Indo-Bangladesh Relations: Continuous Consolidation

S. BINODKUMAR SINGH

On January 28, 2013, Bangladesh Home Minister Muhiuddin Khan Alamgir and his Indian counterpart Union Home Minister (UHM) Sushil Kumar Shinde signed a landmark Extradition Treaty at Dhaka, the Bangladesh capital, to combat terrorism and facilitate suppression of crime by making further provision for the reciprocal extradition of offenders. Significantly, however, Article 6 of the Treaty says that "it would not be applicable in case the offence is of a political character."

Earlier, as a precedent, the two countries had signed the Agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters, Transfer of Sentenced Persons and Combating International Terrorism, Organized Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking, during Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's visit to New Delhi between January 10 and 13, 2010.

In the intervening time, to reduce the incidents of border killings and smuggling of arms and drugs, human trafficking and other illegal activities along the Indo-Bangladesh border, Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) and India's Border Security Force (BSF) on March 13, 2012, started "coordinated patrolling" and "night coordinated patrolling" at 120 border points selected by two different teams of the BGB and the BSF under the India-Bangladesh Coordinated Border Management Plan (CBMP), which had been jointly signed on July 30, 2011, at Dhaka.

Notably, since the Sheikh Hasina led Awami League (AL) Government (it is in alliance with five other parties) came to power in Bangladesh in January 2009, the state initiated a decisive campaign against radical forces on the domestic front, and also acted relentlessly against various militant formations operating in India's North East, which had long been sheltered on Bangladeshi soil. Since Hasina assumed power, security cooperation between Bangladesh and India has been dramatic, resulting in the arrest of some of the top northeast insurgent leaders by Indian Security Forces after they were 'pushed back' into India. Prominent among those held in Bangladesh and 'handed over' to India were: All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) 'chairman' Ranjit Debbarma (January 23, 2013); Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) 'Chairman' Champion R. Sangma (July 30, 2012); United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) 'captain' Antu Chaudang and 'second lieutenant' Pradeep Chetia (February 5, 2011); United National Liberation Front (UNLF) 'chairman' R. K. Meghen alias Sanayaima (November 30,2010); Anti-talks faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) 'chief' Ranjan Daimary alias D R Nabla (May 1, 2010); ULFA 'chairman' Arabinda Rajkhowa alias Rajiv Rajkonwar' and 'deputy commander-in-chief' Raju Baruah (December 4, 2009); ULFA 'foreign secretary' Sashadhar Choudhury and 'finance secretary' Chitraban Hazarika (November 4, 2009).

India has also been requesting Bangladesh to hand over Anup Chetia alias Golap Barua, 'general secretary' of the ULFA, who was arrested in Dhaka along with two other ULFA militants on December 21, 1997, for illegally carrying foreign currencies and a satellite phone, and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Even after spending more than 15 years in various prisons the Bangladesh, he continues to remain behind bars. However, despite the fresh Extradition Treaty, Bangladesh Home Minister Muhiuddin Khan Alamgir on January 28, 2013, stated that Bangladesh would not be able to send back Anup Chetia under the treaty as he had prayed for political asylum in the Supreme Court, adding, "The Supreme Court will first have to dispose of his prayer for political asylum. After that, we will decide whether to treat this person or any other persons under this extradition treaty or in some other way."

Other North East militant leaders on Bangladeshi soil, whose expatriation India seeks, include National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) leaders Bishwamohan Debarman and Subir Debbarma, and NDFB leader Thulunga alias Tensu Narzary.

Bangladesh has unambiguously demonstrated its will to end the operation of Northeast Indian terrorist and insurgent groupings from its soil. Nevertheless, Indian intelligence inputs suggest that at least 55 camps of NE militants continue to operate in Bangladesh, and there is certainly some unfinished business at hand.

Similarly, Dhaka has been demanding that India arrest and hand over Bangladesh's founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's two convicted killers, Abdul Mazed and Moslehuddin Khan (who were at the rank of Captain and Risaldar, respectively, at the time of the assassination), and are believed to be hiding in India.

In addition, there are several other criminals operating with impunity across the Indo-Bangladesh border, and the Extradition Treaty should help the two countries break this criminal nexus. 

As cooperation on the security front strengthened, the resultant increase in trust has led to positive developments on other issues of bilateral concern as well, despite hurdles. These include the historic agreement signed on September 6, 2011, during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Dhaka, to settle land boundary issues, including the exchange of 162 'enclaves' which are in 'adverse possession'. Though the Teesta Water Sharing Deal, could not be concluded because of last-minute objections raised by West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee on the draft of the agreement, India's Water Resources Minister Harish Rawat, on November 7, 2012, during a meeting with visiting Bangladesh Agriculture Minister Motia Chowdhury at New Delhi, expressed interest in inking a provisional Teesta Water Sharing Agreement, until a permanent settlement was found.

On July 3, 2012, moreover, Dhaka gave its letter of consent for the renewal of Transit and Transshipment Rights to India, for the continuation of transshipment of bulk cargoes, with retrospective effect from April 1, 2012 to March 31, 2014. The PIWTT, which was renewed annually till then (July 3, 2012), as was agreed in the Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade (PIWTT, 1972), was suspended on October 26, 2011, after Dhaka refused to issue the letter of consent because of the failure to reach an agreement on the Teesta Deal.

In addition, following up on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on India-Bangladesh Energy Cooperation signed on September 6, 2011, at Dhaka, the first Joint Working Group (JWG) meeting on renewable energy was held in New Delhi on August 3, 2012, where Bangladesh and India briefed each other on the present status and growth potential of renewable energy. Similarly, a high-level Indian delegation led by Power Secretary P. Uma Shankar visited Dhaka on January 29, 2013, to sign a deal for the proposed 1,320 megawatt coal-fired power plant at Rampal in the Bagerhat District of Khulna Division in Bangladesh, and the purchase of power by Bangladesh from India.

Significantly, at the time of the signing of the Extradition Treaty, the two sides also inked a liberalized visa agreement, the Revised Travel Arrangement (RTA), to remove restrictions on visits of businesspersons, students, patients, senior citizens above 65 years and children below 12 years.

Conspicuously, Indo-Bangladesh relations have witnessed a strong positive surge since 2009, and this has had a transformatory impact on the trajectory of terrorism and extremism in both the countries, visibly improving the general security environment in the region, and creating a strong foundation of trust. Much, however, remains to be done and, in this, India needs to be the more proactive, both because it is by far the larger partner, and also because Dhaka appears to have done much more in the recent past than Delhi.

This equation becomes the more crucial as Bangladesh approaches another General Election in which the present Opposition, backed by a very substantial radicalized constituency, will attempt to cast improving relations with India as a 'betrayal' of Bangladeshi interests. As disruptive political mobilization in Bangladesh - of which significant evidence is already visible - gathers force in the run up to the Elections, it will require dramatic and demonstrable successes in the delivery of quantifiable benefits to Dhaka, both to consolidate the relationship and, crucially, to diminish the impact of vicious propaganda that could, otherwise, jeopardize the remarkable gains of the past four years.

Original article published in SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 11, No. 31, February 4, 2013

S. Binodkumar Singh is Research Associate with Institute for Conflict Management

Bangladesh's women take rocky road to India in search of freedom and cash

Unskilled women cross the border and head to Mumbai to seek work, but Dhaka is keen to pass migration off as trafficking

SYED ZAIN AL-MAHMOOD

THEY CALL it "Bombay Colony". The village of Basatpur, in Bangladesh's south-western Jessore district, would seem a world away from the glitzy bars of Mumbai, India's showbiz capital. There are no Bollywood stars in Basatpur, just grinding poverty and choking dust.

But the arid, rundown border village has earned its reputation. For two decades, the women of Basatpur have trekked across the border and made their way to Mumbai where they have made a living as dancing girls at the city's notorious "ladies bars".

Anjuman Ara Begum, 45, has been there and back. "The girls go because there's nothing to eat here," she says. "The men can't earn a living, so they send us across the border." "All this," she adds, waving a hand at her tin-roofed brick house, "all this I made with money I earned in Bombay. I put two sons through college and married off my daughter."

Walking along the single road that strings Basatpur together, it's easy to see which families have sent members to Mumbai and which ones haven't. The thatched huts contrast sharply with the brick buildings, mirroring the diverging paths chosen by their occupants.

In a Muslim-majority country where the idea of women migrating for economic reasons without male guardians is still cause for unease and shame, Begum is a rebel. Remittances from migrant workers stood at $12.8bn (£7.8bn) in the fiscal year ending 30 June 2012, about 11% of Bangladesh's GDP. But the official number of female migrants was just 30,000 in 2011 – less than 5% of the total outflow, according to data supplied by the government's Bureau of Manpower Employment and Training (BMet). "Social attitudes towards women going abroad to work are still conservative," says Dr Nurul Islam, director of BMet.

For decades, Bangladesh banned unskilled women from seeking work overseas. Even though the ban was officially lifted in 2005, migrating abroad for work remains quite difficult for women in practice. Bureaucratic obstacles, high costs and negative social attitudes mean relatively few women migrate along official channels.

According to a study funded by the UN Development Programme, only 40% of Bangladeshi women migrants use recruitment agencies. The rest are believed to make private arrangements with the help of relatives and friends.

"Discouraging women from migration pushes migration underground, placing women at even greater risk of exploitation," says Selim Reza, a researcher with the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit, an affiliate of the University of Dhaka. "In many villages along the Indian border, especially in Jessore and Satkhira districts, women have traditionally walked across without papers, even though the government chooses to ignore this."

In dirt-poor Basatpur, migrating anywhere that required a passport, visa or aeroplane ticket was out of the question. Pushed by poverty and pulled by the lure of well-paid jobs in distant Indian cities, the young women defied tradition to make the perilous journey across India in search of freedom and cash.

"Although the government and NGOs say this is trafficking, the women go of their own accord, usually helped by their husbands," says Arif Hossain, a local journalist who has studied the "bar girls" phenomenon. "In some villages, two-thirds of households have sent someone to Mumbai at some point."

Begum made the 2,000km journey to Mumbai in 1995. With two other women, she walked across the border and took a bus to Howrah station in Kolkata. From there, they took a train to Mumbai. Begum says she waited tables at a Mumbai bar, but acknowledged that the real money was in the "dancing". Some of the dancers sell sex discreetly to customers. "Dancing girls consider themselves a cut above prostitutes," says Hossain. "There is always the benefit of the doubt."

But the road to Mumbai is a rocky one. For some village elders and religious leaders, bar jobs remain a mortal sin. "It's a deal with the devil," says a local imam, who asked not to be named. "Unless these women dotauba [repent], they are in trouble."

Begum says there have been attempts to stop the migration to Mumbai through village arbitrations, but she remains defiant. "When I was starving no one fed me," she says. "I did what I had to do to keep body and soul together."

Mumbai banned dance bars in 2005, blaming them for a climate of moral decay – but an illegal trade still exists, say observers. "Since the authorities cracked down on dance bars, many of the 75,000 or so girls ended up on the streets," says Shailendra Yashwant, a Mumbai-based journalist. "Many were loaded on to trucks and trains, and shipped out of the state. These women are terribly vulnerable."

Nurul Islam of BMet denies there are women crossing or migrating into India without passports or visas. "These are all cases of trafficking," he says. "When there is a porous border, traffickers will always dupe innocent women."

Many experts say the government and some NGOs are sweeping the social and economic issues under the carpet by focusing on trafficking. Some organisations are fighting back. The Management and Resources Development Initiative, a Dhaka-based NGO, has started a skill-development institute in Basatpur where young women are taught handicrafts.

Begum's neighbour, Shamima Sultana, 33, who returned from Mumbai five years ago, is among the first batch of graduates. Sultana says she would never have crossed the border if she had found work locally. "I was helpless," she says. "No girl would like to do what we did."

First appeared in The Guardian, January 31, 2013

Bangladesh Buddhists pick up pieces after mob rampage

Radical Muslims in southern Bangladesh desecrate Buddhist monasteries Photo: Saleem Samad

ANBARASAN ETHIRAJAN

SHASHANKO BARUA's voice trembles when he recounts how he and his family ran for their lives to escape an angry Muslim mob last year.

They hid in a forest for a whole night near their village in the south-eastern Bangladeshi district of Cox's Bazar before returning home.

Mr Barua, a Buddhist, says that when he returned to the village, he found his small tin-roof house had been completely destroyed and all his belongings looted. His neighbours also faced similar fates.

Hundreds of Buddhists became homeless overnight after thousands of Muslims rampaged through villages, looting houses and burning down Buddhist temples.

While Bangladesh has witnessed bloody clashes between Muslims and minority Hindus in the past, it was a rare attack on the Buddhists.

'We had to run'

Local people say the violence went on for nearly six hours in various villages of the Ramu sub-division.

The protests were triggered after an image allegedly insulting the Koran was posted on the Facebook site of a Buddhist youth. Investigations by local media later revealed the youth had nothing to do with the incident.

"The mob first destroyed our temple and looted everything. Then they targeted our houses. We had to run, as I was worried that my teenage daughters could have been [sexually] abused," said Mr Barua, who is a day labourer.

"I am still scared to go out to work. I don't want to go too far to find work as I feel unsafe."

Since the attacks, the Buddhist community in this district near the border with Burma has been in shock. They still wonder with dismay how their own neighbours - Muslims who have been living with them in harmony for centuries - could turn against them.

"There were people from all the major political parties among the rioters," said a community leader who did not want to be identified.

"Some were local leaders who are well-known to us. It is difficult for outsiders to know where these Buddhist temples are situated and which house belongs to the Buddhists."

Religious minority

Buddhists constitute less than 1% of Bangladesh's estimated population of more than 150 million. Around 90% of Bangladeshis are Muslims and Islam is the state religion.

Community leaders took me to various villages and temples destroyed during the riot in late September. Some of the temples were centuries-old and the main temple in Ramu, Sima Vihar is a famous tourist destination.

Buddhist monks say hundreds of precious metal and wooden idols of Lord Buddha were stolen during the riots and religious books in different languages were torched.

Buddhist leaders say the riots were not a spontaneous reaction to the alleged Koran insult. Tension had been building up in the area hours before the rampage, and they say hundreds of people were brought in trucks and vans from Cox's Bazar and Chittagong districts.

Some of them say the attacks were pre-planned and co-ordinated. They also blame the local police and the civil administration for not responding to their pleas when the attacks were going on.

"To destroy the 100-foot Buddhist statue in our temple, the rioters used seven locally-made bombs, tyres and gun powder. Luckily there was no major damage to the statue except for some cracks," said Ben Karunasri Bhikhu, a Buddhist monk at the Uttar Mitha Chori village.

'We are scared'

Villages far from Ramu sub-division were also targeted by the mob. In a few villages, Hindu temples and houses were also ransacked.

"The situation is calm now but we are scared. The real culprits have not been arrested. So, they are still threatening us," said Dr Rakal Chandro Kormokar, a doctor in the village of Ykong Bazaar, near the town of Teknaf.

Buddhist community leaders in the Ramu area, however, said they were satisfied with the swift response of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. She visited the area soon after the riots and ordered all destroyed temples and houses be rebuilt.

Reconstruction work has been going on under the direct supervision of soldiers and border guards. A stream of officials has visited the area, and politicians and civil society leaders have made the journey to show solidarity and support with the Buddhists.

"We have reassured the local people that these things will never occur in the future," said Home Minister Muhiuddin Khan Alamgir.

Although some try to link the attacks on Buddhists with the ethnic conflict between Rohingya Muslims and the majority Buddhist population in the neighbouring Burmese state of Rakhine, local people dismiss the notion.

Thousands of Rohingya Muslims fled to Bangladesh following communal violence last year in Rakhine state. For many it was out of the frying pan and into the fire.

But while the government has increased security around the Ramu area, many Buddhists still feel insecure. They say the majority Muslim community there should make efforts to reach out to them.

"Our neighbours were also involved in the attacks. So the government should take measures to make the local Muslim community show tolerance. Only that will bring a permanent solution and prevent such events in the future," said Nilutpal Barua, a teacher.

Bangladesh has long prided itself on having secular values, but the attacks on minority Buddhists and Hindus have dented this image.

Buddhists leaders say their temples and houses will be rebuilt soon, but it will take time for the emotional wounds to heal.

Appeared in BBC online, February 1, 2013

Anbarasan Ethirajan is Bangladesh correspondent for BBC News

India’s Growing Ties with Bangladesh

SANJAY KUMAR

WHILE INDIA’s relationship with its western neighbor Pakistan has been faltering despite concerted efforts, on the eastern front a new bonhomie is forming with Bangladesh.

The recent signing of a new extradition treaty and visa regime between India and Bangladesh, signed by Indian home minister Sushil Kumar Shinde and his Bangladeshi counterpart Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir, marks a major shift in their relationship.  India has long demanded an extradition treaty with Bangladesh, which was not forthcoming due to an adversarial relationship with the previous regime in Dhaka.

With the treaty, New Delhi has gained a way to clamp down on insurgency in the northeastern region of the country, long a hotbed for separatist and insurgent groups who mostly operate from Bangladesh and other neighboring countries.

It is believed that senior leaders from the outlawed United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and other underground groups are hiding in Bangladesh. The new treaty will allow India to deport them.

Bangladesh also stands to benefit, with India pledging to track down the two convicted killers of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who are believed to be hiding in India.

Likewise, the new liberalized visa regime is a boon for Bangladesh. According to the Times of India, the new regime allows for the provision of multiple entry tourist and medical visas valid up to a year, five-year business visas, and other categories.

While both countries largely stand to benefit from the agreement, the issue of illegal immigration is a sticking point. With a porous, shared border more than 4000 kilometers long, many poor Bangladeshis illegally enter India to find work. The new visa regime addresses this issue to an extent. Some analysts say that the issue cannot be handled comprehensively unless New Delhi issues permits to Bangladeshi migrant laborers.

The India-Bangladesh relationship has been on the upswing since Sheikh Hasina came to power in 2009. The improved relations are largely due to her efforts to stamp out anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh.

Along with greater cooperation, economic activity between the two nations has increased. In 2011, India pledged to invest U.S. $1 billion to build infrastructure in Bangladesh.

While the new extradition and visa agreement and stronger economic ties are a clear marker of progress, there is also a good deal of unfinished business between the two countries.

For one, India has not yet signed the Teesta Water Teaty, which will give Bangladesh access to the Teesta River that flows from India.

Meanwhile, India is waiting for Bangladesh to grant transit access to its landlocked northeastern states bordered by Bangladesh.

According to analysts, as the biggest country in South Asia, India is keen to engage its neighbor in a bid to neutralize China’s growing influence there. To do so, New Delhi must give more economic leverage to Bangladesh and allow Bangladesh to have a bigger share of India’s growing economic success.

Greater concessions from India would also boost Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s popularity, offsetting criticism leveled at her by opposition groups.

Political analysts say the extradition treaty and new visa regime are intended to give the Awami League leader a much needed political makeover before next year’s election.

The arrangement also suits India’s new foreign policy vision, which is based on greater economic engagement with its neighbors.

India has struggled to maintain smooth relations with its neighbors. In the case of Pakistan, it has stepped up economic engagement but made little political progress. By contrast, India’s slowly growing ties with Bangladesh have given its Look East Policy a boost and could be the start of renewed progress.

First appeared in The Diplomat, February 1, 2013

Bangladesh: Between Justice and Politics

PRATYUSH

“Abdul Bari had run out of luck. Like thousands of other people in East Bengal, he had made the mistake – the fatal mistake – of running within sight of a Pakistani patrol. He was 24 years old, a slight man surrounded by soldiers. He was trembling because he was about to be shot.”

So began an article published in June 1971 that chronicled for the first time the atrocities committed by the Pakistani army and its cohorts to prevent the secession of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Long before the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) began to evolve in the 1990s, the article by Pakistani journalist Anthony Mascarenhas in the UK’s Sunday Times turned international public opinion against Islamabad and prompted India to intervene and end the war.

On Monday, a Bangladesh tribunal delivered its first verdict, sentencing Abul Kalam Azad, a Bangladeshi Islamic cleric and former student leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami party, to death for crimes against humanity. Eleven other suspects are awaiting trial. Azad was found guilty in absentia on numerous charges, including genocide, murder and rape. A former TV presenter, he has been on the run since last April and is believed to be in Pakistan. As a member of the Razakar Bahini, an auxiliary force that supported the Pakistani army, Azad helped to crush local resistance in East Pakistan.

Bangladesh says Pakistani troops and their local collaborators killed three million people and raped about 200,000 women during the nine-month war. In the infamous Blood Telegram, American diplomat in Bangladesh, Archer Blood, sent a cable to the U.S. State Department criticizing the U.S. government for its failure to respond to the “genocide” being perpetuated by the Pakistani military.

The scale of the killings would normally have shaken the conscience of the international community. However, unlike the UN-backed International Criminal Tribunals instituted to try war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Bangladesh genocide has received scant international attention. This lack of awareness has persisted, even as victims’ families and human rights groups have spent decades fighting for justice.

International politics are partly to blame. Pakistani troops were let off the hook as part of a broader post-war peace deal between India and Pakistan. Moreover, the Bangladesh Liberation War occurred at the height of the Cold War when the United States, allied with Islamabad, overlooked Pakistan’s atrocities as it sought the nation’s help as a conduit to establish diplomatic ties with China.

But this is now changing thanks to the tribunals. However, these tribunals— referred to as the International Crimes Tribunal— have been controversial since their inception. The U.S.-based Human Rights Watch has repeatedly expressed concerns over the efficacy of the trial, saying that the law under which the accused are being tried does not meet international standards of due process. Critics, including the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) headed by former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, have called the trials a “farce” and see them as a witch-hunt.

The accusation is not unfounded. Zia and current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina are bitter political rivals and have often used state institutions to undermine one another. The Jamaat-e-Islami is an ally of the BNP, which sees the trial as an attempt by Hasina’s Awami League to undermine the BNP-Jamaat alliance.

The court’s standing received a further blow in December when Mohammed Nizamul Huq resigned as chairman of the tribunal. Nizamul left the post after being questioned by The Economist and having private emails published in Bangladesh that cast doubt on the tribunal.

Given the fractured and vindictive political climate in Bangladesh, the risks of new injustices occurring are very real. However, the conviction of a high-profile war criminal is the first tentative step towards closing a deeply haunting chapter in Bangladesh’s turbulent history. The opportunity must not be allowed to wither away.

First appeared in The Diplomat, January 25, 2013

War crimes in Bangladesh

Justice delayed: A first conviction for war crimes sparks controversy

MORE than 41 years after the deaths of as many as 3m people in Bangladesh’s war of secession from Pakistan, a Bangladeshi war crimes tribunal has given its first verdict. On January 21st it sentenced Abul Kalam Azad to death in absentia for genocide and murder committed during the nine-month war in 1971. The verdict is being seen as a victory for Sheikh Hasina, the prime minister, and her Awami League party, who have made the tribunal an important part of her term in office.

Bangladeshis have waited decades for justice and the aims of the tribunal are broadly popular, but critics say the process has been politicised to target allies of Sheikh Hasina’s main opponent, former prime minister Khaleda Zia, head of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). There have also been questions raised about its impartiality. In December The Economist reported on contacts by e-mail and Skype between the presiding judge in one of the tribunals and a lawyer in Belgium who was not an official part of the court. The judge eventually resigned and was replaced. The verdict on Mr Azad came from a second tribunal.

In the judgment Mr Azad is described as a former leader of the youth wing of Jamaat-e-Islami, a party in then East Pakistan and still Bangladesh’s biggest Islamic party today. Its youth wing was the main source of paramilitaries supporting Pakistan in its efforts to prevent East Pakistan’s independence. Its members are alleged to have abducted and murdered dozens of civilians. Mr Azad himself was accused of killing at least 12 Hindus and of rape. He then became a well-connected political figure in Bangladesh and a presenter of popular Islamic television programmes. He fled the country last year and is believed to be in Pakistan.

Mrs Zia has found it impossible to distance her party from Jamaat-e-Islami, an ally whose support the BNP needs if it is to win the election, likely to take place this year. Among the ten other senior figures to be tried are two leading party officials, both former ministers in Mrs Zia’s 2001-2006 government. It may be that almost the entire leadership of Jamaat will be hanged before the polls. So, too, may two members of Mrs Zia’s party, including one of her close advisers. Sheikh Hasina will hope that the taint of 1971 will make the BNP-Jamaat alliance so toxic to voters that she will be returned to power.

First published in The Economist its print edition, January 26, 2013

Bangladesh's watershed war crimes moment

SABIR MUSTAFA

The International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh has delivered its first verdict, sentencing a former Islamist leader to death for crimes against humanity.

Abul Kalam Azad, a former leader of the Jamaat-e-Islami party, was found guilty in absentia on eight charges.

Tribunals set up nearly three years ago are trying alleged war crimes committed during the country's independence war against Pakistan in 1971.

The first verdict signals a major triumph for Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina who has made prosecution of 1971 war crimes a key goal of her government.

From the beginning the tribunals have faced internal scepticism, as well international concerns expressed by such groups as Human Rights Watch.

Late last year the tribunal was shaken by newspaper revelations which led to the resignation of the presiding judge of one of the two courts.

But the government was quick to appoint a new judge, and the tribunals pressed ahead with proceedings, leading to Monday's first verdict.

Watershed moment

Mr Azad, who had gained fame in recent years as a television presenter of Islamic programmes, was accused of murder, rape, torture, arson and looting - mostly against members of the Hindu community in the central district of Faridpur.

He went on the run in April last year and is thought to be in Pakistan.

In 1971, he was a junior leader in Jamaat's student wing and a member of the Razakar Bahini, an auxiliary force set up to help the Pakistan army by rooting out local resistance.

The Razakars were notorious for their operations targeting Hindus as well as civilians suspected of being sympathetic towards Bengali nationalists.

The guilty verdict marks a watershed in Bangladesh's tortuous history, where for 40 years families of victims have campaigned relentlessly to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Bangladesh says up to three million people died during the war, mostly in massacres by the Pakistan army and their local Islamist allies, the Razakar and Al-Badr forces.

Following Indian intervention in December 1971, more than 200 Bengali intellectuals, doctors and engineers were kidnapped and murdered by the shadowy Al-Badr.

Bangladesh's largest Islamist party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, is alleged to have been behind the creation of Al-Badr, providing it with leadership, recruits and inspiration.

Jamaat's leader at the time, Ghulam Azam, is alleged to have inspired the killing of the intellectuals which took place just days before the Pakistan army surrendered to Indian and Bangladeshi forces. He rejects the allegations.

Bangladesh was unable to put on trial Pakistani officers accused of war crimes as they were released as part of a broader peace deal between Delhi and Islamabad.

But the question of their local collaborators and their role in the genocide remained unresolved.

Fractious politics

Since 2011, six top Jamaat leaders, including Ghulam Azam who is now in his nineties, have been in jail, facing various charges of crimes against humanity.

Most observers in Bangladesh agree that there is widespread public support for the trials, which kicked off in 2010 when the first tribunal was set up.

But the fractious and divisive nature of the country's politics was exposed once again, when major parties failed to close ranks even when dealing with an issue as emotive as trials of war crimes.

While the ruling Awami League has made the trials one of its key goals, the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party or BNP has been less forthcoming.

The BNP has maintained an electoral alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami since 2001 and many in the party feel the alliance gives them their best chance of returning to power.

But the BNP is unable to oppose the trials.

The war of liberation and what Bangladeshis term "the genocide" of 1971 remain powerful and emotive issues in the public psyche.

The BNP's tactic has been to support the need to bring perpetrators of war crimes to justice, with a warning that the trials should not be used against political opponents.

The warning has as much to do with protecting some of its own leaders who may be implicated, as to put Jamaat minds at rest.

One senior BNP leader, Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury is already in jail. He denies a number of charges.

Skype 'scandal'

The tribunal itself suffered a set-back last month, when hours of conversation over Skype between one of its presiding judges and a Brussels-based lawyer were revealed in the press.

The exposure came just days before the court was due to deliver the verdict in the trial of Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, a top Jamaat leader and one of the country's most charismatic and controversial Islamic preachers.

Defence lawyers claimed the judge had acted improperly and the conversation showed the accused could not expect a fair trial.

The judge swiftly resigned, triggering calls for the trial of Mr Sayeedi to be recommenced from the beginning.

The tribunal's new presiding judge rejected the calls for retrial, but agreed to have the two legal teams make their final submissions again.

Monday's verdict goes some way to reassure the public that the trial process has not lost its way.

It is important for both the tribunals and the government to demonstrate such resolve, as the trials have already taken on an international dimension.

Recently, Turkish President Abdullah Gul wrote to his Bangladeshi counterpart, calling on him not to put Ghulam Azam to death if he is found guilty.

The letter triggered protests across the country, as many people regarded it as a flagrant interference in Bangladesh's judicial process.

Observers now expect the verdicts in the cases of senior Jamaat-e-Islami leaders such as Mr Sayeedi and Mr Azam to follow rapidly.

First appeared in BBC online, 21 January 2013

Sabir Mustafa is BBC Bengali editor

Rooppur Nuclear Deal Between Russia And Bangladesh

Dr. PETER CUSTERS

Few critical questions have been raised so far by Bangladesh’s intellectual community regarding the deal towards construction of two nuclear power plants in Rooppur. Yet questions do need to be posed. On November 2 last, Russia and Bangladesh signed the long awaited nuclear power agreement on the supply of two 1000 Megawatt reactors. 

Significantly, the deal was closely followed up by a major defense deal worth $1 Billion Dollars for delivery of armored vehicles, transport helicopters and other weaponry. This last deal was sealed during Sheikh Hasina’s recent Moscow visit. The given pattern - of a deal facilitating the purchase and transfer of nuclear technology paving the way for enlarged armament transfers – is broadly similar to the pattern set by the US and India when they signed their framework agreement on nuclear cooperation in 2008 (*). Here, an expansion in US exports of armaments to India was the hidden, reverse side of the nuclear deal. And while ostensibly there is no direct link between the two types of trade, - both the US and Russia evidently are equally eager to enlarge both their sales of nuclear technology and of weaponry towards countries of the Global South. Yet whether the Rooppur deal and the sequential defence deal – both involving huge sums of public money - are really in the interests of Bangladesh? This urgently needs to be scrutinized.

Here I will limit myself to last November’s deal on Rooppur, which Bangladesh’s nuclear lobby undoubtedly will have celebrated as a grand success. After all the dream to provide Bangladesh with nuclear energy is longstanding, dating from the time Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan. The first critical point to be noted is the fact that few details regarding the contents of the nuclear agreement have been revealed to Bangladesh’s public. From the ‘self-evaluation report’ submitted by Bangladesh to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the middle of 2012, however, it appears that the two nuclear reactors to be supplied by Russia to Bangladesh will be of VVER-1000 design. This is a water-cooled and water-moderated reactor reportedly devised in the late 1970s. Towards the cooling of the nuclear fuel rods, water is pumped into the primary circuit of the reactor and kept under constant pressure to prevent it from reaching boiling point. And after its use in the reactor complex, the (polluted) water needs to be released, i.e. dumped back onto the environment. This immediately raises the question as to the consequences of Rooppur for the fisherfolk in Ishwardi, the subdistrict of Pabna where Rooppur is located. Will biodiversity in the reactor’s surrounding water bodies be affected, yes or no?

Further pertinent questions arise once we try to envision how Rooppur’s nuclear fuel rods will be supplied and disposed of. To some extent the arrangements chosen imply that Bangladesh’s own population will not itself be burdened with the damaging conse-quences of the nuclear waste that is generated in the nuclear production chain. Neither will massive amounts of low-level waste be dumped in the country in consequence of uranium mining. Nor will the country’s landscape or subsoil be disfigured due to the presence of storage tanks containing long-lasting, high-level fluid waste from nuclear reprocessing. These consequences will be borne by people elsewhere (!). Yet will these facts suffice to allay the public’s fears? Under the agreement signed between Russia and Bangladesh, Bangladesh will not itself enrich uranium. Russia will both supply the fuel elements for the reactors, and will take back the highly radio-active rods once they have completed their ‘life-cycle’. However, this does not mean that the people of Ishwardi and Pabna can rest re-assured. Central issues to be looked into here are the temporary storage of the radioactive fuel rods after the end of their usage and the transportation of the fuel rods to and from the Rooppur nuclear complex. In Europe the transportation by road of used fuel elements has for many years aroused fierce resistance by anti-nuclear activists.

Thirdly, there is the question of reactor safety from a nuclear catastrophe. Russian officials will surely argue that the VVER-1000 design has proven to be more secure than the design of the granite-moderated reactor in Chernobyl, Ukraine, where the world’s most catastrophic nuclear accident ever took place in 1986. Surely, it is the last-mentioned RBMK-design which has burdened the Russian state and people with nightmarish problems, - of hundreds of thousands of cancer deaths, of a vast contaminated region where agricultural production had to be suspended, and of a huge financial burden for the construction and re-building of a reactor-sarcophage. Yet the so-called ‘stress tests’ undertaken in Russia in 2011, subsequent to the Fukushima disaster in Japan, have laid bare numerous basic defects that Russian reactors share with those in Japan. A joint report brought out by Rosatom and other Russian state institutions in the middle of 2011, for instance, questioned the capability of the country’s reactors to remain safe if cooling systems collapse, and there reportedly is no guarantee that power backup systems will be effective in case of a cooling system failure. The official report also described how spent fuel is simply allowed to accrue in onsite storage sites because of lack of space. One wonders whether scientists belonging to Bangladesh’s nuclear establishment have reviewed this report by Russia’s state agencies. And whether their own worries have been dispelled.

What then is the best way forward? How can the risks deriving from Rooppur for Bangladesh’s population best be assessed? Scientists and economists who are concerned about solving Bangladesh’s energy needs will undoubtedly argue that we need a dispassionate debate on the issue, and that it would be wrong to oppose Rooppur merely on the basis of fear. Being no natural scientist myself and aware of the risks of over-simplification, I would nevertheless argue that the country would do well to take notice of the huge international controversy surrounding nuclear energy today. In neighboring India, for instance, there has emerged an informed debate, which is of immediate relevance for Bangladesh. Coincidentally the strongest opposition against nuclear construction has been built in the area surrounding Koodankulam, in Tamil Nadu, precisely in opposition against a VVER-reactor supplied by the Russian Federation. Being densely populated and subject to annual river flooding, Bangladesh can ill afford to take risks. Hence, whatever construction works in Rooppur, if any, should be preceded by an informed public debate, - a debate in which both the country’s progressive intellectuals, the new generation of urban activists, and Pabna’s peasants and fisher folk take part.

First published in Countercurrents.org, 22 January, 2013

Dr. Peter Custers, a theoretician on nuclear production, lives in Leiden, the Netherlands, author of Questioning Globalized Militarism (Tulika, New Delhi/Merlin Press, London, 2007), www.petercusters.nl