Trying war crimes in Bangladesh - The trial of the birth of a nation

This chairman of Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal resigned. We explain the background to his action, our role in the story, and what it all means for his country’s search for justice

BANGLADESH suffered a violent birth. In the last days of 1971 the country then called East Pakistan was engulfed by torture, rape, mass-killing and other acts of genocide. The main perpetrators were Pakistani troops bent on preventing secession from “West Pakistan”. But the army had the support of many of East Pakistan’s fundamentalist groups, including Jamaat-e-Islami, which remains Bangladesh’s largest Islamic party. Estimates of the death toll vary from around 300,000 to the current government’s reckoning of 3m—one in 20 of the population at that time.

In 2010 Bangladesh established a tribunal to try those accused of war crimes. It is called the International Crimes Tribunal, though it is not an international court in the sense of being founded on international law. Rather it is a national court, based on a Bangladeshi statute passed in 1973 and amended in 2009 and 2012. It was very late to begin the search for justice, for the accused as well as for victims. But war crimes are subject to no statute of limitation.

The main perpetrators are not in the dock, since they are either dead or living in Pakistan. But some suspects are still leading prominent lives in Bangladesh. Ten people have been arrested and charged with offences ranging from individual acts of rape and murder to the ordering of mass executions. This week the first case—that of Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, a member of parliament in 1996-2008 and a leader of Jamaat—seemed to be moving towards its fatal conclusion. His conviction, and presumed death sentence, was widely expected in mid-December.

At the last moment, however, the presiding judge, Mohammed Nizamul Huq, resigned as chairman of the tribunal, following questions put to him by The Economist and the publication in Bangladesh of private e-mails which cast doubt upon his role and upon the court proceedings. Recordings of him speaking by telephone were also available on YouTube. The Economist has seen these, and other materials, and has been investigating their accuracy and significance. This week, we publish the results of those investigations.

The e-mails and phone conversations we have seen raise profound questions about the trial. The material suggests the government tried to put pressure on Mr Nizamul, albeit he seems to have resisted it. It seems to show he worked improperly with a lawyer based in Brussels, and that the lawyer co-operated with the prosecution—raising questions about conflicts of interest. And in Mr Sayeedi’s case it points to the possibility that, even before the court had finished hearing testimony from the defence witnesses, Mr Nizamul was already expecting a guilty verdict.

These concerns are so serious that there is a risk not only of a miscarriage of justice affecting the individual defendants, but also that the wrongs which Bangladesh has already suffered will be aggravated by the flawed process of the tribunal. That would not heal the country’s wounds, but deepen them.

As well as being about the birth of the nation, the war-crimes trial also has enormous significance to today’s politics in Bangladesh. In the general election of 2008 the current prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, campaigned on a promise to set up the tribunal. The men in the dock include leaders or former leaders of Jamaat, which is allied with the main opposition group, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Sheikh Hasina’s bitter foe, Khaleda Zia. Since Mrs Zia cannot win power without support from Jamaat, many people doubt that she would continue with the trials should she become prime minister. She has already condemned them as a “mockery”. Backers of the trials therefore wanted them wrapped up before the next general election, which is due around the end of 2013.

The 1973 act says that “if, in the course of the trial, any one of the members of the Tribunal is, for any reason, unable to attend to any sitting thereof, the trial may continue before the other members.” The evidence we have seen, though, suggests that a full reconsideration of proceedings may now be required.

“Absolutely crazy for a judgment”

 Nizamul and Ahmed Ziauddin, the Brussels-based lawyer of Bangladeshi origin, the judge refers to the government as “absolutely crazy for a judgment. The government has gone totally mad. They have gone completely mad, I am telling you. They want a judgment by 16th December...it’s as simple as that.” December 16th, known as Victory Day in Bangladesh, is the anniversary of the surrender by Pakistani forces in the war of independence.%The first part of that evidence raises questions about the government’s behaviour. It suggests the tribunal came under political pressure to speed proceedings up, even though Bangladesh guarantees the independence of the judiciary. In a conversation of October 14th, between Mr Nizamul and Ahmed Ziauddin, the Brussels-based lawyer of Bangladeshi origin, the judge refers to the government as “absolutely crazy for a judgment. The government has gone totally mad. They have gone completely mad, I am telling you. They want a judgment by 16th December...it’s as simple as that.” December 16th, known as Victory Day in Bangladesh, is the anniversary of the surrender by Pakistani forces in the war of independence.

So determined was the government to hurry matters along that Mr Nizamul and Mr Ziauddin worried that ministers were pushing too hard. “We have to make them understand that it [the verdict] is not a product that you just ask for it and it will be delivered from the machine,” Mr Ziauddin said later in that same conversation.“But we are not in a position to make them understand. Even then we have to try, we have to speak to them.”

It is one thing to push for an early verdict, another to attempt to intervene in the trial to secure one. That seems to have happened, too. In a conversation the next day, Mr Nizamul described how a member of the government “came to visit me this evening. He asked me to pass this verdict fast. I told him ‘how can I do that?’... He said, ‘Try as quick as you can.’”

In a phone interview on 5th December, the judge denied that he had come under political pressure and declared he was master of his own court. “We do proceed according to our own wish,” he said. “We are following our own proceeding according to our own system and own choice.”

Elsewhere in the material we were shown, however, it is Mr Nizamul’s independence that is in question. He is a Supreme Court judge and remains one after resigning as chairman of the tribunal. (A tribunal has between three and five judges; there is no jury.) Mr Ziauddin, the man he is communicating with, is an expatriate Bangladeshi who is an academic specialising in international law. He is the director of the Bangladesh Centre for Genocide Studies in Belgium. The two men have known each other for 25 years, as they were human-rights campaigners and Mr Ziauddin’s late brother had been a student friend of the judge.

The adviser

In the material shown to us, Mr Ziauddin emerges as an important figure in the trial—offering advice, urging Mr Nizamul to do this or that, and supplying him with news and drafts of court documents. In general, judges are required to be extremely careful about discussing details of cases with third parties because that could lead to bias or the impression that they have come under the influence of someone who has nothing to do with the proceedings. This requirement is embodied in Bangladesh’s constitution, which says “the chief justice and other judges shall be independent in the exercise of their judicial functions.” The judges’ code of conduct confirms that “an independent judiciary is indispensable to the justice system in Bangladesh.”

Perhaps, however, there are extenuating circumstances in this particular case. Though the tribunal is a domestic court, its officers seem eager to measure up to the standards set by international war-crimes tribunals. The tribunal is short of resources. It might be understandable if Mr Nizamul quietly talked to an international expert in order to improve the quality of the tribunal’s work.

That is what Mr Nizamul argued. The order of December 6th explains that the tribunal is based on “new law”, so the judges needed to “take the assistance of researchers from inside and outside the country”. It names Mr Ziauddin as just such an expert. “During the proceedings of the trial and order the Chairman also took assistance from him,” it says.

Speaking to The Economist on December 4th, Mr Ziauddin said something similar. “It’s up to judges to decide where they are going to get research support or other support they need. They are quite entitled to do it. The more so when they really don’t have that research backup [in Bangladesh]. [They ask for help] if they feel if there are people more informed about the issue, especially where [international law] is so new in Bangladesh...I’m not really advising him, but if there is a question then I try to respond.”

Yet the characterisation in the order and from Mr Ziauddin contradicts what the judge told us in an interview on December 5th. On the evening before issuing the order, Mr Nizamul admitted that he and Mr Ziauddin talk but denied that the expatriate had a part in preparing documents. “As judges, we cannot take help from third person and outsiders,” he said. Asked whether they sometimes exchange e-mails about the tribunal, he says “No, no, no, regarding tribunal...no talks regarding the judgment or regarding the proceedings, no.” Later he said, “A Supreme Court judge, we do not talk even with our wife regarding the tribunal.”

In his interview on the previous day, Mr Ziauddin also took the view that judges must be careful about speaking to third parties during a trial. He told us that he has “No official standing [with the court]. No relationship whatsoever.” He can send the judge messages if he wants—but “generally though I don’t,” he said, “he’s a judge after all.”

Of course, judges can take advice. But any adviser is usually given an official role, known to prosecution and defence. Also as a general rule, advisers tend to stick to their areas of expertise—giving advice on knotty points of law, for example.

Mr Ziauddin does not seem to meet these requirements. Before the tribunal’s order on 6th December his role had not been disclosed to the court or the public. And his advice seems to go beyond particular points of law to include, for example, the drafting of charges. The 17 hours of conversations available to The Economist took place between August 28th and October 20th this year—the equivalent of almost 20 minutes every day. The two men also exchanged more than 230 e-mails in the 12 months to September. Many of these contacts suggest that Mr Ziauddin was involved in aspects of the trial that go beyond what would be permitted to a court adviser or anyone else. Each particular accusation might appear to be modest, or might be explained away. Taken together, they suggest a disturbing pattern.

First, Mr Ziauddin appears to have helped prepare documents for the tribunal, which the judge said would be improper. On May 12th the Brussels-based lawyer sent Mr Nizamul a document called “GhulamAzamChargesFinalDraft”; it was a slightly revised version of a charge sheet he had sent six days earlier. The next day, May 13th, the tribunal issued its indictment against Mr Azam, whom the two men usually refer to as “the big one”. It was identical to Mr Ziauddin’s document. In interviews with us, both men denied that Mr Ziauddin helped prepare documents for the court.

Second, their discussions ranged beyond the realm of technical advice. On September 6th Mr Nizamul said: “I am a bit afraid about Shahinur [Shahinur Islam, a tribunal judge]. Because he is too inclined to the international standard. It...was in my mind—and prosecutors also complained to me—that he brought the references of foreign tribunals in every order.” Mr Ziauddin replied, “he has to be stopped from doing that or he has to be removed from there...If he does not stop he has to go as well, because it is so harmful to us.” Here, Mr Ziauddin talks as if he can recommend the dismissal of judges.

“Very anxious”

Again, on November 26th 2011 Mr Nizamul (who is known informally as Nasim) sent Mr Ziauddin an e-mail about an important defence petition. His message reads in full: “Subject: Order. not yet received. very anxious. please send by this night bd [Bangladesh] time, otherwise, i will follow my own one. Nasim.” Mr Nizamul’s e-mail suggests that he considered Mr Ziauddin’s arguments to have primacy over his own.

Third, material we have seen suggests that Mr Ziauddin was communicating with the prosecution and judge about the same issues at the same time. On November 8th 2011 he e-mailed Mr Nizamul a list of matters raised by a defence petition that the judge recuse himself from the trial. The first five items on the list are materials and documents that, the e-mail says, were to be supplied to Mr Nizamul by Zaed-al-Malum, the chief prosecutor at the tribunal. It was perfectly proper for the judge to receive such materials, which do not appear to concern matters that might be disputed in court. It is also possible that the prosecutor was the person best placed to supply them. Even so, it is curious that, on a matter of procedure, the chief prosecutor is being asked to help by someone who is also advising the judge.

The connection between judge, prosecution and adviser seemed to have continued. On December 11th 2011 Mr Ziauddin sent an e-mail to two prosecutors, including Mr Malum, apparently giving help with the case against Mr Azam and tips on how to present their arguments. He forwarded this advice to Mr Nizamul the same day. Speaking to us, Mr Ziauddin acknowledged knowing Mr Malum, who is acting for his family in unrelated matters. But he denies improper contact about the cases before the tribunal, and Mr Malum has not replied to our inquiries.

The material we have seen therefore suggests three things: that Mr Ziauddin had an influence over how the prosecution framed its case and how the court framed its indictment; that Mr Ziauddin told the judge in his December 2011 e-mail about how prosecutors might develop their case; and that after the prosecutors laid their charges, the judge accepted guidance about the formal accusations from Mr Ziauddin directly.

Lastly, in the case of Mr Sayeedi, an e-mail from Mr Ziauddin to Mr Nizamul refers to a shared Google document called “Sayeedi judgment”. This document says “last edit was made on October 14”. At this time, Mr Sayeedi’s lawyers were still presenting his defence to the court. The document consists of a series of subjects (“list of testimonies”, “procedural history”; “challenges”, etc). Presumably details were to be filled in later. The final headings, and the only two in capitals, read: “CONVICTION/BASIS” and “SENTENCING”.

Courts often start work on long judgments before the end of a trial and Mr Nizamul could have amended his structure to replace “conviction” with “acquittal”. However, on his own showing, that was not what was happening. He denied to us he had been working on the document in October. “Delwar Hussain’s judgment has not been even started then,” he said.

Legitimate questions

The judge called our allegations “absolutely absurd” and “all false”. Mr Ziauddin argued there were other explanations for our findings but—after the court order telling The Economist to appear before it—said he would make no further comment. We do not believe he has broken any laws and cannot be held responsible for the actions of others. In addition, our investigations have not covered any aspect of the defence’s approach to this tribunal. Nevertheless, we believe that, taken together, the material shown to us raises legitimate questions about due process that the Bangladeshi authorities should now investigate thoroughly. These investigations are the more urgent in the light of Mr Nizamul’s resignation.

First published in The Economist magazine, London, Britain, December 15, 2012

Sustained Consolidation

S. BINOD KUMAR SINGH

SHEIKH HASINA’S Awami League (AL)-led Government, which came to power on January 6, 2009, has consolidated its secular commitments through 2012, reining in Islamist extremist groups and targeting the Left Wing Extremist (LWE) movement in the country. Overall political stability has been established, though some untoward incidents have, nonetheless, occurred; these have largely been instigated by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and its student wing, the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) with the principal objective of disrupting the ongoing War Crimes (WC) Trials.

According to partial data collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the country witnessed 18 terrorism/insurgency-related fatalities in total, including 17 militants and one civilian, in 14 incidents of killing through 2012 (data till December 9). Three Islamist terrorism linked fatalities occurred, including one civilian and two terrorists; in 2010, six such fatalities were recorded, including three civilians and three militants. This is a significant contrast with 2005, when Bangladesh experienced 35 Islamist terrorism linked fatalities, including 26 civilians and nine terrorists.

15 LWE-linked fatalities were recorded in 2012. These included, 12 leaders – Purbo Banglar Communist Party (PBCP) regional leaders – Khalilur Rahman, Mohammad Abdur Rashid, Rahat Ali, Abdul Jalil, Nayeb Ali, Motaleb Hossain, Mostafizur Rahman, Anowar Hossain; Gono Mukti Fauj (GMF, ‘People’s Freedom Army’) regional leaders Tofazzal Hossain, Bidhan Chandra Biswas, Motaled Hossain; and Biplobi Communist Party (BCP) leader Ohidul Islam Rajib – as well as three cadres of PBCP. There were 24 LWE fatalities, all of militants, in 2011; and 50 killings, including 46 militants, three Security Forces (SFs) and one civilian in 2010. Pabna District stood out as the principal LWE centre in 2012, with seven fatalities and eight incidents of arrest in the District.

Meanwhile, SF personnel in Bangladesh arrested 1,616 extremists belonging to various Islamist groups such as JeI, ICS, Jama'at-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HuT), and Hizb-ut-Towhid (HT) in 2012 (data till December 9), as against 578 such arrests in 2011; 958 in 2010; and 23 in 2009. Dhaka District proved to be the epicenter of Islamist activities, with 32 incidents of arrest; followed by 20 such incidents in Chittagong and 19 in Rajshahi District. A majority of the persons arrested belonged to the JeI and ICS, as they took to the streets demanding the release of their top leaders, who are being tried for committing crimes against humanity during the 1971 Liberation War. A total of 1,244 cadres belonging to the JeI-ICS were arrested in 77 incidents throughout 2012 (data till December 9).

Major Islamist extremist arrests included:
November 19, 2012: Police arrested 107 JeI-ICS cadres in five Districts, including Dhaka, on charges of attacking law enforcers and for vandalism.

November 6, 2012: Police arrested 207 JeI-ICS leaders and cadres from different places of the country for attacking the law enforcers and carrying out ‘destructive activities’.

October 21, 2012: Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) arrested eight HT cadres from PTI Road in Barguna District.

August 12, 2012: RAB arrested 35 cadres of HuT from a restaurant in Dhaka's Panthapath while they were holding a “secret meeting” to plan “subversive activities” and a “massive showdown” after the eid holidays.

July 19, 2012: RAB arrested 17 cadres of HuT from different parts of Dhaka while they were holding an anti-government rally and distributing leaflets containing anti-state propaganda.

May 25, 2012: RAB arrested four cadres of HuT, including its ‘regional commander’, in Shibganj sub-district of Chapainawabganj District, while they were in a secret meeting preparing to distribute books and leaflets.

March 5, 2012: RAB arrested two leaders and a member of JMB, identified as Mohammad Asaduzzaman alias Hazari, ‘chief’ of JMB Khulna divisional unit, Mohammad Wahab, ‘head’ of JMB Savar zone and JMB member Anwar Hossain, from different parts of Dhaka City. RAB also seized several JMB publications and leaflets from the possession of the arrestees.

January 9, 2012: A close aide of executed JMB leader Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai, identified as Emdadul Haque Uzzal, was arrested in the Uttara area of Dhaka City.Police also recovered from his possessions several publications of the banned organisation and some books giving instructions on how to make bombs and operate firearms such as AK-47s.

January 8, 2012: RAB arrested Abu Talha Mohammad Fahim alias Bashar, the ‘finance wing chief’ of the JMB, and his accomplice Mohammad Abdul Alim, from Achintola Bahrampur village in Rajshahi District.

Meanwhile, a total of 34 LW extremists including 14 leaders – PBCP ‘leaders’ Motalib Hossain, Jalem Uddin, Mohammad Shahidul Islam, Korban Ali, Mozam Daktar, Ashkar Ali, Hasan Ali, Sabuj Ali, Yadul Islam, and Nuhu Mia; GMF ‘leaders’ Zillur Rahman, Hanif Biswas and Monirul Islam; and Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal-Gano Bahini (JSD- Gano Bahini, National Socialist Party-People’s Army) leader Saheb Joarder – were arrested through 2012. By comparison, there were 66 such arrests in 2011.

The WC Trials , which commenced after the constitution of the International Crimes Tribunal – 1 (ICT-1) on March 25, 2010, by the AL-led coalition Government, has indicted nine high-profile political figures thus far, including seven JeI leaders – Nayeb-e-Ameer (Deputy Chief) Delawar Hossain Sayeedi (on October 3, 2011); former JeI chief Golam Azam (on May 13, 2012); present JeI chief Motiur Rahman Nizami (on May 28, 2012); JeI General Secretary Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mojaheed (on June 21, 2012); JeI assistant secretaries Mohammed Quamaruzzaman (on June 4, 2012); and Quader Mollah (on May 28, 2012); and former JeI member Abul Kalam Azad alias Bachchu Razakar (on November 4, 2012) as well as two Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) political figures and lawmakers – Salauddin Quader Chowdhury (on April 4, 2012) and Abdul Alim (on June 11, 2012). A second Tribunal, ICT-2, was created on March 22, 2012, to speed up the trial process.

JeI and ICS cadres have been trying to disrupt the ongoing WC trials from the very beginning, since most of the indicted leaders are from the party. The JeI-ICS combine carried out a nine-day countrywide agitation programme, commencing November 5, 2012, to protest the campaign of ‘repression’ against party leaders and workers, and demanding the release of its top leaders. Many JeI and ICS cadres were arrested in the aftermath of this and other agitations, for attacking the Police in various places. Issuing a note of warning on November 14, 2012, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina declared, “Launching attacks on the Police by the JeI-ICS trying to obstruct the trial of war criminals will only accelerate the trial proceedings. The more the attacks the faster will be the pace of the trial. No jumping and leaping will work. The trial of war criminals will be held on Bangladesh’s soil.” Indeed, on November 25, 2012, Industries Minister Dilip Barua even urged the Election Commission (EC) to cancel the registration of JeI as a political party as it has failed to fulfil conditions set by the EC. The conclusion of the WC trial before the next elections, due before the end of 2013, is an urgent imperative. In case the BNP comes to power after the 2013 elections, it is inevitable that a concerted effort to suppress the history of the atrocities of 1971 will ensue, and the current WC Trials would be subverted.

Another alarming internal problem is the constitutional provision of a Caretaker Government (CG), which was introduced in the 1996. The AL-led Government, with the passage of the 15th Constitutional Amendment Bill on June 30, 2012, overturned the 16-year-old requirement that general elections be overseen by a non-partisan CG. The BNP-led opposition alliance announced, on November 28, 2012, that they would blockade roads countrywide on December 9, to press for a return of the CG to oversee the next parliamentary polls. Indeed, on December 9, 2012, violent clashes, among BNP-backed blockaders, Police and AL workers, were reported from across the country, including Sirajganj, Dhaka, Narayanganj, Chittagong, Rajshahi, Khulna, Lalmonirhat and Laxmipur Districts. At least two persons were killed (one each in Sirajganj and Dhaka towns) and more than 290 people, including 40 Policemen, were injured during the clashes. Over 70 homemade bombs went off, around 50 vehicles, including five Police vehicles, were set ablaze and 150 others were vandalised.

The Government’s stand, however, is that the it has strengthened the EC so that it could perform its duty properly, and all 6,000 different kinds of elections held under the present Government over the last four years were free and fair and there were no complaints against any of the polls. The Government stated that all future elections would also be held peacefully and fairly.

Bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh came into sharp focus through 2012, and have witnessed further improvements. The first meeting of the Joint Consultative Commission (JCC) was held in New Delhi, India on May 7, co-chaired by Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dipu Moni and the then Indian counterpart S.M. Krishna. The Joint Statement issued after the meeting noted that "the legal framework for bilateral security cooperation would be completed with the signing of the extradition treaty.” In a recent development, a joint statement released after the meeting between Union Minister of Home Affairs (UMHA) Sushilkumar Shinde and his Bangladesh counterpart M. K. Alamgir in New Delhi on December 4, 2012, stated that both sides have agreed that the Extradition Treaty will be finalized and signed in January 2013 during the proposed visit of UMHA to Dhaka. According to the statement, both sides agreed not to resort to firing unless fired upon or attacked by terrorists or armed criminals.

During the Home Minister level talks, Bangladesh Home Minister Shahara Khatun stated, on February 24, 2012, that United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) leader Anup Chetia, currently lodged in a Dhaka jail, would be handed over to India by Bangladesh immediately after the legal process for his deportation was completed. As a result of co-ordinated border plans between the two sides, Bangladesh RAB arrested one of the top rebel leaders of National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) from Khagrachhari District of Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), on February 16. Meanwhile, Bangladesh, on July 30, handed over Champion R. Sangma, co-founder and ‘chairman’ of the Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), to India. Further, from September 19, the Border Guards of Bangladesh (BGB) and RAB launched an intensive operation to track down ULFA (Anti-talks) leader Drishti Rajkhowa. The Sheikh Hasina Government’s strong steps to crack down on terrorist elements on its soil have undoubtedly opened up prospects of increasing cooperation in other areas, between India and Bangladesh.

Meanwhile, during the 13^th Home Secretary-level talks between Bangladesh and India, held on October 16-17, 2012, at Dhaka, discussions were held on the implementation of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Agreement on Transfer of Sentenced Persons and Combating Terrorism, Agreement on Organized Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking, ratification of Land Boundary Agreement (LBA)-1974 by the Government of India and protocol signed in 2011. Both sides agreed to allow developmental work, including the construction of Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) and Land Custom Stations (LCSs), within 150 yards of the zero line. They also agreed to constitute a high-level team to monitor the development of border infrastructure.

Dhaka has also taken a number of visible measures in 2012 to curb both Islamist and left wing extremism. The Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2012, was passed in Parliament on February 16, 2012. According to the Act, the Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit can provide Financial Intelligence Units in other countries with information relating to the financing of terrorism, when so required or requested. The Act also included provisions relating to atomic, chemical and biological weapons; to the arms and ammunition used for terrorist activities; and interventions by terrorist and subversive organisations in the financial sector. Earlier, on March 13, 2012, the Speedy Trial Tribunal – 4 sentenced JMB leader Mamunur Rashid alias Zahid to death for detonating a bomb in the Gazipur District Police Superintendent's office in February 20, 2009, in which 16 people were injured.

In another landmark judgement on March 18, 2012, a Dhaka court indicted BNP chief Begum Khaleda Zia's "fugitive" elder son Tarique Rahman and 29 others on charges relating to the August 21, 2004, grenade attack on an Awami League rally, finally formally launching the trial for the attack.

Bangladesh’s achievements on the counter-terrorism and internal security fronts, as well as in improving relations with India, through 2012, have been remarkable. Nevertheless, a note of caution remains to be sounded as the residual capacities of the JeI-ICS are still significant, and their alliance with the BNP remains sound. Against this backdrop, the BNP’s call to start fresh protests from December to bring back the CG system will be the litmus test for the Sheikh Hasina Government.

 

First appeared in South Asia Intelligence Review, Weekly Assessments and Briefings, Volume 11, No. 23, December 10, 2012

S. Binod Kumar Singh, Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Progress and Globalization in Bangladesh: The Tazreen Fashions Garment factory fire

ZAFAR SOBHAN

BANGLADESH HAS long been a byword for calamity in the rest of the world, a punch line, a metonymy for doom and disaster. It is only when something catastrophic occurs that the world pays attention to our small delta nation on the Bay of Bengal. A quick search for "Bangladesh" on the New York Times or another publication's website uncovers a litany of chaos and misery: labor unrest, murder, pitched street battles between police and political protesters, flash floods, landslides, death, and destruction. Tragedy in Bangladesh. That’s a story everyone gets.

It’s in this context that we meet last week's tragic fire at Tazreen Fashions, a garment factory just outside the capital Dhaka. At last count, over 120 people perished. They died in the some of the most gruesome ways imaginable, either asphyxiated by smoke, being burned alive, or leaping to their deaths in a vain attempt to save themselves. Of the dead, 53 were charred beyond recognition.

But why do these things happen in Bangladesh? Is this just another story illustrating the sufficiency of misery in that benighted country, or is there more to the story that we are missing?

There is more. And it's a familiar narrative of "progress" and globalization. Today Bangladesh is the second-largest garment manufacturer in the world, lagging behind only China, with garment exports of over $18 billion annually. Check your wardrobe. If you don’t have at least one item made in Bangladesh, I’ll eat the whole damn collection.

And it is this dehumanizing, soul-destroying, exploitative trade that has provided employment to over 3 million impoverished Bangladeshis, the vast majority of them women, and utterly transformed the economic and social landscape of the country. In the 40 years since independence, the poverty rate has plummeted from 80 percent down to less than 30 percent today, GDP growth has averaged around 5-6 percent for over 20 years, and the garment industry has had a lot to do with it. Capitalizing on wages that were and remain among the lowest in the world, globalization brought the garment trade to Bangladesh in the 1980s, kicking off decades of growth.

The garment trade is at the forefront of the kind of industrial revolution that we are experiencing in Bangladesh today, which is why, if from the outside, we look like some Dickensian hell-hole of sweatshops and smokestacks, the image is not altogether inapposite. If the Tazreen Fashions story reminds you of the Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire that killed over 140 garment workers some 100 years ago in New York, it is because we are just now going through the ugly industrialization that we hope will turn us into a middle-income country within a few decades.

The harsher and even more difficult truth is that, as appalling as they are, these sweatshops are signs of a kind of advancement. In 2012, few Bangladeshi starve to death any more. This wasn’t the case a generation ago when 80 percent of the country subsisted on agriculture, survival being by no means guaranteed.

But burning to death is not an improvement over starving to death, and none of the above should serve to lessen the horror of the deaths at Tazreen Fashions, nor be seen as any kind of explanation let alone justification for the criminal derelictions of responsibility that caused the catastrophe.

There can be no excuse for factories housing thousands of workers without fire escapes. There can be no justification for the chilling reports that, when the fire alarm went off, factory supervisors told the workers that it was a drill, locked the only doors to the outside, and pushed them back up the stairs to the higher floors, where, once the stairwells filled with smoke and fire from the ground floor, they were doomed to perish.

There can be no excuse for the authorities’ failure to ensure that the factory was not up to code, and that few of the 4,000-plus garment factories in the country comply with the fire safety laws.

And there can be no excuse for companies such as Walmart—now busy distancing themselves from the tragedy—that did not bother to ensure the rights and safety of workers making their clothes, and, in fact, trawl the world looking for the cheapest options to make their clothes, turning a blind eye to the corners that are cut to maintain their margins.

The real tragedy is the utterly unnecessary greed that leads to such misery. The garment trade is so profitable that there is enough to go around for everyone. The factory owners can easily afford to ensure that their factories are not death-traps, the Bangladesh government can easily enforce laws for the protection of workers without hurting the industry, and the buyers can easily afford to pay the few pennies more per item that such measures might necessitate, as well as use their bargaining power to follow through and demand compliance, in accordance with US law.

Yes, last week’s fire was just the latest in a long line of similar tragedies that have taken over 400 Bangladeshi lives in the previous decade. And yes, the fire was in some ways a consequence of a global culture where some lives are evidently deemed cheap. Mortality rates in Bangladesh from so-called accidents are among the highest in the world: 85 road deaths a year per 10,000 registered motor vehicles (more than 50 times the US rate), almost 100 deaths due to residential fires in the past three years, at least 140 people drowned this year in ferry capsizings.

But that doesn’t mean that the fire or other similar tragedies are not avoidable. Bangladesh’s economic advancement (and affordable prices for the American consumer) should not come at the cost of ensuring basic worker safety. Anyone trying to tell you so probably has some clothes he wants to sell you.

Article first published in Vice.Com

Zafar Sobhan is a Dhaka-based editor and columnist

Muhammad Yunus and Bangladesh government battle over Grameen Bank

The 8.3 million women who form the bulk of the Nobel-winning microfinance bank's shareholders could be the losers

SYED ZAIN AL-MAHMOOD in Dhaka

WHEN TASLIMA Begum, a housewife turned entrepreneur from the north of Bangladesh, accepted the Nobel peace prize in Oslo in December 2006, it was a proud moment for Bangladeshi women. The Nobel citation said the prize was awarded to Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank "for their efforts to create economic and social development from below".

Begum, who had used her first 1,500 taka (£12) microloan to buy a goat in 1992 and went on to become an elected director of Grameen's board, said: "My parents gave me birth, but Grameen Bank gave me a life."

Six years on from Oslo, the 8.3 million women who make up the bulk of the microfinance bank's shareholders are facing an unexpected challenge. The bank that received the Nobel prize for its work in fostering socio-economic development from below is fighting to stave off moves from its own government to enforce decisions from above.

In August, the government of Bangladesh amended the 29-year-old law governing Grameen Bank, giving more power to the government-appointed chairman to choose the bank's chief executive. The government, a minority shareholder, also constituted a commission of inquiry, the Grameen Bank Commission, which is expected to recommend further changes to the governance structure of the microlender.

Critics say the move amounts to a government takeover of the institution.

Yunus said there had been no failure in the running of Grameen to warrant an investigation, and he questioned the need for a commission of inquiry.

"People are copying Grameen's management system in other countries," he said. "This is unique not only in Bangladesh but in the [rest of the] developing world. Our staff members transport millions of taka in the villages without armored cars or armed guards. Nobody steals our money. Surely we're doing something right with our management model."

This is the latest in a long-running tug of war between Yunus and the government, which removed Yunus as the head of Grameen last year, saying he had passed retirement age.

Mirza Azizul Islam, a prominent economist and former economic adviser to the government, said the trend was towards diluting the role of the board of directors and concentrating power in the hands of government appointees.

"With these unnecessary changes, the government is tinkering with a system that has allowed Grameen to prosper while many state-run banks are embroiled in scandals," said Islam. "If the basic structure of Grameen is changed, the worry is that the poor women who are the rightful owners of the bank will be disenfranchised."

Grameen is governed by a 12-member board, nine members of which are elected from among the borrowers while the other three, including the chairman, are nominated by the government. The government owns 3% of the bank based on equity, while the rest of the shares are held by the bank's members, mostly women.

"Grameen Bank was formed as an institution owned by its borrower members, who are poor women," said Yunus. "Through its unique decision-making process, Grameen Bank has given millions of women the means to emerge from the shadows in a male-dominated society and to make something of themselves."

Tahsina Khatun, an elected director of Grameen, says the bank's independence is non-negotiable. "Grameen is our bank," she said. "We bought shares bit by bit with our savings. Now the government has started saying this is a government bank. How can we accept that?"

Khatun said Grameen, which gives small loans without collateral, runs on a system based on trust. "If the trust is ruined, the bank will certainly be affected."

At the heart of the dispute are conflicting interpretations of the bank's ordinance. A government review committee concluded last year that since Grameen was created under a special law, it was a statutory public authority – in other words, a government bank.

Yunus contends that Grameen is an independent specialised bank which, according to its founding charter, is run by its board of directors, not by the government. Grameen's employees do not take their salaries from the government budget, which means they are not public servants.

The Awami League-led government's antipathy towards Yunus has been made clear by a series of public comments made by government ministers. The prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, has criticised microfinance institutions for "sucking blood from the poor".

Last week, finance minister Abul Maal Abdul Muhith caused consternation when he quoted another Nobel laureate, the Indian economist Amartya Sen, as saying Yunus was responsible for tarnishing Bangladesh's image abroad. Muhith backtracked after Sen swiftly denied the comments.

Mozammel Haque, chairman of Grameen, denied the government was taking over the bank. "The government will not take over the bank," he claimed. "The bank's operations have been running smoothly according to the law." Haque said the change in the ordinance was necessary to resolve a stalemate over the appointment of a new managing director.

The government has reacted to the stiff opposition put up by Grameen's directors by asking a commission to look into the women's "qualifications" to serve as directors. Critics have accused the government of harassment. Yunus said: "I find it outrageous that people are calling into question the qualifications of these women who have become owners of the bank with their own money and through their hard work."

First published in the Guardian, London, Britain, 21 November 2012

Syed Zain Al-Mahmood is an investigative reporter and editor based in Dhaka, Bangladesh

Gearing up for a change of guard

SUBIR BHAUMIK

 

INDIA HAS, in recent weeks, formally hosted two senior leaders from Bangladesh - both from the opposition parties. First it was the country's former ruler HM Ershad and then the former Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, who was hosted for a whole week. Both met top Indian leaders and expressed satisfaction after the discussions. These discussions may not solve any of the bilateral issues that were discussed - but India's hosting of two opposition figures from Bangladesh at this juncture seems to be significant.

In Dhaka, the political class puts this down to "serious doubts" in the Indian establishment about the ruling Awami League's chances of coming back to power. Since democracy returned to Bangladesh after the ouster of Ershad's military regime, the Awami League and the BNP has turns, winning elections every five years. So a change of guard next year may not surprise anyone, except those who feel the Awami League's massive mandate in December 2008 may have helped it consolidate its position in a nation that was largely frustrated with Islamist excesses, murderous vindictive politics and rotten governance. That has not happened - and for various reasons. Poor leadership, corruptions scams, the needless spat with micro-credit guru Mohammed Yunus - and much more.

But some say the  Awami League has been badly let down by India, after all it has done for its large neighbour. In a country where agriculture is still the occupation of most, water is an emotive issue. India's failure to deliver on the Teesta Water Sharing Treaty has hit Hasina's government below the belt. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was forced to back off on the issue due to the sudden opposition of West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee. This has become a national embarrassment for Singh and India - but it has become favourite ammunition for attacking Hasina back home.

The same is true about the much-awaited, but the much-delayed, Land Boundary  Agreement involving the exchange of enclaves. Those who follow India's murky coalition politics may appreciate why Singh's hands are somewhat tied, but most in Bangladesh, specially those who gun for the Awami League, have a huge issue to run down the party as an "Indian stooge" that has got nothing for all it has done for India.

The present Awami League government has gone after Islamic radicals and separatist rebels from northeast India with a vengeance after it came to power. Most of the top guns of the northeastern insurgency, except the ULFA's elusive military wing chief Paresh Barua who perhaps fled Bangladesh at the right time, have been nabbed and handed over to the Indian authorities. Some of these leaders have been forced to start dialogues with Delhi after announcing ceasefires.

Bangladesh's security services have started massive operations against Pakistan-engineered operations to use Bangladesh for pushing in huge quantities of Indian counterfeit currency. Hasina's government is also ready to concede to most Indian demands from transit to use of Chittagong port - all that augurs well for India's northeast. But in diplomacy, one has to get something to be able to give something. This is where Hasina has been left high and dry and that, in no small measure, is contributing to the possible erosion of the Awami League's popularity.

As a major regional power, it is natural for India to anticipate a change of guard in a neighbouring country and prepare for it. But why not do it discreetly? The way Begum Zia and Ershad were hosted in Delhi has only convinced Bangladeshis that India has written off the Awami League's chances in the next parliament polls and so is preparing for the inevitable. It was natural for a trusted ally like Hasina to expect a payback from India, Teesta et al, in the run-up  to her poll campaign. The last thing she could have bargained for are the current signals from Delhi that India is preparing to change sides if she does not win.

First published in The Hindustan Times, November 18, 2012

Subir Bhaumik, a veteran journalist, is a Senior Fellow with the Kolkata-based Centre for Study in International Relations and Development

What lies beyond this U-turn?

Photo: REACHING ACROSS: President Pranab Mukherjee (right) with BNP leader Khaleda Zia at Rashtrapati Bhavan

HAROON HABIB

There is every possibility that Khaleda Zia’s recanting of her long-held anti-India views is mere pre-election posturing

KHALEDA ZIA, Bangladesh’s leader of the opposition in Parliament, made some significant statements during her October 28-November 3 visit to India that deserve scrutiny.

As far as her Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is concerned, the visit had a dual purpose: one, to establish a stronger relationship between the two countries, and two, to remove the mistrust that India perceivably has towards the BNP.

One of Ms Khaleda Zia’s close aides who accompanied her to New Delhi, said the high-profile visit, roughly a year ahead of the next general election, dispelled the perception that “India favours one political party” in Bangladesh.

During the visit, which was closely watched in both the countries, Ms. Khaleda Zia met key Indian leaders including President Pranab Mukherjee, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid, leader of the opposition in Lok Sabha Sushma Swaraj, senior BJP leader L.K. Advani, BJP president Nitin Gadkari, National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon and Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai.

In her meetings, Ms Khaleda Zia, for the first time, appreciated India’s security concerns and gave an assurance that terrorists and anti-India insurgents would not be allowed on Bangladeshi soil if she comes to power again.

The former Prime Minister, who was a staunch critic of the present Sheikh Hasina government’s improved relations with India, also reportedly supported India’s transit and transshipment through Bangladesh, and also India’s participation in a consortium with China to build a deep-sea port at Bangladesh’s Sonadia.

Like Ms Khaleda Zia, Jatiya Party chairman General H.M. Ershad and Awami League’s general secretary Syed Ashraful Islam had also visited India in recent times on New Delhi’s invitations. Reportedly, the main thrust of Indian interactions with Ms Khaleda Zia was sustaining the relations the two countries had built in the last four years.

This visit was certainly more important than her tour of India in 2006 as the Prime Minister; and is reminiscent of a similar high-profile visit to New Delhi by the then opposition leader, Sheikh Hasina, in 2006.

Happy host

The Indian External Affairs Ministry was also happy with the outcome as its spokesman quoted Ms Khaleda Zia as saying that the visit marked a “new beginning” and “let’s look forward and not look in the rear view mirror”.

There are varying interpretations of the visit. Some say it is in the interest of both India and BNP to build ties ahead of the next general elections in which the ruling Awami League may face a debacle due to anti-incumbency factors. According to pro-Khaleda analysts, the “positive changes” in the BNP were being closely watched by India, and these were first underlined when the then Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee visited Dhaka in May this year. After a meeting with Ms Khaleda Zia, he said India was interested in building relations with Bangladesh and not just with one party.

Also, the visit took place at a time when international politics has changed. Myanmar’s willingness to come out of the cold and the United States’ overtures towards it have made Bangladesh’s geopolitical location of immense importance.

Watch the curve

A secular-democratic Bangladesh has no reason to be perturbed with Ms Khaleda Zia’s radical postures towards India. But it must keep a watch on the U-turn that she is making on her long-held policies.

It is possible that, as in the run-up to the 2001 election, Ms Khaleda Zia is trying to sell the line that a government led by her, despite its Islamist orientation and pronounced anti-India bias, is better suited to deliver on promises made to India than Sheikh Hasina’s secular Awami League. Arch rivals can turn friends, and true changes of heart are welcome. However, those on the vanguard of a secular-democratic Bangladesh doubt Ms. Khaleda Zia can follow through on her assurances while keeping parties like Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamists in the fold. Therefore, the question remains: Is this a genuine change of heart or posturing ahead of the next general election?

Bangladeshis would recall her repeated statements when she was Prime Minister, calling India’s north-east insurgents “freedom fighters”. It was during the BNP-Jamaat alliance’s rule that a massive arms haul was made in Chittagong in April, 2004. The then Prime Minister reportedly had full knowledge of these arms, which were unmistakably meant for insurgent outfits like ULFA.

Bangladesh, which had enjoyed a liberal polity, also turned a happy hunting ground for religious extremists during her regime. Therefore, secular democrats would like to see verification of such pronouncements in action.

One would remember that on return to power in 2001, BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami went about implementing with full vigour their communal agenda, resorting to ‘minority cleansing’ on a scale that Bangladesh had never witnessed except for 1971 and turned the country into a sanctuary for international Islamist terrorist groups.

The present dispensation

When Awami League swept into power in the 2008 general elections, one of the priorities of Prime Minister Shiekh Hasina was to visit New Delhi to extend a warm hand of friendship. Despite stumbling blocks, it was Ms Hasina who boldly initiated a new beginning in India-Bangladesh ties — a first since the two joined hands in the 1971 war for independence of East Pakistan.

Indeed, the Hasina government has initiated a new era of regional connectivity and has also removed a vital security concern of India by bringing north-east insurgents to task.

All these actions, until her recent visit to New Delhi, were persistently challenged by Ms. Khaleda Zia and her Islamist allies, who termed the Hasina government, as usual, “an Indian stooge”.

Given the anti-incumbency factor, the government led by Sheikh Hasina may not be in a commanding position in the coming general election, especially in urban areas. But there is no credible sign that the ratings of the BNP and its Islamist allies have had a substantive rise. Therefore, the perceived defeat of the Awami League may be too hasty a conclusion.

Bangladesh’s politics is fundamentally linked to its Liberation War, and the ongoing trial of “war criminals” initiated by the Hasina government represents an effort to come to terms with the past. It is in the interest of a strong, secular Bangladesh that justice be done. But the BNP, a staunch ally of the Jamaat-e-Islami which has many of its leaders among the top accused, has demanded the trial be suspended and the accused freed.

Ms. Khaleda Zia’s high-profile visit to India has also sent confusing signals to the secular parties and grouping. Rhetoric apart, the confusion can be judged from a recent remark by Awami League’s spokesman Mahbub-ul Alam Hanif, who said that having failed to get support at home, the BNP was trying to get back to power with Indian support.

Despite all the debates, the fact is that Ms. Khaleda Zia has announced a considerable shift from what she and her party have stood for ever since she took over the reins of BNP in the early 1980s. If this change of heart is real and durable, it is welcome in the interest of restoring a healthy regional environment based on understanding and cooperation.

Haroon Habib is a journalist, writer and liberation war veteran. He is Bangladesh correspondent for The Hindu for 3 decades.

First published in The Hindu, Chennai, India, November 17, 2012