The Dhaka regime’s messy surgery

WITH the two major political parties forcibly sidelined, who is left to fix a broken polity? The fact that the writer of this article is compelled to remain anonymous is perhaps indicative of the sudden democracy deficit in Dhaka.

Bangladesh’s political orchestra is reaching a crescendo, at least for this passage. What comes next may be a long, deafening silence. As the two political dynasties were made to exit the country, the remonstrations of the two heads were heard far and wide. The military-backed interim government’s tackling of its envisioned ‘minus two’ rescue plan for the polity has been neither smooth nor discreet. Despite the noises made out of entrenched political camps, however, it has become clear that there is no turning back for Bangladesh. The tables have been turned.

In January, when the military-backed regime took power with an initial ‘emergency’ mandate of 120 days (which will end on 10 May), there was no timeframe in place for elections. Chief Adviser Fakhruddin Ahmed and his military backers provided such a timeline – elections by the end of 2008 – almost as a gift on the eve of the Bengali New Year. But even as the chief adviser was delivering his address to the nation on 13 April, rumours were already rife of plans to exile Begum Khaleda Zia, chair of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Talk of Sheikh Hasina Wajed, president of the Awami League, being barred from entering the country was also being heard. For most of April, Dhaka was a city of rumours.

With all forms of political activity banned, there was very little opposition to the action against the heads of the two main parties when it finally took place. With the anti-corruption dragnet picking up politicians from across the political divide, no one dared to speak out. There had been pressure on Khaleda Zia to leave the country since her son Tarique Rahman’s 7 March arrest. But it was not until her second son, Arafat Rahman, was picked up in a midnight raid at her residence that, on 17 April, she agreed to depart for Saudi Arabia with her immediate family. One down, another to go, it seemed.

The wait was not long. With no foreseeable obstacle to the plan, on 18 April a government press notice stated that Sheikh Hasina had become a “national-security risk”, and was therefore barred from returning to the country from a trip to the US. A day after Hasina had declared the interim government “unconstitutional” in an interview, the government publicised the corruption charges against her. Suddenly, the accusation of political murder was added – a charge that carried with it an arrest warrant. With the travel ban in place, Hasina made an attempt to return to Bangladesh, but was denied entry to an airplane in London on 22 April, the morning the warrant was issued.

Dangerous vacuum

While the attempt to cleanse the political culture overnight is a grand adventure worth applauding, trying to fill the vacuum left by such a sudden removal will not only be difficult, but dangerous. Politically, the first signs of cracks were seen immediately prior to Khaleda’s planned departure. Many mid- and senior-level BNP leaders had been lying low for fear of prosecution on corruption charges. On the evening of 20 April, they found an armyman-turned-BNP politician, retired Brigadier Hannan Shah, holding consultations with the party chairperson. (Khaleda had already been under house arrest for weeks.) With no one to vouch for or denounce his contention, Shah declared that Khaleda wished to reorganise the party and dissolve the existing committees. Some senior BNP leaders feared a split, while others pointed towards arm-twisting by the army to force-feed the party its agenda.

The Awami League is said to be going through similar gyrations. Both of the parties are showing the inherent weakness of an unyieldingly hierarchical political culture. Does this mean that the interim government should be cheered for dismantling them? Perhaps not. While the international community seemed to have given the military-backed government an initial nod, it appears that the announcement that national polls will be held by late 2008 (along with the Election Commission’s elaborate promises of national identity cards, a new voter roll and revamped election rules) might become a means to another end.

On 2 April, the army chief and de facto head of the country, General Moeen U Ahmed, announced: “The aspiring demo-cratic process of Bangladesh and the current transition period allows us an opportunity to develop a new concept, and find a new sense of direction to the future politics of Bangladesh.” This ‘new concept’, of course, may not necessarily refer to the traditional participatory electoral process known to Bangladesh’s electorate. Ahmed went on: “Bangladesh will have to construct its own brand of democracy, recognising its social, historical and cultural conditions, with religion being one of several components of its national identity.” This talk of a ‘new brand of democracy’ was widely and fervently discussed in Bangladesh for the better part of early April, and many political observers characterised it as the first public indication that the armed forces were to implement their own plans for the future of Bangladeshi politics.

However, like some of the other peoples of Southasia, Bangladeshis have seen previous military-backed governments with ‘unique plans’, and scepticism was in the air. By late April, there was already word of tension within the armed forces themselves. Ahmed’s term as army chief ends in June 2008, which is just prior to the currently stipulated timeframe to hold the national polls. General Masud Uddin Chowdhury, the key proponent in formulating the current emergency rule, is slated to be the next chief. While the actions taken by the interim government might have wide-scale popular support – as is believed in the absence of credible public opinion polls – senior army officials would be reluctant to return power to civilian hands without ensuring safeguards, for a backlash from political quarters that have come under the anti-corruption sweep is a certainty.

In the heady atmosphere of early 2007, many had initially thought of Nobel Prize winner Mohammad Yunus and his brand new political party Nagorik Shakti, born under the blanket of emergency rule, as a possible successor in the making. But with bitter reactions from various quarters, and given the current subdued state of politics, Yunus has kept relatively quiet. Many observers have also pointed out that, while the BNP has suffered severely in the recent anti-corruption drive, its chief ally, the Jamaat-e-Islami, remains unscathed, with no more than a few minor leaders behind bars. The place of the Islamist forces in the army’s radarscope will be something to watch. The execution in March of six activists of the militant Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh, convicted for the highly publicised serial bombings of 2005, might have brought to an end one chapter of Bangladeshi militancy. Nonetheless, the patronage received from the Jamaat and the complex web of Islamist sympathy towards such fundamentalists – including from within the army – remains to be probed.

Meanwhile, talk of the political ambitions of military leaders backing a transitional government will undoubtedly continue and progressively escalate until the brass returns to the barracks. But all the talk of establishing a new political party with army support, and of bringing together various splintered political entities, seems to be driven by uncertainty rather than intelligence. In a country that is in desperate need of a clear plan that leads back to the people’s mandate, uncertainty coupled with raw power can be a deadly mixture. Social, cultural, political and economic systems cannot be purged overnight by diktat, as the generals seem to think possible. In the meantime, the Dhaka intelligentsia is having second thoughts about this cleansing. #

This analysis was first published in HIMAL magazine, http://www.himalmag.com/2007/may/analysis_bangladesh.htm

Bangladesh: State in Decline

ANIRUDH SURI, JOSH KURLANTZICK

OVER the last two weeks, the streets of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh--a country once touted as a model of moderate, Islamic democracy--looked more like Baghdad or Karachi. Thousands of protesters charged through Dhaka's alleys and tin-roofed slum dwellings. They attacked stores and clashed with riot police and thousands of soldiers, battling with stones and sticks until some demonstrators fled the scene, their faces bleeding and clothes ripped apart. In just three days last week, the violence escalated, leaving more than 100 people injured.

The riots cap years of turmoil and poisonous politics in Bangladesh, breeding the kind of chaos that is fostering Bangladeshi terrorist groups with links to Al Qaeda. Just since October, similar riots have killed more than 30 people in the country. Indeed, instead of developing into the next Turkey, once-secular Bangladesh may be headed toward becoming the next Afghanistan.

Ostensibly, the riots stemmed from a recent announcement by Bangladesh's opposition leader and former prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, that her 14-party opposition alliance, known as the Awami League, would boycott the January 22 elections. Hasina claims that an interim caretaker government responsible for organizing the polls is biased against her party and should implement several electoral reforms to level the playing field before the election. Seeking to show its power, Hasina's group called for supporters to shut down the capital and other parts of the country through protests and strikes. "Resist the vote thieves," Hasina told her supporters, according to several reports.

In response, Bangladesh's other main party, led by another former prime minister, Begum Khaleda Zia, accused the Awami League of paralyzing Bangladesh's already fragile economy and called for the polls to proceed on schedule, without the reforms.

The protests only reveal larger failures within the country. Bangladesh boasts an educated elite, a history of secularism and tolerance, a strong civil society, a vibrant intellectual life--and nascent interest by foreign investors, who see potential in one of the world's most populous Muslim nations. Dhaka hardly looks like Riyadh or pre-September 11 Kabul: Scantily clad Bollywood stars pose on advertising billboards at major intersections. Women, from Khaleda Zia and Hasina on down, play major roles in Bangladeshi government, business, and society.

But the country has not been well served by its politicians. In fact, in recent years, domestic politics has disintegrated into a blood feud between Khaleda Zia and Hasina, who hate each other. Too often, in a nation where unemployed young men are not hard to round up, this rivalry plays out in political violence on the streets, distracting from the process of governing. Time and again, whichever leader is not in power uses her time in opposition not to parry the government but to call her thugs into the streets and to shut down the economy.

With venomous mainstream politicians like Khaleda Zia and Hasina, and with Bangladeshi elections increasingly devalued, some young Bangladeshis appear to be turning to another alternative: Islamists. Once on the fringe of society, Islamist parties and terrorist organizations have gained prominence in recent years. One recent report by South Asia expert Selig Harrison said that the "growing Islamic fundamentalist movement linked to al-Qaeda and Pakistani intelligence agencies is steadily converting the strategically located nation of Bangladesh into a new regional hub for terrorist operations that reach into India and Southeast Asia." Former State Department terrorism coordinator Cofer Black has echoed that assessment, warning that Bangladesh could become a platform for terrorist groups.

The militants already have made headway. Several Islamist parties have sprung up, including many with strong ties to Bangladeshi militant groups, including Harkat ul Jihad al Islami, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh, and Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). In August 2005, the JMB claimed credit for more than 450 synchronized explosions across the country, and its operatives spread leaflets at the sites of the blasts calling for the establishment of Islamic law. One year earlier, a grenade attack on an Awami League rally killed over 20 people, and Islamist groups regularly attack prominent secular intellectuals and members of religious minorities, sometimes mutilating their bodies in the process. Both Hasina and Khaleda Zia have attempted to co-opt the Islamist parties toward moderation, with little success, and the weak Bangladeshi police force has little ability to crack down on terrorists.

Left unchecked, Bangladesh could become another Afghanistan--a base for regional terrorism--and damage America's growing relationship with South Asia. Yet the United States and other major powers are paying little attention to the crisis in Dhaka. Rather than pushing the caretaker government and the two parties toward a compromise that brings everyone to the polls, the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka has proved passive, merely issuing a statement that "our own support and observation missions will depend on [free and fair elections]." Unless the United States brokers a compromise, further political chaos and a meaningless election might overwhelm the fragile secular political system, leading to intervention by the Bangladeshi army or creating the kind of failed state that occurred in pre-September 11 Afghanistan.

To defuse the crisis, the United States could leverage the roughly $800 million that it gives every year to Bangladesh. Washington could also offer duty-free textile imports from Bangladesh as a carrot to induce compromise. In addition, the United States needs to team up with India to tackle potential terrorism emanating from Bangladesh. For too long, the United States has allowed Bangladeshi terrorist groups to disband only to reappear under different names in different countries.

International pressure and careful public shaming has worked in the past with Bangladesh. In 2001, it took a visit from former President Jimmy Carter before the elections and a public appeal urging the Awami League to accept the results of that year's election which was widely considered to be free and fair by international observers. On January 11, the resignation of Bangladesh's caretaker leader, Iajuddin Ahmed, who was not accepted by both political parties, possibly came due to persistent pressure from the international community, including the United States, the United Nations, and the European Union, among others. But the crisis isn't over yet--the country remains in a state of emergency. In the coming days, the United States might even consider sending diplomats from Washington, not just from the Dhaka embassy, to help stabilize the situation and ensure that free, fair, and credible elections are held with the participation of all political parties.

Thankfully, Bangladesh has not yet imploded. The majority of Bangladeshis remain moderate and secular, and the Islamist parties have never gained more than 10 percent of the total vote. But this once-promising country is heading down a steep slope, and an illegitimate election, followed by more violence, will only make matters worse. #

This article was first published in The New Republic (online), January 15, 2007

Joshua Kurlantzick is a special correspondent for The New Republic. Anirudh Suri is editor of South Asian Perspectives, a monthly publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

'Democra-tators' aim at journalists

Western war reporters hog the glory, but, as Marina Jimenez writes, local watchdogs face the greatest risk

MARINA JIMENEZ

SALEEM Samad, a genial refugee from Bangladesh, spends his days nabbing shoplifters and shushing disorderly customers as a security guard at a Chapters bookstore. But before he arrived in Toronto four years ago Mr. Samad, 55, was leading a very different kind of life.

A prominent journalist, Mr. Samad was forced to spend 55 days in a Dhaka prison, simply for having the audacity to criticize his own government.

The annual World Press Freedom Day, to be marked this Thursday, honours journalists who brave death or jail in pursuit of the truth.

Yet, all too often, the headlines focus on international stars such as Daniel Pearl, the Wall Street Journal reporter kidnapped and killed by extremists in Pakistan. In fact, far more tortured or slain journalists
are not war correspondents but locals such as Mr. Samad, attacked at home or in their newsrooms, often by agents of their own governments.

Often those governments are, like that of Bangladesh, nominally democratic, even members of the Commonwealth. But they are led by what Joel Simon of New York's Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
calls "democra-tators," elected leaders with authoritarian streaks such as Vladimir Putin in Russia and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.

These leaders have a deep mistrust for the institutions that limit their power, such as the judiciary and the press. Three journalists were killed in Russia last year, including Anna Politkovskaya, a Chechnya expert, last October.

In the case of Mr. Samad, he was behind bars from late November of 2002 until mid-January in 2003, and endured torture at the hands of military intelligence officers. When he asked his jailors what crime he had committed, they said he had smeared Bangladesh's good reputation with his exposes on Islamic terrorism, published locally and internationally, including in Time.

"They didn't like my writings on how the Bengali government was harbouring terrorists and jihadists," he says. "They wanted to know why I was trying to undermine a democratic government. They were trying to silence me."

Mr. Samad was lucky. He was released and in 2004 fled Bangladesh for a new life in Canada. Others are not so fortunate.

According to a report released last month by the Paris-based International News Safety Institute (INSI), the number of journalists killed on the job has escalated dramatically in recent years. In the past decade, more than a thousand media members have been slain, and in nine out of 10 cases, the perpetrators have never been prosecuted.

Reporters Without Borders tabulated the deaths of 81 journalists and 32 media assistants (drivers, translators, security and fixers) last year alone. It is the highest toll since 1994, when 103 died, half of
them in the Rwandan genocide. An additional 1,400 attacks or threats were carried out against journalists - many of them during election campaigns in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. Another record.

That is why the focus for this year's World Press Freedom Day is impunity, and the need to bring to justice those who target and kill journalists.

"With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the return to democracy in Latin America, we saw an explosion of press freedom," notes Mr. Simon of the CPJ. "But, in this decade, there have been some losses."

Among them is Hrant Dink, editor of Turkey's only Armenian-language magazine and a well-known critic of the Turkish government's treatment of Armenians. He was shot in the street as he left his office on Jan. 19 of this year.

"In many countries, murder has become the easiest, cheapest and most effective way of silencing troublesome reporting and the more the killers get away with it, the more the spiral of death is forced upwards," INSI director Rodney Pinder said last month.

Not surprisingly, Iraq is the most dangerous place to report from.

The United Nations has become so concerned about the deliberate targeting of journalists that the Security Council even passed a special resolution on Dec. 23, 2006, condemning such attacks and reiterating the right of war correspondents to be treated as prisoners of war and accorded the rights of civilians under the Third Geneva Convention.

Many journalists, though, are killed not in war zones, but covering local politics or crime in countries such as Mexico, Russia, Iran and India. Marlene Garcia-Esperat lost her life for her articles documenting embezzlement and corruption in the local government in Tacurong, the Philippines. She was shot and killed in front of her two children on Easter weekend in 2005. Her bodyguards were off-duty.

Since most of these homicides are never resolved, the sense of impunity only encourages more killings, advocates say. There is also surprisingly little public sympathy for these cases, as though journalists somehow deserve to die for writing about the drug trade, or for criticizing an official state religion.

"There is a sense of complacency when a journalist and their family are killed or are under attack. The public finds it easier to support police officers or firefighters who die in the line of duty," notes Anne Game, executive director of the Toronto-based Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE). "But it's so important to try to protect journalists because they're really on the front line. Their freedom to speak enables others to."

Ross Howard, a journalism instructor at Vancouver's Langara College and president of Media and Democracy, a non-profit Canadian group, has crisscrossed the globe training journalists in the developing
world - only to see them targeted as they become less partisan and more professional.

"There is a tragic irony in post-conflict states in emerging democracies that the better the journalist gets, the more dangerous it becomes for him [or] her," he said.

"In countries such as Iran, Cuba or Pakistan, you cannot criticize the supreme leader, question the country's policies or even the economic corruption among the power-holders," notes Maryam Aghvami, an Iranian journalist who is now living in Toronto, where she heads the 70-member Journalists in Exile.

"If you are brave enough to do so, you are accused of acting against the country's national security, spreading lies and spying for Western powers."

Another key difference today is the erosion of the neutral-observer status that journalists used to enjoy. Radical or revolutionary groups no longer view journalists as conduits of information, but as lucrative
kidnapping targets.

Local columnists such as Saleem Samad are seen as "enemies of the state," and international correspondents as representatives of their own governments.

While there is no meaningful global data comparing journalists killed on the job with, for example, firefighters, Julie Payne, CJFE's manager, says the consequences are more profound. The killing of a journalist undermines one of the primary means of holding people accountable - and serves to silence others.

That is why advocacy organizations have begun funding legal cases overseas. CJFE, the CPJ and a number of other groups helped fund the case against Ms. Marlene Garcia-Esperat's killers. Three hit men were finally convicted and received life sentences in October, 2006, in Cebu - though the true power-holding authors of her death remain at large.

CJFE also manages the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), which issues daily alerts of threats and violations to journalists all over the world.

As for Mr. Samad, he, his wife and adult son were all granted asylum here. Today, in addition to working security at the local bookstore, he edits Durdesh.net, a news portal for the South Asian diaspora.

He also looks forward to a term this fall as a visiting scholar at the University of California at Berkeley's School of Journalism.

Mr. Samad remains thankful to have escaped with his life. After he was released from prison, his house was put under surveillance, his phone lines tapped and his wife continually harassed.

"I kept a small bag ready, sure they would come back and arrest me," he recalls. "I was mentally prepared to pay with my life for my profession." #

Marina Jimenez is a senior feature writer with The Globe and Mail

Article first published in The Globe and Mail, Canada, April 28, 2007 Saturday

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What leads to campus violence, student or partisan politics?

ABM NASIR

BANNING culture is nothing new in Bangladesh. In 1964, Ayub regime banned “Tagore songs” from the public media to suppress and, eventually, cripple Bengali culture. But, not only did Ayub regime failed to do any damage to Bengali culture, but his attempt made “Tagore songs” as one of the symbols of Bengali Nationalism. The Pakistani regime simply didn’t understand the nucleus of the wrath of the Bengali populace. Failure to deal with the right issue such as discrimination against Bengalis, ultimately, forced the Pakistan regime to a disgraceful exit to the west once and for all.

Lately, the issue of “student politics” has re-surfaced in the media. Many are blaming “student politics” for campus violence and proposing a ban on “student politics.”

Indeed, entire premise of the on-going debate, if I may correctly translate it, that student politics breeds campus violence, campus violence shatters academic atmosphere, therefore, student politics must be banned, is based on fallacy.

On the contrary, the core problem in the public institutions is not the student politics but the partisan politics, greed for power and money that breed campus violence. We must recognize that student politics and partisan politics are completely two different aspects of politics. In an ideal situation, partisan politics serves the narrow ideological or political agenda of the political parties, while student politics embraces the greater interest of the students as well as campus community.

Proposing a ban simply skirts the real issue behind campus violence and is like sweeping dirt under the rug. With a simple blow of air, the real issue will re-emerge in different way.

Campus violence is a law and order issue. And, the wide prevalence of campus violence reflects the failure of our governments. In fact, all previous governments of Bangladesh did not only fail to ensure campus safety, but, in most cases, instigated campus violence, either directly, by patronizing student organizations, or indirectly, by appointing partisan vice-chancellors and unleashing police brutality.

In the early 1960s, Ayub Khan sowed the seed of campus violence by patronizing National Student Front (NSF) with two particular goals: to crush the movement of the nationalist and leftist student organizations; and, to use the NSF to promote his basic democracy agenda. In the post liberation era, the notorious seven-murder incidence, perpetrated by a faction of the ruling-party student wing, Bangladesh Student League (BCL), at the Mohsin Hall, Dhaka University, in 1974, marked the first major incidence of violence on campus. In the late 1970s, General Zia’s “Hizbul Bahar” experiment introduced the cadre based student politics and, for the first time, students were provided with arms to counter dissent voices at the academic institutions. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, many products of this experiment dominated campus violence which, in turn, led to loss of many lives. In the early mid 1980s, General Ershad tried to install his own brand of student politics through Notun Bangla Chhatra Samaj. Although failed to install his brand of politics in the academic institutions, Ershad's attempt also led to many violent clashes in campuses across the country. During the mid 1990s and 2005th, campus community experienced relatively fewer incidences of violence, mainly due to monopoly control of campuses by successive ruling-party student organizations. Since 1971, aside from ruling-party student organizations, student fronts of two opposition political parties, the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) of radical Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Bangladesh Student League (BCL) of Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), dominated and perpetrated frequent campus violence to a large extent. After 1975, while JSD student front, failing to reap any benefit from the so called November revolution of 1975 and gain any governmental patronage, splintered into many factions and withered into an insignificant force in campuses, the ICS, continued to thrive and in many instances excelled in notoriety and its capacity to perpetrate violence against rival student groups. This dramatic rise of ICS can be ascribed to three important factors: the patronage of Ershad during early 1980s; support of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party; and, the failure of the Awami League government to take any action against the ICS’s violent activities during 1996-2001.

All the incidences illustrated above clearly show governments’ role in campus violence. Had government stayed away from campus politics and taken drastic measures to prevent campus violence, many worst form of campus violence could have been averted.

What motivates government to interfere with student politics and instigate campus violence? What incentives induce students to participate in partisan politics as well as to perpetrate campus violence?

Government’s motivation in dominating campus politics is rooted in its motivation of holding on to national power. Students are young, energetic, educated, and perhaps the most informed group in society. University campuses have always been the center of freedom of expression and the free flow of information. And students have always been the incorruptible voices of people in times of national crises and major threat to the very existence of any tyrannical government. Therefore, in an effort to suppress these dissent voices and put permanent hold on to power, government installs its cronies in the academic institutions.

In the process of enticing students into partisan politics, government provides them with a set of perverse incentives in exchange for students’ support. Students are provided with various benefits including opportunities of earnings from toll collections, holding onto seats in the residential halls, getting jobs, likelihood of future political appointments and, most importantly, getting away with committing crimes in campus. In return for these benefits, partisan student outfits counter any activities of the students’ organizations deemed threat to the existence of incumbent and the opposition political parties. Competition among various student groups for such benefits and attempt of rival student fronts to oust government beneficiaries lead to campus violence.

According to a report published in May 4, 2001, issue of the Daily Janakantha by Akhil Poddar, campus violence, over the three decades since country’s liberation in 1971, cost 118 lives with more than 10000 students, teachers, staffs and outsides injured. In addition to precious lives, campus violence also costs students lost academic years and the country more resources per student to make up for each year lost due to campus violence. Had there been no Ershad vocation, this author could have been graduated four years earlier from his alma mater, Dhaka University.

Such quid pro quo relationship between government and students must stop. As long as such status quo remains in place, government will keep meddling with student politics, students will get engaging in partisan politics, and campuses will get embroiled in violence.

Current trend in the student politics is the bi-product of the state of our national politics. As stated in the preceding paragraph, national politics and partisan politics on campuses maintain a symbiotic relationship. Proposing a wholesale ban on student politics while ignoring current state of the national politics is like a steering a ship into the wind, not knowing the direction. Failure of the past governments does not justify the use of undemocratic means to stop individuals’ rights to political discourse.

Alternatively, through constructive debate, the stakeholders can find solutions to campus violence. The solution shall include a positive set of incentives for both government and the opposition political parties so that they would be aversed to interfering with student politics and a set of incentives for students so that would be reluctant to invite ideologies that only serve interests of partisan politics.

If government upholds rules of law and guarantee students with quality of education, safe and quality campus environment, seats at the residential halls, merit based and non-discriminatory recruitment policies for jobs, only then will students shun destructive and partisan politics and campus violence will be the story of the yesteryear.

Laws that do not provide incentive based enforcement are meant to be broken. In the United States, a speeding ticket costs a violator his income in the form of court fees, fines and higher insurance premium for several years. And this monetary damage for traffic violation provides drivers with incentive not to speed. We, therefore, instead of proposing drastic measure to resolve a problem, must search for solutions that reward good deeds and penalize aberrant and destructive behaviours. #

ABM Nasir, Ph.D. is Assistant Professor and Lead Faculty of Economics, School of Business, North Carolina Central University, Durham, NC.
April 30, 2007

The world can't afford Bangladesh's going Taliban

CHARLES TANNOCK

IS Bangladesh headed into the black hole that consumed Afghanistan under the Taliban? Fears are mounting, as official and fundamentalist religious forces now seem to operate with impunity - and the apparent support of local police, the ruling Bangladeshi National Party (BNP), and local authorities.

For many years Bangladesh was an exception in the Islamic world, pursuing an independent course in a peaceful, secular and democratic fashion. Traditionally, under Bengali Sufi mystical teachings, the majority Muslim population lived peacefully with other religions, and Bangladesh had a good record on education and civil rights for women. Until recently, Muslim fundamentalists were discredited, because militias such as "Al-Badr" and "Razakar" had supported atrocities against civilians during the civil war of 1971.

That began to change in 2001, when Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia, the widow of the assassinated military strongman General Zia, replaced secularism in the Constitution with the "Sovereignty of Allah." Encouraged by this change, the BNP's junior coalition partner, Jamaat-e-Islami, which has links with the militias and remains close to Pakistan, has been calling for imposition of Sharia, or Islamic law.

The BNP appears to view religious extremism as a tool to break the power of the opposition Awami League, which is largely supported by the secular and urban middle classes. Similarly, the massive rise in the number of madrassas, or religious schools, financed by Saudi and Gulf money - totaling roughly 64,000 and operating under the same fundamentalist Deobandi Islam that inspired the Taliban - is part of a clear effort to change Bangladesh's culture of religious tolerance.

The danger inherent in Bangladesh's course is very real. Indian intelligence officials allege that the leader of a BNP coalition partner, Mufti Fazlul Haq Amini, maintains ties to the banned armed Islamist group, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, or Huji, which in turn is allegedly linked to Al-Qaeda. In 1999, Huji members attempted to assassinate the moderate poet Shamshur Rahman with an axe. Forty-four Huji members were arrested, two of whom claimed to have been sent from South Africa and Pakistan by Osama bin Laden to distribute money to the extremist madrassas.

Bangladeshi migrant workers in the Gulf states who return home imbued with radical Wahhabi and Salafi teachings fan the fires even more. Competing for influence among radical Islamist leaders in northwestern Bangladesh is Bangla Bhai, who in 2004 attempted an Islamist revolution in several provinces bordering India. Supported by local police and 10,000 followers, the rebellion ended only after a government crackdown.

The NGO Taskforce against Torture has documented over 500 cases of torture and intimidation by radical Islamists, who also have murdered supporters of the Communist Party, such as Abdel-Kayyam Badshah. Indeed, Hindus, Christians and Buddhists have been targeted as well, and religious extremists more recently have attacked Sufi shrines deemed to be idolatrous, and even Bengali cultural events that unite all religions in a common identity. For example, during Ramadan prayers in October 2004, a mob of a 1,000 people razed a mosque of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community. The 100,000 members of this Muslim sect, which believes that Mohammad was not the last prophet, have been declared infidels. The government outlawed their publications until the ban was reversed by the Bangladeshi High Court. Hindus, Ahmadiyyas, and tribal people in the Chittagong hills, fearful for their safety, have been leaving the country in droves.

The atmosphere of violence is palpable in other ways. Sheikh Hasina, the Awami League's leader and the daughter of Bangladesh's founding father, survived a grenade attack last summer that killed at least 20 people and injured hundreds more. The killers have never been apprehended. Britain's High Commissioner in Bangladesh was wounded in a similar bomb attack this May.

To their credit - albeit under pressure from donor countries - the Bengali authorities seem to sense that their country is drifting toward becoming a failed state and are making greater efforts to arrest Islamist killers, despite some of them being part of the ruling coalition. Two radical Islamist groups have also been banned. But piecemeal arrests will not be enough to reverse the drift if a culture of intolerance is allowed to fester.

One encouraging note is that annual economic growth has been a steady 5 percent for the past few years. But now many Bangladeshis fear for their livelihoods, owing to unlimited Chinese textile imports following the end of quotas last year. Economic deterioration in Bangladesh would only worsen inter-communal tensions and provide a fertile breeding ground for jihadists. However, the reforms needed to head off decline are often blocked by political infighting and opposition boycotts.

The world cannot afford a second Afghanistan in Bangladesh, where Huji members are believed to have given sanctuary to many Taliban fighters after the fall of their regime. Pressure from India will not be enough to force the Bengali government to adhere to the tolerant form of Islam that the country pursued during its first three decades of independence. All of Asia's powers, including China and Japan, will have to play a part in stopping Bangladesh's drift into fanaticism and chaos. The rest of the world should support them before it is too late. #

Charles Tannock is vice president of the human rights subcommittee of the European Parliament. THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in collaboration with Project, Thursday, July 21, 2005

Bangladesh: moving towards or away from democracy?

KIRSTY HUGHES

POLITICS is suspended in Bangladesh. Since a state of emergency was announced at the start of 2007, all political activity has been banned, along with trade union activity, and with powers available to the military-backed caretaker government to censor the media, if it chooses to exercise them.

And yet, three months after the Bangladesh military encouraged the president to announce a state of emergency on January 11 (so cancelling general elections due on January), many of Bangladesh’s liberal commentators are broadly supportive of developments as is much of the wider public. Politics, so the argument goes, had become so corrupted, that the only route to revive real democracy in the country was to suspend the corrupted version of democracy for some time.

But the big unanswered question is whether, and how fast, Bangladesh will return to democratic rule, and whether a genuinely new uncorrupted democracy can be established.

The Corrupting of Political Life
For the last 16 years, Bangladeshi politics has been dominated by its two main parties and their two leaders – the “two begums” – Sheikh Hasina Wajed of the Awami League (AL), and Khaleda Zia, leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in power from 2001 to autumn 2006. But the current state of emergency already appears to have spelt the end for these two leaders’ political roles, and possibly too for that of their parties.

Hossain Zillur Rahman, executive chairman of a Dhaka think tank – the Power and Participation Research Centre – argues that the electorate “emerging as a quiet force” has had enough of turbulent national politics: “If you looked at the discourse of the political parties, who created their own spokesmen in many different spheres, you would see the country as composed of two big blocs and a battle to death going on. But on January 11, we saw that this was not the case. There were the two parties with some supporters and the greater majority of the electorate did want competitive politics but not this extreme short-sightedness and corruption.” And he goes on: “there was a very strong and visible view of the electorate that whatwas happening was not correct...so in that way it set the ground for intervention by institutional actors like the armed forces.”

Other commentators emphasise the undermining of the very basics of democracy by the behaviour of the two parties. Leading barrister Kamal Hossain, who was involved in drafting Bangladesh’s democratic constitution, asks why the constitutional set-up did not work. Bluntly answering his own question, he says “because they were making party politics something you cannot believe. You do not expect that ‘winner takes all’ means literally all, including taking the police as your private militia, the civil service as party lackeys and using any law as pure patronage for party loyalists, with no other criterion for appointments but party loyalty.” For a democratic system to work, says Hossain: “A minimum political morality is necessary… you cannot just use political authority as patronage…or with absolute impunity.”

For Daily Star, current affairs editor, Syed Badrul Ahsan, inefficiency rather than corruption has been the bigger problem in Bangladesh politics during the 1990s. Of the most recent BNP government, he says: “From 2001 to October 2006, corruption seemed to become institutionalised at all levels down to the rural level, including the politicising of civil servants.”

Kamal Hossain calls the appointment, on October 29, 2006, of the president as leader – chief adviser – of the caretaker government (meant to take the country through to the January elections): “a civilian coup” and “ a comedy of the absurd”, since the caretaker government was meant to be politically neutral, while the president had been voted in by the BNP. And last autumn, explains Hossain, the BNP “suddenly produced an electoral register with 93 million voters, not 73 million as five years before…so it was palpably obvious it was a bogus list so any residue of confidence disappeared and the electoral commission lost all credibility.”

A State of Emergency
As violent street protests and strikes continued through 2006, the Awami League announced it would boycott the elections. The international community was also starting to express its concerns – on January 10, the European Union announced it would be withdrawing its election monitors and that the EU would re-assess the full range of its relations with Bangladesh if the elections went ahead.

Debapriya Bhattacharya, executive director of the Centre for Policy Dialogue, a Bangladeshi think tank, says that: “a one-sided election on January 22 was about to be bulldozed through…we saw the results were predetermined and the outgoing government was going to give itself another five years and then hold on by other means.” He also admits that: “There was a fear that the army would be used by them [the BNP] to abet them in this usurping of power. But I think the army saw the light– and patriotism and a sense of self-preservation must have helped.”

Some observers see the hand of the US in developments – presumed to be worried at the instability and the potential growth in violent Islamist activities already visible since a bombing campaign in 2005. In the day or two before the state of emergency, the United Nations had apparently threatened to delist the Bangladeshi army from UN peacekeeping duties – a rather lucrative and prestigious occupation. More than one western observer suggests this was a trigger, or perhaps an excuse, for the army to push the president to call the state of emergency.

From January 11, the new military backed caretaker government started work under the leadership of former Bangladeshi central bank governor – and one time World Bank official – Fakhruddin Ahmed, together with 10 other “technocratic” cabinet appointees. In the subsequent three months, the government – and military – embarked on a major anti-corruption campaign, arresting around 1,00,000 people, including many senior party political figures, and other leading professional and official actors. Not least among these was the son of Khaleda Zia, Tarique Rahman, accused of major corruption, with many saying he effectively ran a parallel government.

Many leading Awami League figures have also been arrested. Sheikh Hasina was by the start of April on a “private” visit to the US with many speculating both whether she will come back and whether Khaleda Zia may also be “encouraged” to leave the country.

Journalist Badrul Ahsan thinks it is important for the political parties to restructure “and to get out of the grips of families and dynasties. If Sheikh Hasina does not come back then that will suggest maybe we are going in for some radical changes.” Departure of the “two begums” many say, would be a very positive signal. Commentators also emphasise that the focus on anti-corruption has been welcomed by the public. Ahsan says: “Dealing with corruption has struck a chord. So far people seem pretty satisfied.” He suggests that if people do not like the direction the country is going, their mood will get expressed: “Bengalis have a history of losing patience politically.”

Think tank director, Hossain Zillur Rahman makes a similar point: “If the current government goes very much against the electorate in certain policies, you would immediately see a transformation of the situation and you would see much less ease of action; there is a tacit endorsement at moment.” Debapriya Bhattacharya too thinks that those who say the public will become restless in three months “are indulging in wishful thinking”. He goes on: “The government is unelected but still very popular – it will have to renew its legitimacy everyday with good work and without big mistakes.”

Questions Remain
Even so, the rapid and aggressive move in the first three months to demolish thousands of illegal roadside and pavement businesses and slum homes, leaving people homeless and/or penniless, is seen by many as an excessive approach to anti-corruption and one hurting the poorest rather than those higher up the corruption change. And the hanging of six Islamist militants, at the end of March (convicted of a series of bombings that took place in 2005), while welcomed by many, was also criticised for the haste with which it was carried out and the failure to follow through on information the six have supposedly given to police of senior political and professional names involved in masterminding their activities.

Others also point to corruption in defence deals and question whether the military can really differentiate itself as not part of the corrupt previous system. Moreover, many admit there is an open question as to whether the military will withdraw from its current increasingly powerful political role as and when the caretaker government moves to restore democracy, or whether it will get a taste for political power, Pakistan-style.

Badrul Ahsan argues that: “The armed forces are doing a pretty good job, hopefully they will not come in but stand behind and support the government. There could be questions of army corruption but generally they are above the fray.” But according to an article in The Economist (April 7, 2006): “the distinction General Ahmed [head of the army] wants to draw between corrupt politicians and honest soldiers is bogus. Senior army officers say in private that corruption is institutionalised in the armed forces.” And Zillur Rahman admits that there can be downside risks too, despite his careful optimism: “In certain quarters there could be overambition or it could be taken in directions not in line with expectations. Those dangers are there.”

But Barrister Kamal Hossain suggests that: “It’s too early to have any real suspicions on those lines [of the army]…and I’ve a feeling that some of those trying to project these suspicions are from the old political parties.” But one Dhaka journalist takes another view: “The army is getting restless. And the current government cannot run this for another two years, with just 11 people...they are non-elected and very hesitant on some steps…and the army has got personal ambition.” He suggests that in the coming period there may be a national unity government, which could be a positive step: “Then we would have some consensus for what is going on and put some reins on the army.”

Next Steps
Whether the state of emergency continues to get such widespread support will depend, according to many, on key decisions andsignals in the next three to six months.

In terms of the anti-corruption drive, there is a strong sense not only that it must be seen through and people brought to justice but that it is also vital for it to follow transparent and due processes. At present, bail has been suspended for all those charged with criminal and anti-corruption offences. And there have been a number of deaths associated with security forces since January 11, while Human Rights Watch drew attention recently to the Bangladesh security forces past reputation for torture and extrajudicial killings.

So many will be watching internally and externally for the restoration and exercise of rights and civil liberties, and for a freeing up again of political and trade union activity, and for a lessening or absence of any implicit or explicit media censorship.

People are also waiting for a clear timetable, including a prospective date for when local and national elections will be held. While it is understood that it may take some time to produce credible new electoral lists – possibly with photo identification and identity cards – the risks of drift and of time passing in a democratic vacuum are also emphasised by some.

Zillur Rahman says a short-term road map is needed soon: “an idea of the calendar – is it two years for the reform period? And so [we need] a date by which competitive elections are expected to return.” But while some may live comfortably with the vague and delaying announcement, at the start of April, by the Bangladesh Chief Election Commissioner that even 18 months may be too soon to be ready for new elections, others do not want to see a long delay. Kamal Hossain thinks it vital to see in the next few months how purposefully the administration is going ahead with the restoration of the election process and machinery. “I do not want to project forward two years” says Hossain “the pressure should be there for everyone including ourselves.”

As well as concerns that the army may decide it likes political power, and even go down a “Musharraf route” in the months ahead, the other big question is whether and how the party political system can be effectively restructured. Some hope that with the ‘two begums’ out of the way, some renewal can begin. Some look to Nobel Prize winner, Muhammad Yunus’ new party as a way forward, though so far it has not taken off rapidly.

Zillur Rahman calls it a time of both opportunity and danger, saying that political actors know the direction needed, but the question is whether, how and to what extent reforms are carried through: “How politics will come back is a challenge to society at large, a challenge to political parties to reform themselves…and it’s a challenge to the current drivers, the caretaker government and the army, of finding how to move ahead. We are in an experimental stage and so outcomes are very open.” But he concludes: “The danger is if it loses direction – aimlessness – and that risk is there.”

Bangladesh is clearly at a political turning point. The first three months of the state of emergency have rested on considerable public support, not least due to relief at an end to strikes, violence and instability, along with the drive against corruption. But there are already some danger signals suggesting the road forward to renewed democracy may be bumpy indeed. Whether that road is at least seriously attempted or whether the military will attempt to go down another route entirely will become clear in the next few months. #

This article was first published in Economic & Political Weekly, April 14, 2007
http://www.epw.org.in/uploads/articles/10493.pdf

Kirsty Hughes, former Eurocrat turned freelance writer, is traveling through South Asia over the next two months. A former Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and coordinator for the European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN), she writes a political travel blog while on her travels. See: http://thebulletin.typepad.com/the_bulletin_blog/kirsty_hughes/index.html
<hugheskirsty@gmail.com>

Need to end climate of impunity, bring to justice the perpetrators of violence & harassment towards journalists

Bangladesh: World Press Freedom Review 2006

WITH elections originally scheduled for 22 January 2007, the international community is focused on the difficulties and the dangers faced by Bangladeshi journalists seeking to report independently. Later, the elections were first postponed, and then cancelled. A state of emergency was imposed when the "caretaker" government stepped down under military pressure at the beginning of February 2007.

Fakhruddin Ahmed, a former World Bank official, who took over the government in early February 2007, along with 10 advisors and no functioning parliament, pledged to hold elections quickly. However, at the time of writing, a date has yet to be set.

A resolution adopted by the European Parliament, in mid-November 2006, condemned, "the physical attacks on journalists […] and the violence related to the forthcoming general election and the transitional arrangements." The resolution also stated that Bangladesh’s government should "guarantee media balance during the election campaign." To this end, authorities should "put an end to the climate of impunity and […] bring to justice the perpetrators of violence and harassment directed towards journalists in Bangladesh."

The electoral system in Bangladesh foresees the introduction of a three-month administration by a "caretaker" authority charged with leading the country to fresh elections. This system, designed to minimize elections frauds and to ensure the neutrality of the electoral preparations, has worked well in the past three elections. Democracy was originally restored in Bangladesh in 1990 after 15 years of military rule.

However, physical as well as legal attacks against the media have not stopped even after the "caretaker" authority led by Iajuddin Ahmed replaced Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia at the end of her five-year mandate.

The case of imprisoned journalist, Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury, was also highlighted in the European Parliament’s resolution.

Salah Uddin Shoaib Chaudhury, editor of the weekly tabloid Blitz, was arrested in November 2003 at Dhaka airport while he was leaving Bangladesh to attend a conference in Israel organised by the Hebrew Writers Association. Bangladesh has no diplomatic relations with Israel and travel to Israel is illegal for Bangladeshi citizens. Authorities found the text of the speech he was going to hold at the conference as well as reports on Bangladesh’s human rights situation. Chaudhury, a moderate Muslim, was accused of having links with Israeli intelligence and charged with sedition, which carries a maximum penalty of death or thirty years’ imprisonment. It is likely that the charges against Chaudhury are in connection with articles he wrote advocating dialogue between religions, calling for the recognition of the state of Israel and warning about radical Islam and the rise of al-Qaeda in Bangladesh. The final subject is one that the government has no wish to see discussed in the media.Chaudhury was released on bail in May 2005 after spending 17 months in prison and has since been awaiting trial on charges of espionage, blasphemy and sedition. In the past year, Chaudhury has been the victim of various attacks. He reportedly received telephone death threats on 26 February from a man claiming to be Bangla Bhai, the alias of Islamist militant leader Siddiqul Islam, who was sentenced in absentia in February to 40 years in prison for a bomb attack that killed two judges in November 2005. Chaudhury said that he received no response to his complaints to the police about the threat.

On 5 July, two small bombs exploded outside the office of Chaudhury’s Weekly Blitz in Dhaka, and two more devices were found unexploded inside the office. Although no one was injured and the explosions caused only minor damage to the office facilities, the attack followed threats against Chaudhury and his newspaper that were once again reportedly ignored by police. On 29 June, few days before the attack, Mufti Noor Hussain Noorani, leader of the radical movement Khatmey Nabuat (KNM), threatened Chaudhury on the phone after the Weekly Blitz ran articles critical of KNM On 5 October, a group of 40 people attacked the journalist in his office, breaking one of his ankles and stealing approximately US$4,000. The Writers in Prison Committee reported that leading members of the ruling Bangladesh National Party (BNP) were allegedly among the attackers.

While Chaudhury’s case is appalling and rightly deserves international attention, he is only one of the many journalists attacked and harassed this year in Bangladesh; Bangladeshi authorities are apparently unable to bring those responsible for these attacks to justice. Unpunished attacks against journalists in Bangladesh have only encouraged further attacks, in a media environment where journalists do not give up on their right to report injustices, corruption and their government’s shortcomings.

While in recent years, there has been an increase in the attacks against the press by members of radical Islamist groups, a large number of the violent attacks against journalists are carried out either by supporters of the ruling BNP or BNP’s youth wing or other activist groups. These attacks are in retaliation for criticism or exposure of crimes by the journalists.

One journalist was killed this year in Bangladesh due to his profession, according to IPI. Bellal Hossain Dafadar, a correspondent for the Khulna-based daily newspaper Janabani, died in hospital on 14 September after being stabbed by five unknown assailants.

A second journalist was almost killed when, on 1 March, the room where he was sleeping was set on fire by a group of unidentified people. When Nur Siddique, student and correspondent for the daily Prothom Alo, tried to escape the fire, he found that the door of his room had been locked; some neighbours managed to rescue him. Nur Siddique believes that supporters of BNP from within the university attacked him because of his recent articles about the student branch of the political party.While the Bangladesh constitution supports press freedom, members of the government do not reflect this duty in their own actions. The cancellation of a journalists’ seminar on 13 April following threats and pressures by local BNP leader and MP Manjurul Ahsan Munshi is ample evidence of this attitude.

The seminar, organised by the Debidwar Press Club, was going to discuss torture against journalists in Bangladesh and abroad. It was closed when approximately 15 people stormed the hall shortly before the forum was due to begin, forcibly removing guests from their seats and confiscating broadcast equipment, according to IFJ reports. Senior journalists and media personnel were verbally assaulted during the altercation.

Only three days before the attack, Munshi was convicted for harassing Debidwar Press Club member and journalist for the daily Prothom Alo, Atiqur Rahman Bashar. He was sentenced to six months in prison, but released on bail.

While threats and attacks against journalists happen almost every day in Bangladesh, the country’s journalists have shown a strong will to resist such threats and to protest against them. On different occasions this year, journalists throughout Bangladesh took to the streets to protest violence against the media; sadly, these demonstrations often lead to further violence.

In one of these cases, on 29 May, over 20 journalists were assaulted by BNP members during a demonstration taking place in the city of Kushtia. According to reports, BNP activists threw bricks, sticks and chairs at the 150 journalists who staged the demonstration in support of three journalists who had received threats from a BNP MP.

Hasan Jahid, a correspondent for the daily Manabzamin, Munshi Tariqul Islam, correspondent for the daily Shamokal, and Al Mamun Sagor, correspondent for the daily Jugantor, had been forced to flee Kushtia on 10 May following threats by MP Shahidul Islam after they published articles criticising the MP.

The journalists were returning to Kushtia on 29 May. Shahidul Islam also brought legal actions against them, claiming they tried to extort money from him in return for a promise not to print the articles. The three journalists denied such allegations and said they were being targeted because they exposed Islam’s alleged corruption.

On 3 June, about 60 people staged a counter protest in Dhaka, claiming to be victims of extortion and beatings by Islam supporters. According to the Daily Star, the protesters, mostly employees and supporters of the BNP, demanded Islam’s expulsion from the party and his arrest.

On 30 May, BNP members attacked the offices of a printing press, damaging the press, threatening employees and seizing documents. The editors of the daily Dainik Andolaner Bazar, which was being printed at Quality Press when the office was attacked, suspended publication fearing threats to staff safety, according to CPJ. Local media said that MP Shahidul Islam was behind the attack; however, he later denied any responsibility.

On 31 May, police injured eight journalists during a demonstration in which a group of journalists marched from the Satkhira Press Club to the courts to protest the attack on Dainik Andolaner Bazar and demand the arrest and persecution of those responsible for it.

At the end of November, another BNP member, Hazi Mujib, reportedly threatened to kill Subrata Deb Roy Sanjay, a journalist for Dainik Khabor and Dainik Sylheter Dak, because of Sanjay’s reports on Mujib’s alleged illegal business affairs. In recent years, Mujib has filed two defamation cases against Sanjay. Police did not react to the alleged death threats.

Journalists working in Bangladesh are not only attacked by BNP members and BNP activists, there are many other groups that harass journalists and media outlets whose reporting they dislike. Impunity is a major problem in Bangladesh and the main reason for the continued attacks.

In this light, the 16 November European Parliament resolution urging Bangladesh authorities "to put an end to the climate of impunity and to bring to justice the perpetrators of violence and harassment directed towards journalists" is welcome. The hope is that this kind of international pressure, and the outcome of the forthcoming election, will change a situation that has existed in Bangladesh for many years is thin. The world should not ignore the gross human right violations committed against Bangladesh’s over 150 million inhabitants. #

The IPI World Press Freedom Review 2006 is the Vienna-based International Press Institute’s annual review of press freedom in over 180 countries around the world, published on 25 April 2007

http://www.freemedia.at/cms/ipi/freedom_detail.html?country=/KW0001/KW0005/KW0110/

The interim government has no tenacity; Hasina’s exile saga ends with a whimper

A.H. JAFFOR ULLAH

THE military-backed interim government of Bangladesh by now knows only how to roil things up. They undoubtedly deserve a reprimand after messing with Sheikh Hasina’s return to her motherland and Khaleda’s government sponsored exile to Saudi Arabia when she did not want to step outside the country.

The government earned a negative rating after the news came out that Hasina would become a persona non grata as per government's dictum and Khaleda Zia will be shoved from her motherland to become a refugee in the holy land. I could not find any supporters for the government in any cyber forums, which does not bode well for Fakhruddin Administration.

In the last week (April 19 through April 25) the Internet was abuzz with Hasina’s abortive attempt to secure a seat in a Dhaka bound British Airways flight and Khaleda Zia’s silent fight against her forced exile to Saudi Arabia. While Hasina was made voluble by government’s rejection to let her enter Bangladesh, Khaleda became mournful and reticent as she lead a quiet life inside the restricted military zone. Undoubtedly, today’s decision by the government would make both the rivals happy and elated.

There is a sense of relief in Bangladesh and a plethora of newspaper reports all point to that direction. Until the revocation order for Hasina’s exile and Khaleda’s isolation in her house was made public, a pall of gloom descended in Bangladesh’s sky. To make the matter worse, Hasina mentioned in sympathetic language the plight of her archrival, Khaleda. Immediately, the BNP reacted positively and some leader even commented that the two largest party would jointly fight against the military-backed interim government for easing political activities and holding parliamentary election. Perhaps the government took into cognizance the verbal threat as a real one and that hastened the decision by the government to lift the ban against both Hasina and Khaleda.

The government has certainly helped to elevate the stature of both Hasina and Khaleda and in retrospect it was not a wise move by the government to force the two leaders into exile a la Benazir Bhutto and Mia Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan. After today’s event, the government gave the impression that things are in disarray and it has lost the focus. Another big question looms everywhere in Bangladesh - who is in control? Did army take the hard-line position? Is the civilian government making the final decision after army is messing things up with their hard-line position concerning dynastical nature of the main political parties?

The two advisers, Mainul Hosein and MA Matin, who earned enough bad reputation, should go into hiding for few days to cool things off. These two advisers have diminished their reputation by saying contradictory things with 24 hours. Were they expressing the views of the civilian government or the military? These are the questions that went unanswered. The chief adviser, Fakhruddin Ahmed, would do a great favour to his administration if he sidelines the two vocal advisers for the time being. For they have created enough miasmas and those did not help at all to establish a sense of fair play by the government in respect to Hasina or Khaleda.

Of all politicians, Sheikh Hasina was in an enviable position because she was getting an audience and sympathetic ear wherever she went in America or Great Britain. Especially in England she met quite a few British MPs and she told them in clear and straightforward language about her plights in the hands of the military-backed interim government.

In summary, the interim government of Bangladesh has earned some bad reputation as it tried to block Sheikh Hasina’s return to her motherland; it also tried in vain to hasten the departure of Khaleda Zia to Saudi Arabia. The government’s ill-conceived plan fell flat and all it saw was resistance from all sides. The Bush and Blair government uttered some harsh word and the government became scared stiff and finally backed down from their original plan to oust both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia from their respective party by inducing them to seek exile. This plan did not materialize and it simply fizzled up giving a black eye to the interim government. So whose reputation and image was tarnished? Fakhruddin Administration should learn a thing or two from this exile fiasco. First, do not pay any attention to the Kurmitola crowd and second, muzzle in both Mainul Hosein and MA Matin because their unbridled remarks are earning this administer more foes than friends. #

Dr. A.H. Jaffor Ullah, a researcher and columnist, writes from New Orleans, USA

Bangladesh people were let down by Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed

SHABBIR AHMED

THE conspiratorial regime of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) through their usual intrigue led the entire country into chaos and confrontation. One after another, the conspiracies to manipulate the election results and to control the caretaker government through an obedient and obsequious President Dr. Iajuddin Ahmed brought suspicion among the people of Bangladesh. That resulted in the overwhelming participation in the mass demonstration against the tyrannical influence of BNP and JI on the past caretaker government. The main objective was to bring about a drastic change in the government high-up in terms of neutrality, transparency, fairness, and honesty. The BNP and JI leaders/workers/supporters were hell-bent on continuing the status quo so that none of the factors were implemented for ensuring free and fair election. Under this backdrop, emergency rule was imposed, which BNP-JI wanted on their own terms because to them anything but Awami League was fine. It was unfortunate for them that the emergency rule was not established under BNP-JI's terms.

The people of Bangladesh had high expectations from this government under Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed for bringing reforms and necessary changes within a shortest possible time to pave the way for a free and fair election. It was really a good feeling when I watched the first speech of Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed. It was promising, brief but adequate, and inspiring. Most of the time our head of the government delivered speeches so long that sometimes the speeches were annoying. I must say that Dr. Fakhruddin's speech was a new type in Bangladesh, which was brief but eloquent and complete. Naturally, the conscious people both inside and outside Bangladesh expected very high output from his administration such as in terms initiating rule of law, upholding human rights, and ensuring civil norms in the country as a whole. I reckon no government could establish these things fully. They could take initiative in such a way that the successive governments will have to let these processes continue to progress with time. Like me, many conscientious people thought that the present government under Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed would initiate and establish the foundation for these processes.

On the contrary to the expectation of the people, recently a few missteps taken by the government has become a matter of concern for the political future of Bangladesh. Many have already questioned whether Bangladesh is going to follow the path of Pakistan, where ultimately anarchy and religious extremism will grow in the absence of organized deep-rooted liberal democratic parties. The attempt of the government to send Mrs. Khaleda Zia in exile and at the same time preventing Mrs. Sheikh Hasina to enter Bangladesh has not been taken in good spirits by those, who always supported the liberty and human rights of individuals in the country where they were born. In particular, the case of Mrs. Sheikh Hasina is very tragic and sensitive. During the past five years under the rule of BNP-JI, she had to lose many of her party leaders and workers in the hands of the killers aligned to the former rulers. She herself survived critically from a grenade attack.

As one can assume, the first case under the influence of the government was out of the blue. A person by the name Tajul Islam Farook filed a case against Mrs. Sheikh Hasina few days ago for extortion of three crore taka. The case became questionable after being evaluated by a good number of people. Some analysts thought it was not possible for Mr. Farook to deliver that much money in one suitcase. It was not possible for him even to carry the money alone. Especially, it was not possible for someone to deliver the money in a big suitcase in Ganabhaban (Prime Minister's Office) to a sitting Prime Minister. As it appeared, the strategy was later changed by those who wanted to scare Mrs. Sheikh Hasina. A few days later, a murder case was brought against her. That also did not dissuade Mrs. Sheikh Hasina to return to Bangladesh. The resolve of Mrs. Sheikh Hasina to go back to Bangladesh is probably the reason why the policy makers issued letters to the airlines as a last ditch effort for not carrying her to Dhaka.

All these things centering the return of Mrs. Sheikh Hasina is occurring while we have a chief of the caretaker government, who inspired many of us (including me) because we thought that Bangladesh was going to be in the hands of a well-educated, well-experienced, and well-articulated person. It was our expectation that the rule of law and basic rights of all individuals would be honoured. Unfortunately, our hopes are vanishing fast as we observe the dealings of the government with Mrs. Sheikh Hasina and Mrs. Khaleda Zia in a totally unlawful manner. Especially, Mrs. Sheikh Hasina has been denied her basic rights to go back and defend herself in the court of law. On one hand, the government is filing cases but on the other hand, the same government is not allowing her to go back. In fact, the government should let her go back so that the law enforcement agencies can take steps against her and at the same time she can take steps to defend the charges against her. This is not what we are observing now. Instead, we observe the unlawful and contradictory steps taken by the government under none but Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed, whom the people trusted with high esteem.

As it appears, the policy has been adopted following the steps taken by the military rulers of Pakistan. In Bangladesh, our people are more conscious and more mature politically than the people of Pakistan. Bangladesh was born by fighting against a regime that suppressed the basic democratic rights of the people. The same people are fighting again and again for the same cause. If the basic democratic rights of the leaders are not honoured, then it is obvious that the rights of the common people are going to be violated. We may not agree on the corrupt policies adopted by Mrs. Khaleda Zia but we cannot support her deportation under pressure to any other country. Similarly, we cannot support the obstruction against Mrs. Sheikh Hasina on her return to her country. It is so frustrating that a number of highly contradictory steps violating human rights were taken by the government, wittingly, under Dr. Fakhruddin from whom we expected a lot of thing to achieve. For good reasons, many do not expect very high from the political leaders. Are we getting better from an esteemed well-educated Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed? Then, why do the snobbish educated gentlemen always blame the politicians? #

Shabbir Ahmed writes from USA and he could be contacted shabbirahmed2000@yahoo.com

Bangladesh political history of exile

HIRANMAY KARLEKAR

I had thought of not writing on Bangladesh for a while but then the stars seemed to have willed otherwise. On April 22, Sheikh Hasina, who had then an arrest warrant for murder - since stayed by a court - issued against her, was not allowed to board a British Airways flight from London to Dhaka. Bangladesh's caretaker Government, the airline's authorities reportedly told her, would not allow the plane to land if she was on it. With the report that Begum Khaleda Zia's impending exile was delayed by the unavailability of an 'appropriate' flight, delay in getting visas, and uncertainty about the Government finding ways to fund her stay abroad, questions pertaining to Bangladesh's political future have again sprung to the fore.

Neither development - provided Begum Zia is despatched into exile - was entirely unexpected. Many in Bangladesh's civil society and public spheres have held for a long time that the rivalry between the two leaders was destroying Bangladesh and both parties should throw up other, more rational leaders. Understandably, moves are under way for doing precisely that. But then, it is one thing for the civil society and business leaders to wish, and quite another for the wish to be fulfilled. By all accounts, the enterprise is having trouble getting off the ground. Hence, according to the proverbial knowledgeable sources, the 'Operation Exile'.

While the fate of the operation remains to be seen, the question arises: Is the present regime trying no more than pushing the two leaders abroad? Is the military, as the Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen Moin U Ahmed, said at a gathering of civil administration and civil society leaders and journalists at Bandarban cantonment on February 8, merely helping it to put Bangladesh back on the "right track through the concerted efforts of all"? His assertion on the same occasion that the Army had no intention of capturing power, has lost some of its credibility following his reading of the keynote address - 'The Challenging Interface of Democracy and Security' - at a regional conference of the International Political Science Association in Dhaka on April 2. He said in the paper that Bangladesh would have to construct its own brand of democracy recognising its own social, historical and cultural conditions with religion being one of the several components of its national identity.

According to the General, "own brand of democracy" meant a system marked by a balance among the powers of the Government, President and Prime Minister ensuring transparency, accountability and a sense of responsibility. Terming the armed forces as a "silent partner" of the people, he also said that power should not be concentrated in the hands of a dynasty or a party. "I believe the aspiring democratic process of Bangladesh and the current transition period allow us an opportunity to develop a new concept and find a new sense of direction to the future politics of Bangladesh," he said.

The impression that a drastic systemic overhaul is underway is clearly conveyed by the war against corruption, crime and violence that the Government seems to have launched and the tall poppies that have been felled. The ability of authoritarian governments to change societies root and branch through surgical operations from above is, however, rather limited. Peter the Great and Kemal Ataturk, for example, could not modernise Russia and Turkey respectively. Since it will not be easy for the present Government to meet the high expectations it has aroused among the people, discontent is bound to grow and, over a time, lead to political protest. This is all the more likely to happen because, Lt Gen Moin U Ahmed's talk revived memories of Field Marshal Ayub Khan's concept of a "basic democracy" and President Soekarno of Indonesia's concept of a "guided democracy". While the former was dubbed - and rightly so - as a "basic fraud", the latter bore the stamp of Soekarno's own "guidance" rather than of democracy. Both established authoritarian orders which failed.

The impression that the present regime is striking roots and is seeking to craft a political order different from a parliamentary one is suggested by the uncertainties that now prevail over the holding of parliamentary elections in Bangladesh. In his maiden address to the nation over radio and television on January 21, Mr Fakhruddin Ahmed, who had assumed office as Chief Adviser to the caretaker Government on January 12, pledged to transfer power to an elected Government at the earliest through holding a free, fair and credible general election after reconstituting the Election Commission (EC) and preparing a flawless electoral roll. While he did not mention any timeframe, the emphasis was clearly on holding the election at the earliest. Chief Election Commissioner Shamsul Huda, however, said on April 5 that no election would be held before at least 18 months, the time required for preparing voters lists and photo identity cards. He could not say whether the election would be held immediately after 18 months as there would be a lot of other things to do, including the creation of a congenial atmosphere for the poll.

Mr Ahmed has doubtless provided a definite indication of sorts when he said during his second address to the nation on April 12, "I would like to categorically state that the present caretaker Government will not stay in power a day longer than it is necessary. I strongly believe, it will be possible to hold the much-awaited parliamentary election before the end of 2008". If things work according to schedule, the next parliamentary election will be held almost two years after the present caretaker Government took over on January 11, 2007. Much has happened since then and much will no doubt happen before 2008 is over.

New Delhi needs to watch the situation carefully - particularly whether the caretaker Government curbs the continuing illegal migration from Bangladesh and departs from the earlier Government's policy of fomenting insurrection and terrorism in north-eastern India - and not go overboard in welcoming it. Civilian Governments propped by military power generally prove to be ephemeral. In Bangladesh, Lt Gen Ziaur Rahman had no trouble removing Khandkar Mushtaq Ahmed and Abu Sayem as President and becoming President himself. Nor did Lt Gen HM Ershad have any problem following the example after defenestrating Presidents Abdul Sattar and AFM Ahsanuddin Chowdhury. While hoping for the best, India needs to strictly follow a policy of quid pro quo with the present regime in Bangladesh. It must retain bargaining chips for future contingencies, particularly since the Bangladesh Army now has a substantial Islamist component and it is no stranger to coups. #

Hiranmay Karlekar is a columnist for The Pioneer, New Delhi, India

http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnist1.asp?main_variable=Columnist&file_name=karlekar%2Fkarlekar126.txt&writer=karlekar

Bangladesh: Democracy Saved or Sunk?

JALAL ALAMGIR

Many in Bangladesh are relieved that the military stepped in to liberate them from political chaos. But this move has set the country on a slippery slope to authoritarian rule. In the long run, the best formula for success is to build Bangladesh into a showcase for democracy in the Islamic world.

On January 11, Bangladesh began yet another tumultuous political transformation. A caretaker government backed by the military took over power, declared a state of emergency, and postponed national elections. Most Bangladeshis sighed relief.

Within weeks, the newly installed government began a “war” against corruption, arresting scores of top politicians in dramatic midnight raids and sending them straight to prison. Most Bangladeshis became exuberant, and many are demanding summary trials for the corrupt.

While stressing that democracy needs to be restored eventually, foreign diplomats also cheered on the new government’s assertive line. The British High Commissioner said he was “pleased with the approach that was taken,” and more recently, the U.S. assistant secretary of state said his country was “strongly supportive of the reform steps.” After a 16-year experiment with democracy, Bangladesh’s return to authoritarianism feels to many like a refreshing change.

It wasn’t always like this. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations used to hail Bangladesh as an example to the rest of the Islamic world: a moderate Muslim democracy. As recently as 2002, public support for democracy was overwhelming in the country, as several surveys showed. Bangladesh enjoyed secular institutions and a growing economy. It held regular elections, and power rotated between the two major parties, the center-right Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the center-left Awami League. But, despite the public’s commitment to democratic institutions, contempt was growing against the many politicians who regularly subverted those institutions.

That contempt peaked toward the end of BNP’s 2001–06 tenure. The party’s reign had been anything but democratic. With its Islamist allies, it had gone on a rampage against political and religious minorities. Its feared paramilitary force, the Rapid Action Battalion, operated with impunity, and extrajudicial deaths jumped to nearly 400 in 2005, a 20-fold increase from the average during the Awami League administration (1996–2001). Corruption had become so rampant that Transparency International rated Bangladesh as the most corrupt country in the world four out of the last five years. Extortion was commonplace, especially for businesses. Some could not even pay their utility bills without bribing someone. Gruesome terrorist attacks took place, but the cases went mysteriously unsolved. Finally, BNP tried to rig the January 2007 elections, a move that was protested en masse by the opposition, and the country came to a standstill. That’s when the military intervened.

With these conditions, Bangladeshis could be forgiven for welcoming their new military rulers with open arms. After the chaos of the past six years, who can blame them?

The new caretaker government’s stated goal is to “save” democracy by ensuring “a level playing field” before holding elections. In the process, it wants to change the system comprehensively, involving everything from how political parties operate, to the authority of the courts, to the balance of power between the president and the prime minister, to even considering a “National Charter” to rival the Constitution.

All this is a familiar refrain. From Burma and Pakistan in the 1950s to Thailand or Fiji in 2006, saving democracy or saving the nation through enacting large-scale reforms has been the common pretext for authoritarian power grabs. Bangladesh itself experienced such takeovers in 1975, 1977, and 1982.

Already, there are troubling signs that the country’s new authoritarian order may be more than just temporary. The caretaker government’s drive to “clean up” politics has reached far beyond the top rungs of power. As of early April, more than 70 people have been killed extrajudicially. More than 100,000 people— many of them mid-level workers of various political parties—have been detained so far, often without charges, and thousands more are being added every day in what amounts to a massive political purge.

To speed up the process, the government has substantially increased its authority to arrest without charges, deny bail, and conduct summary trials. It has curtailed the right of citizens to appeal its verdicts. Military personnel now head most of the important administrative committees, such as the Anti-Corruption Commission. A powerful National Security Council is in the works that will allow authorities to interpret political issues as security issues.

As for elections, the civilian face of the government has dismissed any possibility of holding them in the next year and a half. The Army chief has gone much farther, declaring outright in a recent speech, “We do not want to go back to an elective democracy,” and proposing that some kind of a homegrown system be devised as an alternative.

This is exactly what Islamists, happy to see the principle of popular sovereignty eviscerated, want to hear. But a homegrown system could be disastrous for both national and regional stability. Accustomed to political freedom, Bangladeshis would eventually resist authoritarianism, ushering in another round of violent conflict.

This unsavory outcome can only be nipped through continuous pressure on the temporary government. But because political activity is banned and fundamental rights are suspended, it’s up to outside powers to take the lead, especially in four key areas.

First, Western diplomats should keep pressing the government to announce an election date soon. The caretaker government is going well beyond its initial mandate of organizing elections. It is making major policy decisions that should be the preserve of an elected government.

Second, international organizations and trading partners should resist the urge to cut easy deals. Sensing quick wins, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank are pushing policy reform initiatives, while individual countries, like India and China are dangling lucrative business agreements. Big contracts signed away from the public eye will reopen doors for corruption.
Third, Britain, the United States, and the European Union should insist that the government restore fundamental rights. Its current path of rule by fiat threatens to destroy the very political and legal institutions that need to be revived from the damage wrought on them in the last six years.

Finally, Western powers should support the democratic process and resist the urge to pick preordained winners. The entry of Dr. Muhammad Yunus, the microfinance pioneer and Nobel Peace laureate, who wants to form a political party in which power would be decentralized, has shaken up the dinosaurs of BNP and Awami League. The ongoing political purge will improve his electoral prospects. Some, however, want to hold off elections in favor of an appointed, Palestinian-style “national unity government.” More extreme would be a Pakistan-style outcome, in which a secular military dictatorship acts as a U.S. ally in its war on terror. As tempting as these options may be, the West must let Bangladeshis decide for themselves through free elections, held reasonably soon. For a working democracy that protects fundamental rights would be a much better showcase for the larger Islamic world than another pliable regime whose domestic legitimacy is becoming increasingly questionable. #

This article was first published in FOREIGN POLICY magazine, April 2007

Jalal Alamgir is assistant professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts, Boston

Islamic militancy in Bangladesh can remember its geometry

RIPAN KUMAR BISWAS

A shape memory alloy is a metal that remembers its geometry. After a sample of smart alloy has been deformed from its original atomic configuration, it regains its original geometry by itself during heating or, at higher ambient temperatures, simply during unloading (pseudo-elasticity or super elasticity).

If a car made of this kind of metal was damaged in a collision, its outer shell could be restored after being heated in boiling water.

Islamic militancy in Bangladesh is just like metal memory which can be regained its original geometry by itself in any where, anytime.

Or it can be better described as amoeba that can change its shape anytime according to its necessity.

The recent execution of six top label Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) kingpins on March 30, 2007 didn’t uproot the Islamic fundamentalism from the country. Speakers in a seminar on April 11, 2007 titled 'Militancy in Bangladesh: Against Democracy, Rule of Law and the Spirit of Liberation War,’ organized by Bangladesh Heritage Foundation and Democracy and Human Rights Research at Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs auditorium, mentioned that the Islamic militant activities are still running in full swing in every corner of Bangladesh. Hijbut Tahrir, Hijbe Abu Omar, Hijbut Tawhid, Al Ferdous or Party of Allah. These are some active Islamic militancy organizations after JMB.

According to the intelligence sources, JMB cadres are regrouping to carry out their organizational activities under the leadership of Hannan Uddin and Mawlana Mohiuddin Faruki in different names like Hijbut Tahrir, Hijbe Abu Omar and Hijbut Tawhid in the southern part of Bangladesh, Barisal.

Both the leaders are returnees from Afghan war and explosives experts.

In an another nabbing, police in Gaibanda district arrested 17 militants of Party of Allah from Mouja Malibari village of Maibari union on April 7, 2007.

Islami Biplobi Command council, a Chittagong based Islamic militancy organization; recently send a death threat to a correspondent of a national daily for his exclusive reporting about their activities.

Actually, around 100 Islamic militancy groups are active across the country. They usually come in front line when they need.

Some times they change their way of work, their dressing, their address or their identity.Even their family member can hardly figure out their works and activities.

On April 11, 2007, security forces in Bangladesh arrested a senior leader of JMB from Goalkandi Bazar in Bagmara upazila, Rajsahahi.

The arrestee, Mokarram Ali, was involved providing trainings to use bomb and arms to JMB cadres while Abul Kalam Azad was arrested from Cox's Bazar for his suspicious movement.

A number of Islamic militants of Hizbut Touhid including a unit chief Anisur Rahman were arrested at Gangni upazila, Meherpur on April 13, 2007. Like those arrestees, around 1,200 trained cadres of Hizbut Touhid are active in greater Kushtia including Kushtia, Meherpur, Chuadanga and Jhenidah. Most of them are madrasa students or imams of mosques and they are operating their militancy under cover of Tabliq Jamaat (proselytizing group). Abdur Rashid, a JMB leader of Hamirkutsa village of Rajshahi, was arrested for attempting murder of Sripur union Chairman Makbul Hossain and police assault on April 9, 2007. And the numbers of arrestees are increasing day by day in every corner of Bangladesh. On April 6, 2007, law enforcement agencies arrested 10 militants of a newly formed Islamic militant group called Hijbe Abu Omar from their dens in the capital Dhaka, (southern) Barisal and northern Bhaluka town. According to the arrestees, they formed new group after deserting the Islamic militant group Harkatul Jihad which were responsible for a spate of bombings at cinemas and non-governmental organization offices in Bangladesh. They do kidnapping to raise their funds and their militants are usually sent to battlegrounds abroad with an aim to become strong militants. Very few may dare to take any steps against Islamic militancy groups after observing the recent killing of the public prosecutor (PP) of Jhalakathi District Judge's Court and chief counsel of the case filed against JMB militants for killing two Jhalakathi judges Advocate Hyder Hossain on April 11, 2007. He reportedly told to the law enforcement agencies about the threats he was receiving after execution of six top level militants at different jails on March 30, 2007. Meanwhile, both the families of senior assistant judges Jagannath Pandey and Sohel Ahmed who were killed in a suicide bomb attack at Purba Chadkati in Jhalakathi town on November 14, 2005 by JMB militants are getting numerous threats from different Islamic militancy groups. Their daily lives are becoming more hectic and dangerous after seeing the end of Hyder Hossian. Having power to restore its original geometry at any time, any where is irrelevant to its original source. And the sources are almost known to see.

High profile politicians, Islamic parties, Islamic NGOs, Foreign Aids or even some personnel from law enforcement agencies are patronizing the Islamic militancy in Bangladesh. Their training camps are being financed by Middle Eastern charities and organizations and some local financial institutes. Jamaat-e-Islami at present controls around 60 percent mosques and mosque-based educational facilities in the country. The party has already set up at least one madrasa in every village to provide Islamic education. In addition, Bangladesh has dense jungle and highly populated urban areas which allow radical Islamists to hide their training and operations from sophisticated surveillance and help to protect them from the threat of capture- elaborate escape and evasion plans are enforced.

It is a laboratory for the disastrous consequences of Islamist participation in the democratic process.

Operating in this labyrinthine environment, terrorist trainees have developed elaborate escape and evasion plans.

They have systematically developed their organizational structure so that they can change their shape any time, any where like amoeba or can restore their geometric shape after any destruction like memory metal. #

Ripan Kumar Biswas is a freelance writer based in New York
Ripan.Biswas@yahoo.com