Statement by Dr. Payam Akhavan International Counsel to Sheikh Hasina
IT is my privilege and honour to speak on behalf of Sheikh Hasina. I have undertaken to represent her with great aforethought and fully aware of the far-reaching importance of her struggle. Like every other human being, Sheikh Hasina is entitled to the protection of her fundamental human rights under international law. But it is obvious that the campaign by the military-backed caretaker government to eliminate her as a political leader has grave consequences not just for her, but also for the future of democracy in Bangladesh. As such, her political persecution through the perversion of justice may be the most significant measure of whether this nation will continue to have free and fair elections, to continue on a historical path of developing a mature democracy through trial and error, or whether Bangladesh will go the way of other countries in the region, where unchecked military rule, political radicalization, and religious violence prevail.
While outstanding local counsel in Bangladesh struggle to protect her rights before national courts, the caretaker government must be reminded that this case also implicates the government’s obligations under long-standing United Nations human rights covenants. It is in this respect that I have assumed the position of international counsel, to ensure that Bangladesh abides by its obligations under international law, to remind the government that its actions are being watched closely by the world community, that it cannot establish a military dictatorship under the cover of an anti-corruption campaign, that it cannot engage in such flagrant abuse of power with impunity.
The conduct of the government over the past several months leaves little doubt that the prosecution of Sheikh Hasina is a thinly masked political trial with no merit whatsoever. Those of you who have followed her case are well aware that when the government first accused her of corruption in April of this year, it was Sheikh Hasina that insisted on returning to Bangladesh to challenge the accusations. You will recall that it was the government that vigorously attempted to prevent her from returning from her travels abroad, threatening to impose heavy penalties on any airline that would dare fly her to Dhaka. And it was only after considerable international pressure that the government relented, allowing her to return. Sheikh Hasina returned, as the Economist wrote, to a “rock star’s welcome”, as tens of thousands of Bangladeshis welcomed her back, a testimony to her overwhelming popularity as a leader, and an indication of why the so-called caretaker government is so intent on eliminating her from the political scene. Surely, Sheikh Hasina’s return is inconsistent with the slanderous image of a corrupt Prime Minister that the government tries to portray.
But it is the government’s case itself that most clearly betrays the merit-less accusations against her, and the lengths to which the police and prosecution have been manipulated to use the judiciary as an instrument of political assassination. I refer here to the accusations of businessman Azam Chowdhury, whose information report forms the basis of the current charges against Sheikh Hasina. It cannot go unnoticed that in his original statement to the police, Mr. Azam did not in any way implicate Sheikh Hasina in his allegations of corruption. He only accused her cousin Sheikh Selim who was the Minister of Health at the relevant time. It was only after Sheikh Selim was arrested, detained, and interrogated under questionable circumstances, that a case against Sheikh Hasina could be made. The sole evidence is Sheikh Selim’s supposed “confession” that he approached Sheikh Hasina concerning illicit payments, and that she advised him that those payments should go to her sister Sheikh Rehana. Now what were the circumstances that led to such an incredulous admission by Sheikh Selim? There are credible indications that while in custody, he was subjected to serious physical and mental abuse. His interrogators reportedly threatened that if he did not collaborate with them, his family would “die a slow, painful death”.
Should there be any doubt about the veracity of such allegations of torture, should I be accused of hyperbole in advocating Sheikh Hasina’s case, I draw your attention to the August 1st letter that Human Rights Watch submitted to Mr. Fakhruddin Ahmed, Chief Advisor of the caretaker government of Bangladesh. In this letter, coming from one of the most distinguished human rights organizations in the world, Mr. Fakhruddin is advised that: “Serious and systemic human rights abuses are taking place on your watch.” In addition to torture and extrajudicial executions, Human Rights Watch notifies the Chief Advisor that “emergency rules that do not respect basic due process rights, or the large number of arbitrary arrests and detention without proper judicial oversight or public accountability, are a direct result of your government’s policies” and that “the rule of law appears to be breaking down under your administration.” The letter goes on to state that “Because the sweeping regulations under the state of emergency now in force do not comply with international requirements and have been misused in practice, we urge you to repeal them immediately.” As indicated by a recent hearing in which the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh granted bail to Sheikh Hasina, the use of the Emergency Power Rules by the government reflects a deliberate policy to deny her basic due process rights. Under the Rules, those accused of corruption may be held without bail. It is regrettable that the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court has stayed the grant of bail following an appeal by the Attorney-General, and that the government has initiated new cases in order to continue Sheikh Hasina’s unlawful and arbitrary detention. It is also telling that she has been given only a few days in which to prepare a Wealth Report under the Emergency Rules, while in prison, without access to her papers or other records, which were all confiscated at the time of her arrest, and without the cooperation of the banks.
Notwithstanding these gross abuses of due process, it is the evidence obtained through the torture of her cousin Sheikh Selim that stands out as the most egregious violation of human rights. Consider the following statement by Human Rights Watch to the government concerning the use of torture in order to obtain “confessions”: “Bangladesh’s military forces have become notorious for taking people into custody, torturing them to death or executing them in faked ‘crossfire killings.’” Indeed, this letter refers to the case of Mr. Tasneem Khalil, a consultant for Human Rights Watch and stringer for CNN, who in May of this year was “taken from his home in front of his wife and child, blindfolded and driven to an interrogation centre, where he was tortured and questioned … Mr. Khalil saw sophisticated torture equipment and could hear other detainees screaming in pain. … Before his release, [he] was forced to make false confession, and asked to sign documents and testify on video admitting to acts that could be considered treasonous.” It is in this dire context that the so-called “confession” of Sheikh Selim has to be assessed, and I will also note that since he is still in detention, the full extent of his mistreatment may be difficult to divulge.
One of the most fundamental human rights norms is the prohibition of torture. This includes the inadmissibility of confessions obtained through torture as evidence in judicial proceedings. The government of Bangladesh must be reminded that the use of torture in the trial of Sheikh Hasina is a particularly serious violation of international law. It is in fact an international crime that the government is under an obligation to prevent and punish under United Nations human rights treaties which it has signed. Torture gives rise to individual criminal responsibility not only of those who perpetrate it, but also of those in positions of authority that legitimize it by failing to prosecute perpetrators. Those that are acquiescing in this travesty of justice against Sheikh Hasina should consider the doctrine of command responsibility, not least in a case with such a high-profile and intense international scrutiny. It was after all in the Pinochet case before the House of Lords in this country that the consequences of tolerating such conduct became apparent for once untouchable Heads of State. The message should be clear for the current leaders of Bangladesh. Instead of prosecuting Sheikh Hasina on trumped up charges of corruption, those responsible for the torture of Sheikh Selim should be put on trial, otherwise those that are condoning such conduct may themselves be in the dock one day.
As part of our initial campaign to hold Bangladesh accountable to its international human rights obligations, we have last week communicated the details of Sheikh Hasina’s case to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva. In particular, we have sent information to the Special Rapporteur on Torture, Professor Manfred Nowak of Austria, and to the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judiciary, Leandro Despouy of Argentina. We will ensure that the United Nations system, and more widely, the international community, is fully appraised of the legal proceedings against Sheikh Hasina, and hope that the government will appreciate that its human rights violations, its attempt to subvert democracy, will exact a heavy cost. It is especially regrettable that Bangladesh, a nation with a proud tradition of internationalism, a nation whose military have served as United Nations peacekeepers throughout the world, must now become a symbol of a military bent on usurping the power of democratically elected leaders. We are certain that there are those amongst the ranks of the military that realize the grave consequences for Bangladesh of becoming an international pariah, of losing the tremendous hard-won prestige and influence that the armed forces have brought to this nation.
In charting its course of action, the international community must also realize that the laudable goal of fighting corruption cannot be at the expense of human rights. Surely, Bangladesh’s deterioration into a military dictatorship will only increase the abuse of power, will only increase the corruption that comes with the absence of accountability. Democracy and respect for the rule of law is a long and arduous process that is achieved in over time. While Sheikh Hasina herself supported the assumption of power by the caretaker government in January of this year, it was based on the desire for free and fair elections, for an end to the turmoil that had gripped the country, and not for the elimination of democracy. And those that believe that the military-backed government should be given yet more time to prepare for elections now postponed till 2008 should consider how with the most popular political leader in prison, and with rights of assembly and free speech severely curtailed under emergency laws, it is possible to hold free and fair elections. This amounts to denying democracy in the name of attaining democracy. We therefore appeal to the international community to adopt a principled policy that upholds human rights and the rule of law, lest Bangladesh fall prey to the same authoritarian forces that have resulted in a steady deterioration of peace and stability in neighbouring countries.
And most of all, our message to the government of Bangladesh is that we will not allow this travesty of justice to go unchallenged. We will use every means at our disposal to enlist the support of the United Nations, and to expose the trial of Sheikh Hasina for what it is: a military coup masquerading as an anti-corruption campaign. #
London, August 6th, 2007
Friday, August 10, 2007
Tuesday, August 07, 2007
When this government fails
MOZAMMEL H. KHAN
THANKS are due to law adviser Mainul Hosein who has at last candidly expressed an apprehension that the current caretaker government (CTG) might fail and warned all concerned to think about the consequences should this happen.
However, instead of soul searching, the adviser, in his usual style, has relocated the blame onto others. The adviser went on to say: "It is the responsibility of the people in every sector to help the government … But I find a lack of consciousness among the intellectuals and the media people. They are not playing the role we expect of them."
I am not sure how much time the adviser devotes to reading what is being ceaselessly written in the country's news media by the columnists and editors of most of the credible news dailies.
On January 11, this government took over the reins of the country not only with the backing of the armed forces but enjoying an overwhelming support of the masses who did not want the scheduled one-sided election of January 22 go through.
It enjoyed the wholehearted support of the columnists, news media and the members of the civil society who were fighting tooth and nail against holding of a farcical election as nefariously planned by the four-party alliance.
Never before since the first government right after the victory of our liberation war, any government enjoyed such good will of the masses and the media. Regrettably, only after 200 or so days it is no one but the self-assumed chief spokesperson of this government himself who has had to issue the warning of failure.
The realisation, no matter however late, is commendable but the responsibility is misplaced. Ironically, the handful of columnists who were blindly in favour of holding the January 22 election under the pretext of constitutional continuity have metamorphosed themselves, over the last few months, into sycophantic supporters of the current government, while the erstwhile proponents for creating a level playing field before holding an election have become sceptics. The reasons are multi-fold.
Firstly, this government's actions in many cases are mired in lack of transparency and accountability. These actions of the government have even impelled the US charge d' affairs to suggest ensuring that the corruption cases are prosecuted fairly, transparently, and without "selectivity or political motivation."
Following the arrest of Sheikh Hasina on July 16 on charge of so-called extortion which the law adviser himself had earlier termed "peculiar," The Daily Star editor, Mahfuz Anam, in his splendid commentary noted sharply the apparent misguided agenda of the government with the clear warning that "the fundamental mistake committed by past proponents of 'command politics' was to underestimate the wisdom of our masses."
Notwithstanding such a bold warning from the country's most prestigious English daily, how the honourable adviser can blame the media and the intellectuals of their lack of consciousness? The adviser must have also come across with the grim concerns his friend Rashid Suhrawrdy has expressed in his article in DS.
In any government where an iota of accountability and respect for the media exists, Mahfuz Anam's commentary (many of our compatriots foresee it will be considered a milestone in our political history when the dust settles) would certainly generate a response from the government.
Just like any other government in the past, it did not happen. Yet, the law adviser asked the media and the intellectuals to point out their mistakes in order for them to avert any of their impending failures.
Secondly, the law adviser "wants to run the government honestly abiding by laws so that an example could be created." Would an example of "abiding by laws" be the deployment of more than a thousand members of the law enforcing agencies, some of them wearing bulletproof vest, with dog squads, to arrest an unarmed near-60-year-old woman isolated in her home in the wee hours of night without any warrant of arrest from a court of law?
Thirdly, the law adviser accused the media for keeping themselves busy with the politicians and lectured on upholding some values. If one goes through the media briefings of the law adviser, quite a contrary situation would emerge.
It is the honourable adviser who availed every opportunity to lecture the nation on the quality of a "good politician" and which leaders should be discarded for what reasons, not only a clear overstepping of his brief, but a blatant violation of the oath of office which he solemnly made by affirming: "I will do right to all manner of people according to law, without fear of favour, affection or ill-will."
The soft corner of the current government for a certain political party, which has had quite a dishonourable past, including the immediate past, when it was a strident voice for the January 22 elections, has been revealed clearly. The general secretary of that party was allowed to leave the country while a former PM was not allowed to go out of the country although cases of similar nature were lodged against both of them. This list could go on.
Fourthly, "selectivity and political motivation" of the government actions have been so much self-evident as it seems that Sheikh Hasina was the immediate past PM and her government was responsible for the most despicable governance this country has ever experienced, her party colleagues were the ones responsible for reckless looting and plundering national wealth in the last five years, and that her political alliance's "irresponsible acts" led to the declaration of emergency.
This sort of selectivity has created rooms for speculations that have led the political analysts to put forward hypotheses, regrettably, not very much in conformity with the well meaning intention of the January 11 takeover.
It is an open fact that it is the credibility of the armed forces of the country that is at stake in the success and failure of this government. God forbid, if its mission plunges in disarray, as has been apprehended by the law adviser, it is the leaders of the armed forces who will have to bear the brunt.
The advisers neither have any election mandate nor any constituency to lean onto. They might share the credit, if any, but do not have to partake the burden of failures since they are virtually no one so far as the people of the country are concerned. #
Dr. Mozammel H. Khan is the Convenor of the Canadian Committee for Human Rights and Democracy in Bangladesh
This article was first published in Daily Star, DhakaAugust 6, 2007
http://www.thedailystar.net/2007/08/06/d708061502133.htm
THANKS are due to law adviser Mainul Hosein who has at last candidly expressed an apprehension that the current caretaker government (CTG) might fail and warned all concerned to think about the consequences should this happen.
However, instead of soul searching, the adviser, in his usual style, has relocated the blame onto others. The adviser went on to say: "It is the responsibility of the people in every sector to help the government … But I find a lack of consciousness among the intellectuals and the media people. They are not playing the role we expect of them."
I am not sure how much time the adviser devotes to reading what is being ceaselessly written in the country's news media by the columnists and editors of most of the credible news dailies.
On January 11, this government took over the reins of the country not only with the backing of the armed forces but enjoying an overwhelming support of the masses who did not want the scheduled one-sided election of January 22 go through.
It enjoyed the wholehearted support of the columnists, news media and the members of the civil society who were fighting tooth and nail against holding of a farcical election as nefariously planned by the four-party alliance.
Never before since the first government right after the victory of our liberation war, any government enjoyed such good will of the masses and the media. Regrettably, only after 200 or so days it is no one but the self-assumed chief spokesperson of this government himself who has had to issue the warning of failure.
The realisation, no matter however late, is commendable but the responsibility is misplaced. Ironically, the handful of columnists who were blindly in favour of holding the January 22 election under the pretext of constitutional continuity have metamorphosed themselves, over the last few months, into sycophantic supporters of the current government, while the erstwhile proponents for creating a level playing field before holding an election have become sceptics. The reasons are multi-fold.
Firstly, this government's actions in many cases are mired in lack of transparency and accountability. These actions of the government have even impelled the US charge d' affairs to suggest ensuring that the corruption cases are prosecuted fairly, transparently, and without "selectivity or political motivation."
Following the arrest of Sheikh Hasina on July 16 on charge of so-called extortion which the law adviser himself had earlier termed "peculiar," The Daily Star editor, Mahfuz Anam, in his splendid commentary noted sharply the apparent misguided agenda of the government with the clear warning that "the fundamental mistake committed by past proponents of 'command politics' was to underestimate the wisdom of our masses."
Notwithstanding such a bold warning from the country's most prestigious English daily, how the honourable adviser can blame the media and the intellectuals of their lack of consciousness? The adviser must have also come across with the grim concerns his friend Rashid Suhrawrdy has expressed in his article in DS.
In any government where an iota of accountability and respect for the media exists, Mahfuz Anam's commentary (many of our compatriots foresee it will be considered a milestone in our political history when the dust settles) would certainly generate a response from the government.
Just like any other government in the past, it did not happen. Yet, the law adviser asked the media and the intellectuals to point out their mistakes in order for them to avert any of their impending failures.
Secondly, the law adviser "wants to run the government honestly abiding by laws so that an example could be created." Would an example of "abiding by laws" be the deployment of more than a thousand members of the law enforcing agencies, some of them wearing bulletproof vest, with dog squads, to arrest an unarmed near-60-year-old woman isolated in her home in the wee hours of night without any warrant of arrest from a court of law?
Thirdly, the law adviser accused the media for keeping themselves busy with the politicians and lectured on upholding some values. If one goes through the media briefings of the law adviser, quite a contrary situation would emerge.
It is the honourable adviser who availed every opportunity to lecture the nation on the quality of a "good politician" and which leaders should be discarded for what reasons, not only a clear overstepping of his brief, but a blatant violation of the oath of office which he solemnly made by affirming: "I will do right to all manner of people according to law, without fear of favour, affection or ill-will."
The soft corner of the current government for a certain political party, which has had quite a dishonourable past, including the immediate past, when it was a strident voice for the January 22 elections, has been revealed clearly. The general secretary of that party was allowed to leave the country while a former PM was not allowed to go out of the country although cases of similar nature were lodged against both of them. This list could go on.
Fourthly, "selectivity and political motivation" of the government actions have been so much self-evident as it seems that Sheikh Hasina was the immediate past PM and her government was responsible for the most despicable governance this country has ever experienced, her party colleagues were the ones responsible for reckless looting and plundering national wealth in the last five years, and that her political alliance's "irresponsible acts" led to the declaration of emergency.
This sort of selectivity has created rooms for speculations that have led the political analysts to put forward hypotheses, regrettably, not very much in conformity with the well meaning intention of the January 11 takeover.
It is an open fact that it is the credibility of the armed forces of the country that is at stake in the success and failure of this government. God forbid, if its mission plunges in disarray, as has been apprehended by the law adviser, it is the leaders of the armed forces who will have to bear the brunt.
The advisers neither have any election mandate nor any constituency to lean onto. They might share the credit, if any, but do not have to partake the burden of failures since they are virtually no one so far as the people of the country are concerned. #
Dr. Mozammel H. Khan is the Convenor of the Canadian Committee for Human Rights and Democracy in Bangladesh
This article was first published in Daily Star, DhakaAugust 6, 2007
http://www.thedailystar.net/2007/08/06/d708061502133.htm
Saturday, August 04, 2007
Un-con-sti-tu-tion-al
Bangladesh’s interim government is becoming more illegal by the day
MOHAMMAD AMJAD HOSSAIN
AFTER 36 years of existence, the sacrifices made by hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshis for the freedom of their country have gone in vain. The people of Bangladesh fought a bloody war against the Pakistan Army in the name of freedom, equality, justice, humanity and a society free of exploitation. But Bangladesh has not attained the dream for which so many laid down their lives in 1971. As the current interim administration in Dhaka digs itself further into unconstitutional muck, this realisation becomes starker by the day.
Against January’s backdrop of political violence and increasing frustration, the imposition of emergency was initially welcomed. Optimism as stoked by a series of praiseworthy actions by the newly appointed government, particularly the crackdown on corruption in Bangladesh’s political and business circles. But alas! Though it promised much at first, the interim government has essentially followed in the footsteps of past governments, particularly in its casual dismissal of constitutional provisions on governance.
The first problem is the current administration’s understanding of the term interim. The institution of the non-party caretaker government, vested with the specific responsibility of overseeing the impartial handover of power from one administration to the next, entered Bangladesh’s Constitution in 1996. Article 126 of the Constitution mandates that the government must hold elections within 90 days of the dissolution of the previous Parliament. Article 58 B(1) says that the interim government must relinquish its power as soon as the new Parliament is constituted and a prime minister elected. All previous caretaker governments since 1991 conducted elections within the stipulated 90-day window. This is the first time that such an administration has failed to do so, and is instead working to maintain its own position. But by the end of July, it had been in power for almost exactly 200 days.
The caretaker administration’s three-month window expired on 12 April. On that day, Chief Advisor Fakhruddin Ahmed declared that elections could not be held before the country’s endemic political corruption was tackled; he included only the vaguest mention of this being a possibility by the end of 2008. In mid-July, this push-back date was finally confirmed by newly appointed Chief Election Commissioner Shamsul Huda. A second problem, given the government’s reluctance to conduct elections in the near future, is that Iajuddin Ahmed was elected president on 6 September 2002 for a period of five years. His term will expire in September of this year. If elections are not conducted before then, further political confusion will emerge.
A third difficulty in the current situation is the mechanism of the emergency ordinance promulgated on 11 January, the day before Fakhruddin Ahmed assumed his position as Chief Advisor. Bangladesh’s Constitution dictates that an ordinance declaring a state of emergency requires the approval of the prime minister. But the Chief Advisor, who enjoys the status of prime minister under the caretaker government, was appointed only after the ordinance was put in place. This state of emergency has subsequently suffered from a major constitutional flaw from the very start. Furthermore, given that the Constitution stipulates that any state of emergency will end after 120 days, the emergency expired on 13 May.
Interestingly, the government has made no attempt to extend the emergency ordinance, instead continuing to function as if it has not lapsed.
No opposition
Fakhruddin Ahmed’s administration is mandated with the task of carrying out ‘routine’ functions, and arranging for elections to take place as soon as possible. But far from concentrating on creating an atmosphere conducive to elections, the interim government has made significant policy decisions, such as the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, in particular in the financial sector. Meanwhile, extrajudicial killings by the army and police have caused considerable concern, as has the arrest of hundreds of people without due process of law.
It is disconcerting that, despite all of this, civil society in Bangladesh has remained almost completely silent about the illegality of the caretaker government’s rule and the role of the military in backing the administration. At the time of writing, no one had approached the courts to lodge a case. Those who might have done so are undoubtedly afraid of harassment or worse – trepidation that has been heightened by the 16 July arrest of Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina, one of the very few to have raised the issue of the regime’s unconstitutionality.
Given the various problems of its legitimacy, the interim administration will need to adopt one of two alternatives if it is to save its political skin. First, it could declare martial law, and bring the defence forces into overt politics. Second, it could suspend or abrogate the Constitution. Currently, there is a growing perception that the army might indeed take over direct power in Dhaka. While none currently appear ready to stand in its way, there is ultimately little doubt as to whether the people of Bangladesh, given past experience, would accept military rule. #
This article was first published in HIMAL Southasian magazine, Kathmandu, August 2007
View express in the article is exclusively of the author and not of DurDesh.net
http://himalmag.com/2007/august/bangladesh_government_amjad_hossain.htm
MOHAMMAD AMJAD HOSSAIN
AFTER 36 years of existence, the sacrifices made by hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshis for the freedom of their country have gone in vain. The people of Bangladesh fought a bloody war against the Pakistan Army in the name of freedom, equality, justice, humanity and a society free of exploitation. But Bangladesh has not attained the dream for which so many laid down their lives in 1971. As the current interim administration in Dhaka digs itself further into unconstitutional muck, this realisation becomes starker by the day.
Against January’s backdrop of political violence and increasing frustration, the imposition of emergency was initially welcomed. Optimism as stoked by a series of praiseworthy actions by the newly appointed government, particularly the crackdown on corruption in Bangladesh’s political and business circles. But alas! Though it promised much at first, the interim government has essentially followed in the footsteps of past governments, particularly in its casual dismissal of constitutional provisions on governance.
The first problem is the current administration’s understanding of the term interim. The institution of the non-party caretaker government, vested with the specific responsibility of overseeing the impartial handover of power from one administration to the next, entered Bangladesh’s Constitution in 1996. Article 126 of the Constitution mandates that the government must hold elections within 90 days of the dissolution of the previous Parliament. Article 58 B(1) says that the interim government must relinquish its power as soon as the new Parliament is constituted and a prime minister elected. All previous caretaker governments since 1991 conducted elections within the stipulated 90-day window. This is the first time that such an administration has failed to do so, and is instead working to maintain its own position. But by the end of July, it had been in power for almost exactly 200 days.
The caretaker administration’s three-month window expired on 12 April. On that day, Chief Advisor Fakhruddin Ahmed declared that elections could not be held before the country’s endemic political corruption was tackled; he included only the vaguest mention of this being a possibility by the end of 2008. In mid-July, this push-back date was finally confirmed by newly appointed Chief Election Commissioner Shamsul Huda. A second problem, given the government’s reluctance to conduct elections in the near future, is that Iajuddin Ahmed was elected president on 6 September 2002 for a period of five years. His term will expire in September of this year. If elections are not conducted before then, further political confusion will emerge.
A third difficulty in the current situation is the mechanism of the emergency ordinance promulgated on 11 January, the day before Fakhruddin Ahmed assumed his position as Chief Advisor. Bangladesh’s Constitution dictates that an ordinance declaring a state of emergency requires the approval of the prime minister. But the Chief Advisor, who enjoys the status of prime minister under the caretaker government, was appointed only after the ordinance was put in place. This state of emergency has subsequently suffered from a major constitutional flaw from the very start. Furthermore, given that the Constitution stipulates that any state of emergency will end after 120 days, the emergency expired on 13 May.
Interestingly, the government has made no attempt to extend the emergency ordinance, instead continuing to function as if it has not lapsed.
No opposition
Fakhruddin Ahmed’s administration is mandated with the task of carrying out ‘routine’ functions, and arranging for elections to take place as soon as possible. But far from concentrating on creating an atmosphere conducive to elections, the interim government has made significant policy decisions, such as the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, in particular in the financial sector. Meanwhile, extrajudicial killings by the army and police have caused considerable concern, as has the arrest of hundreds of people without due process of law.
It is disconcerting that, despite all of this, civil society in Bangladesh has remained almost completely silent about the illegality of the caretaker government’s rule and the role of the military in backing the administration. At the time of writing, no one had approached the courts to lodge a case. Those who might have done so are undoubtedly afraid of harassment or worse – trepidation that has been heightened by the 16 July arrest of Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina, one of the very few to have raised the issue of the regime’s unconstitutionality.
Given the various problems of its legitimacy, the interim administration will need to adopt one of two alternatives if it is to save its political skin. First, it could declare martial law, and bring the defence forces into overt politics. Second, it could suspend or abrogate the Constitution. Currently, there is a growing perception that the army might indeed take over direct power in Dhaka. While none currently appear ready to stand in its way, there is ultimately little doubt as to whether the people of Bangladesh, given past experience, would accept military rule. #
This article was first published in HIMAL Southasian magazine, Kathmandu, August 2007
View express in the article is exclusively of the author and not of DurDesh.net
http://himalmag.com/2007/august/bangladesh_government_amjad_hossain.htm
Friday, August 03, 2007
Bangladesh: Protecting Rights as Vital as Ending Corruption
Mr. Fakhruddin Ahmed
Chief Advisor
Government of
Re: Human Rights Situation in
Dear Chief Advisor:
WHEN your caretaker government was established in
Your government has taken some strong initiatives to clean up corruption and hold political and business leaders accountable for their actions. Measures to reform the civil service and bureaucracy have been welcomed by many Bangladeshis, though we caution that due process for civil servants must be observed. And, unlike the previous government, you have made it clear that you will not tolerate or condone the actions of violent militants.
However, we are deeply concerned that the laudable goals of fighting corruption and reforming the political system are not being matched by efforts to protect human rights. Serious and systemic human rights abuses are taking place on your watch. Many of these, such as torture and feigned “crossfire killings,” were serious problems before you took office and continue today. Others, such as emergency rules that do not respect basic due process rights, or the large number of arbitrary arrests and detention without proper judicial oversight or public accountability, are a direct result of your government’s policies.
Since your administration took over, torture of persons in the custody of the security forces has continued to be routine. Many people have died in custody in unexplained circumstances. Your government has not put into place the most basic safeguards to ensure proper independent access to places of detention, requiring all persons to be held in official places of detention, and establishing a process whereby independent investigations are routinely undertaken when deaths in custody occur.
The joint forces, led by the army, have shown almost complete disregard for established legal norms conducting arrests and holding people in detention. Instead of being brought immediately before a magistrate, detainees are routinely taken to army barracks and other unofficial places of detention and tortured, both as punishment and to force them to sign confessions. Many people are being picked up in the middle of the night without warrant. Led by
Bangladeshi civil society and the media, which have often been celebrated in the past for courage and freedom, are under severe threat. Activists and journalists have been summoned by members of the army, particularly those claiming to be members of the DGFI, and threatened. Many have been silenced for fear of arbitrary arrest because they know of other cases of arbitrary detention, torture, and death.
We are particularly concerned because the rule of law appears to be breaking down under your administration. Under the emergency laws, the right to bail and the right to appeal are routinely denied. Court decisions are regularly ignored.
Illegal acts by the security forces are being enabled by the sweeping emergency rules your administration has put in place, which are being misused on a daily basis by the armed forces. Under emergency rules that ban protests and limit effective legal remedies, the security forces believe they can commit abuses with impunity.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which
Because the sweeping emergency regulations under the state of emergency now in force do not comply with international requirements and have been misused in practice, we urge you to repeal them immediately. All persons currently detained under the emergency regulations should be charged with a cognizable criminal offense or released. Those mistreated in detention should be able to seek legal remedies through competent authorities.
When challenged about the human rights situation, officials of your government cite the commitment to create a national human rights commission. Creating an independent and competent national human rights commission in accordance with the UN’s Paris Principles on national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights would be an important step, one in which Human Rights Watch would be happy to offer advice. However, a national human rights commission will take years to set up and act effectively. With so many arbitrary arrests, torture and extrajudicial killings, much more has to be done, and without delay (see recommendations below).
We would particularly like to use this opportunity to remind you of the case of journalist Tasneem Khalil, who has worked as a consultant for Human Rights Watch and as a stringer for CNN. On May 11, 2007, Mr. Khalil was taken into custody after midnight by men in plainclothes claiming to be
We have since learned that Mr. Khalil had been held and tortured by the DGFI. The interrogation center Mr. Khalil was taken to is an extension of the DGFI headquarters in
As you know,
In a sense Mr. Khalil was fortunate. He had the advantage of foreign friends, colleagues, and diplomats who were in a position to appeal to your government for help. However, there are thousands now in custody, unable to secure bail and often subjected to torture, who are not so well connected. We do not know who is being tortured at this very minute by DGFI or others, but we do know that it is happening.
We appreciate your personal intervention and that of other government officials to ensure Mr. Khalil’s release and safe exit from the country. But as his case makes clear, arbitrary arrest and detention and torture are a significant problem in
Your government knows who was responsible for Mr. Khalil’s torture – and that of many other victims – where they work, and where the torture centers are located. Your government knows that these are not isolated cases – an untold number of people are being tortured every day. As a matter of basic human decency as well as your obligations under international law, you must act to close down such torture centers without delay. We look forward to public statements from you and members of your government on this subject, as well as action.
We take your government’s claims to be reform-minded seriously. For that reason, you would expect nothing less than to be held to the domestic and international standards that
Specifically, Human Rights Watch urges your government and the armed forces to take steps to protect human rights and follow the rule of law by:
Immediately repealing the emergency regulations under the state of emergency and restoring fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution.
Charging or releasing those detained and give them access to legal counsel and family members.
Restoring the right to petition for bail and challenge detentions.
Using only official places of detention and end the use of irregular sites, such as the one maintained by DGFI, to prevent torture.
Ensuring that those whose rights have been violated have an effective remedy before competent authorities.
Allowing access by independent monitors to all places of detention.
Prosecuting members of the army, RAB, police and other government officials responsible for human rights violations.
While some in your government claim that the human rights situation is no worse than under the previous democratically elected government, I’m sure you will agree that this is not an appropriate standard. You and your colleagues have chosen to lead the government. We are certain that you did not take your positions in order to preside over a government and security forces that routinely abuse human rights, but that is the reality in
It is now your responsibility to ensure that the rights of all persons in
Thank you for your consideration. We would be pleased to meet with you and appropriate officials in your government to address these matters further.
Yours sincerely,
Brad Adams
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Related Material
Press Release, May 11, 2007
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/08/01/bangla16556.htm
Press Release, January 25, 2007
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/05/11/bangla15906.htm
Judge, Jury, and Executioner: Torture and Extrajudicial Killings by
Report, December 14, 2006
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2007/01/25/bangla15182.htm
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/bangladesh1206
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From: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/08/01/bangla16556.htm
© Copyright 2003, Human Rights Watch
Tuesday, July 31, 2007
Cosying up to the Bangla generals
Civil-rights and other abuses notwithstanding, New Delhi is looking at the current situation in Bangladesh with great interest – and actually hope.WASBIR HUSSAIN
AFTER years of turbulent relations, it is ironic that New Delhi is currently basking in a sense of reassurance over the possibility of good-neighbourly relations with Bangladesh, with the army-backed interim government appearing to be firmly in place in Dhaka. Since it took over in January, the tenor of statements emanating from the highest levels in the interim administration have enthused New Delhi for a variety of reasons. In particular, Indian diplomats and security officials have expressed approval for Dhaka’s crackdown on ‘terror’.
Indeed, hopes have been stoked in the Indian establishment that the interim government headed by Fakhruddin Ahmed, a former banker, will eventually take the long-awaited steps that could choke off the insurgents from Northeast India, whom New Delhi is convinced are taking refuge across the border in Bangladesh. But there are also hopes that the current administration in Dhaka will energise Indo-Bangladeshi ties that have been at a low over the past decade. In particular, this could translate into creating an atmosphere of trust and goodwill to boost mutually beneficial economic measures.
To optimistic observers, New Delhi and Dhaka have over recent years maintained a hot-and-cold relationship, largely defined by who has been in power in Bangladesh – either the seemingly secular Awami League, or the conservative Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). To a dispassionate observer of South Asian politics, however, India-Bangladesh relations have more specifically been held hostage to the bitter ‘battle of the begums’, between Awami League chief Sheikh Hasina and BNP supremo Khaleda Zia.
Either way, both parties have found it to their benefit to thwart Indian policy. The Awami League early on sought to shake off its pro-India image to please the domestic audience, by not coming out with proactive measures for improving ties with New Delhi. Meanwhile, the BNP, backed by Islamist forces, was able to be significantly more open in its anti-India posturing. Under both parties, New Delhi feels it has received very little cooperation from Dhaka on matters of illegal migration, or shelter for the Northeast insurgents who India says operate out of 200 camps inside Bangladesh. Furthermore, Dhaka has regularly continued to deny India transit facilities from West Bengal through Bangladesh, to service its landlocked northeastern states.
At least on the surface, things have changed significantly since the interim government took over in January and imposed a state of emergency. The army-backed regime called off the 22 January national elections, and has subsequently reconstituted the Anti-Corruption Commission, and arrested close to 200 politicians (and mounting), mostly on graft charges. It has also revived the National Security Council, giving military leaders a platform on which to air their views on governing the country. In the meantime, there has been mounting criticism over human-rights abuses, unconstitutional governance, and clamping down on the media and other bodies urging transparency. But New Delhi seems heartened by the crackdown on militancy, and this may well blind Indian policymakers to a host of problems, the seeds of which are planted in the current bout of activism by its eastern neighbour.
The most ‘reassuring’ signal that the interim government in Dhaka has sent New Delhi came on 30 March, when the authorities executed the most prominent names in Bangladesh’s rising Islamist militancy – chief of the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) Abdur Rahman and his deputy, Siddiqul Islam, alias ‘Bangla Bhai’. With its hands full in Kashmir, India has been extremely wary of the possibility of a new front on its eastern flank, along the 4100-km porous border, particularly in the wake of controversial Western reports that the country was becoming a hub of al-Qaeda-linked Islamist forces.
The 30 March executions were seen as a significant blow to Bangladesh’s first overt militancy campaign, which had rattled the country through a series of coordinated blasts and suicide bombings during 2005. With the BNP-Jamaat alliance government having consistently denied the existence of Islamist militancy in the country, the executions were seen by Delhi as Dhaka’s getting serious about a clear and present danger.
What India can do
Should India cosy up to Dhaka’s new army-backed regime? Some analysts would give an emphatic nod – despite both the strong-arm tactics being employed by the interim administration, and the fact that Dhaka officials have yet to carry out any action against the alleged Northeast-insurgents’ camps. As things stand, the possibility of the Bangladesh Army taking over direct power appears unlikely, particularly given the role its ranks play in lucrative peacekeeping missions. This is all the more reason, then, for India to engage with the interim government, and give it much-needed backing.
The current rulers in Dhaka look set to remain in power for some time, with elections not about to be held for at least a year. Furthermore, the process of comprehensive electoral reforms, including the preparation of the new voters’ list and identity cards for all those above 18 years of age, is yet to begin. This massive exercise, involving between 76 and 80 million voters, is estimated to take at least 12 months to complete. Furthermore, the Bangladesh Army chief, Lieutenant-General Moeen U Ahmed, has vowed no let-up in the hunt for corrupt politicians and militants while the interim government clears the way for a ‘free and fair’ election. That job will be accomplished neither easily nor soon, and so it appears that the army will inevitably carry on ruling Bangladesh by proxy for some time to come.
Aside from keeping contact with the Fakhruddin Ahmed regime, New Delhi must also take into account the possibility that sections from within this interim authority (or a new political force entirely, including fresh faces from the existing political parties) could well come to call the shots during the next elections and beyond – with, perhaps, the backing of the army.
As the larger and more powerful neighbour, India is also in a position to cut some ice with the regime, by taking unilateral, proactive action on a few particular issues. New Delhi can demonstrate its support to Dhaka’s battle against militancy by rounding up Bangladeshi criminal elements who may be operating from India’s border areas. Towards this end, Dhaka has already been regularly furnishing the names of such criminals to Indian officials, just as India has been providing Dhaka with details of Indian militants said to be operating from within Bangladesh.
But the most important area where New Delhi needs to intervene is in correcting the balance of trade between the two countries, which has long been weighted heavily against Bangladesh. In 2001-02, Bangladesh’s exports to India were a meagre USD 50.2 million, while imports from India that year stood at more than USD 1 billion. That trade imbalance continues, with Bangladesh’s exports to India in 2005-06 standing at USD 251.6 million, and imports from India going up to nearly USD 1.8 billion during that period. Part of this process is already underway, and offers an immediate opportunity for the Indian government. Since mid-2006, India has offered duty-free import of seven new items from Bangladesh, and promised to do away with duty on 4200 additional items within three years. New Delhi has also sought a list of all irritants, including non-tariff barriers, that are currently impeding bilateral trade.
During the visit of Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Dhaka on 19 February, the Indian government announced unconditional duty-free access to the import of two million pieces of readymade garments from Bangladesh. With a total investment of USD 389.2 million during the period of 1971 to September 2006, India is ranked as the 12th-largest investor in Bangladesh. Now, hopes are pinned on India’s Tata group to finally negotiate its long-pending three-billion-dollar investment in Bangladesh, for a power station, steel plant and fertiliser unit. Talks were suspended last summer, but in mid-May this year the new Board of Investment executive chairman, Nazrul Islam, said that the government was “close to an agreement with the Tatas”. While these assurances need to be taken to their logical end, under the current circumstances India should also consider extending to Bangladesh a free trade agreement, as it has with Sri Lanka.
Once bilateral economic ties improve, and once Bangladeshis begin to see benefits from concessions given by India, the government in Dhaka would be in a better position to pursue an ‘India-friendly’ policy. As for the other bilateral bone of contention, New Delhi need not even push for transit facilities through Bangladesh at this time. After all, India has recently started a USD 103 million development project on the Sittwe port in Burma and the Kaladan River in Mizoram, bypassing its need to access the Chittagong port. If Dhaka-New Delhi relations improve, the two countries would be in a position to work on a strategy to end the most politically potent issue – economic migration from Bangladesh to India – by focusing on how to jointly improve the economy in Bangladesh.
Being the most dominant of Bangladesh’s neighbours, and a democracy to boot, India cannot for long remain a mute witness to widespread reports of the throttling of democratic values by the army-backed Dhaka regime. Apart from everything else, the test for New Delhi will lie in successfully performing a delicate balancing act: between cosying up to the generals in Dhaka, and warning them of the possible consequences of straying too far from the democratic path. This will be a very difficult undertaking, but the latter cannot be accomplished without the former. #
Wasbir Hussain is a Guwahati-based Political Analyst and Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, India
This article was first published in HIMAL magazine, Kathmandu, July 2007
http://himalmag.com/2007/july/opinion_bangla_generals.htm
Democracy in Peril in Bangladesh
MUCHKUND DUBEY
THE domestic politics of Bangladesh was poised in a delicate position at the beginning of the year 2007. The country was heading towards a general election which was doomed to be a farce. The first caretaker government which, according to the constitutional provision, took over the reins of the government after the expiry of the five-year term of the last elected government of Begum Khaleda Zia, was reconstituted by President Iajuddin Ahmed, following the resignation by a number of members in protest against arbitrary arrests of people in wanton violation of human rights. The reconstituted caretaker government was heavily tilted in favour of the BNP/Jamaat combine. Subsequently this caretaker government was dismissed and the President who had been handpicked for the post by Begum Khaleda Zia and whose allegiance to the BNP was widely known, took over direct control of the government. He decided to go ahead with the elections as scheduled on January 22 in spite of the prolonged agitation, of the Awami League and its allies, for the replacement of the Election Commissioner whose links with the BNP were well-known, and drastic revision in the electoral roll which was heavily rigged. This left the Awami League and its allies no alternative but to announce the boycott of the elections.
In this context, the declaration of emergency, the suspension of the general election and the swearing-in of a new caretaker government on the January 11 came as a great relief to the nation. The head of the caretaker government, Fakhruddin Ahmed, is highly regarded as a person of integrity, probity and quiet efficiency. The campaign launched by the new government to cleanse the Bangladesh society of corruption with a view to creating conditions conducive to holding a free and fair election, evoked widespread support. Senior officials, prominent businessmen and politicians who were initially arrested on charges of corruption and fraud came from the entire range of the political spectrum of the country. This went towards confirming the impartiality and objectivity of the new government. Some of the big-ticket arrests like that of Tareq Zia, the eldest son of Begum Khaleda Zia, and the punitive action taken against some extremist religious leaders proved to be popular and gladdened the heart of the liberal forces in the country.
When Professor Mohammad Yunus, the noted Bangladeshi economist who was last year awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, announced his intention to float a party of his own for contesting the next election, it was universally seen as a step taken under the sponsorship of the caretaker government. Some intellectuals and leaders of civil society organisations enthusiastically welcomed Yunus’s initiative and agreed to work for him. The leaders of the political parties, however, did not seem to be too concerned because they knew that in the absence of grassroots support and party infrastructure, this initiative was unlikely to go very far.
The people were generally carried away by the euphoria of the early success in the crackdown on corrupt bureaucrats, politicians and businessmen and by a sense of nemesis against those who had held the country to ransom. There were, however, some big question marks about the new caretaker government which unfortunately did not figure prominently in the political debate in Bangladesh. The people did not take too long to discover that the emergency and the associated changes in the political set-up had been manipulated through the intervention of the Bangladesh armed forces, and that the military was exercising a major influence in the running of the government. Moreover, there was an ambivalence regarding the military’s attitude towards the forces of religious extremism. On the one hand, the higher echelons of the military establishment were seen to be capable of perceiving the long-term danger to Bangladesh polity and society posed by these forces. They are also perhaps under the pressure of major economic powers, particularly the USA and EU, to curb these forces. The chances of the military heeding their advice can be rated high because these countries provide the main market for Bangladesh’s principal export, that is, readymade garments, extend financial and technical assistance, and, above all, determine the extent of Bangladesh’s involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, which has emerged as a major source of foreign exchange earnings by the country. On the other hand, over the last few decades there has been considerable accentuation of religious overtones in the training of the Bangladesh Army. It is also believed in some quarters that the Pakistani external intelligence agency, the ISI, through the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence of Bangladesh, exercises considerable influence on the Bangladesh Army. This has the implication of the Army adopting a softer attitude towards the religious extremist forces if not really supporting them.
It should have been clear right from the very beginning that corruption cannot be eliminated by military measures like mass scale arrests, punishment through trials in kangaroo courts and removal from politics of the leaders of major political parties. Corruption is basically a social and political phenomenon and the only means of curbing it is the adoption of measures of social transformation and widespread popular campaign against it at the grassroots level. Besides, history shows that the military breeds its own brand of corruption, at times more pernicious and ubiquitous than civilian corruption.
Finally, though in view of the deep-seated intolerance of the military dictatorship and strong and volatile urge for democracy among the Bangladeshis, the Bangladesh armed forces may have no appetite for a direct control of the government, a slide towards decisive military influence over the government may become irretrievable in the short and medium run.
The recent developments, particularly the arrest of Hasina on July 16 and the issue of a summons to Khaleda Zia to appear in the court on a charge of corruption, raise further questions regarding the intentions of the Bangladesh Army and of the government supported by it, and the future of democracy and liberal values in Bangladesh. There can be little doubt that these actions are a part of the move by the caretaker government to weaken, if not to decimate, the two major political parties and, in any case, remove Hasina and Khaleda Zia from the leadership positions, before the nation goes to the poll. This move should be seen together with the attempt by the government to trigger reforms in these two political parties with the same objective in view. The principal element of the reforms, being considered by both the parties, is to exclude the possibility of any leader holding the post of the chairperson of the party for more than two terms. Some of the other elements are to eliminate dynastical transfer of leadership and introduce internal democracy in the functioning of the parties.
Seen in this light, the charges of extortion against Hasina and corruption against Khaleda Zia appear to be only a frame-up. Moreover, there was no compelling need under the law of the land to arrest Hasina and keep her in custody before the investigation of her case is completed. She is not the type of person who would become a fugitive from law. Nor is she likely to tamper with the evidence being collected against her with the full backing of the Army. The summary rejection of her bail petition was, therefore, astonishing. That the method of her arrest was unsavoury is very well expressed in the statement on the subject issued by Khaleda Zia the day after the arrest. She said: “I am deeply disheartened to see that being an ex-Prime Minister, chief of a political party, daughter of a national leader, and an aged woman as well as a distinguished citizen of the country, she faced a disgraceful and indecent situation in the court premises.” The arrest was more of a design to humiliate and harass her and tarnish the esteem in which she is held by the people, than to make an example of her for the purpose of rooting out corruption. There is no doubt that of late Hasina and Khaleda Zia have become unpopular in the country except among their loyalists, because they are seen as a symbol of dynastical rule which they are determined to perpetuate, and because of their sordid record of holding the Bangladesh economy and democracy to ransom through frequent hartals and prolonged boycotts of Parliament. The major powers exercising influence in Bangladesh would also like these leaders eased out of politics because of the same reasons.
But it should be realised that the evils which these leaders have come to symbolise are not going to disappear simply by removing them from their positions in their political parties. For, these problems are too deep-rooted in the society and polity of Bangladesh to be amenable to solution by the quick-fix simplistic approach of removing these two leaders. The next rung of politicians in these political parties who would assume leadership after the exit of Hasina and Khaleda Zia, are dyed in the same wool as these two leaders. They may not have inherited leadership on the qualification of dynasty as Hasina and Khaleda Zia have done, but as the example of Indian politics shows, dynastical political inheritance and chronyism prevails pervasively at all the rungs of political leadership in most South Asian countries. Besides, some of the leaders spearheading internal reforms in the Awami League and BNP are not known to be free from the temptation of corruption.
The caretaker government should realise that beyond a point, the action being taken by them against Hasina and Khaleda Zia can prove counter-productive. The arrest of Hasina has already evoked widespread sympathy for her in Bangladesh and abroad and washed some of her presumed sins. The Awami League leaders have for the time being closed their ranks and decided to suspend all reform initiatives until Hasina is released. This has also lowered not only the caretaker government’s but also Bangladesh’s image abroad and has dented the popular support for the caretaker government.
In some of the comments on the functioning of the caretaker government, questions have been raised regarding its attitude towards religious extremist elements. In recent months, the government does not seem to have moved visibly and decisively against these elements. Some of the leaders of extremist religious groups against whom cases of murder are pending, are yet to be arrested. One of the reasons given for lesser activism with regard to dealing with these elements may be that they are relatively less corrupt than leaders belonging to the mainstream political parties. It is also possible that in the Bangladesh society, there may be greater tolerance for religious extremism than for corruption, which may come in the way of a severe crackdown against such forces. However, it should be realised that religious fanatics, though less corrupt, are more dangerous in that they are the purveyors of much of the violence that takes place in the society and because of their link with global terrorist groups. They also pose a greater threat to social cohesion, peace and progress than corrupt politicians.
THE recent political developments in Bangladesh have raised serious questions regarding the future of democracy and liberal values in this country. Going by the schedule of the elections recently announced by the government, it is going to be two years before democracy can be expected to be restored in Bangladesh. This is too long a hiatus in the democratic process. Surely, the revision of the electoral rolls should not take as long as two years.
Cleansing Bangladesh’s politics of corrupt elements in order to pave the way for holding free and fair elections is an open-ended goal the fulfilment of which can take years. This may be used for further extending the life of the caretaker government. Moreover, democracy of the kind that was prevalent in Bangladesh until recently cannot be rebuilt on the debris of the existing major political parties. The alternative arrangement under which the next elections are expected to be held, may very well turn out to be a mockery of democracy. A likely scenario is that the government that would come to power after the election would continue to remain military-backed and controlled, with the difference that the present set of caretakers would be replaced by a new set of “caretakers”, belonging to the sanitised Awami League or the BNP or a new political formation that may be created for this purpose. Such a government may not be averse to and may, in fact, be obliged to seek the support of the Jamaat and other religious elements to remain in power. This kind of government may continue for several years until it is brought down by popular resistance and movement, which would indeed be an uphill task entailing widespread strife and turmoil and tremendous sacrifice by the people.
WHAT should be the attitude of India towards the developments in Bangladesh? On Hasina’s arrest, the Government of India has taken the right stand in urging that “basic human rights should be fully respected in such high profile cases and there should be no violation of the due legal process”. This stand is not very different from that taken by the United States whose representative, in his statement after the event, underscored the general principle that everyone has the right of fair trial and self-defence, and underlined that the cases against Hasina should be dealt with according to the existing laws.
But what is at stake for India in Bangladesh is not the personal safety or the future political role of Hasina or Khaleda Zia but the fate of democracy and of the values which the Indian state stands for. Prospects in this regard do not appear to be bright. In any event, they are highly uncertain. Besides, India has little leverage to persuade the Bangladesh Government to desist from pursuing some of its misconceived notions and plans of how democracy should be restored in Bangladesh, and to hold free and fair elections earlier than scheduled.
Nevertheless, India should convey its concern to the Bangladesh Government in no uncertain terms, but in a proper diplomatic manner whenever there is an opportunity to do so. In any event, India should not give the impression that the caretaker government has India’s support for what it is doing. One gets the impression that some sections of the policy-makers in the Government of India believe that it is possible to do business with the present government in Bangladesh and get decisions taken on issues of concern to India on which no headway had been possible with the governments headed by Hasina or Khaleda Zia. This assessment is misplaced and the sooner it is given up the better it will be for all concerned. The present government in Bangladesh is hardly in a position to muster the courage needed for taking decisions on pending Indo-Bangladesh issues, like handing over ULFA militants who have taken shelter in Bangladesh, granting India transit facilities for its goods to move to other parts of the country through the territory of Bangladesh, and entering into long term arrangement in the energy field. The military is bound to be deeply divided on these issues. Besides, the present Bangladesh Government is too embroiled in domestic political problems to be able to devote the kind of time, attention and energy that is required for resolving these problems with India. #
Muchkund Dubey is a former Foreign Secretary of India & served as High Commissioner to Bangladesh in 1982
This article was first published in Mainstream magazine (VOL XLV, No 32) on 29 July 2007
http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article253.html
THE domestic politics of Bangladesh was poised in a delicate position at the beginning of the year 2007. The country was heading towards a general election which was doomed to be a farce. The first caretaker government which, according to the constitutional provision, took over the reins of the government after the expiry of the five-year term of the last elected government of Begum Khaleda Zia, was reconstituted by President Iajuddin Ahmed, following the resignation by a number of members in protest against arbitrary arrests of people in wanton violation of human rights. The reconstituted caretaker government was heavily tilted in favour of the BNP/Jamaat combine. Subsequently this caretaker government was dismissed and the President who had been handpicked for the post by Begum Khaleda Zia and whose allegiance to the BNP was widely known, took over direct control of the government. He decided to go ahead with the elections as scheduled on January 22 in spite of the prolonged agitation, of the Awami League and its allies, for the replacement of the Election Commissioner whose links with the BNP were well-known, and drastic revision in the electoral roll which was heavily rigged. This left the Awami League and its allies no alternative but to announce the boycott of the elections.
In this context, the declaration of emergency, the suspension of the general election and the swearing-in of a new caretaker government on the January 11 came as a great relief to the nation. The head of the caretaker government, Fakhruddin Ahmed, is highly regarded as a person of integrity, probity and quiet efficiency. The campaign launched by the new government to cleanse the Bangladesh society of corruption with a view to creating conditions conducive to holding a free and fair election, evoked widespread support. Senior officials, prominent businessmen and politicians who were initially arrested on charges of corruption and fraud came from the entire range of the political spectrum of the country. This went towards confirming the impartiality and objectivity of the new government. Some of the big-ticket arrests like that of Tareq Zia, the eldest son of Begum Khaleda Zia, and the punitive action taken against some extremist religious leaders proved to be popular and gladdened the heart of the liberal forces in the country.
When Professor Mohammad Yunus, the noted Bangladeshi economist who was last year awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, announced his intention to float a party of his own for contesting the next election, it was universally seen as a step taken under the sponsorship of the caretaker government. Some intellectuals and leaders of civil society organisations enthusiastically welcomed Yunus’s initiative and agreed to work for him. The leaders of the political parties, however, did not seem to be too concerned because they knew that in the absence of grassroots support and party infrastructure, this initiative was unlikely to go very far.
The people were generally carried away by the euphoria of the early success in the crackdown on corrupt bureaucrats, politicians and businessmen and by a sense of nemesis against those who had held the country to ransom. There were, however, some big question marks about the new caretaker government which unfortunately did not figure prominently in the political debate in Bangladesh. The people did not take too long to discover that the emergency and the associated changes in the political set-up had been manipulated through the intervention of the Bangladesh armed forces, and that the military was exercising a major influence in the running of the government. Moreover, there was an ambivalence regarding the military’s attitude towards the forces of religious extremism. On the one hand, the higher echelons of the military establishment were seen to be capable of perceiving the long-term danger to Bangladesh polity and society posed by these forces. They are also perhaps under the pressure of major economic powers, particularly the USA and EU, to curb these forces. The chances of the military heeding their advice can be rated high because these countries provide the main market for Bangladesh’s principal export, that is, readymade garments, extend financial and technical assistance, and, above all, determine the extent of Bangladesh’s involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, which has emerged as a major source of foreign exchange earnings by the country. On the other hand, over the last few decades there has been considerable accentuation of religious overtones in the training of the Bangladesh Army. It is also believed in some quarters that the Pakistani external intelligence agency, the ISI, through the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence of Bangladesh, exercises considerable influence on the Bangladesh Army. This has the implication of the Army adopting a softer attitude towards the religious extremist forces if not really supporting them.
It should have been clear right from the very beginning that corruption cannot be eliminated by military measures like mass scale arrests, punishment through trials in kangaroo courts and removal from politics of the leaders of major political parties. Corruption is basically a social and political phenomenon and the only means of curbing it is the adoption of measures of social transformation and widespread popular campaign against it at the grassroots level. Besides, history shows that the military breeds its own brand of corruption, at times more pernicious and ubiquitous than civilian corruption.
Finally, though in view of the deep-seated intolerance of the military dictatorship and strong and volatile urge for democracy among the Bangladeshis, the Bangladesh armed forces may have no appetite for a direct control of the government, a slide towards decisive military influence over the government may become irretrievable in the short and medium run.
The recent developments, particularly the arrest of Hasina on July 16 and the issue of a summons to Khaleda Zia to appear in the court on a charge of corruption, raise further questions regarding the intentions of the Bangladesh Army and of the government supported by it, and the future of democracy and liberal values in Bangladesh. There can be little doubt that these actions are a part of the move by the caretaker government to weaken, if not to decimate, the two major political parties and, in any case, remove Hasina and Khaleda Zia from the leadership positions, before the nation goes to the poll. This move should be seen together with the attempt by the government to trigger reforms in these two political parties with the same objective in view. The principal element of the reforms, being considered by both the parties, is to exclude the possibility of any leader holding the post of the chairperson of the party for more than two terms. Some of the other elements are to eliminate dynastical transfer of leadership and introduce internal democracy in the functioning of the parties.
Seen in this light, the charges of extortion against Hasina and corruption against Khaleda Zia appear to be only a frame-up. Moreover, there was no compelling need under the law of the land to arrest Hasina and keep her in custody before the investigation of her case is completed. She is not the type of person who would become a fugitive from law. Nor is she likely to tamper with the evidence being collected against her with the full backing of the Army. The summary rejection of her bail petition was, therefore, astonishing. That the method of her arrest was unsavoury is very well expressed in the statement on the subject issued by Khaleda Zia the day after the arrest. She said: “I am deeply disheartened to see that being an ex-Prime Minister, chief of a political party, daughter of a national leader, and an aged woman as well as a distinguished citizen of the country, she faced a disgraceful and indecent situation in the court premises.” The arrest was more of a design to humiliate and harass her and tarnish the esteem in which she is held by the people, than to make an example of her for the purpose of rooting out corruption. There is no doubt that of late Hasina and Khaleda Zia have become unpopular in the country except among their loyalists, because they are seen as a symbol of dynastical rule which they are determined to perpetuate, and because of their sordid record of holding the Bangladesh economy and democracy to ransom through frequent hartals and prolonged boycotts of Parliament. The major powers exercising influence in Bangladesh would also like these leaders eased out of politics because of the same reasons.
But it should be realised that the evils which these leaders have come to symbolise are not going to disappear simply by removing them from their positions in their political parties. For, these problems are too deep-rooted in the society and polity of Bangladesh to be amenable to solution by the quick-fix simplistic approach of removing these two leaders. The next rung of politicians in these political parties who would assume leadership after the exit of Hasina and Khaleda Zia, are dyed in the same wool as these two leaders. They may not have inherited leadership on the qualification of dynasty as Hasina and Khaleda Zia have done, but as the example of Indian politics shows, dynastical political inheritance and chronyism prevails pervasively at all the rungs of political leadership in most South Asian countries. Besides, some of the leaders spearheading internal reforms in the Awami League and BNP are not known to be free from the temptation of corruption.
The caretaker government should realise that beyond a point, the action being taken by them against Hasina and Khaleda Zia can prove counter-productive. The arrest of Hasina has already evoked widespread sympathy for her in Bangladesh and abroad and washed some of her presumed sins. The Awami League leaders have for the time being closed their ranks and decided to suspend all reform initiatives until Hasina is released. This has also lowered not only the caretaker government’s but also Bangladesh’s image abroad and has dented the popular support for the caretaker government.
In some of the comments on the functioning of the caretaker government, questions have been raised regarding its attitude towards religious extremist elements. In recent months, the government does not seem to have moved visibly and decisively against these elements. Some of the leaders of extremist religious groups against whom cases of murder are pending, are yet to be arrested. One of the reasons given for lesser activism with regard to dealing with these elements may be that they are relatively less corrupt than leaders belonging to the mainstream political parties. It is also possible that in the Bangladesh society, there may be greater tolerance for religious extremism than for corruption, which may come in the way of a severe crackdown against such forces. However, it should be realised that religious fanatics, though less corrupt, are more dangerous in that they are the purveyors of much of the violence that takes place in the society and because of their link with global terrorist groups. They also pose a greater threat to social cohesion, peace and progress than corrupt politicians.
THE recent political developments in Bangladesh have raised serious questions regarding the future of democracy and liberal values in this country. Going by the schedule of the elections recently announced by the government, it is going to be two years before democracy can be expected to be restored in Bangladesh. This is too long a hiatus in the democratic process. Surely, the revision of the electoral rolls should not take as long as two years.
Cleansing Bangladesh’s politics of corrupt elements in order to pave the way for holding free and fair elections is an open-ended goal the fulfilment of which can take years. This may be used for further extending the life of the caretaker government. Moreover, democracy of the kind that was prevalent in Bangladesh until recently cannot be rebuilt on the debris of the existing major political parties. The alternative arrangement under which the next elections are expected to be held, may very well turn out to be a mockery of democracy. A likely scenario is that the government that would come to power after the election would continue to remain military-backed and controlled, with the difference that the present set of caretakers would be replaced by a new set of “caretakers”, belonging to the sanitised Awami League or the BNP or a new political formation that may be created for this purpose. Such a government may not be averse to and may, in fact, be obliged to seek the support of the Jamaat and other religious elements to remain in power. This kind of government may continue for several years until it is brought down by popular resistance and movement, which would indeed be an uphill task entailing widespread strife and turmoil and tremendous sacrifice by the people.
WHAT should be the attitude of India towards the developments in Bangladesh? On Hasina’s arrest, the Government of India has taken the right stand in urging that “basic human rights should be fully respected in such high profile cases and there should be no violation of the due legal process”. This stand is not very different from that taken by the United States whose representative, in his statement after the event, underscored the general principle that everyone has the right of fair trial and self-defence, and underlined that the cases against Hasina should be dealt with according to the existing laws.
But what is at stake for India in Bangladesh is not the personal safety or the future political role of Hasina or Khaleda Zia but the fate of democracy and of the values which the Indian state stands for. Prospects in this regard do not appear to be bright. In any event, they are highly uncertain. Besides, India has little leverage to persuade the Bangladesh Government to desist from pursuing some of its misconceived notions and plans of how democracy should be restored in Bangladesh, and to hold free and fair elections earlier than scheduled.
Nevertheless, India should convey its concern to the Bangladesh Government in no uncertain terms, but in a proper diplomatic manner whenever there is an opportunity to do so. In any event, India should not give the impression that the caretaker government has India’s support for what it is doing. One gets the impression that some sections of the policy-makers in the Government of India believe that it is possible to do business with the present government in Bangladesh and get decisions taken on issues of concern to India on which no headway had been possible with the governments headed by Hasina or Khaleda Zia. This assessment is misplaced and the sooner it is given up the better it will be for all concerned. The present government in Bangladesh is hardly in a position to muster the courage needed for taking decisions on pending Indo-Bangladesh issues, like handing over ULFA militants who have taken shelter in Bangladesh, granting India transit facilities for its goods to move to other parts of the country through the territory of Bangladesh, and entering into long term arrangement in the energy field. The military is bound to be deeply divided on these issues. Besides, the present Bangladesh Government is too embroiled in domestic political problems to be able to devote the kind of time, attention and energy that is required for resolving these problems with India. #
Muchkund Dubey is a former Foreign Secretary of India & served as High Commissioner to Bangladesh in 1982
This article was first published in Mainstream magazine (VOL XLV, No 32) on 29 July 2007
http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article253.html
Monday, July 30, 2007
Institutionalising Military into Politics
Ominous sign for democracy and political institution
It is ironical that, when one of the most institutionalised military establishments in the world, the Turkish army, under pressure from the European Union, is relinquishing its authority to elected representatives, the issue of institutionalising the military in the political process is surfacing in Bangladesh.
ABM NASIR
ON the first day of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Israeli air attack completely destroyed Egyptian air defence system. A large part of the Egyptian air force was destroyed on the ground and the rest incapacitated. It was no surprise attack. A few days back, the then Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, had warned the high command of Egyptian military officials of the imminent Israeli air strike. The high command simply failed to act upon the warning. Among two most important reasons often cited in the literature of the Arab-Israeli conflict about the fiasco of the Egyptian military are the transfer of 300 senior military officials to civilian positions and institutionalisation of the Egyptian army in the political process. The transfer, in some cases to get rid of unreliable officials and in other cases to reward the protégés of Nasser with more comfortable jobs of senior officials, dealt a severe blow to the efficiency of the Egyptian armed forces, whereas institutionalisation of the Egyptian military into politics left a force beset with constant bickering for the power pie, with highly corrupt officials and demoralised soldiers. The final outcome of the war was the defeat of the Arab allies to a smaller but more efficient Israeli defence force under the command of an elected government.
The debacle of the Arab coalition in the 1973 war clearly indicates how politicisation of military and relocation of military officials to civilian positions may lead to serious problems during a national crisis like war. It further indicates that despite having a greater military power, a politically ambitious military with lack of professionalism may itself pose a serious threat to the national security of a country.
A previous article of this author (‘The emergence of the tyranny of a non-political status quo’, New Age, July 21) indicated that the current political crisis in Bangladesh is the upshot of a conflict between the syndicates of political parties and non-political establishments. But, the current reform process seems to be completely oblivious to this important aspect of the crisis. Instead, it appears to be selectively downgrading the political parties to a lower hierarchy in the political power game while systematically creating power bases for the syndicates of the military establishment and other non-political interest groups.
There is no denying that the political leadership was utterly insincere in their efforts, unless forced by popular movements, to create a viable and sustainable political institution. But, the failure of the political leadership shall not justify creating, through selective reforms, a status quo of the military syndicate, which, in the past, through indiscriminate appointments of military officials in the civil administration, also contributed significantly to the current crisis in the governance structure. For example, during the military rule of 1975-1990, two generals, Ziaur Rahman and Hussain Muhammad Ershad, systematically positioned military officials in the civilian administration, violating the warrant of precedence of service rules. Under Zia, army officials occupied the positions of 6 of 20 secretaries, 14 of 20 police superintendents, 10 of 20 corporate directorships and 32 diplomats. Under Ershad, 20 senior administration positions, 14 corporate directorships and two-thirds of the diplomatic positions were occupied by senior army officials (see Stanley Kotchaneck, Patron-Client Politics and Business in Bangladesh, 1993, p.58-63).
All these relocation not only served the interest of the military establishment but also benefited incompetent bureaucrats and sycophants of the military establishment. Subsequently, it turned away talented graduates from civil service jobs, which used to be considered as highly respected positions to hold. Indeed, the nation’s bureaucracy, main organ of the governing process, paralysed through such a systematic violation of service rules that started in 1975, is yet to regain its past stature. Today, the same history seems to be repeating. Military officials are again being posted in important civil administration positions, disregarding future and further debilitating consequences on the governing structure.
The issue of the formation of the National Security Council is yet another attempt to manipulate the political process and institution to the benefits of the military syndicate. On July 10, the chief of army staff, General Moeen U Ahmed, at a seminar organised by the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies and the American Centre, referred to corruption as a national security issue. Corruption is undoubtedly a national issue of utmost importance. But, it is not quite clear from the army chief’s speech how corruption threatens national security. Then again, one can easily find a good analogy of tying national security with political ambition in the Bush administration’s use of the national security issue to enter a pre-emptive war against Iraq, which the majority of American people now oppose, and Pakistani dictator Pervez Musharraf’s abuse of the national security issue to justify his military rule. Similarly, the army chief’s statement is an attempt to convince the people of the importance of the military’s role in the political process through the formation of the National Security Council, which, by the way, is supposed to deal with threats against the sovereignty of the country.
Recent statements of the law and communication advisers to the interim government in the media only reinforce the conviction of this author about the ongoing behind-the-door efforts to institutionalise the military’s role in the political process through the formation of the National Security Council.
It is ironical that, when one of the most institutionalised military establishments in the world, the Turkish army, under pressure from the European Union, is relinquishing its authority to elected representatives, the issue of institutionalising the military in the political process is surfacing in Bangladesh.
No functional democracy authorises military interference in the national political process. For example, the United States National Security Council is dominated by civil administration officials with virtually no decision-making authority of the defence officials. India, which has to live under constant threats of China and Pakistan, two dominant military forces with nuclear capabilities, allows defence officials to serve in the National Security Council only as advisers. Even Israel, the most militaristic democracy in the world, grants the ultimate decision-making authority of the National Security Council to the elected prime minister.
Pakistan, a failed state, perhaps is the only exception to the rule. Pakistani army is virtually the omnipotent guidance for the democratic process in that country. There is speculation that the composition and functions of the National Security Council of Bangladesh are being planned to be modelled on those of Pakistan’s. This possibility raises a set of questions. First, is the proposal, by certain people, of power sharing between the president and the elected prime minister somewhat related to the proposal to have the president lead the National Security Council? Second, will the military have significant decision-making authority in the National Security Council? Third, will the unelected president have the authority to overthrow an elected parliament? (One must remember that two elected Pakistani prime ministers were dismissed by unelected presidents allegedly acting at the behest of the military.) If all the answers are in the affirmative, then it appears that the nation is heading toward a Pakistani style democracy, where power of the elected representatives is subject to the caprice of the military-technocrat oligarchy. And, it would be really unfortunate to see such retrograding of the political institution of Bangladesh in the name of political reforms.
The government must understand that selective reforms would end up making no significant progress in the political institution and competition. Naxalites failed because they waged a wrong war on wrong targets. In the name of wiping out the class system, they tried to eliminate landlords and the outcome was a mutually destructive bloody campaign with many lives lost without any avail to anyone. #
ABM Nasir teaches economics at North Carolina Central University, Durham, North Carolina, US and can be reached at nasnc@yahoo.com
It is ironical that, when one of the most institutionalised military establishments in the world, the Turkish army, under pressure from the European Union, is relinquishing its authority to elected representatives, the issue of institutionalising the military in the political process is surfacing in Bangladesh.
ABM NASIR
ON the first day of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Israeli air attack completely destroyed Egyptian air defence system. A large part of the Egyptian air force was destroyed on the ground and the rest incapacitated. It was no surprise attack. A few days back, the then Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser, had warned the high command of Egyptian military officials of the imminent Israeli air strike. The high command simply failed to act upon the warning. Among two most important reasons often cited in the literature of the Arab-Israeli conflict about the fiasco of the Egyptian military are the transfer of 300 senior military officials to civilian positions and institutionalisation of the Egyptian army in the political process. The transfer, in some cases to get rid of unreliable officials and in other cases to reward the protégés of Nasser with more comfortable jobs of senior officials, dealt a severe blow to the efficiency of the Egyptian armed forces, whereas institutionalisation of the Egyptian military into politics left a force beset with constant bickering for the power pie, with highly corrupt officials and demoralised soldiers. The final outcome of the war was the defeat of the Arab allies to a smaller but more efficient Israeli defence force under the command of an elected government.
The debacle of the Arab coalition in the 1973 war clearly indicates how politicisation of military and relocation of military officials to civilian positions may lead to serious problems during a national crisis like war. It further indicates that despite having a greater military power, a politically ambitious military with lack of professionalism may itself pose a serious threat to the national security of a country.
A previous article of this author (‘The emergence of the tyranny of a non-political status quo’, New Age, July 21) indicated that the current political crisis in Bangladesh is the upshot of a conflict between the syndicates of political parties and non-political establishments. But, the current reform process seems to be completely oblivious to this important aspect of the crisis. Instead, it appears to be selectively downgrading the political parties to a lower hierarchy in the political power game while systematically creating power bases for the syndicates of the military establishment and other non-political interest groups.
There is no denying that the political leadership was utterly insincere in their efforts, unless forced by popular movements, to create a viable and sustainable political institution. But, the failure of the political leadership shall not justify creating, through selective reforms, a status quo of the military syndicate, which, in the past, through indiscriminate appointments of military officials in the civil administration, also contributed significantly to the current crisis in the governance structure. For example, during the military rule of 1975-1990, two generals, Ziaur Rahman and Hussain Muhammad Ershad, systematically positioned military officials in the civilian administration, violating the warrant of precedence of service rules. Under Zia, army officials occupied the positions of 6 of 20 secretaries, 14 of 20 police superintendents, 10 of 20 corporate directorships and 32 diplomats. Under Ershad, 20 senior administration positions, 14 corporate directorships and two-thirds of the diplomatic positions were occupied by senior army officials (see Stanley Kotchaneck, Patron-Client Politics and Business in Bangladesh, 1993, p.58-63).
All these relocation not only served the interest of the military establishment but also benefited incompetent bureaucrats and sycophants of the military establishment. Subsequently, it turned away talented graduates from civil service jobs, which used to be considered as highly respected positions to hold. Indeed, the nation’s bureaucracy, main organ of the governing process, paralysed through such a systematic violation of service rules that started in 1975, is yet to regain its past stature. Today, the same history seems to be repeating. Military officials are again being posted in important civil administration positions, disregarding future and further debilitating consequences on the governing structure.
The issue of the formation of the National Security Council is yet another attempt to manipulate the political process and institution to the benefits of the military syndicate. On July 10, the chief of army staff, General Moeen U Ahmed, at a seminar organised by the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies and the American Centre, referred to corruption as a national security issue. Corruption is undoubtedly a national issue of utmost importance. But, it is not quite clear from the army chief’s speech how corruption threatens national security. Then again, one can easily find a good analogy of tying national security with political ambition in the Bush administration’s use of the national security issue to enter a pre-emptive war against Iraq, which the majority of American people now oppose, and Pakistani dictator Pervez Musharraf’s abuse of the national security issue to justify his military rule. Similarly, the army chief’s statement is an attempt to convince the people of the importance of the military’s role in the political process through the formation of the National Security Council, which, by the way, is supposed to deal with threats against the sovereignty of the country.
Recent statements of the law and communication advisers to the interim government in the media only reinforce the conviction of this author about the ongoing behind-the-door efforts to institutionalise the military’s role in the political process through the formation of the National Security Council.
It is ironical that, when one of the most institutionalised military establishments in the world, the Turkish army, under pressure from the European Union, is relinquishing its authority to elected representatives, the issue of institutionalising the military in the political process is surfacing in Bangladesh.
No functional democracy authorises military interference in the national political process. For example, the United States National Security Council is dominated by civil administration officials with virtually no decision-making authority of the defence officials. India, which has to live under constant threats of China and Pakistan, two dominant military forces with nuclear capabilities, allows defence officials to serve in the National Security Council only as advisers. Even Israel, the most militaristic democracy in the world, grants the ultimate decision-making authority of the National Security Council to the elected prime minister.
Pakistan, a failed state, perhaps is the only exception to the rule. Pakistani army is virtually the omnipotent guidance for the democratic process in that country. There is speculation that the composition and functions of the National Security Council of Bangladesh are being planned to be modelled on those of Pakistan’s. This possibility raises a set of questions. First, is the proposal, by certain people, of power sharing between the president and the elected prime minister somewhat related to the proposal to have the president lead the National Security Council? Second, will the military have significant decision-making authority in the National Security Council? Third, will the unelected president have the authority to overthrow an elected parliament? (One must remember that two elected Pakistani prime ministers were dismissed by unelected presidents allegedly acting at the behest of the military.) If all the answers are in the affirmative, then it appears that the nation is heading toward a Pakistani style democracy, where power of the elected representatives is subject to the caprice of the military-technocrat oligarchy. And, it would be really unfortunate to see such retrograding of the political institution of Bangladesh in the name of political reforms.
The government must understand that selective reforms would end up making no significant progress in the political institution and competition. Naxalites failed because they waged a wrong war on wrong targets. In the name of wiping out the class system, they tried to eliminate landlords and the outcome was a mutually destructive bloody campaign with many lives lost without any avail to anyone. #
ABM Nasir teaches economics at North Carolina Central University, Durham, North Carolina, US and can be reached at nasnc@yahoo.com
Friday, July 27, 2007
Bangladesh’s nonchalant Generals and their Deathly Gallows
SAJJAD JAHIRONLY a little more than two years ago, on the 15th of June 2005 to be precise, General Moeen U. Ahmed became the Bangladesh Chief of Army Staff. Who knew then this general was waiting in the wings to become an ambitious power monger? Who could visualize then he would follow the same path of his guru Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan, who successfully cut the two non-theocratic parties to sizes thus empowering the mulladom? What a historical parallel is being unfolded in Bangladesh by the Pakistani army brass's Bangladeshi junior partners! Without Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif their political parties are nothing short of a boat without a captain. General Moeen knew that at this juncture Hasina less Awami League would be an impotent entity. Similarly a cornered Khaleda Zia will result in simple disintegration of the party.
General Moeen had the audacity to scold whole Bangladehi nation for not paying enough "respect" to the founding father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. He was pointing fingers to the civilian segment of the society. He conveniently forgot that it was the Bangladeshi military that brutally killed Sheikh Mujib, his close relatives, which includes pregnant women and children. The General did not bother to recollect that it was two vile generals, namely, Ziaur Rahman and H.M. Ershad, who very systematically followed a master plan to erase the memory of Sheikh Mujib from the collective psyche of the Bangladeshi people.
General Moeen U. Ahmed blamed the civilian politicians for all the wrong doings that occurred during the last few decades of Bangladesh's existence. His selective memory failed to accommodate one important piece of information. That is, out of the last 36 years since Bangladesh's emergence as a sovereign country, close to 27 years the nation was ruled by Bangladesh army either directly or indirectly. The General can not deny that the outcome of the October 2001 general election brought enough joy to many of the powerful army brass in the Cantonment. Will it be too much of a speculation if someone says, the BNP victory was many generals' wishful thinking?
It is sad to see General Moeen U. Ahmed is showing enough signs of lack of integrity in his public persona. Never had he attempted any degree of self-criticism. May be, self-criticism is not in their lexicon. While he was constantly finger pointing to the corruption epidemic in political circle, never for a single moment he ever uttered any word indicating corruption within the army barracks. It is an open secret, like any social ill, corruption does exist in cantonment in a big way. It is conceivable that many big cheeses in the retired army community became tycoons overnight through illegitimate means. Like any "money grabbing" agency in Bangladesh, Defense Purchasing is an area where corruption has been quite rampant. Can General Moeen deny that?
The military backed current Bangladesh caretaker government's recent drama of prosecuting Sheikh Hasina is the last straw that broke the camel's back. It was an open secret that General Ershad is one of the most corrupt rulers of the country. He remained untouchable to this day. Ironically, a few days before the so-called historical 1/11, this general was indicted by the former regime. Strangely enough, today he remains a free man.
When mullah and military commingle, they make a deadly cocktail. Pakistan is a good example. Ziaul Huq made the country a precursor of a Talibanistic nation. In Bangladesh 's case, Ziaur Rahman and H.M. Ershad started the process of Islamization of once secular nationalist country. When ex-DGFI Chief General Matin says he does not have clue if Jamaatis were corrupt, it gives us enough headache.
The Generals are leading the nation to a deathly gallows, it seems. #
This article was first published in: http://deshivoice.blogspot.com/
Thursday, July 26, 2007
Power Play
Bangladesh’s military-backed government is trying to oust two of the nation’s most prominent politicians. They’re not going quietly.HASSAN SHAHRIAR, Special to Newsweek
Rashed Ahmed / AFP-Getty Images
Hasina’s supporters protest her arrest on extortion charges earlier this month
MORE than 25 years ago, Bangladesh's leading politicians persuaded two housewives to enter the public arena. The women spearheaded agitation, forced a military dictator to quit power and restored parliamentary democracy in their impoverished nation. Then the two arch rivals won elections in popular votes and alternated as prime ministers for more than a decade in the predominantly Muslim country. Now their era of dominance may be coming to an ignominious end.
Khaleda Zia, 62, inherited the political legacy of her slain husband, President Gen. Ziaur Rahman, and Sheikh Hasina, 59, that of her assassinated father, the nation's founding leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Both were top contenders for power in Bangladesh’s next election, scheduled for late 2008. But now both face a permanent exile from politics as even their own supporters accuse them of corruption, cronyism and attempts to establish political dynasties. While both have denied the charges, matters took a new turn with last week’s arrest of Hasina on extortion charges. Hasina is also accused of playing a role in four killings allegedly committed by members of her opposition Awami League during a riot last year.
Hasina’s arrest was the latest step by Bangladesh’s interim military-backed government to force her and Zia out of the country. The seven-month-old caretaker regime, which took charge after 30 people were killed in clashes following the end of Zia's five-year term, has cracked down on corruption and pledged to hold credible elections next year. In recent weeks it has detained more than 170 key political leaders, businessmen and public servants on charges of graft and abuse of power. It has also begun encouraging reformists to challenge Zia and Hasina and patronizing groups that established two new political parties. "[Zia and Hasina] delivered nothing to the nation in [the] last 26 years," says Ataur Rahman, a Dhaka University teacher and president of the Bangladesh Political Science Association. "It is time for them to yield to new leadership.
Hasina argues that the charges against her are false and aimed at keeping her from fighting at the polls. "It's a conspiracy to stop me from speaking for the rights of the people," she told a court that rejected her bail petition and sent her to a makeshift sub-jail last week. "I've done nothing wrong." Hasina's arrest has sparked violent protests and brought strong condemnations from lawyers, teachers, political parties and media. Teachers at Dhaka University—hub of the nation’s political activity—wore black badges and boycotted classes Sunday to protest Hasina's arrest and Zia's harassment. Zia, who is not on speaking term with Hasina, has also condemned the arrest and demanded her release.
Meanwhile, many analysts believe that Zia—currently in virtual confinement at her Dhaka Cantonment house—may be the next to be arrested. The government's anticorruption commission has given the two leaders seven days to submit wealth reports detailing their income and assets. Zia’s elder son, Tarique Rahman, an heir apparent during his mother's reign, is already in jail facing a number of corruption charges. And the election commission is drafting laws to disqualify people from seeking votes if they are convicted on corruption charges.
The big question now is how recent developments could affect Bangladeshi politics in the longer term. One fear: that the instability might give rise to Islamic extremism. Mizanur Rahman Shelley, a social scientist and chairman of the Centre for Development Research, Bangladesh (CDRB), compares the situation with the reign of Iran's Reza Shah Pahlavi, who systematically crushed liberal democrats. "The vacancy was filled slowly but steadily by the extremist religious elements, led by mullahs," notes Shelley. "Towards the end, the Shah had some of the confined nationalist leaders to his aid, but it was too late. The extremists took over."
It is unclear just how much support there is for fundamentalists in Bangladesh. However, there are also fears that the military—which has ruled Bangladesh directly or indirectly for 15 years since it achieved independence from Pakistan in 1971—might consolidate its grip on the country. At present, the generals are simply supporting the civilian caretaker administration, but some Bangladeshis favor setting up a security council to give the military a more formal role in government. "There should be a mechanism so that the military can play its role in policymaking," says Rahman. "There is a need for stabilization of the civil-military relationship." The army chief, Gen. Moeen U. Ahmed, is brushing aside such speculation—for now, at least. "We have no intention to take power," he says. "We are supporting the caretaker government. The security council is not a priority issue." Nonetheless, the general feels that the nation's constitution must be rewritten to maintain a balance of power between the figurehead president and the all-powerful prime minister.
Most Bangladeshis have applauded the government's drive against corruption, but they also have other priorities. One example: they complain that the government has hardly taken any step to control price hikes. "There are high prices, tight monetary measures and economic uncertainty," says Qazi Kholiquzzaman Ahmad, president of the Bangladesh Economic Association. "The government needs to address them quickly on the reality of the grounds, not on any dogma."
There’s also the issue of party politics. Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Hasina's Awami League are bitterly divided. Reformists within the two parties—encouraged by the government—both want to loosen the vise of their leaders by introducing term limits that would end their control. "A lot of damage has been done to our politics," says A. H. Mofazzal Karim, Zia's adviser and a leading reformist. "We should start a new chapter which will not allow repetition of evildoings of the past." Others, however, argue that such attempts can be counterproductive. "The reform will not bring positive results for the country if it is forced on political parties," says Akbar Ali Khan, a former adviser to the caretaker government. "Solutions will not come if only the parties are split in the name of reforms."
Zia herself believes the government wants to break up the two parties, accusing it of failing to act against those trying to oust her and Hasina. "[The government] imposed restrictions on our movements, but [it is] not touching those who are speaking about reforms, she charged during a conference call with leaders of her party's Australian branch Saturday night. "Their only agenda is to split the party." Both Zia and Hasina still command large followings, and their opponents have neither the mass appeal nor the charisma of these dominant figures. But given the government's determination to be rid of them, that won't be enough to keep them in the center of the political stage much longer. #
Hassan Shahriar is Executive Editor of Bangladesh's leading newspaper Dainik Ittefaq, also correspondent for Newsweek magazine. He is current International President of the Commonwealth Journalists Association (CJA). He could be reached shahriar@bangla.net
This article was contribute special to Newsweek and published on July 24, 2007
© 2007 Newsweek, Inc.
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