ZIA HASSAN
For many people who had
lost their near and dear ones during the bloody birth of the nation, the
scars were too deep to let go so easily. It was aggravated by the fact
that the 195 Pakistani military officials primarily accused of genocide were
never tried. It was further compounded by the fact that the key collaborators
of the war crimes were eventually mainstreamed into national politics and even
served as ministers during the regime of current opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
The issue of justice for 1971 has long been a
contentious one in Bangladeshi politics. Many believed that Bangladesh
A war crimes tribunal to
bring the collaborators to justice was thought to be one of the key steps in
that direction. It was in the election manifesto of the ruling party - a
promise that motivated a lot of young people to vote for them.
Hijacked revolution
However, two years into
the process, many now believe the tribunal to be vulnerable to outside
interventions in an attempt to convert the case into a political weapon for the
ruling party. This, together with the resultant violence that ravaged the country,
have now left a lot of people confused and wondering what they were fighting
for in the first place.
At the same time, the
controversies have also given rise to a group of hard core Bengali nationalists
who are willing to turn a blind eye to the systematic corruption and
manipulation of the election system to secure another term for The
Awami League (AL).
As they are aware, the tribunal might get dismantled and the accused freed if
the opposition BNP and its ally Jamat-e-Islami ascend to power - a possibility they
are not willing to accept.
In such a situation, the
lines between politics, judiciary, election and justice are increasingly
getting blurred. The whole population now appears to be ideologically
divided into two distinct camps - for and against the tribunal.
It all looked distinctly
different back in February.
The urban youth gathered
in Shahbag square to protest against the verdict awarded
to Kader Mollah, one of the key accused. They thought the verdict - life
imprisonment, which they considered to be too lenient - indicated that the
government may be conducting secret negotiations with Jamat-e-Islami. It
appeared, apart from a handful of hard core Jamat-e-Islami supporters, that
there was a broad unanimity in Bangladesh
The movement which
clearly was anti-establishment in nature, very soon played into the hands of
the political parties.
Though water bottles
were hurled at government ministers who tried to gain entrance to the
centre-stage in the first few days, the ruling party found a way to infiltrate
the movement with the assistance of some faithful party cultural
figureheads in no time and started dictating its agenda. The crowd started
dispersing.
When the Awami captured
Shahbag, BNP opposed it. Mahmudur Rahman, the firebrand editor of the national
daily, The Amar Desh [Be], led the way to label the
movement as one against Islam, organised by atheists.
Subsequent events led to
the emergence of Hefajot-e-Islam, a religious group formed by madrassas
scholars in protest against the defamation of the prophet - written by a slain
blogger who was an activist in the Shahbag movement.
Divided opinions
Bangladesh witnessed
further bloodshed across the country in which more than 400 lives were lost and
it swung from crisis to crisis leading up to this month when the tenure of the
Awami government ended and it refused to hand over power to a caretaker
government citing a constitutional requirement, bringing another set of violent
conflicts with the opposition and its allies.
Last week, Kader Mollah
was executed after his appeal was turned down by the country’s Supreme Court.
Jamat-e-Islami claims
that there are a number of inconsistencies in the judgement of Kader Mollah and
other trials. Few doubt the involvement of Jamat-e-Islam in the genocide
that took place in 1971. However, many are now unwilling to side with the
government in what they believe to be a systematic targeting of top tier
leadership of Jamat-e-Islami in exclusion of some of the Awami leaders that
have been accused of being collaborators as well.
Public opinion has also
been influenced by the revelations of irregularities through the hacking of a
Skype account of one of the judges and the eagerness of the Awami to divide the
electorate into pro and anti-liberation forces based on their support of the
Awami League.
To many people, the
timing of the execution and alacrity in its proceedings indicate the
government’s willingness to use the tribunal for political gains. The exigency
was interpreted as the government’s need to have at least one execution before
the election.
The Awami league is
preparing for an election which the chief opposition party deems too partisan
to participate in 151 AL
Meanwhile, a series of
countrywide blockades imposed by the opposition is disrupting the country’s
entire economy due to the limited flow of goods. About 150 lives have been lost
in last two months in ensuing violence.
Support for
Jamat-e-Islami still comes with a stigma in the country, especially in the
urban middle class population. But, if you follow the comments section
below articles of the leading media - you will find Jamat-e-Islami is making a
stunning comeback by accumulating sympathy. The alleged irregularities of the
trial and public perception of it seem to have turned the party into a victim,
from a party which was always considered a pariah and one with blood in its
hands.
Yet a large number of
the population will object to this view. For them Jamat-e-Islami and its
leaders are known war criminals who need to be punished at any cost. They
have a valid argument which must be judged against the particular context of Bangladesh
Procedural flaws
The country’s judiciary
has been politicised since its inception. Jamat-e-Islami and its leadership
have had ample chances to hide their criminal tracks, especially as they have
been in power through an alliance. Lack of documentation makes it quite
difficult to conclusively incriminate anyone after 42 years. Many of the
witnesses have now passed away. But, the stories of the crimes have carried on
for generations and many were reported in the media, years after the war.
Hence, the trial has to depend on circumstantial evidence and sole witnesses or
witnesses who were very young at the time the crimes took place.
Under
such circumstances, some of the most ardent supporters of the tribunal
might find it justifiable to bend the rules. It might appal a law student, but
this is a country where most people give whole-hearted support to the
extra-judicial killings of top criminals as they know the criminals would
otherwise escape justice by securing bail from the court where it is very
common for a case to be unresolved for 20 years.
Therefore, we see people
who consider the atrocities too severe to be forgiven and want nothing but
death penalty for the accused war criminals to redeem the collective national
shame of letting them avoid punishment this long.
As mentioned above, a
big part of the population seems to be disagreeing with this
viewpoint. Not because they consider procedural flaws to be the ultimate
sin for a Bangladeshi court, but because they are disgruntled about the
government’s attempt to use the war crimes tribunal to cover up heavy
corruption and the systematic looting of national wealth. In the meantime,
supporters of Jamat-e-Islam maintain that their leaders are being tried only
because of their support of Islamist politics.
The country appears to
be deeply divided and this division has now transcended politics and
descended into society, aided by the media.
The media, which mostly
constitutes the culturally educated urbanites, are vociferously taking a side
against the alleged war criminals. They are also conveniently ignoring the
instances of shooting on the protesters by law enforcement agencies.They are
choosing to ignore the multiple dynamics of the debate that is ravaging the
country.
Apart from a small
number of indigenous peoples living in hill tracts, Bangladesh
Many people believed the
war crimes tribunal will allow the country to get rid of the ghosts of the
past. But it now appears the willingness to use the tribunal as a political
tool has created a chasm among the population. The attempt at getting rid of
the ghost may haunt the country for many years to come.
First published in AlJazeera, December 25, 2013
Zia Hassan is a
political and cultural analyst. He writes in local and international blogs and
social media outlets
No comments:
Post a Comment