media. Freedom of the Media and acceptance of criticism are crucial for the survival of democracy in Bangladesh.

The article was first published in the Volume 18, No. 47, May 18, 2020 of SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

S. Binodkumar Singh is a Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, India

Bangladesh: Visible Gains, Hidden Dangers

S. BINODKUMAR SINGH

On December 18, 2014, the International Crimes Tribunal-2 (ICT-2) indicted Forkan Mallik, an alleged Razakar (a paramilitary force organized by the Pakistan Army) commander from Mirzaganj sub-District in Patuakhali District, for his involvement in crimes against humanity during the Liberation War of 1971. The tribunal framed five charges against Forkan, a supporter of the main opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

On November 24, 2014, ICT-1 awarded the death penalty to Mobarak Hossain aka Mobarak Ali (64), former rukon (union member) of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and commander of the Razakar force. Mobarak was indicted on April 23, 2013, on five specific incidents of murder, abduction, confinement, torture and loot.

On November 13, 2014, ICT-1 sentenced Zahid Hossain Khokon alias Khokon (70), vice-president of BNP's Nagarkanda unit and a Razakar commander of Faridpur District, to death in absentia. Khokon was indicted on October 9, 2013, on 11 charges, including genocide, torture, abduction and confinement during the Liberation War. He is absconding and, while Bangladeshi authorities say they have no information regarding his whereabouts, reports suggest that he may be residing in Sweden with his elder son and daughter.

The War Crimes (WC) Trials began on March 25, 2010, and through 2014, the two ICTs indicted nine persons and delivered four verdicts. Thus far, the ICTs have indicted 25 leaders, including 13 from JeI, five from Muslim League (ML), four from BNP, two from Jatiya Party (JP) and one Nizam-e-Islami leader. Verdicts against 14 of them have already been delivered – 12 were awarded death sentence while the remaining two received life sentences. One of the 12 who received the death sentence has already been executed, while the remaining 11 death penalties are yet to be executed. The two persons who were awarded life sentences have already died serving their sentence. They were JeI Ameer (Chief) Ghulam Azam (91), who died on October 23, 2014; and former BNP minister Abdul Alim (83), who died on August 30, 2014.

Sheikh Hasina Wajed’s Awami League (AL)-led Government, which retained power winning the 10th General Elections held on January 5, 2014 in the face of a comprehensive Opposition boycott, has enormously consolidated its secular commitments and kept its promise to punish the perpetrators of the 1971 genocide. By bringing the war crimes' perpetrators to justice, Dhaka has also succeeded in minimizing the threat of Islamist extremists within the country, both because they have become conscious of the clear intent of the incumbent Government, and because many of their top leaders are among those arraigned or convicted for the War Crimes.

The Government also remained determined in its approach to dealing with JeI, the country's largest right-wing party and main Islamist extremist troublemaker. Law Minister Anisul Huq, speaking at Dhaka city on December 7, 2014, announced, "The Draft Bill to ban JeI will be placed in the Cabinet this month and it is expected to be passed in the first session of the Parliament in 2015." Notably, in a landmark ruling, the Dhaka High Court, on August 1, 2013, had declared the registration of JeI as a political party, illegal. A three-member Special Bench, including Justice M. Moazzam Husain, Justice M. Enayetur Rahim and Justice Quazi Reza-Ul Hoque, passed the judgment, accepting a writ petition challenging the legality of JeI's registration as a political party.

Further, in a major blow to JeI, Election Commissioner Shah Nawaz, on November 7, 2013, declared that the party could not participate in the General Elections of January 2014, in line with the High Court order. JeI was, of course, one of the Opposition parties that boycotted the Election.

Significantly, Security Force (SF) personnel arrested at least 1,757 cadres of JeI and Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), the student wing of JeI, through 2014, in addition to 4,038 such arrests in 2013. 

Nevertheless, disruptive elements led by the BNP-JeI-ICS combine, continued to engage in violent activities through 2014. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), a total of 60 people, including 29 civilians, nine SF personnel and 22 extremists, were killed in incidents related to Islamist extremism in 2014 (data till December 21), in addition to 379 persons, including 228 civilians, 18 SF personnel and 133 extremists, killed in 2013.

As the Government continued with its policy of checking the growth of Islamist extremist forces led by the BNP-JeI-ICS combine, it deprived the Islamist terrorist formations of any opportunity to revive their activities within the country, despite sustained efforts, through 2014. The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) arrested JMB chief coordinator Abdun Noor and four of his close aides from the Sadar Sub-District Railway Station of Sirajganj District, on October 31, 2014, and recovered 49 detonators, 26 electronic detonators, four time bombs, 155 different kinds of circuits, 55 jihadi books, and a power regulator. During preliminary interrogations, the JMB operatives confessed that they were planning to carry out large-scale bomb attacks across the country, particularly in Dhaka city.

In a disturbing development, the Detective Branch (DB) of Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) arrested two cadres of the Ansarul Bangla Team (ABT), Tanjil Hossain Babu (26), who had some technological expertise, and Muhamad Golam Maula Mohan (25), a Computer Sciences and Engineering graduate, along with a plastic frame of a drone, electronic devices and some books on jihad, from Dhaka city's Jatrabari area on December 16, 2014. After their interrogation, Joint Commissioner Monirul Islam of DB claimed, "They reached the final stages of making the drone after a six-month planning and research. Once completed, the drone could be flown up to around 25th floor of a building to launch an attack." ABT is an al Qaeda inspired terrorist formation that crystallized in 2013 from the remnants of the Jamaat-ul-Muslimeen.

Nevertheless, under the sustained pressure exerted by Security Forces, the country did not record a single major terrorist incident (resulting in three or more fatalities) by any Islamist terror outfit through 2014. In fact, only one violent incident involving such groups was reported through the year. On February 23, 2014, a Police Constable was killed and another two Policemen were injured, as an armed gang of 10 to 15 unidentified terrorists ambushed a prison van that was carrying three convicted Jama'at-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) terrorists in the Trishal Sub-District of Mymensingh District. All the three convicts managed to escape during the ambush. Though Police arrested one of them soon after, the whereabouts of the other two remain unknown.

On the other hand, a total of 96 terrorists were arrested through 2014, adding to the 163 detained in 2013. Of these 96, 43 belonged to JMB, 25 to Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), 12 to Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), six to Kalamaye Jamaat, five to ABT, three to Hizb-ut-Towhid (HT), and one each to Kalema Dawat and Islamic State.

Dhaka has also continued its campaign against an incipient Left Wing Extremist (LWE) movement in a somewhat one-sided battle. Through 2014, 16 LWE cadres were killed - 11 of the Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP), three of the Purbo Banglar Sarbahara Party (PBSP), one of the Biplobi Communist Party (BCP), and one unidentified. No civilian or SF fatality took place in LWE-linked violence through 2014. In 2013, a total of 25 fatalities were connected to LWE violence, including four civilians and 21 militants.

The nation, however, continues to face a significant threat from Islamist extremism. India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA), investigating the October 2, 2014, accidental blasts at Burdwan in West Bengal, uncovered a plot by JMB to assassinate Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed and BNP Chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia.

According to revelations made by arrested accused in the case, JMB was planning to establish an 'Islamic state' in Bangladesh through armed struggle. The projected 'Islamic state' was also intended to incorporate the Districts of Murshidabad, Nadia, and Malda in West Bengal. Referring to the development, Bangladesh's National and Security Intelligence (NSI) Director General, Mohammad Shamsul Haque, observed, on December 15, 2014,

We have largely neutralized radical groups like the JMB or HuJI-B, but now they seem to have found sanctuaries across the border. If we think we have neutralized a group and sit easy, it is (a) big mistake. There is no room for complacency. We need to closely monitor their activities even if a few terrorists are left in the fray. Because they may well set up bases across the border, make fresh recruitment, acquire weapons and plan attacks.

Further, on September 5, 2014, Asim Umar, the leader of the newly formed al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) based in Pakistan, incited Muslims to engage in the global jihad (holy war) and expressed his group’s determination to extend the fighting from Pakistan to Bangladesh, Myanmar and India. Further, a video released on November 29, 2014, and attributed to the 'Bangladesh division' of AQIS, encouraged Bangladeshi Muslims to come to the jihadi battlefield and included glimpses of a base of fighters in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

Threats from the Islamic State (IS, formerly the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham, ISIS) are also very much a reality. On September 29, 2014, a 24-year-old British citizen was arrested in Dhaka city on suspicion of recruiting people to fight alongside IS cadres in Syria. When asked about Bangladesh’s position on the IS and the Syrian crisis, Foreign Minister A.H. Mahmood Ali disclosed, on September 30, 2014, “We have not heard about any presence of the [ISIS] group, but a British citizen of Bangladeshi origin was arrested.”

Bangladesh’s achievements on the counter-terrorism and internal security fronts through 2014 have been remarkable. Further, over the last few years, the WC Trials have also progressed quite well. A note of caution, nevertheless, remains to be sounded, as the residual capacities of subversive and extremist elements, prominently including JeI-ICS, are still significant, and their alliance with BNP remains sound. Further, surviving fragments of a range of other outfits, including JMB, HuT, HT, HuJI and ABT, also have a potential for regrouping and fomenting violence. In the unstable environment of South Asia and the wider Asian region, there is little space for complacence.

First published in South Asia Intelligence Review, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 13, No. 25, December 22, 2014

S. Binodkumar Singh is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management, India

Bangladesh: Clash of Titans

S. BINODKUMAR SINGH

With less than three months left before the General Elections in Bangladesh (the term of the present Parliament expires on January 24, 2014) political tensions in the country are approaching a knife-edge, with mass mobilisation and violence escalating continuously, and the major political formations in the country increasingly polarized. The Opposition parties led by the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) have started a movement demanding a non-party Caretaker Government (CG) to oversee the next polls. A three-day countrywide shut down by the BNP between October 27-29, 2013, saw violent clashes between mobs and Police, and at least 10 persons were killed.

Earlier, on October 19, 2013, with the crescendo of street demonstrations and violence soaring, Bangladeshi authorities had banned rallies and street protests in capital Dhaka for an indefinite period. Police and elite anti-crime Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) personnel were deployed around the Bangabandhu International Conference Centre (BICC) and other strategic locations of the city to thwart possible street protests by BNP cadres. On October 20, 2013, the Opposition parties staged demonstrations across the country as part of their protest against the indefinite ban on public gatherings in Dhaka city. At least 20 people were injured in a clash between the activists of ruling Awami League (AL) and opposition BNP at Ku Koramara village in Bagerhat District on that day. Later, on October 25, 2013, seven people were killed in violence that broke out between BNP activists, AL activists and law enforcers in different places across the country. Several hundred people were also injured.

Meanwhile, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) had arrested four leaders and cadres of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B) from Ashulia, an outskirt of Dhaka city, on October 7, 2013, and recovered one foreign-made pistol, 32 bullets, and 1,135 rounds of SMG (Sub-Machine Gun) bullets, five detonators, one kilogram of high-powered explosive and other blasting equipment from their possession. Separately, RAB arrested three leaders of Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), an Islamist extremist outfit, at Rahanpur Bazar under Gomastapur sub-District of Chapainawabganj District on October 8, 2013, and recovered two computer central processing units (CPUs) and monitors, 26 CDs, and books propagating extremism. Indeed, in the wake of a bomb blast at Hefajat-e-Islam (HeI) Nayeb-e-Ameer (Deputy Chief) Mufti Izharul Islam Chowdhury's madrasa (religious seminary) in Chittagong on October 7, 2013, top officials of the Home Ministry and Police disclosed, on October 8, 2013, that banned militant outfits were planning to carry out terrorist attacks in the country.

In an exceptional gesture on October 26, 2013, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had phoned her archrival Khaleda Zia, leader of the BNP, and had a 37-minute conversation inviting the BNP chairperson to the Gono Bhaban (People's House), the official residence of the Prime Minister, to talk about the impending parliamentary elections. Khaleda, however, rejected the invitation, demanding, instead, "If you first agree in principle on holding the next general election under a non-partisan polls-time Government, then we will call off all our agitation including the 60-hour hartal. And we will sit to discuss how to form the polls-time Government."

With the initiative to evolve a consensual solution in tatters, BNP, in alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), its student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI), and other radical groups, unleashed a wave violence in the streets across the country. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), as many as 194 people, including 102 civilians, 83 JeI-ICS cadres, and nine Security Force (SF) personnel 631 have been killed since the delivery of the first verdict in the War Crimes Trial on January 21, 2013 (Data till November 3, 2013).

Significantly, it appears that the 18-Party opposition alliance, till now headed by the BNP, is progressively being hijacked by the JeI, with its focus shifting to opposition to the War Crimes Trials and obstruction of the execution of its verdicts, rather than any dispute over the impending Parliamentary elections. Indeed, at a rally held by the alliance at the historic Suhrawardy Udyan in Dhaka, JeI cadres scuffled with BNP activists in their attempts to occupy the stage and the first seats. With ugly clashes between JeI-ICS cadres and BNP activists at the venue, JeI cadres cheered only when their leaders were making speeches. The Daily Star reported that the ICS activists had been ordered by the party high command to rush to the venue and take control of the rally. This was repeated in other places in Bangladesh, where simultaneous 'joint' rallies were being held.

Even as her party was upstaged, Khaleeda Zia intensified her attack against the Sheikh Hasina Government, describing it as 'totally illegitimate' and 'unconstitutional'.

Significantly, in a public opinion survey conducted by The Daily Star and Asia Foundation, with 1,400 respondents across 14 Districts during the second and third weeks of September 2013, the AL-led Government received significant praise from voters on various issues, including agricultural policy and performance, power supply, delivery of public service and law and order. Nevertheless, a majority of 55 per cent of the respondents declared that they would vote for the BNP, with just 28 per cent saying they would vote for AL.

Counter-intuitively, at the same time, public opinion appears to be building up against radicalization and public demonstrations to this effect have been prominent. Thus, after the Opposition of October 28, children of the freedom fighters of 1971, under the banner of Amra Muktijoddhar Shontan (AMS, We Are Children of Freedom Fighters) washed the alter of the a liberation war memorial site at the Suhrawardy Udyan in Dhaka with their blood, declaring it had been 'desecrated' by Khaleeda Zia, who made a speech demanding the release of convicted war criminals. In a symbolic gesture, AMS leaders donated blood drawn by a doctor, which was then dissolved in water, with which the altar was cleansed. Suhrawardy Udyan in Dhaka is the venue where Sheikh Mujibur Rehman had delivered the historic March 7, 1971 speech. It is also the historic venue where the remnants of the Pakistan Army surrendered to India on December 16, 1971.

Meanwhile, even as polarized political passions intensified, the International Crimes Tribunal-2 (ICT-2), on November 3, 2013, awarded the death penalty to absconding Al-Badr leaders Mohammad Ashrafuzzaman Khan alias Nayeb Ali and Chowdhury Mueenuddin for their involvement in the 1971 War Crimes. All 11 charges leveled against them by the prosecution were proved. The convicts received the death penalty for abduction and killing of nine Dhaka University teachers, six eminent journalists and three physicians in December 1971. Mueen was the 'operations in charge' and Ashraf was the 'chief executor' of Al-Badr and they directly took part in the killing of intellectuals in Dhaka. On June 24, 2013, Ashraf and Mueen were jointly indicted on 11 counts of crimes against humanity for abducting and killing 18 persons. The trial began on July 15. The two accused were tried in absentia. Mueen lives in London and Ashraf in New York.

Earlier, on October 9, 2013, the ICT-2 had sentenced Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader Abdul Alim (83) to 'imprisonment until death'. Alim was the chairman of Joypurhat Municipality during the Liberation War period, and was subsequently a founding member of BNP. He was elected Member of Parliament in 1979, 1996 and 2001. Zia-ur-Rahman made Alim a Cabinet Minister in 1978. Alim was found guilty on nine of the 17 charges brought against him. The four charges on account of which he was sentenced to 'imprisonment until death' included: committing genocide in Karai Kadipur, Chawkpara, Sonapara, Palpara and Munshipara of Jaipurhat District on April 26, 1971; committing genocide at Uttar Hatsahar and Harunja Hat of Khetlal in Jaipurhat District towards the end of May 1971; killing 15 youth at West Amatra in Jaipurhat District on June 14, 1971; and killing three freedom fighters at Khanjanpur Khuthibari in October 1971.

Thus far nine verdicts have been awarded by the International Crimes Tribunals (ICTs) conducting the War Crimes Trials that begin on March 25, 2010. While seven verdicts had been announced earlier, the Abdul Alim verdict is the second against a BNP leader. The first BNP leader to be convicted, on October 1, 2013, was Salauddin Quader Chowdhury.

In another trial on the same day, ICT-1 indicted the vice-president of the Nagarkanda unit (Faridpur District) of BNP, M.A. Zahid Hossain Khokon (70) alias Khokon Razakar on 11 charges, including genocide, torture, abduction and confinement during the Liberation War of 1971. According to the charges leveled against him, Khokon, at that time a local leader of the Razakars (Volunteers), an auxiliary force of the Pakistani Army, in Faridpur District, was involved in at least 13 incidents of war crimes that resulted in the death of more than 50 people, serious injuries to another eight and the rape of two women. Khokon was also proven to be involved in the forced conversion of Hindus, the torching of numerous houses and two temples, and the deportation of seven people. Khokon became the 14^th high profile leader in Bangladesh to be indicted for War Crimes. Earlier, 13 leaders, including 11 of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and two of the BNP, had been indicted for War Crimes.

Further, on October 6, 2013, the Jatiya Sangsad (National Parliament) passed the 'Voters' List (Second Amendment) Bill, 2013', with a provision of removing the names of those who were awarded punishment for War Crimes. The amended section of the law stated that the names of those who were awarded punishment under the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunal) Order 1972 or under the International Crimes Tribunal or mentally retarded person declared by any court or a person not citizen of Bangladesh, would be removed from the voters' list. Law Minister Shafique Ahmed tabled the Voters' List (Second Amendment) Bill, 2013, in Parliament and it was passed by voice vote.

Significantly, on October 8, 2013, accusing the BNP Chairperson Khaleda Zia of siding with war criminals, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina warned that if the BNP came to power again, the country would experience a reign of terror and corruption, declaring, "The BNP resorts to terrorism, looting and corruption when it comes to power, while the AL brings peace and carries out massive development." Further, she added, "I believe that we will be able to complete the trial of those who committed crimes against humanity during the Liberation War in 1971. The BNP cannot save them." While addressing her party's grassroots leaders at her residence in Dhaka city on October 9, 2013, Prime Minister Hasina articulated the apprehension that pro-liberation forces would be wiped out and a dangerous situation would prevail in the country if the "BNP-Jamaat-e-Islami-Hefajat-e-Islam" combine came to power through the next parliamentary election.

Indeed, the achievements of the Sheikh Hasina Government in its counter-terrorism and de-radicalization programmes, as well as on the developmental front, have been extraordinary. Nevertheless, the political uncertainties persist, and her performance does not appear to have been translated into a consolidated electoral advantage. The current mass mobilisation on the War Crimes issue and the arrangements for the coming elections certainly have the potential to undermine the Hasina Government's gains, even as subversive and extremist Islamist formations retain significant potential to stage a dangerous and disruptive revival.

First appeared in SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 12, No. 18, November 4, 2013

S. Binodkumar Singh is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management, India

Bangladesh: Islamist Siege

Islamist seize Dhaka on May 5, 2013

S. BINODKUMAR SINGH

On May 5, 2013, Hefazat-e-Islam (HeI, 'Protectorate of Islam') enforced their 'Dhaka Siege' programme to mount pressure on the Awami League (AL)-led Government to implement their 13-point demands , including the demand to "pass a law providing for capital punishment for maligning Allah, Islam and Prophet Muhammad. and smear campaigns against Muslims". Four civilians were killed and several others injured as cadres of HeI fought running battles with Police across Dhaka, turning the capital into a city of panic. 70,000 Islamists marched down at least six highways and took position at the entry points of the city, stopping road transport and cutting off Dhaka's road links with rest of the country, while they raised slogans of 'Allahu Akbar' (God is great) and "One point, One demand: Atheists must be hanged."

More than 10,000 personnel drawn from the Police, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and paramilitary Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) jointly launched a drive late on May 5, 2013, to clear demonstrators from Dhaka. As violence moved beyond the capital on May 6, 2013, at least 27 persons, including three Security Force (SF) personnel and a HeI cadre, were killed and several other injured in Narayanganj, Chittagong and Bagerhat Districts. Two of the injured died on May 7 and another one on May 9.

Earlier, on March 9, 2013, HeI Ameer (Chief) Shah Ahmad Shafi had put forward a 13-point demand at the Olama-Mashayekh (Islamic Scholars) Convention organized at the Darul Uloom Hathazari Madrassah Convention Hall in Chittagong District. On the same day, HeI's 'central joint secretary general' Maulana Moinuddin Ruhi, gave the call for theApril 6 rally at the end of a 'Long March' (from Chittagong to Dhaka). During the April 6 rally, the HeI gave the Government an April 30 deadline to meet its demands or face a 'Dhaka Siege' programme, commencing May 5, 2013.

Indeed, in an attempt to clamp down on the HeI cadres on the eve of 'Long March', the SFs arrested 30 HeI cadres from a bus in Palashbari area of Gaibandha District on April 5, 2013, while they were travelling to Dhaka. Subsequently, a clash between HeI and AL cadres at Dhaka city left one person dead and at least another 30 injured. As tension grew, four people were killed between April 6 and May 4, 2013.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 2013, two days prior to the 'Dhaka Siege' deadline, Prime Minister (PM) Sheikh Hasina Wajed addressing a Press Conference in Dhaka, offered a conciliatory response on the 13 demands, observing, "We have already gone through HeI demands. Many of these have already been implemented while some are in the process." Speaking explicitly about the second and 'most important' demand, to "pass a law providing for capital punishment for maligning Allah, Islam and Prophet Muhammad. and smear campaigns against Muslims", the PM stated that the Information and Communication Technology Act, 2009, and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) already contained provisions for punishment for the offence.

The Government's reply to each of the 13 demands asserts that these demands are nothing more than an attempt by the Islamist forces, backed by the main opposition party Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its ally Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), to hold the country to ransom, as these formations feel the heat of the War Crimes (WC) Trial. Significantly, on May 9, 2013, JeI Assistant Secretary General Muhammad Kamaruzzaman was awarded the death penalty by the International Crimes Tribunal-2 (ICT-2). He was found guilty on five out of seven counts of torture and mass murder committed during the 1971 War of Independence. He is the third JeI leader to face the death penalty, while another one has received a life sentence. ICT-2, constituted on March 22, 2012, delivered the first WC verdict against former JeI leader Maulana Abul Kalam Azad alias Bachchu Razakar, on January 21, 2013, awarding a death sentence for killing 14 Hindus, raping two women, torturing two other persons and setting homes ablaze in Faridpur District, his birthplace. A total of nine persons, seven from JeI and two from BNP, have been indicted so far, for War Crimes.

Indeed, Bangladesh has seen a surge in violence since the January 21, 2013, verdict. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, the country has recorded 186 fatalities, including 109 civilians, 64 Islamist cadres and 13 SF personnel, in street violence since then (data till May 12, 2013).

Describing the activities of HeI as 'mysterious', Information Minister Hasanul Haq Inu, had noted, on May 2, 2013, "The movement of HeI is not to protect the faith of Muslims. They are working as the shadow of JeI and its student wing Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), to foil the trials of war criminals." Similarly, Environment and Forest Minister Dr. Hasan Mahmud, on May 7, 2013, asserted that BNP central leaders M.K. Anwar and Sadeque Hossain were behind the May 5 violence in Dhaka. He also blamed central leaders of the BNP-backed students' organizations, the Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal (JCD) and ICS, for leading the trouble in Paltan, Baitul Mukarram and Motijheel areas of Dhaka during the HeI demonstrations and rally. On May 8, 2013, State Minister for Law, Advocate Quamrul Islam claimed, further, "The BNP-JeI men carried out vandalism, arson and looting during Sunday's violence". He went on to claim that the mayhem in Dhaka city was funded by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. Two left-leaning parties, the Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) and the Bangladesher Samajtantrik Dal (BSD), at a joint rally in front of the National Press Club in Dhaka city, demanded an immediate ban on HeI, JeI and ICS, for 'creating anarchy' across the country. The leaders of these two parties also blamed the main opposition BNP for extending support to HeI.

The abrupt emergence of HeI as a formidable disruptive force has largely been seen by the BNP-JeI-ICS front as an opportunity to exploit the current situation to harvest some political gains. With the survival of some of their leaders at stake, they appear willing to drive the country to the brink of chaos in their effort to derail the ongoing WC Trials. At the same time, however, a clear groundswell of opinion - albeit without the attendant violence that characterizes the Islamist protests - in favour of the WC Trials has also been dramatic. A direct and escalating confrontation appears inevitable at this juncture, and it remains to be seen whether the Government has the will and sagacity to manage this evolving crisis, even as it pushes the WC Trials process to a logical culmination. And all this will be necessary before the General Elections, which fall due in December 2013 - January 2014.

First appeared in SouthAsia Intelligence Review, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 11, No. 45, May 13, 2013

S. Binodkumar Singh is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management