Bangladesh Arms Trafficking: Residual Networks

Veronica Khangchian

In perhaps, the single biggest arms seizure since the April 2, 2004, Chittagong arms haul case where 10 truckloads of weapons had been seized, a huge arms cache was recovered by the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) of Bangladesh, over several days, from the Satchari National Park in the Chunarughat Sub-District of the Habiganj District in Bangladesh, adjoining the West Tripura District in the Indian State of Tripura. Officials disclosed that they recovered 184 rocket shells (40mm) and 153 chargers for rocket launchers abandoned inside one bunker on a hillock in the reserve forest, some 130 kilometers from the capital, Dhaka, during the raid on June 3, 2014. Another six more empty bunkers were located on the same day. On June 4, the RAB found another two bunkers and recovered 38 rocket shells, four machine guns, 95 rocket chargers, 1,300 rounds of machine gun ammunition, and over 13,000 bullets of different calibres. RAB recovered more arms and ammunition, including four machine guns in a bunker on June 8, and also found oil used for cleaning firearms. Another two empty bunkers were also located. As it resumed a search operation deep into the reserve forest on the eight consecutive day, RAB made additional recoveries, including one machine gun barrel, 633 rounds of ammunition, and 54 anti-tank shells, from three newly discovered bunkers, on June 9.

The area from where the arms were recovered was once the base camp of the now-defunct Indian insurgent outfit, the Tripura-based All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF). The camp was later captured by insurgents belonging to the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT). The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), with its principal theatre of operations in the Indian State of Assam, abutting Tripura, and ATTF had earlier smuggled a huge quantity of Chinese-made weapons from the Southeast Asian grey market by sea, landed them around Cox's Bazar or Chittagong, and transported these to rebel bases such as Satchari, from where arms were smuggled into India's troubled northeast.

However, some confusion prevails over the present recoveries. Indian security agencies are yet to ascertain whether these belong to any militant outfit active in India's Northeast. Media reports have speculated on the distant possibility of ULFA 'chief' Paresh Baruah asking ATTF to store the weapons in its one-time bases, and this cannot be ruled out. Reports also indicate that ATTF leader, Ranjit Debbarma (now in Tripura jail), who had close ties with Paresh Baruah, had stocked the cache in collaboration with ULFA militants. A June 4 media report suggested that the arms and ammunition belonged to ULFA leader Baruah. Information gleaned by Indian intelligence agencies from Debbarma, and provided to Bangladesh authorities, led to the recovery of the ammunition on June 3, three kilometers off the border. According to the report, arms smuggled from China by Baruah were kept in the Satchari Forest and were sent to Indian militants at opportune moments.

However, Bangladesh State Minister for Home, Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal, asserted that the haul was based on intelligence collected by local Bangladesh agencies. RAB Media Wing Director Habibur Rahman added that the arms and ammunition recovered in the Satchari Forest were apparently similar to those recovered in Chittagong in 2004, and to a truckload of ammunition recovered at Bogra in June 2003.  It is significant, moreover, that investigators of the Bogra ammunition haul had determined that the ammunition was bound for the Satchari Forest, and had also confirmed its linkages with NLFT and ULFA.

Earlier, a Bangladesh Court had arrived at a significant verdict in the Chittagong arms haul case, nearly 10 years after the incident. On January 30, 2014, a Chittagong District Court awarded the death penalty to 14 accused, including Motiur Rahman Nizami, Ameer (chief) of the Jamaat-e-Islami (Jel), Lutfozzaman Babar of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the then Minister of State for Home, and ULFA-I 'commander-in-chief' Paresh Baruah (in absentia), for smuggling 10 truckloads of arms into Chittagong District in 2004, during the tenure of the BNP-led Government. Investigations revealed that the weapons were manufactured in China and were being shipped to ULFA. The condemned also include former Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) Director Major General (Retd) Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury; former Director General of National Security Intelligence (NSI) Brigadier General (Retd) Abdur Rahim; and three other NSI officials – Director (Security) Wing Commander Shahab Uddin Ahmed; Deputy Director Major (Retd) Liakat Hossain; and Field Officer Akbar Hossain Khan. Others awarded the death penalty in the case are former Additional Secretary (Industry) Nurul Amin; the then Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Ltd. (CUFL) Managing Director Mahsin Uddin Talukder; CUFL General Manager (Administration) K.M. Enamul Hoque; and three businessmen, Hafizur Rahman Hafiz, Deen Mohammad and Haji Abdus Subhan.

In the initial stages of the trial, which commenced in 2005, only some small fry, mostly labourers, truckers and trawler drivers, were implicated, leaving out the big shots as the then BNP-led Government allegedly tried to cover up the involvement of the state machinery, including its Ministers and high officials of intelligence agencies. However, after an Army-backed caretaker Government took charge on January 11, 2007, ahead of the country’s General Elections, the Court of Chittagong Metropolitan Judge ordered further investigations on February 14, 2008. In June 2011, Muniruzzaman Chowdhury, Senior Assistant Superintendent of Criminal Investigation Department, submitted two supplementary charge-sheets, accusing 11 new suspects. While Paresh Barua and former Secretary of the Industries Ministry, Nurul Amin, have been absconding ever since the recovery of the arms, the other nine are behind bars. Baruah and Amin were sentenced in absentia. The verdict of the Special Tribunal observed that the role of the then Prime Minister Khaleda Zia in the incident was 'mysterious', and pointed to the direct involvement of then Ministers and top military and civil officials. Judge S.M. Mojibur Rahman also argued that the smuggling of such a huge volume of weapons and ammunition was not possible without Government support, and noted, “They [the intelligence officials] were involved in the conspiracy to destroy the entire nation by putting the country’s existence at stake.”

Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed has now promised separate investigations into the role of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and her party (BNP) in the Chittagong arms haul case, declaring, ‘The trial of 10 truckloads of arms haul is over. We will now probe afresh the conspiracies behind it, from where the arms came, how it was brought to Bangladesh and who had funded it." The Prime Minister added that Bangladesh had become hotbed of activities of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) after the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in August 1975.

Analysts note that the death sentence awarded to Paresh Barua will have little impact on the outfit as Barua and most of his cadres have already shifted base out of Bangladesh. Intelligence officials in Assam, however, feel that the elusive insurgent leader will be under greater pressure to come forward for talks, should Myanmar act as Bangladesh did, and evict insurgents from India's north-east, including Barua and his cadres, from its soil. The Assam Police have intelligence inputs that Barua is currently operating out of his base along the Myanmar-China border. Officials in Bangladesh argue that the death sentence would at least ensure that Baruah would not be able to enter Bangladesh without the court’s intervention.

Significantly, the verdict comes at a time when ULFA-I is facing a crisis. Sources indicate that not more than 10 hardcore members of the outfit are inside Assam, and that the group has no more than 180 cadres in camps in Myanmar. Senior leaders who were in the Mon District of Nagaland have been called back to Myanmar after the outfit awarded the death sentence to 'operational commander' Pramod Gogoi alias Partha Pratim Asom. On March 16, 2014 [the party's 'Army Day'], ULFA-I asked its members to re-strengthen the outfit, fearing that certain members had a nexus with the SFs. At least eight ULFA-I cadres, including Pramod Gogoi, were executed on the instructions of ULFA-I's 'commander-in-chief', Paresh Baruah, for 'conspiring’ with Police and Security Forces to engineer a mass surrender of cadres over the preceding four months. Seven cadres had also been executed in December 2013, while they were trying to flee the Myanmar base to surrender to the Police. 'Operational commander' Pramod Gogoi was executed on January 15, 2014 in the Mon District. ULFA-I is said to have a total of around 240 cadres at present.

Significantly, the Goalpara Police recovered a stock of ammunition and detonators from ULFA-I along the Assam-Meghalaya border in the Goalpara District on January 27, 2014. The Police disclosed that a group of ULFA-I militants had entered Hatigaon, a village under the Agia Police Station, with arms and explosive materials, which they stored inside a rubber plantation. Goalpara Superintendent of Police (SP) Nitul Gogoi stated, “We got the information that a group under the leadership of Drishti Rajkhowa brought the ammunition from Bangladesh.”

Coordination between the Meghalaya based Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA), one of the biggest procurers of arms in Meghalaya, and ULFA-I, remains a concern. In the latest incident, on June 26, 2014, a militant identified as Dharma Kanta Rai, who was on ‘deputation’ from the ULFA-I to the GNLA, was killed during a rescue operation mounted by West Garo Hills Police at Darekgre near Rongmasugre village in West Garo Hills District, to free four abducted persons from the GNLA and ULFA. The abductions had been carried out on June 25 from Kantanagre village in West Garo Hills District. The deceased ULFA-I cadre was reportedly an improvised explosive device (IED) expert, used by GNLA to target Police movements.

Worryingly, media reports indicate that a large proportion of weapons and ammunition that reach the mushrooming in Meghalaya, are from the armory of insurgent groups presently engaged in peace parleys with the Government. These groups include the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the pro-talks faction of ULFA (ULFA-PTF). According to sources, these frontline militant outfits never divulged the exact composition of their arsenal and, according to one source, “80 to 90 per cent of these arms lie unused for five to six years and just before their life span lapses, these militant groups prefer to dispose of these weapons.”

Further, despite dramatically improving relations between India’s Border Security Force (BSF) and Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB), Northeast insurgent groups continue to maintain some 45 hideouts in Bangladesh, mostly belonging to ATTF and NLFT (21 camps), according to BSF Special Director General B.D. Sharma. He added, on June 20, that the insurgents could not be fully wiped out from Bangladesh soil because deployment of BGB was thin compared to requirements, and that, “They are now raising new forces and we hope that the situation would improve soon. Besides, the terrain and riverine border also come in the way of maintaining effective border vigil.” However, Mohammed Latiful Haider, Additional Director General, BGB, has denied the existence of any camps of Indian militant outfits in the country. The denial came on June 25, after the first day of a border coordination conference held between senior BSF and BGB officials at Kadamtala, at BSF North Bengal Frontier Headquarters near Siliguri, under the Darjeeling District of West Bengal.

Bangladesh has now clearly declared that it would not allow its territory to be used against India. The assurance, reiterated to Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj on her first foreign visit on June 26, 2014, came as the External Affairs Minister promised to put extra energy into bilateral ties. Swaraj stated that New Delhi sought a comprehensive and equitable partnership with Bangladesh for a secure and prosperous South Asia.  With recent developments, and agreed cooperation between India and Bangladesh, a further significant improvement can be hoped for.

First published South Asia Intelligence Review, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 12, No. 52, June 30, 2014

Veronica Khangchian is Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Indo-Bangladesh Relations: Continuous Consolidation

S. BINODKUMAR SINGH

On January 28, 2013, Bangladesh Home Minister Muhiuddin Khan Alamgir and his Indian counterpart Union Home Minister (UHM) Sushil Kumar Shinde signed a landmark Extradition Treaty at Dhaka, the Bangladesh capital, to combat terrorism and facilitate suppression of crime by making further provision for the reciprocal extradition of offenders. Significantly, however, Article 6 of the Treaty says that "it would not be applicable in case the offence is of a political character."

Earlier, as a precedent, the two countries had signed the Agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters, Transfer of Sentenced Persons and Combating International Terrorism, Organized Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking, during Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's visit to New Delhi between January 10 and 13, 2010.

In the intervening time, to reduce the incidents of border killings and smuggling of arms and drugs, human trafficking and other illegal activities along the Indo-Bangladesh border, Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) and India's Border Security Force (BSF) on March 13, 2012, started "coordinated patrolling" and "night coordinated patrolling" at 120 border points selected by two different teams of the BGB and the BSF under the India-Bangladesh Coordinated Border Management Plan (CBMP), which had been jointly signed on July 30, 2011, at Dhaka.

Notably, since the Sheikh Hasina led Awami League (AL) Government (it is in alliance with five other parties) came to power in Bangladesh in January 2009, the state initiated a decisive campaign against radical forces on the domestic front, and also acted relentlessly against various militant formations operating in India's North East, which had long been sheltered on Bangladeshi soil. Since Hasina assumed power, security cooperation between Bangladesh and India has been dramatic, resulting in the arrest of some of the top northeast insurgent leaders by Indian Security Forces after they were 'pushed back' into India. Prominent among those held in Bangladesh and 'handed over' to India were: All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) 'chairman' Ranjit Debbarma (January 23, 2013); Garo National Liberation Army (GNLA) 'Chairman' Champion R. Sangma (July 30, 2012); United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) 'captain' Antu Chaudang and 'second lieutenant' Pradeep Chetia (February 5, 2011); United National Liberation Front (UNLF) 'chairman' R. K. Meghen alias Sanayaima (November 30,2010); Anti-talks faction of National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) 'chief' Ranjan Daimary alias D R Nabla (May 1, 2010); ULFA 'chairman' Arabinda Rajkhowa alias Rajiv Rajkonwar' and 'deputy commander-in-chief' Raju Baruah (December 4, 2009); ULFA 'foreign secretary' Sashadhar Choudhury and 'finance secretary' Chitraban Hazarika (November 4, 2009).

India has also been requesting Bangladesh to hand over Anup Chetia alias Golap Barua, 'general secretary' of the ULFA, who was arrested in Dhaka along with two other ULFA militants on December 21, 1997, for illegally carrying foreign currencies and a satellite phone, and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Even after spending more than 15 years in various prisons the Bangladesh, he continues to remain behind bars. However, despite the fresh Extradition Treaty, Bangladesh Home Minister Muhiuddin Khan Alamgir on January 28, 2013, stated that Bangladesh would not be able to send back Anup Chetia under the treaty as he had prayed for political asylum in the Supreme Court, adding, "The Supreme Court will first have to dispose of his prayer for political asylum. After that, we will decide whether to treat this person or any other persons under this extradition treaty or in some other way."

Other North East militant leaders on Bangladeshi soil, whose expatriation India seeks, include National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) leaders Bishwamohan Debarman and Subir Debbarma, and NDFB leader Thulunga alias Tensu Narzary.

Bangladesh has unambiguously demonstrated its will to end the operation of Northeast Indian terrorist and insurgent groupings from its soil. Nevertheless, Indian intelligence inputs suggest that at least 55 camps of NE militants continue to operate in Bangladesh, and there is certainly some unfinished business at hand.

Similarly, Dhaka has been demanding that India arrest and hand over Bangladesh's founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's two convicted killers, Abdul Mazed and Moslehuddin Khan (who were at the rank of Captain and Risaldar, respectively, at the time of the assassination), and are believed to be hiding in India.

In addition, there are several other criminals operating with impunity across the Indo-Bangladesh border, and the Extradition Treaty should help the two countries break this criminal nexus. 

As cooperation on the security front strengthened, the resultant increase in trust has led to positive developments on other issues of bilateral concern as well, despite hurdles. These include the historic agreement signed on September 6, 2011, during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Dhaka, to settle land boundary issues, including the exchange of 162 'enclaves' which are in 'adverse possession'. Though the Teesta Water Sharing Deal, could not be concluded because of last-minute objections raised by West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee on the draft of the agreement, India's Water Resources Minister Harish Rawat, on November 7, 2012, during a meeting with visiting Bangladesh Agriculture Minister Motia Chowdhury at New Delhi, expressed interest in inking a provisional Teesta Water Sharing Agreement, until a permanent settlement was found.

On July 3, 2012, moreover, Dhaka gave its letter of consent for the renewal of Transit and Transshipment Rights to India, for the continuation of transshipment of bulk cargoes, with retrospective effect from April 1, 2012 to March 31, 2014. The PIWTT, which was renewed annually till then (July 3, 2012), as was agreed in the Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade (PIWTT, 1972), was suspended on October 26, 2011, after Dhaka refused to issue the letter of consent because of the failure to reach an agreement on the Teesta Deal.

In addition, following up on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on India-Bangladesh Energy Cooperation signed on September 6, 2011, at Dhaka, the first Joint Working Group (JWG) meeting on renewable energy was held in New Delhi on August 3, 2012, where Bangladesh and India briefed each other on the present status and growth potential of renewable energy. Similarly, a high-level Indian delegation led by Power Secretary P. Uma Shankar visited Dhaka on January 29, 2013, to sign a deal for the proposed 1,320 megawatt coal-fired power plant at Rampal in the Bagerhat District of Khulna Division in Bangladesh, and the purchase of power by Bangladesh from India.

Significantly, at the time of the signing of the Extradition Treaty, the two sides also inked a liberalized visa agreement, the Revised Travel Arrangement (RTA), to remove restrictions on visits of businesspersons, students, patients, senior citizens above 65 years and children below 12 years.

Conspicuously, Indo-Bangladesh relations have witnessed a strong positive surge since 2009, and this has had a transformatory impact on the trajectory of terrorism and extremism in both the countries, visibly improving the general security environment in the region, and creating a strong foundation of trust. Much, however, remains to be done and, in this, India needs to be the more proactive, both because it is by far the larger partner, and also because Dhaka appears to have done much more in the recent past than Delhi.

This equation becomes the more crucial as Bangladesh approaches another General Election in which the present Opposition, backed by a very substantial radicalized constituency, will attempt to cast improving relations with India as a 'betrayal' of Bangladeshi interests. As disruptive political mobilization in Bangladesh - of which significant evidence is already visible - gathers force in the run up to the Elections, it will require dramatic and demonstrable successes in the delivery of quantifiable benefits to Dhaka, both to consolidate the relationship and, crucially, to diminish the impact of vicious propaganda that could, otherwise, jeopardize the remarkable gains of the past four years.

Original article published in SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, Weekly Assessments & Briefings, Volume 11, No. 31, February 4, 2013

S. Binodkumar Singh is Research Associate with Institute for Conflict Management