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Showing posts with label indigenous peoples' rights. Show all posts
Showing posts with label indigenous peoples' rights. Show all posts

Friday, June 09, 2023

Indigenous People in Bangladesh Suffer as Government Drags Feet


SALEEM SAMAD

25 years ago, ethnic militias fighting in Bangladesh’s southeastern forest hills agreed to lay down their arms against the state in exchange for concessions of self-governance and land rights. To date, the government has not made good on its promises, leaving many ethnic minority farmers stranded, unable to reclaim the farmland on which they once made their livelihoods.

In the hill forest districts of Bangladesh, known collectively as the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), the inhabitants continue to suffer in agony. Many of these indigenous peoples speak Sino-Tibetan languages and practice Buddhist, Hindu, or other local religions, traits which set them apart as a minority in largely Indo-Aryan-speaking and Muslim Bangladesh. They are suffering because the government has not complied with the peace accord, celebrated at the time, which it signed 25 years ago with armed militias seeking autonomy in the region.

The United People’s Party of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (PCJSS), the political high command of the mainly Chakma, Marma, and Tripura guerillas called the Shanti Bahini (“Peace Force”), signed a peace accord with the government of Sheikh Hasina on 2 December 1997. The historic CHT Peace Accord brought to an end a protracted insurgency of more than two decades, a bush war that had cost many lives and livelihoods in southeast Bangladesh.

Parliament quickly ratified the accord, and the surrender of the combatants and their ordinance quickly followed. Finally, thousands of ethnic refugees, until then languishing in squalid camps in the neighboring Indian state of Tripura, were able to come home.

Implementation is taking forever

However, PCJSS leader Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma, known as Shantu Larma, lamented that this silver jubilee is nothing to celebrate. The government has not been willing to implement it. Unfortunately, a quarter of a century after the signing of the accord, a peace audit claims that only 25 provisions and 18 clauses have been partially implemented, out of 72 provisions.

While the government celebrates the anniversary of the proclaimed peace, full-fledged governing councils have not been formed through direct elections, as promised by the peace accord, in any of the CHT’s three districts. The interim councils were formed with hand-picked ruling party members, mostly ethnic Bengalis from outside of the region and a few ethnic minority members. The government remains conspicuously silent when the implementation of the fundamental provisions of the accord is raised.

In spite of these headwinds, Shantu Larma is hopeful that the accord will see the light of day by its golden jubilee, if not earlier. And so it must, for unless the peace accord, signed during the first term of Sheikh Hasina’s government, is put into reality, peace will remain elusive for the indigenous peoples of these beautiful hills.

In the last 25 years, the CHT Peace Accord Implementation Committee has held only six meetings. This is a reflection of the government’s lack of seriousness.

Larma remains loyal to the Prime Minister, who is now in her fourth term. He argues that as she made a sincere political commitment to getting the peace deal inked and ratified, so will she surely strive to make progress in implementing the accord.

However, he reminded the national government that the responsibility to implement the peace accord lies with them and with no one else, not PCJSS or the former insurgents. He fears that the delay will cause frustration and anger among the hill people, creating a political divide in the community, especially among young people and students. In the years since the accord, young people have from time to time acted out violently in the hopes of putting pressure on the government to realize the accord’s implementation.

A roadmap to implement the accord to achieve peace was also agreed with the government. Those affected do not understand what is causing the delay in the implementation of the accord.

A history of discrimination

The PCJSS argues that, like previous regimes, the ruling Awami League party has been implementing a policy of Islamization, and, coupled with the crisis, it has intensified militarization in the CHT to completely eradicate the national identity of the hill people. In this, they see the continuation of a long and painful history.

The military dictator General Ziaur Rahman (1977-1981) attempted to Islamize the hill forest and pushed tens of thousands of landless Muslim Bengali settlers from the plains districts to outnumber the local ethnic population.

Parleys with the government’s liaison committee were initiated during the military junta of General Hussain Muhammad Ershad (1982-1990) when he offered an olive branch to the guerillas to surrender. The peace process was entrusted to a small group of immature military officers, who forced the community leaders to sign a halfhearted peace treaty. This treaty was rejected by the Shanti Bahini commanders.

Subsequently, when Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party came to power in 1991, she unilaterally declared a ceasefire in the hills and initiated peace talks with members of parliament. Her regime experienced hiccups as the liaison committee could not spell out a political solution to the crisis. The end result was zero. The dialogue was abruptly abandoned in 1996.

When Sheikh Hasina came to power a year later in 1997, a flurry of peace talks resulted in the CHT Peace Accord after the government recognized the crisis in the hill forest as the political problem it was. The Peace Accord was written with the supreme sacrifice of the blood of the hill peoples and the political vision of the Awami League government, but the effects of Bengali ethnic imperialism still continue.

Thousands of people in Bangladesh, especially those visiting the hill forests as tourists are not aware that de facto military rule continues and that the so-called Operation Uttaran, the government’s offensive, has not been withdrawn, despite what was agreed in the accord.

Rights groups complain that appalling human rights abuses, including illegal detention, extrajudicial deaths, enforced disappearances, legal harassment, and attacks against the hill people by Bengali settlers continued without any respite. The members of the CHT Citizens’ Council, an outfit of the Bengali settlers, have gained notoriety for forced conversion of native girls to Islam, kidnapping for ransom, looting of produce from native farmers, land grabbing, and other crimes. Human rights organizations have recorded evidence from parents and guardians that indigenous children have been taken away by force and admitted to madrasas (Islamic schools) in other areas of the country and converted to Islam without the knowledge of their parents.

Native administrations disempowered

The authorities are presently making systematic efforts at forced demographic transformation of the region—further marginalizing the natives who have protected the hill forest, the flora and fauna for centuries.

Law and order, police, land and land management, forest and environment conservation, communication infrastructure development, and other competencies stipulated by the accord have not been handed over to the district councils. Alas, district police forces have not been formed. And despite the decision of the Accord Implementation Committee, the jurisdiction to issue “Permanent Resident Certificates,” vital for the recognition of indigenous identity and of the incumbent rights to vote and to receive restitution according to the peace agreement, has not been turned over to the native administrations as promised.

It is an ongoing tragedy that the refugees who have returned from India have not yet gotten their land back, in violation of the accord. Internally displaced refugees have regained their land either, Mangal Kumar Chakma recently wrote in The Daily Star.

The list of permanent residents of the three hill districts, who are the ones eligible to vote there, has not yet been prepared, again despite the accord’s mandate. Even the electoral rules and election rules for the hill district councils have not been formulated.

This undemocratic and partisan path sends the wrong message to the hill people, demonstrating the government’s dearth of political commitment. The land occupation and eviction of ethnic minorities remain an apple of discord between the Bengalis settled and protected by the military and the ethnic nationalities of the hill forests. The hill people are constantly losing their lands and being evicted from their homesteads in the absence of a functional CHT Land Commission and with the sluggish progress of the implementation of the peace accord.

The Land Commission mandated under the CHT Peace Accord has not progressed at all. The commission was supposed to demarcate the ancestral lands of the minorities to establish their legal rights against encroachers. So far, the light at the end of the tunnel still appears distant.

First published in the FairObserver.com @myfairobserver, 9 June 2023

Saleem Samad is an award-winning independent columnist and media rights defender based in Bangladesh. He became an Ashoka Fellow in 1991, and won the Hellman-Hammett Award in 2005

Monday, January 16, 2023

“Adivasis Drowning In Abject Poverty”


SALEEM SAMAD

A rosy picture of national ethnic people dancing and singing adorned in traditional ethnic dress in most national events, cultural programmes on state-run television, Pahari (hill people) ethnic food festivals and recruitment in government jobs is not the true story of the life, livelihood and visibility of the Adivasis in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh has 50 different national minorities. They have distinctive languages, cultures and practices which they inherited from their ancestors. The Adivasis are inhabitants in forests in the plainland and the hill forests in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT).

Left-leaning lawmaker Fazle Hossain Badsha agreed to disagree with leading development economist Prof Abul Barakat on his policy research on the status of Adivasi. He remarked that they should not be bracketed as a disadvantaged or vulnerable population, which does not reflect the real status of the national minorities.

Badsha without hesitation said, the Adivasis are drowning in abject poverty and pushed toward vulnerability by the majoritarian but stopped short of mentioning ‘Bangalee Muslims’ as the devil.

They have adopted several “survival strategies” to combat hunger and poverty from environmentally friendly exploitation of nature, the lawmaker observed.

Well, the lawmaker agreed with Prof Barakat that Adivasis are losing their forest rights, are traditionally conservators of forests, access to farm in khas (public) lands, and clumsy land acquisition formalities have pushed the Adivasis further into vulnerability to survive on a bare minimum.

Dr Barakat shared his findings from a policy study on the ‘Study of Budget Allocation and Budget Spent for Development of Ethnic People (CHT and Plainland) in Bangladesh’, a research conducted by the Human Development Research Centre (HDRC) and funded by Manusher Jonno Foundation on 15 January at CIRDAP Auditorium.

The economist said two-thirds of the Adivasis are caught in a functionally landless category. The poverty index argues that 60 per cent of the national minorities are very poor.

The national budget is more than a statement of allocation for the development of economic and social sectors. But the ethnic people have been deprived and discriminated against historically, admitted the study.

The budget allocations for the Adivasi people are too little and too inadequate. A large part of the allocations are not spent for them and they get an insignificant amount from a large pie.

Adivasi people do not get adequate allocations from the national budget. Like all other ordinary and marginalised people, the participation of Adivasis in the budget planning process is absent.

Even their community and national leaders are not approached for any meaningful discussion to assess the real needs and demands.

Some allocations seem to be “not so needful”, while some other priority needs are ignored, most likely due to the absence of consultation with the communities.

The lack of effective monitoring is another stark reality. A portion of the insufficient allocation to the Adivasi is not fully spent due to a lack of accountability. The quality of spending is questionable due to leakage misappropriation by the rent-seekers, mistargeting and other misgovernance issues.

Reviewing the national budget allocation for the Adivasi it is found that an estimated Taka 2,508 crore (1.22 per cent of the Annual Development Plan-ADP) in financial year (FY) 2020-21; and Tk 2,400 crore in FY 21-22.

It could be understood that the allocations decreased in FY 21-22 by Tk 108 crore or 4.34 per cent in nominal terms.

There are some critical but missing allocation line items for the ethnic people for plainland Adivasi people, those include food assistance in ‘monga’ (absence of farm work) months, legal aids for ownership of grabbed land, education in their language, equitable health services, enhancing livelihood endowment, promotion and protection of Adivasi culture and knowledge management,

The critical missing allocation line items for the CHT Adivasi include adequate budget provisions for the land commission, CHT regional council, perspective plan, biodiversity and environmental protection.

Lawmaker Badsha echoed with Dr Barakat that a separate ministry for the plainland Adivasis was recommended. The present Ministry for CHT Affairs could be revamped and made into one ministry for the national minorities, which may have a CHT Division in the newly formed ministry.

An effective Land Commission is very vital for the Adivasi against organised land grabbers, having political clouts. The land grabbers are actively functioning all over the communes of Adivasi regions with impunity.

The land litigations in district courts are another frustration for the Adivasis who lost their ancestral lands to the land grabbers. The worst case scenario is when the state acquires a large portion of lands which belonged to the Adivasis in a bid to develop so-called eco-parks or lease the land to private corporations for the construction of resorts and plantation gardens.

Finally, the study recommends emphasising food security, inclusive development, widen the social net to trap the Adivasis slipping into abject poverty and hunger.

First published in The News Times,January 16, 2023

Saleem Samad, is an award-winning independent journalist, media rights defender, recipient of Ashoka Fellowship and Hellman-Hammett Award. He could be reached at <saleemsamad@hotmail.com>; Twitter @saleemsamad

Saturday, December 28, 2013

How not to do a war crimes tribunal: the case of Bangladesh

The promising start of the tribunals, once thought to bring closure to people, has devolved into power politics.

ZIA HASSAN

For many people who had lost their near and dear ones during the bloody birth of the nation, the scars were too deep to let go so easily. It was aggravated by the fact that the 195 Pakistani military officials primarily accused of genocide were never tried. It was further compounded by the fact that the key collaborators of the war crimes were eventually mainstreamed into national politics and even served as ministers during the regime of current opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).

The issue of justice for 1971 has long been a contentious one in Bangladeshi politics. Many believed that Bangladesh needed a meaningful closure to the trauma of the past in order to move forward.

A war crimes tribunal to bring the collaborators to justice was thought to be one of the key steps in that direction. It was in the election manifesto of the ruling party - a promise that motivated a lot of young people to vote for them.

Hijacked revolution
However, two years into the process, many now believe the tribunal to be vulnerable to outside interventions in an attempt to convert the case into a political weapon for the ruling party. This, together with the resultant violence that ravaged the country, have now left a lot of people confused and wondering what they were fighting for in the first place.

At the same time, the controversies have also given rise to a group of hard core Bengali nationalists who are willing to turn a blind eye to the systematic corruption and manipulation of the election system to secure another term for The Awami League (AL). As they are aware, the tribunal might get dismantled and the accused freed if the opposition BNP and its ally Jamat-e-Islami ascend to power - a possibility they are not willing to accept. 

In such a situation, the lines between politics, judiciary, election and justice are increasingly getting blurred. The whole population now appears to be ideologically divided into two distinct camps - for and against the tribunal.

It all looked distinctly different back in February.

The urban youth gathered in Shahbag square to protest against the verdict awarded to Kader Mollah, one of the key accused. They thought the verdict - life imprisonment, which they considered to be too lenient - indicated that the government may be conducting secret negotiations with Jamat-e-Islami. It appeared, apart from a handful of hard core Jamat-e-Islami supporters, that there was a broad unanimity in Bangladesh about bringing the war criminals to justice.

The movement which clearly was anti-establishment in nature, very soon played into the hands of the political parties.

Though water bottles were hurled at government ministers who tried to gain entrance to the centre-stage in the first few days, the ruling party found a way to infiltrate the movement with the assistance of some faithful party cultural figureheads in no time and started dictating its agenda. The crowd started dispersing.

When the Awami captured Shahbag, BNP opposed it. Mahmudur Rahman, the firebrand editor of the national daily, The Amar Desh [Be], led the way to label the movement as one against Islam, organised by atheists.

Subsequent events led to the emergence of Hefajot-e-Islam, a religious group formed by madrassas scholars in protest against the defamation of the prophet - written by a slain blogger who was an activist in the Shahbag movement. 

Divided opinions
Bangladesh witnessed further bloodshed across the country in which more than 400 lives were lost and it swung from crisis to crisis leading up to this month when the tenure of the Awami government ended and it refused to hand over power to a caretaker government citing a constitutional requirement, bringing another set of violent conflicts with the opposition and its allies.

Last week, Kader Mollah was executed after his appeal was turned down by the country’s Supreme Court.

Jamat-e-Islami claims that there are a number of inconsistencies in the judgement of Kader Mollah and other trials. Few doubt the involvement of Jamat-e-Islam in the genocide that took place in 1971. However, many are now unwilling to side with the government in what they believe to be a systematic targeting of top tier leadership of Jamat-e-Islami in exclusion of some of the Awami leaders that have been accused of being collaborators as well.

Public opinion has also been influenced by the revelations of irregularities through the hacking of a Skype account of one of the judges and the eagerness of the Awami to divide the electorate into pro and anti-liberation forces based on their support of the Awami League. 

To many people, the timing of the execution and alacrity in its proceedings indicate the government’s willingness to use the tribunal for political gains. The exigency was interpreted as the government’s need to have at least one execution before the election.

The Awami league is preparing for an election which the chief opposition party deems too partisan to participate in 151 AL nominees have already been "elected" without a single vote being cast.

Meanwhile, a series of countrywide blockades imposed by the opposition is disrupting the country’s entire economy due to the limited flow of goods. About 150 lives have been lost in last two months in ensuing violence.

Support for Jamat-e-Islami still comes with a stigma in the country, especially in the urban middle class population. But, if you follow the comments section below articles of the leading media - you will find Jamat-e-Islami is making a stunning comeback by accumulating sympathy. The alleged irregularities of the trial and public perception of it seem to have turned the party into a victim, from a party which was always considered a pariah and one with blood in its hands.

Yet a large number of the population will object to this view. For them Jamat-e-Islami and its leaders are known war criminals who need to be punished at any cost. They have a valid argument which must be judged against the particular context of Bangladesh.

Procedural flaws
The country’s judiciary has been politicised since its inception. Jamat-e-Islami and its leadership have had ample chances to hide their criminal tracks, especially as they have been in power through an alliance. Lack of documentation makes it quite difficult to conclusively incriminate anyone after 42 years. Many of the witnesses have now passed away. But, the stories of the crimes have carried on for generations and many were reported in the media, years after the war. Hence, the trial has to depend on circumstantial evidence and sole witnesses or witnesses who were very young at the time the crimes took place.

Under such circumstances, some of the most ardent supporters of the tribunal might find it justifiable to bend the rules. It might appal a law student, but this is a country where most people give whole-hearted support to the extra-judicial killings of top criminals as they know the criminals would otherwise escape justice by securing bail from the court where it is very common for a case to be unresolved for 20 years.

Therefore, we see people who consider the atrocities too severe to be forgiven and want nothing but death penalty for the accused war criminals to redeem the collective national shame of letting them avoid punishment this long.

As mentioned above, a big part of the population seems to be disagreeing with this viewpoint. Not because they consider procedural flaws to be the ultimate sin for a Bangladeshi court, but because they are disgruntled about the government’s attempt to use the war crimes tribunal to cover up heavy corruption and the systematic looting of national wealth. In the meantime, supporters of Jamat-e-Islam maintain that their leaders are being tried only because of their support of Islamist politics.

The country appears to be deeply divided and this division has now transcended politics and descended into society, aided by the media.

The media, which mostly constitutes the culturally educated urbanites, are vociferously taking a side against the alleged war criminals. They are also conveniently ignoring the instances of shooting on the protesters by law enforcement agencies.They are choosing to ignore the multiple dynamics of the debate that is ravaging the country.   

Apart from a small number of indigenous peoples living in hill tracts, Bangladesh is a country of a single race, the Bengalis. The collective mind-set and cultural values have certain homogeneousness which has protected this society from any major conflicts, apart from the ones delivered by feudal party politics. But, that is now set to change.

Many people believed the war crimes tribunal will allow the country to get rid of the ghosts of the past. But it now appears the willingness to use the tribunal as a political tool has created a chasm among the population. The attempt at getting rid of the ghost may haunt the country for many years to come.

First published in AlJazeera, December 25, 2013

Zia Hassan is a political and cultural analyst. He writes in local and international blogs and social media outlets

Friday, May 24, 2013

Bangladesh - Amnesty International Report 2013: The State of the World Human Rights


HUMAN RIGHTS 
KNOW NO BORDERS





Photo: Elite anti-crime team RAB. Rights groups blame RAB for extrajudicial executions and other violation of human rights, but government argues that such incidents have been reduced (but not stopped)



Some 30 extrajudicial executions were reported. State security forces were implicated in torture and other ill-treatment and at least 10 enforced disappearances. Political violence resulted in the death of at least four men. Women continued to be subjected to various forms of violence. The government failed to protect Indigenous communities from attack by Bengali settlers. At least 111 workers died in a factory fire, some allegedly because officials refused to let them leave the premises. More than 20 Buddhist temples and monasteries, one Hindu temple and scores of Buddhist homes and shops were set on fire during a communal attack. One person was executed and at least 45 people were sentenced to death.

Background
In January, the Prime Minister stated that no human rights violations had been committed in the country.

Political violence escalated in December, when opposition parties tried to impose day-long general strikes. At least four people died and dozens of strikers and police sustained injuries. Jamaat-e-Islami demanded the release of their leaders currently being tried on war crimes charges. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) demanded that the forthcoming general elections be held under a caretaker government. Members of a group affiliated with the governing party attacked opposition members, beating and stabbing one bystander to death.

National and international concern about allegedly high levels of corruption were echoed in June when the World Bank cancelled US$1.2 billion credit for the construction of Padma bridge in central Bangladesh, due to the government’s insufficient response to allegations of corruption. An inquiry by the Anti Corruption Commission remained open.

The authorities continued to raise concerns with India over killings of Bangladeshis by Indian border control forces. More than a dozen Bangladeshis were killed by Indian forces while crossing the border into India.

Extrajudicial executions
At least 30 people were victims of alleged extrajudicial executions. Police claimed they had been killed in gun battles with security forces. Families said they had been killed after being arrested by people in plain clothes identifying themselves as Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) personnel or other police. No one was brought to justice for these killings. 

RAB personnel allegedly shot dead Mohammad Atear Rahman (also known as Tofa Molla), a farmer, in Kushtia district on 12 September. RAB said he was killed in “crossfire”, although Atear Rahman’s family and other witnesses said RAB had arrested him at his home the previous evening. His body reportedly bore three gunshot wounds, two in the back.

Torture and other ill-treatment
Torture and other ill-treatment were widespread, committed with virtual impunity by the police, RAB, the army and intelligence agencies. Methods included beating, kicking, suspension from the ceiling, food and sleep deprivation, and electric shocks. Most detainees were allegedly tortured until they “confessed” to having committed a crime. Police and RAB allegedly distorted records to cover up the torture, including by misrepresenting arrest dates.

Enforced disappearances
At least 10 people went missing throughout the year. In most cases the victims were never traced. Those bodies that were recovered bore injuries, some caused by beatings.

Ilias Ali, Sylhet division secretary of the opposition BNP, disappeared together with his driver Ansar Ali on 17 April. The government promised to investigate the case but provided no information by the end of the year.

Violence against women and girls
Women continued to be subjected to various forms of violence. These included acid attacks, murder for failing to pay the requested dowry, flogging for religious offences by illegal arbitration committees, domestic violence, and sexual violence.

Aleya Begum and her daughter were arrested without a warrant on 9 September and were allegedly tortured at Khoksa police station in Kushtia district. After two days they were transferred to Kushtia city police station and kept in a dark room. The daughter, a college student, was separated from her mother at night and sexually abused by police officers. The two women were released on 18 September, after appearing in court. Aleya Begum and her daughter shared their story with the media, and were arrested and jailed again on 26 September.

Indigenous Peoples’ rights
As in previous years, the authorities failed to settle Indigenous Peoples’ claims to land that had been seized from them during the internal armed conflict (1975-1997), or recently occupied by increasing numbers of Bengali settlers. Tension between the two communities and the failure of the security forces to protect local Indigenous people against attacks by Bengali settlers led to several clashes and injuries on both sides.

At least 20 people were injured in a clash between Indigenous people and Bengali settlers in Rangamati on 22 September. Local people said security forces came to the scene but failed to stop the violence.

Workers’ rights
Trade union leaders supporting garment factory workers’ rallies against low pay and poor working conditions were harassed and intimidated. One man was killed. 

Trade union leader Aminul Islam went missing on 4 April. He was found dead a day later in Ghatail town, north of Dhaka. His family saw evidence of torture on his body and believed he had been abducted by security forces. He had previously been arrested and beaten by members of the National Security Intelligence for his trade union activities.

At least 111 workers died from burns and other injuries, some allegedly because factory officials refused to open the gates to let them escape a fire that broke out at Tazreen Fashion in Savar town, north of the capital Dhaka, in November.

Communal violence
Attacks against members of minority communities took a new turn in late September. Thousands of people protesting against an image posted on Facebook of the Qur’an, which they considered derogatory, set fire to more than 20 Buddhist temples and monasteries, one Hindu temple and scores of homes and shops in the southern cities of Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong.

Death penalty
At least 45 people were sentenced to death. One man was executed in April.

Amnesty International Report 2013: 
The State of the World Human Rights