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Friday, March 12, 2010

2009 Human Rights Report on Human Rights Practices Bangladesh

BANGLADESH IS a parliamentary democracy of 155 million citizens. On December 29, 2008, the Awami League (AL) alliance led by Sheikh Hasina Wazed won 263 of 299 parliamentary seats in elections international and domestic observers considered to be free and fair, with isolated irregularities and sporadic violence. The elections and the peaceful transfer of power ended two years of rule by a military-backed caretaker government. Civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces.

The government's human rights record improved somewhat due to the return of a democratically elected government and the repeal of the state of emergency. There was a slight increase in the number of extrajudicial killings by security forces; there remained cases of serious abuse, including extrajudicial killings, custodial deaths, arbitrary arrest and detention, and harassment of journalists. With the return of an elected government, reports of politically motivated violence increased 3.3 percent. The failure to investigate fully extrajudicial killings by security forces, including the deaths in custody of alleged mutineers from the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) border force, remained a matter of serious concern. Some members of security forces acted with impunity and committed acts of physical and psychological torture. Violence against women and children remained a serious problem, as did trafficking in persons. Violence against religious and ethnic minorities still occurred, although many government and civil society leaders stated that these acts often had political or economic motivations and could not be attributed only to religious belief or affiliation.

On February 25-26, members of the BDR staged a mutiny, alleging poor pay and benefits, as well as corruption in the senior officer corps, which were drawn from the army. During the two-day mutiny, BDR soldiers killed 57 officers and 15 of their family members, including the director general and his wife. Security forces subsequently arrested more than 2,000 individuals allegedly involved in the uprising. The government announced plans to try them under the existing BDR Act, which carries a maximum prison term of seven years. Those charged with criminal acts were to be tried under the penal code in special tribunals. According to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and media reports, 59 BDR soldiers died while in police custody or in the BDR barracks. There were credible reports that many of the deceased had been tortured. To investigate these allegations, the government formed a committee, which concluded that only two members died as a result of torture. No other government action was taken.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life
Members of the security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings. The police, BDR, military, and the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) occasionally used unwarranted lethal force.

According to government statistics, there was a 3 percent increase in the number of killings by all security personnel, and the government did not take comprehensive measures to investigate these cases despite public statements by high-ranking officials that the government would show "zero tolerance" and would fully investigate all extrajudicial killings by security forces. The number of killings by the police and combined security forces also increased. According to the media and local human rights organizations, no case resulted in criminal punishment, and in the few instances in which the government levied charges, those found guilty generally received administrative punishment.

According to media reports, local and international human rights organizations, and the government, the RAB killed 41 persons during the year, from 68 the year before, a nearly 40 percent drop. The average number of such deaths dropped from six per month in 2008 to three per month during the year. Combined security units consisting of RAB members and police, however, killed 25 persons during the year. The deaths, some under unusual circumstances, occurred during raids, arrests, and other law enforcement operations, or in some cases while the accused were in custody. The government often described these deaths as "crossfire killings," "gunfights," or "encounter killings," terms it used to characterize exchanges of gunfire between the RAB or police and criminal gangs.

According to media reports, local and international human rights organizations, and the government, law enforcement officials were responsible for 154 deaths, 129 of which were attributed to crossfire. According to reported figures, this total represented a 3 percent increase from the previous year. The RAB accounted for 38 crossfire killings; members of the police were responsible for 63; combined security units consisting of the RAB and police were responsible for 25; and the army committed three crossfire killings. Since 2004 when the minister for law, justice, and parliamentary affairs stated crossfire deaths under RAB or police custody could not be considered custodial death, the government has not disclosed publicly any prosecution of a RAB officer for a killing.

According to Ain O-Shalish Kendra (ASK), a leading human rights organization, 58 deaths occurred in custody during the year, including 30 deaths in prison.

For example, according to Odhikar on May 8, police officers and RAB members allegedly shot and killed Sayeedur Rahman Sayeed in a crossfire killing in Alamdanga, Chuadanga. Family members claimed police from the Islamic University Police arrested Sayeed on a bus along the Ujangram Bazar Road and transferred him to the Chuadanga RAB Six Camp. The RAB and police claimed they were conducting a raid on a cemetery where Sayeed and his accomplice were holding a meeting when the two men opened fire. The security forces allegedly returned fire, killing Sayeed. According to witnesses, no gunfight took place and the police and RAB staged the incident. Sayeed's body had two bullet wounds, broken bones above his right heel and left elbow, and additional wounds on his body.

On May 28, a team from RAB 2 allegedly killed two Dhaka Polytechnic Institute students, Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Mohsin Sheikh, in a shootout. On June 15, according to media reports, family members of the victims filed a case against 10 RAB personnel. Family members, fellow students, and teachers claimed Jinnah and Sheikh were members of the Bangladesh Chhatra League and did not have criminal records. The RAB claimed the two students were "criminals" and "muggers," and that they had stopped the students at a checkpoint for acting suspiciously. The metropolitan magistrate ordered the officer-in-charge of Tejgaon Police Station to investigate the case and submit a report by August 20. The officer-in-charge stated that he submitted the investigation report to the court and the matter was pending at year's end.

The government did not conduct further investigations into the alleged killing of Abdur Rashid Malitha and Nasima Akthtar Rikta by officers from RAB 12 in June 2008. According to Odhikar, relatives of Rikta did not speak out for fear of retaliation from security forces.

There were no further developments in the June 2008 killing of Anwar Hossain by police officers or the 2007 killing of Khabirul Islam by naval personnel.

The government did not take formal action to investigate the 2007 killing by army personnel in Madhupur of Choilesh Ritchil, an activist in one of the country's indigenous communities.

Deaths allegedly due to torture occurred while in police custody. According to Odikhar, on January 11, police from the Shahbajpur Police Camp arrested, allegedly tortured, and killed Nawab Ali of Bariakandi village. His body was recovered from a river near his home on January 14 with signs of trauma. Officials temporarily suspended the three police officers allegedly involved in the incident. Police stated they were conducting an internal investigation into the matter but after repeated inquires from Odhikar, the investigating officer stated that the final report had been submitted three months earlier, and the investigation committee had concluded that Nawab Ali died from falling into the river.

On January 28, according to Odhikar, police from Chandgaon Police Station arrested, tortured, and killed Mohammed Habib and tortured his colleague Arif. According to police, the men were arrested on suspicion of importing drugs from India and were injured during their arrest. On the day of arrest, the police transferred the men between the police station and the hospital several times before producing them before court. Because Habib was ill, the court ordered hospitalization; however, on arrival at the hospital Habib was declared dead by doctors. Arif claimed police tortured both he and Habib for an extended period of time and that the torture may have caused Habib's death. He alleged that three police officers trampled on Habib's chest. Arif had visible injuries on his left hand and right leg. Following Habib's death, an "unnatural death case" was filed. According to the assistant police commissioner of the Chittagong metropolitan police, the three officers involved were suspended. An investigation was ongoing at year's end.

According to media reports, 59 BDR members arrested in the wake of the February 25-26 mutiny died in custody. Family members of the victims alleged they died after being tortured. According to Odhikar, several BDR members taken into custody claimed the RAB and police physically assaulted and beat them, administered electric shocks, blindfolded them, and hung them upside down while in custody; NGOs alleged army personnel also were involved in custodial deaths. The government announced an investigation and promised to publish a report by July regarding the nature of the deaths but failed to publish any report. The government investigation ruled that only two members died due to torture and that the others died as a result of illness or suicide. At year's end the government had not taken any action regarding the deaths or allegations of torture.

On March 22, Nayak Mobarak Hossain, a detective in the BDR security unit of the 18th Rifle Battalion in Cox's Bazar, died at the Dhaka Medical College Hospital after soldiers allegedly assaulted him, according to his family. Hossain had been present in BDR headquarters during the mutiny. His wife alleged that on February 28, the army detained him, took away his phone, and did not allow him to contact his family. On March 18, Hossain allegedly telephoned his wife to say he was being kept in poor conditions and tortured, and if anyone attempted to communicate with him, he would be tortured further. Two individuals who saw Hussain's body confirmed severe bruising, swelling of limbs, injuries to both palms, and broken joints. They also claimed that marks on his body indicated that burnt needles were inserted into his fingers. The local magistrate who presided over the autopsy did not reveal any further details. A local police sub inspector in Dhaka, who was present at the medical examination, opened a murder investigation. The case was ongoing at year's end.

The government did not conduct any further investigations into the alleged March 2008 death by torture of Abul Hossain Dahli by police in Botiyaghata.

On May 25, according to Odhikar, following a petition from the victim's father, the chief judicial magistrate ordered local police to file a case against 16 officers from RAB 8 who allegedly tortured to death Afzal Khan in 2008. Khan's father reported receiving various threats from the accused.

There were no new developments in the April 2008 death of Fakir Chan in police custody in Maulvibazar. Chan's widow told Odhikar she was not financially able to pursue any legal case against his alleged killers.

Politically motivated violence resumed following the end of the state of emergency, with opposition party supporters claiming harassment by ruling party supporters. Motivations for the violence often were unclear. According to Odhikar, 251 deaths were suspected of being politically motivated, compared to 50 the previous year.

On June 19, seven to eight unknown assailants abducted and killed opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) member Manju Morshed Shipu in Mohammadpur, Dhaka. Witnesses claimed the men abducted Shipu while he was returning home on the night of June 18. Several hours later, guards saw a microbus drive into a school playground, heard a gunshot, and subsequently found Shipu's body. According to police, Shipu had been shot in the left side of the forehead, and there were marks of beating on his arms, back, and feet. Marks on his hands, feet, and eyes indicated he had been bound and blindfolded. According to Shipu's wife, he was a potential candidate for ward commissioner in the city corporation elections. She believed his murder was politically motivated and filed a case with the Mohammadpur police station on June 20. There were no further developments by year's end.

There were no further developments in the July 2008 killing of Moshiul Alam Sentu, allegedly by officers from RAB 8. According to Odhikar, Sentu's mother claimed she tried to file a case against the RAB, but no lawyers would take it out of fear the RAB would target them.

There was no further investigation into the July 2008 killing of Mizanur Rahman Tutu by police officers. Family members told human rights groups they did not file a case.

At year's end authorities had not carried out death sentences in the case of three individuals from the banned Islamist organization Harkatul Jihad al Islami (HuJi) who were tried in 2007 for organizing a grenade attack at the Hazrat Shahjalal Shrine in Sylhet in 2004. Two others sentenced to life imprisonment were serving their sentences.

There also were a significant number of reports of killings involving political party supporters.

On May 8, according to media reports, one person died and at least 15 others were injured in a clash between AL and BNP activists in Hagragari village, Lalpur upazila (sub district). The two groups reportedly attacked each other with firearms and sharp weapons.

There were no developments in the February 2008 killing of Mohammad Farman Ali by political rivals or the death of an individual following gunfire between AL and BNP activists.

Vigilante killings remained a problem during the year, although figures suggested that the problem had lessened or remained the same. Odhikar reported at least 90 killings, but local human rights organizations also acknowledged that the number of reported cases probably represented only a fraction of the actual incidents. The most recent figures are from 2008 when there were 163 reported vigilante killings.

On July 2, a mob killed a suspected robber in Naranpar village in Comilla. The deceased was identified as Yakub Hossain alias Tetu Miah.

On September 14, according to press reports, a mob beat a carjacker to death and critically injured during an attempted carjacking in the Pallabi area of Dhaka. A third person fled the scene. According to Pallabi police, the three men shot the driver during the robbery attempt. There was no investigation at year's end.

On November 15, according to the Daily Star, a mob beat to death Badsha Bhai, an alleged regional leader of an outlawed faction of Purbo Banglar Communist Party in Roypur village in Gangni upazila. According to police, 15 "village watchers" chased Badsha as he was walking in the village and beat him. Police took Badsha to Meherpur General Hospital where he was declared dead.

There were no further investigations into the March 2008 vigilante killings in Nasirabad and Kaliakoir, near Dhaka.

Violence along the border with India remained a problem, and the number of incidents increased by nearly 63 percent from the previous year. According to human rights organizations, the Indian Border Security Force killed 96 citizens during the year.

b. Disappearance
Disappearances and kidnappings remained problems during the year, but precise figures were unavailable. At least some of these kidnappings were politically motivated, although many were often for money or as a result of localized rivalries.

On August 22, a group of local armed criminals kidnapped nine members of an extended family from their house in Dhaka and held them in a nearby engineering workshop. After eight hours, police located them and arrested 16 men who were charged several with kidnapping. The cases were pending at year's end. Police suspected the criminals were using the kidnapping as an attempt to coerce the family into giving up their land.

There were no further developments in the September 2008 kidnapping of 40 fishermen from the Kachikhali coast of Pathorghata. There were no developments in the November 2008 disappearance of Liakat Hossain, allegedly involving members of the RAB.

The government did not take any steps to investigate the 2007 kidnapping of two Danish aid agency employees.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Although the constitution prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, security forces including the RAB, military, and police frequently employed severe physical and psychological abuse during arrests and interrogations. According to figures provided by human rights organizations, the use of such techniques dropped in 2008 but increased during the year. Abuse consisted of threats, beatings, and the use of electric shock. According to human rights organizations, security forces tortured at least 68 persons. The government rarely charged, convicted, or punished those responsible, and a climate of impunity allowed such abuses by the RAB, police, and military to continue.

On June 4, according to Odhikar, Kahalu police in Bogra arrested and tortured the president of the student wing of the BNP, Morshed Habib Bhuiyan Jewel, in Netrokona district. Jewel alleged that several times while in custody at the Netrokona Model Police Station three to four police officers blindfolded him, suspended him from the ceiling with handcuffs, and beat him with sticks from the waist down. According to Jewel, police also poured hot water into his nose and mouth. Netrokona police claimed Jewel was a suspect in a murder case and that they were interrogating him. Witnesses and the victim claimed police arrested him due to his political affiliation. Jewel remained in jail at year's end.

There were no developments in the 2007 torture cases of Shahidul Islam, Mohammad Jamal Uddin, and Mohammad Kajol.

According to human rights organizations, there were at least three recorded incidents of rape and sexual abuse by law enforcement personnel.

For example, on February 28, according to Odhikar, four police constables gang-raped a member of an ethnic minority group in the Chittagong metropolitan area.

There were no new developments in the July 2008 rape of a 14-year-old girl in Sonargaon, Narayanganj, allegedly by RAB officer Abdul Gaffur. Gaffur was under arrest and awaiting trial at year's end. There was no further investigation into the July 2008 rape of a young girl at Kamlapur Dhaka, allegedly by police sub inspector Rezaul Karim.

Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Prison system conditions remained abysmal due to overcrowding, inadequate facilities, and lack of proper sanitation. Human rights observers believed these conditions contributed to custodial deaths. Unlike in the previous year, there were no accounts of security forces holding detainees in ad hoc or military detention facilities.

According to Odhikar, 48 persons died in prison and 31 persons died in the custody of police and other security forces during the year.

According to the government, the existing prison population at year's end was 71,880, or more than 250 percent of the official prison capacity of 28,668. Of the entire prison population, approximately one-third of the detainees had been convicted. The rest were either awaiting trial or detained for investigation. Due to the severe backlog of cases, individuals awaiting trial often spent more time in jail than if they had been convicted and served a maximum sentence. In most cases, prisoners slept in shifts because of the overcrowding and did not have adequate bathroom facilities.

The law requires that juveniles be detained separately from adults, but in practice, many juveniles were incarcerated with adults. Approximately 347 children were imprisoned (some with their mothers) despite laws and court decisions prohibiting the imprisonment of minors. In some places, the figure was much higher, mainly because there was no proper means of recording age in the criminal justice system. According to statistics from the 2008 International Centre for Prison Studies report, minors made up 0.4 percent of the prison population.

Although the law prohibits women in "safe custody"(usually victims of rape, trafficking, and domestic violence) from being housed with criminals, in practice separate facilities were not always available.

In general the government did not permit prison visits by independent human rights monitors, including the International Committee of the Red Cross. Government-appointed committees composed of prominent private citizens in each prison locality monitored prisons monthly but did not release their findings. District judges occasionally visited prisons but rarely disclosed their findings.

In 2008 the inspector general of prisons tried to address prisoner morale by allowing low-level offenders to meet family and friends inside jail cells without any physical barriers between them. There were few additional efforts to improve the prison system during the year.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The constitution prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the law permits authorities to arrest and detain persons suspected of criminal activity without an order from a magistrate or a warrant.

In December 2008 the president promulgated the Emergency Power (Repeal) Ordinance to revoke the state of emergency that had been declared in 2007. Under the state of emergency, the government promulgated the Emergency Power Rules (EPR), which gave the government authority to detain citizens without filing formal charges or specific complaints. In repealing the state of emergency, the ordinance specified that, although cases brought under the EPR would continue to have validity, pending cases would be conducted under the traditional rules and laws.
According to official government statistics, the police arrested 50,787 persons during the year. Of those arrested, 15,894 were detained without arrest warrants or convictions.

On March 21, police arrested former deputy speaker of parliament and opposition member Akhtar Hamid Siddiqui in the Naogaon district. The officer in charge of the Mohadebpur Police Station alleged Siddiqui had threatened him. Siddiqui was sentenced to one month's detention order under the Special Powers Act of 1974.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus
Police are organized nationally under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and have a mandate to maintain internal security and law and order. Under recent governments, police were generally ineffective and reluctant to investigate persons affiliated with the ruling party. The government ended its use of the joint forces security structure formed in 2007 under the state of emergency and composed of police, the RAB, members of the military, and other security agencies. Unlike the previous year, the military intelligence agency, the Directorate General Forces Intelligence (DGFI), did not take the lead in maintaining law and order as it had under the state of emergency.

The RAB received human rights training sponsored by foreign governments, the UN Development Program, and a local NGO, the Bangladesh Society for Enforcement of Human Rights (BSEHR). Although the RAB continued to commit serious human rights violations, the number of incidents involving the RAB dropped from the previous year.

The government took steps to address widespread police corruption and a severe lack of training and discipline. The inspector general of police continued to implement a new strategy, partially funded by international donors, for training police, addressing corruption, and creating a more responsive police force.

Plaintiffs rarely accused police in criminal cases due to lengthy trial procedures and the fear of retribution. Reluctance to confront police perpetuated a climate of impunity.

Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention
The law provides for arrest without the use of warrants in certain cases. Section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 100 of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police Ordinance authorize detention of persons on suspicion of criminal activity without an order from a magistrate or a warrant, and the government regularly used such provisions. The number of preventive and arbitrary arrests declined from the previous year when the state of emergency was in effect.

Unlike in previous years under the caretaker government, the new government did not carry out mass arrests. ASK, a domestic human rights organization, and media outlets estimated that authorities made more than 2,000 routine arrests daily. The majority of those arrested were released within one or two days, often on payment of a bribe.

Under the existing Special Powers Act, the government or a district magistrate may order a person detained for 30 days to prevent the commission of an act that could threaten national security; however, authorities held detainees for longer periods. The magistrate must inform the detainee of the grounds of detention, and an advisory board is required to examine the detainee's case after four months. Detainees had the right to appeal. Many detainees taken into custody during the caretaker government's anticorruption drive were held under this act, and the government sought and received numerous detention extensions from advisory boards consisting of two judges and a government official. Use of the provisions of the Special Powers Act declined during the year.

There was a functioning bail system in the regular courts. For example, the courts granted bail to many of the officials and former officials accused of corruption.

Most criminal detainees charged with crimes were granted access to attorneys. The government rarely provided detainees with state-funded defense attorneys, and there were few legal aid programs for detainees. Government-funded legal aid programs received little funding, and there were no efforts to expand those programs during the year.

The government generally permitted lawyers to meet with their clients only after formal charges had been filed in the courts, which in some cases occurred several weeks or months after the initial arrest. Arbitrary arrests were common, and the government held persons in detention without specific charges, often to collect information about other suspects.

Arbitrary and lengthy pretrial detention continued to be a problem. There were an estimated two million pending civil and criminal cases. A 2008 estimate from the International Centre for Prison Studies found nearly 70 percent of prison inmates were in pretrial detention.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The law provides for an independent judiciary, but in practice a longstanding temporary provision of the constitution placed the executive in charge of the lower courts, judicial appointments, and compensation for judicial officials. In 2007 the caretaker government implemented legislation the previous government had developed separating the judiciary from the executive, and that legislation remained in effect throughout the year.

The court system has two levels: the lower courts and the Supreme Court. Both hear civil and criminal cases. After the separation of the judiciary from the executive, the government appointed judicial magistrates to replace the executive magistrates who had presided over the lower courts. Although executive magistrates still exist, their powers are restricted, and they are only appointed in specific circumstances; for example, executive magistrates were appointed to administer the mobile court system to look at issues of food adulteration and quality. The Supreme Court has two parts, the high court and the appellate divisions. The High Court Division hears some original cases mostly dealing with constitutional issues, and reviews cases from the lower courts. The Appellate Division hears appeals of judgments, decrees, orders, or sentences of the High Court. Rulings of the Appellate Division are binding on all other courts.

On July 15, the government appointed four new judges to the Appellate Division. Members of the legal community criticized the appointment of one of the judges, which superseded the appointment of a more senior judge of the High Court Division. According to government officials, the appointments were made because the additional judges were necessary to dispose of the large numbers of cases pending in the Appellate Division.

In September 2008 the Appellate Division resumed the practice of overturning politically charged decisions by the High Court Division, usually to the benefit of the current AL government. In at least two cases, the Appellate Division overturned decisions granting bail to high-level corruption suspects who were leaders of opposition parties. Additionally, corruption, judicial inefficiency, lack of resources, and a large case backlog remained serious problems with the judiciary.

The EPR authorized the government to create special speedy anticorruption courts to adjudicate cases prosecuted by the Anticorruption Commission (ACC). Sentences from these tribunals could also be appealed to the High Court. During the year, the repeal of the EPR led to the demise of these courts.

In 2005 a High Court panel judged unconstitutional an amendment to the constitution that legitimized martial law in the 1980s. The prime minister's office arranged for a stay of the ruling because of its ramifications for the legacy of former president Ziaur Rahman, the late husband of the then prime minister. The case remained in the Appellate Division at year's end.

Trial Procedures
The law provides accused persons with the right to be represented by counsel, to review accusatory material, to call or question witnesses, and to appeal verdicts. Cases are decided by judges rather than juries, and trials are public. In practice a public defender is rarely provided to defendants. Defendants are presumed innocent and have the right to appeal, to be present and to see the government's evidence.

Corruption and a substantial backlog of cases hindered the court system, and trials were typically marked by extended continuances, effectively preventing many from obtaining a fair trial due to witness tampering, victim intimidation, and missing evidence. Human rights observers contended magistrates, attorneys, and court officials demanded bribes from defendants in many cases filed under the Special Powers Act during the year.

Political Prisoners and Detainees
The caretaker government detained more than 150 high-ranking politicians, businessmen, and officials as part of its anticorruption campaign. The courts released most of these persons in 2008.

According to media reports, during the year the government withdrew 1817 allegedly "politically motivated" cases that had been filed under the regular penal code and the Anticorruption Commission Act. Most of the cases withdrawn involved ruling party politicians.

During the year, under a new chairman, the ACC filed a money laundering case against Koko Rahman, the son of BNP leader Khaleda Zia. A separate money laundering case was also filed against Koko Rahman and Khaleda Zia's other son, Tarique Rahman. In 2008 the ACC and the public prosecutor prosecuted a total of 228 cases against high-ranking political officials, ranging from extortion and money laundering to murder.

Former law minister Moudud Ahmed and former communications minister Anwar Hossain Manju remained free on bail, although their cases remained in process. Ahmed refused the government's offer to drop the cases against him, and Manju continued to appeal two of his three sentences. The metropolitan public prosecutor decided to withdraw one of the cases against Ahmed for possessing alcohol at his residence in 2007. The High Court threw out one of Manju's convictions.

The trial continued against journalist Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury, detained for his attempted 2003 travel to Israel. The government allowed Choudhury to travel abroad while the case was pending.

During the year, the new government began to identify and withdraw allegedly "politically motivated" cases initiated under the caretaker government. The government set up an inter-ministerial committee to review the applications of individuals alleging cases filed against them were politically motivated. Initially, the majority of the cases recommended for withdrawal appeared to be those brought against AL members. However, in August and September the committee recommended withdrawal of cases against BNP members Moudud Ahmed and Tarique Rahman.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
Administrative as well as judicial remedies are available for alleged wrongs. The government did not interfere with civil judicial procedures. Corruption and outside influence were problems in the civil judicial system. Alternative dispute resolution for civil cases allows citizens to present their cases for mediation. According to government sources, wider use of mediation in civil cases quickened the administration of justice, but there was no assessment of its fairness or impartiality.

Property Restitution
During the year the government took measures to implement the 2001 Vested Property Return Act, providing for property restitution to persons, mostly Hindus, whose property the government seized after the 1965 India-Pakistan war. On November 2, the cabinet approved the Vested Property Return (Amendment) Act, which set a time limit for the government to produce a list of lands seized under the Vested Property Act. Members of religious minorities welcomed the new act but argued it needed to be amended to expand the definition of who could inherit properties and to bar political leaders involved in the seizure of land from determining how the lands would be returned to their original owners. The bill was before parliament at year's end.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The law allows intelligence and law enforcement agencies to monitor private communications with the permission of the chief executive of the MOHA. According to media reports, the government established a national monitoring center made up of representatives from law enforcement and intelligence agencies to monitor and coordinate phone taps in 2008. Media and human rights groups complained that the government continued to employ the practice of illegal phone tapping. Police rarely obtained warrants as required, and officers violating these procedures were not punished. Human rights organizations indicated that the special branch of the police, National Security Intelligence, and the DGFI employed informers to conduct surveillance and report on citizens perceived as critical of the government.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, but the government occasionally did not respect these rights in practice.

Although public criticism of the government was common, newspapers depended on government advertisements for a significant percentage of their revenue. As a result, newspapers practiced self-censorship on some issues.

There were hundreds of daily and weekly independent publications. Although there were significant improvements over the previous year, newspapers critical of the government experienced some government pressure. Journalists perceived to be critical of the government and those aligned with the opposition alleged harassment from unspecified wings of the security forces and members of the ruling party. In addition to one official government-owned news service, there were two private news services.

Unlike in the previous year, the military's Inter-Service Public Relations (ISPR) office and the DGFI did not directly restrict newspaper ownership or content. However, journalists reported the military cautioned them against criticizing the government or the military, especially in the aftermath of the BDR mutiny. Matiur Rahman Chowdhury, editor of Manabzamin and host of two television talk shows, stated in the English language New Age that officials told him indirectly to refrain from inviting specified guests during the BDR incident. He also said tapes for a particular talk show were taken from station several hours before the show was scheduled to be broadcast.

The host of a popular Bengali-language current affairs talk show, Point of Order, alleged she received phone calls from individuals identifying themselves as DGFI officials who warned her against promoting "antigovernment and anti-state propaganda." She also said sponsors of her program had been encouraged to stop their support of her show.

The government owned one radio and one television station. The parliament passed a law mandating that the public television station, BTV, remain the country's only terrestrial broadcast channel. An estimated 60 percent of the population did not have access to private satellite channels.

There were 10 private satellite television stations and three private radio stations in operation. There were two foreign-based and licensed satellite television stations that maintained domestic news operations. Cable operators generally functioned without government interference. The government required all private stations to broadcast, without charge, selected government news programs and speeches by the prime minister.

The 24-hour all-news television station, CSB, which the government shut down in 2007, purportedly for not having a proper license, remained closed at year's end.

Attacks on journalists continued to be a problem. There was an increase in individuals affiliated with the government or ruling party harassing, arresting, or assaulting journalists. According to Odhikar and media watchdog groups, at least three journalists were killed, 84 were injured, one was arrested, 45 were assaulted, 73 were threatened, and 23 had cases filed against them during the year. According to some journalists and human rights NGOs, journalists engaged in self-censorship for fear of retribution from the government.

On January 1, following the parliamentary elections, activists of the AL's student wing, the Chhatra League, harassed and threatened with death Dhaka University correspondents of the Bengali and English publications Daily Sangbad, Janakantha, BDNews24.com, Destiny, and Janatar Chokh. The activists ransacked the reporters' rooms, destroyed their valuables, and threatened to kill them. No action was taken against the alleged vandals.

On September 1, according to Odhikar, two Chattra League activists attacked and ransacked a store owned by the Chuadanga representative of the daily Amar Desh, reportedly in retaliation for a report published in the paper criticizing an AL member of parliament (MP). The activists set fire to the store and burned copies of Amar Desh. Members of the Chattra League then ransacked the store owner's home and assaulted his wife and children. Chattra League and Jubo League members also ransacked the business of the Chuadanga representative of the daily Janakantha and the home of the local representative of the daily Prothom Alo.

On October 22, officers of RAB 10 arrested F.M. Masum, a reporter for the English-language daily New Age from his home in Jatrabari, near Dhaka. According to New Age and the Asia Human Rights Commission (AHRC), RAB members beat Masum with iron rods, wooden sticks and the blunt sides of machetes and rubbed salt into his wounds, allegedly because he had worked on several news stories on extrajudicial killings committed by the battalion and its involvement in the fight against drugs. Staff from New Age alleged Masum was targeted because he had written about violence against journalists. The home minister ordered RAB 10 to release Masum, and RAB officials announced an investigation into the matter. After the incident, RAB officials gave varying accounts of the reason for Masum's detention, including that he had been found in possession of drugs and that he was found with prostitutes. However, when Masum was released, RAB officials stated he had been arrested for not cooperating with the law enforcement agency. RAB headquarters released a statement expressing regret for the incident and transferred one of the officers involved. No further action was taken at year's end.

There were no developments in the March 2008 case of Rabiul Islam, a journalist for the Rajshahi-based Bengali language Daily Sunshine who was allegedly tortured by local police.

The government took no further action in the May 2008 assaults against Daily Star correspondents Mirza Shakil and Iasinur Rahman.

There were no new developments in the case of Jahangir Alam Akash, who reportedly was tortured by authorities in November 2008. Akash ran his own blog devoted to press freedoms and human rights during the year.

There were no developments in the case of the Jai Jai Din editor who was fired in July 2008 because he published a cartoon critical of then Army Chief General Moeen Uddin Ahmed.

The trial court dismissed charges against accused teachers and students in the 2007 attack on journalists at Dhaka University. Tasneem Khalil, former Daily Star journalist and researcher for Human Rights Watch, continued to live in exile in Sweden following his 2007 interrogation and torture by joint forces.

Unlike in previous years, the government did not subject foreign publications and films to stringent reviews and censorship. A government-managed film censor board reviewed local and foreign films and had the authority to censor or ban films on the grounds of state security, law and order, religious sentiment, obscenity, foreign relations, defamation, or plagiarism, but this was less strict than in the past. In practice video rental libraries and DVD shops stocked a wide variety of films, and government efforts to enforce censorship on rentals were sporadic and ineffective.

Unlike in the previous year, the government only rarely exercised censorship in cases of immodest or obscene photographs, perceived misrepresentation or defamation of Islam, or objectionable comments regarding national leaders.

There were no developments regarding the 2007 decision to ban Alpin, the satirical weekly magazine of the newspaper Prothom Alo, due to alleged blasphemy against Islam.

Unlike in previous years, the government did not use defamation charges to curb freedom of speech.

There were no developments in the 2007 defamation lawsuit filed by Mah Selim against Juganthor newspaper.

Internet Freedom
Although individuals and groups generally could engage in the peaceful expression of views via the Internet, local human rights organizations reported continued government monitoring of Internet communications. The most recent figures from the World Bank indicated that 5.8 percent of the population used the Internet in 2008. On March 9, the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission, the country's Internet regulatory body, blocked YouTube and several other Web sites for posting a recorded conversation between Prime Minister Hasina and angry army officers following the BDR mutiny. The restriction was lifted on March 21 after a public outcry.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
The government did not limit academic freedom or cultural events; however, media groups reported that authorities discouraged research on sensitive religious and political topics.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The constitution provides for freedom of assembly and association, and the government generally respected these rights in practice. The lifting of the state of emergency in December 2008 restored these rights to citizens.

Freedom of Assembly
Restrictions on holding rallies and processions ended with the withdrawal of the state of emergency in December 2008. The new government generally permitted rallies to take place but on occasion used Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code to prevent opposition political groups from holding meetings and demonstrations. Section 144 authorizes the administration to ban assembly of more than four persons; according to ASK, the administration used this provision at least 82 times during the year. At times police or ruling party activists used force to break up demonstrations.

On July 5, according to media reports, the police arrested two individuals and used force against 17 others demonstrating in front of the Indian High Commission in Dhaka against the planned construction of the Tipaimukh Dam in India. The operation to break up the group of protestors, who were allegedly demonstrating peacefully, involved approximately 100 police officers.

On August 19, the district administration in Manikganj invoked Section 144 of the law to prohibit a rally organized by the opposition BNP. Authorities cited the potential for violence because the local branch of the ruling AL's student wing had announced a simultaneous rally.

On September 2, according to media reports, police used force against demonstrators as they marched toward the headquarters of the Mineral, Oil, and Gas Corporation to protest the decision to lease off-shore energy blocks to foreign companies for oil and gas exploration. The subsequent clashes between the protesters and the police left approximately 30 persons, including 10 police officers, injured. The Home Ministry issued a statement expressing regret for the attacks on the procession and ordered an inquiry into "any police excesses."

Local officials used Section 144 prior to planned council meetings of the BNP to prevent clashes either between BNP and the ruling party or among rival factions of BNP. On December 22, ruling party activists and the police attacked individuals at a reception in honor of Moyeen Khan's selection as a party leader. BNP supporters clashed with the police and AL supporters, causing dozens of injuries. According to ASK, ruling party activists initiated the clash.

Freedom of Association
The law provides for the right of every citizen to form associations, subject to "reasonable restrictions" in the interest of morality or public order, and the government generally respected this right. Individuals were free to join private groups. Unlike the previous year under the state of emergency, trade unions were able to conduct their normal activities.

c. Freedom of Religion
The constitution incorporates elements of Islam but stipulates the right--subject to law, public order, and morality--to profess, practice, or propagate the religion of one's choice. The government generally respected this right in practice. Religion shaped the platforms of some political parties, but the government was sensitive to the religious sentiments of most citizens. Violence against religious and ethnic minorities was a problem occasionally. Discrimination against members of religious minorities, such as Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists, existed at both the governmental and societal levels, and religious minorities were disadvantaged in practice in such areas as access to government jobs, political office, and justice. The secular AL government, however, appointed some members of the minority communities to senior government and diplomatic positions. In the new cabinet, three of the 38 ministers were non-Muslims.

Shari'a (Islamic law) was not implemented formally and not imposed on non-Muslims, but it played an influential role in civil matters pertaining to the Muslim community. The Muslim Family Ordinance codifies issues such as inheritance, marriage, and divorce for registered marriages of members of the Muslim community. A Muslim man may marry as many as four wives; however, a Muslim man must get his first wife's signed permission before taking an additional wife. Society strongly discouraged polygamy and it was rarely practiced.

Family laws concerning marriage, divorce, and adoption differed slightly depending on the religion of the individuals involved. Each religion had its set of family laws. Under Hindu law, unlimited polygamy is permitted, and although there is no provision for divorce or legal separation, Hindu widows may legally remarry. There were no legal restrictions on marriage between members of different faiths.

As in the previous year, government protection of Ahmadiyyas, an Islamic group, continued to improve, although social discrimination continued and there were sporadic cases of harassment. The High Court continued to stay the government ban on publishing Ahmadiyya literature, effectively allowing Ahmadiyyas to publish.

As in previous years, the government failed to prepare a list of property that the government expropriated from Hindus following the 1965 India-Pakistan War. The cabinet took steps this year to enact a law to speed up this process.

The law permits citizens to proselytize, and the government respected that right in practice, although local authorities and communities sometimes objected to efforts to convert persons from Islam.

Some missionaries faced problems in obtaining or renewing visas, and some reported that internal security forces closely monitored their activities.

The government allowed various religions to establish places of worship, train clergy, travel for religious purposes, and maintain links with coreligionists abroad.

Societal Abuses and Discrimination
Discrimination against Ahmadiyyas, Hindus, and Christians decreased during the year. There were no demonstrations by anti-Ahmadiyya groups during the year.

There were reports of attacks on members of minority communities, although many of these reports could not be independently verified, and motives for such attacks--criminal, political, or religious--could not be ascertained.

On January 10, according to the Bengali language daily Prothom Alo and the Bangladesh Buddhist Hindu Christian Unity Council, more than 150 armed thugs attacked a mostly Hindu village in Gazipur, outside Dhaka. The mob beat many of the residents, damaged several houses and an image of a goddess, and assaulted several women.

On March 30, according to Shamokal, 50 police officers and 100 citizens evicted approximately 400 predominantly Hindu individuals from their ancestral homes in Sutrapur in old Dhaka. Many of the homes were destroyed. The attackers, allegedly led by the brother of a local AL politician, also destroyed the oldest Shiva temple in Kalirghat.

On August 22, according to media reports, a group of AL activists attacked a Hindu family in old Dhaka and abducted nine members, including children and women, whom it kept in confinement. The police later recovered the victims and arrested four of the alleged abductors. Authorities claimed the abductors may have wanted to take over the house of the Hindu family. A local AL leader admitted the accused belonged to his party but claimed the party itself did not sanction the occupation of the Hindu property. Media reports suggested police had shown undue lenience towards the alleged criminals.

There were no developments in the case of Biman Chandra Bosak, who was allegedly beaten by RAB officers and police in April 2008 after he filed a case against a Muslim neighbor who tried to seize land dedicated to a Hindu deity.

There were also no developments in the April 2008 attack against two Christian men in Rangunia allegedly by members of an Islamist group

In contrast to previous years, there were no reports of the military attempting to evict Hindu families from land in the Mirpur area of Dhaka abutting the military cantonment.

According to human rights groups, harassment by forestry department officials persisted, although it decreased from previous years.

Religious minorities continued to be disadvantaged in seeking government jobs and political office, although reportedly less so than in the past following the election of a secular government. Selection boards for government services often lacked minority group representation.

There was no Jewish community in the country and there were no reports of anti-Semitic acts against locals, but some newspapers occasionally printed anti-Semitic articles and commentary.

d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons
The law provides for freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights in practice except in the cases of some opposition political figures. Immigration officials at Zia International Airport in Dhaka prevented numerous politicians belonging to the opposition BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami from leaving the country, citing instructions from undisclosed higher authorities. Some of the politicians successfully challenged the unannounced restrictions on their travel abroad and managed to depart and return to the country. In some instances, the government filed criminal charges against the politicians after they had filed petitions with the High Court challenging the prohibition on their travel. With the lifting of the state of emergency, the government no longer had legal authority to prohibit travel.

The law does not provide for exile, which was not practiced. The country's passports were invalid for travel to Israel.

Protection of Refugees
The country is not a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or the 1967 Protocol. As a result, and in the absence of any national legislation, the law does not provide a legal framework for the granting of asylum or refugee status. The government had no formal system for providing protection to refugees. In practice the government provided some protection against the expulsion or return of refugees to countries where their lives or freedoms would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to refugees.

The government continued to deny asylum to Rohingyas arriving from Burma. The government categorized them as illegal economic migrants and turned back many at the border; however, the border was porous, and attempts to stem the tide of migration proved unsuccessful. According to the UNHCR, some of the individuals who were turned back were likely entitled to refugee status. Some unregistered persons in UNHCR camps returned to the country illegally after their official repatriation to Burma. On a number of occasions, local police picked up unregistered persons outside the camps and imprisoned them under the Foreigners Act.

Working with the UNHCR, the government provided temporary protection to approximately 28,000 registered Rohingya refugees at two official refugee camps and to individual asylum seekers whom the UNHCR interviewed and recognized as refugees on a case-by-case basis. According to international aid organizations active in the area, there were an estimated 200,000 to 500,000 Rohingyas not officially recognized as refugees living among the local population in the surrounding area of Teknaf and Cox's Bazaar, including approximately 12,000 at an unofficial site. There were no repatriations of Rohingyas during the year.

Working with the UNHCR, the government continued to improve conditions in refugee camps following findings in recent years that sanitation, nutrition, and shelter conditions had fallen below minimum international standards. The government permitted the UNHCR to build replacements for shelters and latrines and permitted more NGOs to work in the camps on skills training, education, and health for residents.

According to the UNHCR, there were cases of abuse against refugees, including rape, assault, domestic abuse, deprivation of food, arbitrary detention, and documentation problems. However, there were fewer such incidents reported in previous years.

As in previous years, the government continued to ignore UNHCR requests to allow Rohingya refugees who were unable to return to Burma to work locally, get medical care, or attend school outside the camps. The government began to allow the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) to operate schools through grade five in the camps. In practice, however, the provision of basic services from the UNHCR and other NGOs meant registered refugees often received better medical care than individuals in surrounding villages. The government insisted all Rohingya refugees remain in camps until their return to Burma. The government claimed Rohingya refugees were not allowed to possess money and that money in their possession could be confiscated. In practice, enforcement of these rules remained sporadic and depended on local authorities. For example, many refugees worked illegally as manual laborers or rickshaw pullers in the unregulated economy, and small numbers of students studied with the assistance of private tutors and participated in countrywide school exams through the high school level.

The government repeatedly rejected a UNHCR proposal to grant refugees rights for temporary stay and freedom of movement under a self-reliance program.

Stateless Persons
In May 2008 the High Court ruled that Biharis living in the country, once considered stateless, were citizens. Approximately 160,000-200,000 non-Bengali Bihari Muslims who immigrated to the former East Pakistan during the 1947 partition, a large number of whom supported Pakistan during the 1971 war, continued to live in camps throughout the country. According to Refugees International, many of these persons lived in unsanitary conditions with little access to education and medical resources. Some Biharis declined citizenship in 1972, and a minority awaited repatriation to Pakistan, where the government was reluctant to accept them. Many in the Bihari community were born after 1971, and the vast majority of this population has now been assimilated into the mainstream Bengali-speaking environment, although social barriers to upward mobility remained.

Approximately 80 percent of all adult Biharis, or 184,000 persons, were registered as voters following voter registration drives ahead of the December 2008 elections.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government
The constitution provides citizens the right to change their government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice through periodic, free and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage.

Since assuming power after the caretaker government, the parliament passed 66 bills. Many of those bills either ratified some of the ordinances the caretaker government promulgated or made new laws based on the substance of the ordinances. The Representation of the People's Order (Amendment) Ordinance 2008 significantly changed the electoral law that had been in place since 1972, in an attempt to address corruption in politics. The major political parties considered some of the new provisions in the bill, such as the abolition of students' and women's wings and foreign chapters, to be undemocratic, but they accepted the changes with some of reluctance and revised their party constitutions. Under the amended ordinance, candidates must reveal information about their education, wealth, and criminal records when they file to run for parliament. Political parties must submit statements to the election commission outlining expenditures and sources of funds.

On April 6, the parliament passed the Upazila Parishad (Amendment) Act to reintroduce a tier of the local government abolished in 1991. The act, in contrast with provisions in a lapsed ordinance the caretaker government promulgated, made it mandatory for the upazila parishads, or councils, to accept the advice of the local MP. Under the act, upazila parishads could not communicate directly with the central government without their local MP's advice.

The parliament had 345 members, 300 of whom were directly elected. The remaining 45 seats were reserved for women nominated by the political parties, based on their proportional representation within the 300-member group of directly elected members of parliament. Party leaders appointed candidates for elections, and there were allegations that wealthy candidates could purchase nominations from party leaders with campaign contributions or personal gifts.

Elections and Political Participation
Sheikh Hasina, leader of the AL, became prime minister on January 6, following the parliamentary elections in December 2008. The 14-party AL alliance won 230 of 299 seats in the elections, which international and local observers deemed free and fair. Hasina's cabinet included representatives from the other parties in her coalition. Hasina replaced Fakhruddin Ahmed, chief advisor to the caretaker government, as the head of government. BNP chairperson and former prime minister Khaleda Zia became leader of the opposition.

On January 22, the country held elections to the newly created upazila parishads, or sub district councils, throughout the country. There were reports of violence, intimidation, vote rigging, and low voter turnout. The candidates backed by the ruling party won most of the upazila posts, although the election was not officially party based. The election commission organized repolling in a number of upazilas where elections were suspended due to violence.

On January 25, the new parliament convened for its first session. Members of the main opposition party, the BNP, which alleged irregularities in the elections, participated in the first few sessions but subsequently walked out to protest the inadequate allocation of seats in the front row of the opposition bench and did not return to the house at year's end. The parliament formed all 48 standing committees in the first session with participation from opposition parties.

There were 64 women serving in parliament, 19 of them were directly elected. According to the law, women are eligible to contest and win any number of seats among the 345 members of parliament, but 45 seats were reserved for women. Six women, including Prime Minister Hasina, held the status of cabinet minister, including the ministers of home affairs, foreign affairs, and agriculture. Khaleda Zia, as the leader of the opposition, and Sajeda Chowdhury, as the deputy leader of parliament, also had the status of cabinet minister. Two women were appointed as state ministers, and a third was serving as a whip of parliament with the status of a state minister. In the January 22 upazila elections, 481 women vice chairpersons were elected to reserved positions for women. Six of the 89 supreme court judges were women.

There was no provision to provide parliamentary seats for minorities. Members of minority groups constituted approximately 10.3 percent of the population but held only approximately 5 percent of seats in parliament.

Section 4 Official Corruption and Government Transparency
The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, but the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. Following the declaration of a state of emergency in 2007, the caretaker government and military took several significant steps to address government corruption. On April 2, however, the ACC chairman resigned following statements by the prime minister suggesting a willingness to reconstitute the ACC. On May 2, the president appointed Gholam Rahman, the former chair of the Bangladesh Energy Regulatory Commission, as the new chairman of the ACC.
During the year the government undertook a substantial review of the actions of the ACC under the caretaker government. An AL-headed parliamentary standing committee summoned the former ACC chairman and two of its current members to appear before the committee to account for some of the ACC's actions against political leaders during the caretaker period. The ACC officials defied the summons and the committee recommended parliamentary action against them. A parliamentary committee also conducted an inquiry into alleged corruption and irregularities by the speaker, the deputy speaker, and the chief whip of parliament and recommended action against them, including stripping former speaker and BNP leader Jamiruddin Sircar of his membership in parliament. Sircar petitioned the High Court to challenge the authority of the committee to take these actions against him. Parliament, however, rejected the committee's recommendation to strip Sircar of his membership.

The government formed a review committee headed by the state minister for law, justice, and parliamentary affairs to recommend withdrawal of politically motivated cases that the government and ACC filed. The committee subsequently recommended the withdrawal of approximately 1,817 cases filed mostly against AL leaders, including all the cases filed against Sheikh Hasina. Other cases recommended for withdrawal included one case against BNP leader Khaleda Zia's son, Tarique Rahman, one against BNP leader and former law minister Moudud Ahmed, and one against Jatiya Party secretary general Ruhul Amin Howlader. Ahmed refused the government's offer to withdraw all cases against him and demanded withdrawal of all politically motivated cases against BNP leaders, including Khaleda Zia and her sons.

During the year authorities had released most of the accused in ACC cases from prison on bail, and the ACC did not file many new cases against politicians or bureaucrats. On March 16, the ACC filed a money laundering case against Arafat "Koko" Rahman, son of BNP leader Khaleda Zia. Separately, the ACC also filed a money laundering case against Tarique Rahman and his associate Giasuddin Al Mamun. On August 5, the ACC filed charges against Khaleda Zia and others for allegedly embezzling funds from the Zia Orphanage Trust.

As in prior years, the ACC focused its efforts on developing cases involving public persons failing to disclose income. The National Board of Revenue filed a tax evasion case against AL advisory council member and immediate past general secretary Abdul Jalil. The arrest came soon after Jalil told a television reporter that his party's victory in the 2008 elections was the result of an understanding with the caretaker government and the military leaders.

In previous years the caretaker government detained prominent business leaders using the Special Powers Act, which permitted preventive detention. Most of those persons were then tried under existing anticorruption legislation. Most high-profile cases were handled under the EPR, which initially denied suspects both the right to bail and the right to appeal their cases during the course of the trial. A supreme court ruling restored some forms of bail and the court exercised its authority to consider bail petitions.

The release of many corruption suspects continued to draw comment from some members of civil society, who stated the government was not serious about fighting corruption. Government leaders argued that the government and the ACC would continue to pursue corruption cases despite release of some suspects on bail. In September the president granted clemency to a fugitive convicted of corruption, Shahadab Akbar, son of deputy leader of parliament Sajeda Chowdhury. The special courts had sentenced Akbar to 18 years' imprisonment for several corruption cases and fined him 15 million taka ($220,000). Some legal experts questioned the granting of clemency to a fugitive and noted that the constitution authorizes clemency only for those convicts who surrender to a court of law.

On March 29, the parliament passed the Right to Information Act, in line with a lapsed September 2008 ordinance promulgated by the caretaker government. This law effectively annulled the Official Secrets Act, which had denied the public access to government information. The act went into effect on July 1 and required the formation of a three-member information commission. The commission, however, was not functional at year's end.

Section 5 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Non-governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated independently and without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Although human rights groups often were sharply critical of the government, they also practiced self-censorship.

The government required all NGOs, including religious organizations, to register with the Ministry of Social Welfare. During the state of emergency, NGOs came under heightened scrutiny by the caretaker government and the military, a practice that decreased under the elected civilian government. Nevertheless, local and international NGOs, including Odhikar and the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), reported the government sought to impede their work either by canceling projects or subjecting them to restrictive operating requirements.

On August 31, Odhikar received a letter from the NGO Affairs Bureau (NAB), the office within the prime minister's office that approves NGO projects, canceling its approval of an ongoing human rights training and advocacy project. The letter cited objections to the project from the Ministry of Home Affairs but did not provide any details. A newspaper quoted a home ministry official as saying the ministry objected to the project following instructions from unspecified higher authorities. Domestic and international human rights NGOs criticized the government for the arbitrary cancellation of the project and called for a review of the decision. On October 11, a High Court panel stayed the government order canceling its approval of Odhikar's training project and issued a ruling asking the government to explain why its decision to cancel the project should not be declared illegal and void. The case was still pending at year's end.

According to ACILS, in October, the NAB informed the organization it was delaying the release of approximately 34 million taka($500,000) in foreign funding for a program to improve labor standards in the shrimp and fish processing sector. The NAB noted that the Home Ministry had required ACILS to secure a clearance from several national security agencies before proceeding with the program. By year's end the government had assured ACILS that the clearances had been completed and that the funds would be released in the near future.

There were no developments in the case of RAB 3 officers allegedly harassing Odhikar in November 2008. According to Odhikar, the RAB continued some harassment of the organization during the year.

Asudullah Al-Galib, leader of Ahle Hadith, a local Islamic group, remained free on bail while awaiting trial on six charges for a 2005 attack on several offices of leading NGOs, including the Grameen Bank and the Rural Advancement Committee. His case was pending at year's end.

In July the parliament passed the National Human Rights Commission Act, successor to the ordinance the caretaker government promulgated. The law changed the formation of the commission and created a new seven-member selection committee, dominated by government officials from the ruling party: the speaker of parliament, the home, law, and justice ministers, and the law commission chairman and cabinet secretary. The other two committee members are an opposition party MP and a ruling party MP, both chosen by the speaker. Human rights activists criticized the new law for granting the commission inadequate powers and politicizing the selection process.

Section 6 Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
The law prohibits discrimination, but the government did not strongly enforce laws aimed at eliminating discrimination. Women, children, minority groups, and persons with disabilities often confronted social and economic disadvantages.

Women
Laws specifically prohibit certain forms of discrimination against women, provide special procedures for persons accused of violence against women and children, call for harsh penalties, provide compensation to victims, and require action against investigating officers for negligence or willful failure of duty. Enforcement of these laws was weak. In 2003 parliament passed an amendment to the current law, weakening provisions for dowry crimes and addressing the issue of suicides of female victims of acts of dishonor.

The law prohibits rape and physical spousal abuse but makes no specific provision for spousal rape. According to Odhikar, there were 454 reported incidents of rape during the year, including 211 against women and 243 against children. According to human rights monitors, the actual number of rape cases was higher because many rape victims did not report the incidents due to social stigma. Prosecution of rapists was not consistent.

For example, on July 9, according to Odhikar and media reports, two men raped a 14-year-old girl in Chorbhodrashon, Faridpur, and recorded the incident on a mobile phone camera. The men then circulated the images among friends, uploaded the images onto a Web site, and copied it onto CDs, which they sold at the local market. The victim's family filed a case with the Women and Children Repression Prevention Court in Faridpur against Kalam Khan, Tushar Khan, and two other unknown men. The court issued arrest warrants for the men and ordered a ban on the sale of the CD. The accused men continued to threaten the victim's family. There were no further developments at year's end.

Domestic violence is not criminalized. According to women's rights groups, it was widespread and increased during the year, although data quantifying it was difficult to obtain. A 2000 study by the UN Population Fund indicated that at least 50 percent of women experienced domestic violence at least once in their lives. The National Women Lawyers' Association (BNWLA) reported 3,502 incidents of domestic violence and received 3,496 complaints related to domestic violence issues. Domestic violence is not criminalized in the country, and most efforts to combat it were funded by NGOs with little assistance from the government. Some of the reported violence against women was related to disputes over dowries. There was an increase in the number of dowry-related killings during the year. Odhikar reported 227 dowry-related killings, an increase from 188 the previous year.

Domestic violence is not criminalized
On June 3, according to the Daily Star, a man beat his wife to death in Shibram village, Barobari union in Lalmonirhat Sadar. Police recovered the woman's body the next day and filed a case against the husband. The case was ongoing at year's end.

On July 4, according to media reports, a man beat his wife and allegedly forced her to drink poison in Narsingdi. The woman died on the way to the hospital; her husband claimed she had committed suicide. When the wife's relatives confronted the husband about her death, he allegedly attacked them, seriously injuring six men. According to relatives, the husband regularly beat his wife because he was upset that he had not received a dowry from her parents. A case was filed with the police and was pending at year's end.

On October 19, according to the Daily Star, a man strangled his wife in Kadamtoli, Siddhirganj upazila, because she refused to give him a dowry of 20,000 taka (approximately $295). The woman was reportedly seven months pregnant when her husband killed her. A case was filed with local police. The husband fled with his young son after the incident and there were no further developments at year's end.

Female prostitution continued to be legal. Male prostitution was illegal, although local NGOs claimed it was common in the major cities. Authorities generally ignored the minimum age of 18, often circumvented by false statements of age, for legal female prostitution. The government rarely prosecuted procurers of minors, and large numbers of underage girls worked in brothels. Estimates for the number of underage girls in commercial sexual exploitation ranged from a 2003 UNICEF estimate of 10,000 underage girls, but other estimates placed the figure as high as 29,000.

NGOs such as the BNWLA operated facilities to provide shelter to destitute persons and distressed women and children. According to the BSEHR, persons in "safe custody" were no longer housed in prisons. Courts sent most of them to shelter homes. In a few cases they were sent to prison as a transit for short periods.

A 2001 high court ruling banned fatwas (religious edicts). Islamic tradition dictated only those muftis (religious scholars) who have expertise in Islamic law are authorized to declare a fatwa. Despite these restrictions, village religious leaders sometimes made such a declaration in an individual case and called the declaration a fatwa. Such declarations could result in extrajudicial punishments, often against women for alleged moral transgressions.

Incidents of vigilantism against women--sometimes led by religious leaders by means of fatwas--occurred. According to Odhikar, 37 incidents of vigilante justice against women occurred during the year. The punishments included whipping, beating, and other forms of physical violence.

For example, on May 22, a fatwa committee in Bitteshwar union ordered a 26-year-old woman whipped 100 times, according to the Daily Star. The woman, an unwed mother, sought to have her son's paternity socially acknowledged, a claim the alleged father denied. The woman was whipped until she lost consciousness, at which point village leaders asked her father to tie her hands as they continued to whip her. Police filed cases against six men but only three were arrested. The trial was pending at year's end.

On June 10, according to media reports, village leaders in Companiganj whipped a 35-year-old woman and her mother because the daughter allegedly had an affair with a man. Local police arrested five villagers for their involvement in the attack. On June 12, the local AL chapter organized a women's rally to protest the arrest of the perpetrators and warned the police and press against further "excesses" with regard to this incident.

On June 27, according to the Daily Star, village leaders in Khaiyar, Comilla, whipped two women in front of hundreds of persons for their alleged involvement in behavior that was described as "antisocial activity." Local religious leaders issued a fatwa against the women after village arbitration. One of the women was whipped 202 times, and the other received 101 lashes. Each woman was fined 30,000 taka (approximately $442). Local police arrested six individuals allegedly involved in the incident, who were on trial at year's end.

There were no further developments in the September 2008 case of Mahmuda, a local woman who was shunned by her community after her husband divorced her.

Acid attacks remained a serious problem. Assailants threw acid in the faces of victims--usually women--that left them disfigured and often blind. Acid attacks often related to allegations of spousal infidelity. During the year, according to Odhikar, 101 persons were attacked with acid. Of these, 64 of the victims were women, 20 were men, and 17 were children.

For example, on May 7, according to the AHRC, in Khulna, Ayub Mollah attacked a young woman with acid after she refused his marriage proposal. The woman was admitted to the Khulna Medical College Hospital with burns to her face, ear, and left shoulder. Witnesses reported that the investigating officer accepted refreshments from Mollah before attempting to convince the victim to drop her case. The officer allegedly told the woman she was too poor to win the case, and she should settle for a cash payment and consider marrying Mollah for her own safety. The woman filed a complaint with the Koyna police seeking physical and legal protection, but no action has been taken. The investigating officer's final report of the case cleared Mollah of any wrongdoing.

The law provides for speedier prosecutions of acid-throwing cases in special tribunals and generally does not allow bail. The Women and Child Repression Control Act seeks to control the availability of acid and reduce acid-related violence directed toward women, but lack of awareness of the law and poor enforcement limited the law's effect. According to the Acid Survivors Foundation, the special tribunals were not entirely effective, but that prosecutors were able to obtain an unspecified number of convictions during the year.

Deputy attorney general Rajik Al Jalil stated that the new guidelines covered verbal abuse and physical attacks, including the sending of suggestive text messages. Sexual harassment in schools, workplaces, and in other public spaces remained a problem during the year. A study published on May 19 by the Journal of Interpersonal Violence found that out of 5,106 unmarried adolescent girls in rural areas surveyed in 2004, 35 percent experienced harassment, 34 percent experienced unwanted sexual attention, and 14 percent experienced sexual intimidation.

Reproductive health information was freely available, but income and education often served as barriers to access. According to a 2005 report by the World Health Organization (WHO), "the state of maternal health in Bangladesh is dismal" and the country has a very high maternal mortality rate 300 per 100,000 live births. The WHO also listed some of the major causes of maternal death, including postpartum hemorrhage, obstructed labor, postpartum sepsis, and violence or injuries. According to the government, approximately 85 percent of women give birth at home, and only 18 percent have access to a skilled birth attendant. Fifty percent of women attended one of four recommended prenatal visits; only 21 percent attended all four. Only 21 percent of women attend one or more postnatal visits.

Most of the programs offered by the government and NGOS to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases were focused on women.

Women remained in a subordinate position in society, and the government did not act effectively to protect their basic rights. For example, under traditional Islamic inheritance laws, women inherited only half that of sons, and in the absence of sons, they may inherit only what remains after settling all the debts and other obligations.

Employment opportunities increased at a greater rate for women than for men in the last decade, largely due to the growth of the export garment industry. Women constituted approximately 80 percent of garment factory workers. There were some disparities in pay in the overall economy between men and women, but in the garments sector they were roughly comparable.

On September 2, the new AL government vowed to reinstate the National Women's Development Policy that the previous AL government established in 1997. The policy's features included reservation of seats for women in parliament, initiatives to appoint women in senior posts in the administration and in all spheres of employment, and greater legal measures to end discrimination against women. There were no further developments at year's end.

Children
The government, with the assistance of local and foreign NGOs, worked to improve children's rights and welfare, enabling the country to make significant progress in improving children's health, nutrition, and education. Despite the progress, according to UNICEF only slightly fewer than half of all children remained chronically malnourished.

The law does not grant citizenship automatically by birth within the country. Individuals become citizens if they, their fathers, or grandfathers were born in the territories that are now part of the country. If a person qualifies through citizenship through ancestry, the father or grandfather must have been a permanent resident of these territories on March 25, 1971. Birth registrations were available only to approximately 10 percent of the population

Primary education was free and compulsory, but the implementation of compulsory education fell short, in part because parents kept children out of school to work for money or help with household chores. Government incentives to families who sent children to school contributed significantly to the rise in primary school enrollments in recent years. Despite these efforts and contrary to established policies, public schools imposed fees that were burdensome to poor families and created a disincentive to attend school.

Although the legal age of marriage is 18 for women and 21 for men, underage marriage was a widespread problem. Reliable statistics concerning underage marriage were difficult to find because marriage registrations were sporadic and birth registrations rare. A local human rights NGO, Mass Line Media, concluded from a 2004 survey that an estimated 40 percent of all marriages could be considered child marriages. In an effort to reduce child marriages, the government offered stipends for girls' school expenses if parents promised to delay their daughters' marriage until at least age 18.

According to human rights monitors, child abandonment, kidnapping, and trafficking continued to be serious and widespread problems. Despite advances, including a monitoring agency in the Ministry of Home Affairs, trafficking of children continued to be a problem.

Child labor remained a problem in certain industries; it frequently resulted in the abuse of children, mainly through mistreatment by employers during domestic service, and occasionally included servitude and trafficking for commercial sexual exploitation abroad. According to a 2006 study by the Bangladesh Institute of Labor Studies, attacks on children constituted more than 50 percent of the deaths, injuries, and sexual assaults reported among domestic workers during the year.

Trafficking in Persons
The law prohibits trafficking in persons, but trafficking remained a serious problem affecting men, women, and children. Trafficking in children for "immoral or illegal purposes" carries the death penalty or life imprisonment, and the government took measures for the expeditious prosecution of traffickers. During the year special courts dealing with incidents of repression against women and children adjudicated 66 cases. Courts convicted 33 persons and ordered life sentences for 26 convicted traffickers.

Trafficked women and children went to India, Pakistan, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and destinations within the country. Men seeking work abroad as expatriate labor in destinations such as Malaysia and the Middle East occasionally found themselves in exploitative situations of forced labor, with conditions including restrictions on movement, threats, and physical assault. Some women and children were trafficked internally for commercial sexual exploitation. Some children faced forced labor in the fishing industry, and entire families were subject to bonded labor throughout the country.

According to government sources, law enforcement personnel rescued 73 victims of trafficking during the year. Some of the rescued victims remained in government homes or at NGO-run shelters and received social and vocational skills training while NGOs attempted to locate their families.

During the year the BNWLA rescued 123 domestic trafficking victims and repatriated 42 others. The actual number of persons arrested for trafficking was difficult to assess, as charges against traffickers sometimes cited lesser crimes, such as crossing borders without proper documents. According to the Centre for Women and Child Services, most trafficked boys were younger than 10, while most trafficked girls were 11 to 16 years of age.

The exact number of women and children trafficked was unknown. Most trafficked persons were lured by promises of jobs or marriage, and some were forced into involuntary servitude outside and within the country. Parents sometimes willingly sent their children away to escape poverty. Unwed mothers, orphans, and others outside the normal family support system were also vulnerable. For example, traffickers living abroad often married women and deserted them upon arrival in the destination country, where they would be sold into bonded labor, menial jobs, or commercial sexual exploitation. International criminal gangs conducted some of the trafficking. The border with India was loosely controlled, especially around Jessore and Benapole.

As many as 10,000 children were used in brothels for commercial sexual exploitation, and procurers of minors were rarely prosecuted.

Government corruption greatly facilitated the process of trafficking. Police and local government officials often ignored trafficking in women and children for commercial sexual exploitation and accepted bribes from brothel owners and pimps.

Because the number of workers traveling to Southeast Asia and the Middle East increased, the expatriate labor market remained lucrative. Labor recruiters sometimes offered nonexistent jobs or conditions that left migrant workers stranded upon arrival in the receiving country. Recruiters also often charged exorbitant fees that made workers extremely vulnerable to forced labor and debt bondage. Some women were subjected to forced prostitution upon arrival in the receiving country.

During the year the Bureau for Manpower, Education and Training (BMET) received 1,025 complaints against recruiting agencies and their agents. By year's end, the BMET had settled a total of 470 complaints and collected 50.6 million taka (approximately $745,000), more than double the year before. In addition, the government cancelled the licenses of six recruiting agencies and ordered them to forfeit their security deposits due to fraudulent activities and breach of contract. During the year the government also suspended activities of one recruiting agency due to fraudulent activities.

In August the parliamentary standing committee on expatriate welfare and overseas employment ministry issued a two-month deadline to the Bangladesh Association of International Recruiting Agencies (BAIRA) and the BMET to develop and submit a detailed action plan to curb irregularities and mismanagement in the migration sector. The committee also asked the BAIRA to set the migration cost at no more than 95,000 taka (approximately $1,400) and to standardize a minimum salary for the workers. NGOs alleged that former MPs and other senior political figures were involved with several fraudulent recruiting agencies.

In 2007, as part of negotiations to send workers to South Korea, the government agreed to eliminate the role of recruitment agencies and to have the Ministry of Expatriate Welfare recruit workers directly. In 2007 the government of Malaysia suspended the import of expatriate laborers from the country after persistent problems with recruitment agencies. This issue was later resolved but from time to time Malaysia cancelled visas for the country's workers because of a perceived surplus of labor.

Although a lack of resources hindered investigations, the government maintained anti-trafficking police units in all 64 districts to encourage victims to testify against their traffickers and to compile data on trafficking. In response to inadequately trained police and prosecutors, the government worked with legal experts to provide specialized training to prosecutors and with the International Organization on Migration to develop an anti-trafficking course for the National Police Academy.

The government continued efforts to combat trafficking in persons through intensive case tracking by the trafficking monitoring cell at police headquarters and holding bimonthly inter-ministerial committee meetings headed by the MOHA. The cell monitored police activities and assisted in prosecuting relevant cases. The government had monitoring committees headed by the deputy commissioners in all 64 districts. These committees transmitted to the national monitoring agency in Dhaka daily progress reports on arrests, convictions, acquittals, and repatriation of trafficked victims.

In 2007 the Foreign Ministry issued new instructions to all consular staff worldwide on how to handle trafficking cases abroad and introduced labor-trafficking training courses for director-level officials. During the year, 17 foreign ministry officials and officials from the Ministry of Expatriates' Welfare and BMET received training to enhance their capacity to protect trafficking-in-persons victims. Thirteen labor attaches received training on ensuring migrant workers' rights and monitoring the compliance of contractual agreements in destination countries.

During the year the MOHA arrested 120 persons on trafficking charges and disposed of 66 trafficking cases. Of those cases, 33 persons were convicted, and 26 of them were sentenced to life imprisonment. Although the law allows capital punishment for convicted human traffickers, no death sentences were handed down during the year. Government anti-trafficking projects included conducting awareness campaigns, research, lobbying, and rescue and rehabilitation programs. In February police established a victim support center to provide legal advice and a short-term shelter facility for the victims of trafficking and other forms of violence. The MOHA secretary continued to meet bimonthly with NGOs working on anti-trafficking issues to facilitate coordination and cooperation between the government and civil society. The MOHA also formed a committee to adopt a national plan of action to combat human trafficking in the country.

Since 2005 a cooperative effort among NGOs, the government, and the UAE resulted in the repatriation of 199 camel jockeys, all of whom were reunited with their biological parents. Authorities from the government and the NGO community continued to monitor the repatriation, rehabilitation, and social integration of former camel jockeys. All camel jockeys received 104,000 taka ($1,500) as compensation. The government, with assistance from UNICEF, initiated the second phase of the camel jockey rehabilitation project to focus on ensuring the sustainability of community care groups and livelihood options for victims. During the year, the program to repatriate and compensate former camel jockeys was largely completed. All children were reunited with their families.

Many NGOs, community-based organizations, and local government leaders worked against trafficking through prevention, research, data collection, documentation, advocacy, awareness creation, and networking, cross-border collaboration, legal enforcement, rescue, rehabilitation, and legislative reform. Despite constraints such as lack of birth and marriage records at the village level, authorities prosecuted trafficking cases. There was limited success in increasing shelter capacity and developing rehabilitation programs, including skills and vocational training, to facilitate sustainable social reintegration of the survivors largely due to lack of adequate funding. Despite efforts to address trafficking for sexual exploitation, the government failed to demonstrate significant progress in criminally prosecuting and convicting labor trafficking offenders and recruiters. In December the government formed a committee at the Expatriates' Welfare Ministry to review laws and regulations on labor migration for reformation.

Persons with Disabilities
The law provides for equal treatment and freedom from discrimination for persons with disabilities; in practice, persons with disabilities faced social and economic discrimination. The law focuses on prevention of disability, treatment, education, rehabilitation and employment, transport accessibility, and advocacy.

The Ministry of Social Welfare, the Department of Social Services, and the National Foundation for the Development of the Disabled were the government agencies responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. Government facilities for treating persons with mental disabilities were inadequate. Several private initiatives existed for medical and vocational rehabilitation, as well as for employment of persons with disabilities.

Indigenous People
Indigenous populations had marginal ability to influence decisions concerning the use of their lands. There was some progress in the implementation of the 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord. The government reconstituted the CHT Land Commission, which announced its decision to conduct a land survey beginning on October 15. The National Committee for Implementation of the CHT Peace Accord also was reconstituted with Deputy Leader of Parliament Sajeda Chowdhury as chairman. The government did not cede responsibility for key functions such as land use and natural resources to local authorities, as the accord specified. Law and order problems and alleged human rights violations continued, as did dissatisfaction with the implementation of the Peace Accord.

The government allowed some cell phone and Internet coverage to the three Hill Tract districts in 2008. Although the government cited security concerns as the reason for limiting coverage, human rights groups and local officials claimed lack of coverage was also aimed at stunting the development of the region. The Land Commission dealing with land disputes between tribal individuals and Bengali settlers did not function effectively in addressing critical land disputes after the signing of the Peace Accord. Tribal leaders remained disappointed with the lack of assistance to those who left the area during the insurgency. Local human rights organizations alleged that security forces took advantage of the state of emergency to increase human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests, against indigenous people in the preceding two years.

In 2007 the government withdrew 16 temporary camps of security forces in the Rangamati area of the Hill Tracts. Since the signing of the 1997 Peace Agreement, the government had withdrawn 212 camps, leaving approximately 270 camps. On July 29, the ISPR office issued a press release announcing plans for a partial removal of troops from the CHT in two months. The main opposition BNP and its allies protested that withdrawal of troops would leave the Bengali settlers insecure and compromise sovereignty. The army withdrew a brigade, including three infantry battalions and 35 security camps, per the announced plans. In August Bengali settlers barricaded roads and enforced "hartals" (strikes) in parts of the CHT to protest the decision. Indigenous leaders welcomed the partial army removal but also insisted on complete withdrawal of camps and faster implementation of other clauses of the peace accord.

The conflict continued between the Parbattya Chattagram Jono Sanghati Samity (PCJSS), which signed the 1997 Peace Agreement with the government, and the United Peoples' Democratic Front (UPDF), which opposed the peace agreement. There were no further updates regarding the 2007 killing of PCJSS activist Vinku Kumar Chakma.

NGOs continued to allege that security forces abused the indigenous population of the CHT. There were no updates to the 2007 land dispute in Mahalchari in Khagrachari district.

There were no developments in the 2007 arrest of UPDF members Bimol Bikash Chakma and Milon Bihari Chakma.

Indigenous communities in other areas continued to report loss of land to Bengali Muslims. The government neither cancelled work on national park projects on land traditionally owned by indigenous communities in the Moulvibazar and Modhupur forest areas, nor did it undertake any new activities. In addition, indigenous communities, local human rights organizations, and churches in the area continued to claim the government had yet to withdraw thousands of false charges the Forestry Department filed against indigenous residents.

Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Homosexual acts remained illegal but in practice the law was rarely enforced. There were a few informal support networks for gay men, but organizations to assist lesbians were rare.

Attacks on lesbians and gay men occurred on occasion, but those offenses were difficult to track because victims desired confidentiality. Strong social stigma based on sexual orientation was common and repressed open discussion about the subject. Local human rights groups did not monitor the problem, and there were few studies on homosexuality in the country.

Although overt discrimination against lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgender individuals was fairly rare–-partly because few individuals openly identified their orientation–-there was significant societal discrimination. Openly gay individuals, particularly those from less affluent backgrounds, found their families and local communities ostracized them. Some sought refuge in the transgender or "hijra" community.

Other Societal Discrimination
There were no reported cases of violence or discrimination against HIV/AIDS patients. NGOs believed this was partly a function of the refusal of victims to self-identify and an absence of research given the relatively low rate of HIV/AIDS in the country.

Section 7 Worker Rights

a. The Right of Association
The law provides for the right to join unions and, with government approval, the right to form a union, although numerous restrictions on union registration remained. For example, the law requires more than 30 percent of an enterprise's total workforce to be members before approval and the union can be dissolved if membership falls below 30 percent; no more than three trade unions can be registered in any establishment; and managerial staff and other employees designated by employers as "confidential" may not join unions.

Civil service and security force employees were legally prohibited from forming unions. In 2006 new categories of workers, including teachers and NGO workers, were permitted to form unions; however, due to the broad limitations on union organizing during the state of emergency, these regulations were not formally instituted.

The total labor force was approximately 50 million, of whom approximately 1.9 million belonged to unions, many of which were affiliated with political parties. There were approximately 5,000 garment factories employing 2.5 million workers; more than 80 percent were women. No reliable labor statistics were available for the large informal sector in which the majority (nearly 80 percent) of citizens worked.

The 2006 Bangladesh Labor Act (BLA) consolidated laws from 25 separate acts into one comprehensive law. The director of labor is responsible for the registration and dissolution of unions. The registrar of trade unions has authority to deregister unions without labor court approval, and during the year some unions were deregistered, primarily for labor law violations. The law afforded unions the right of appeal in the case of dissolution or denial of registration.

The law recognized the right to strike; however, many restrictions on this right remained. For example, 75 percent of union membership must consent to a strike before it can proceed. The government can shut down any strikes lasting more than 30 days and refer the matter to labor courts for adjudication. In addition, strikes are banned for the first three years of commercial production or if the factory was built with foreign investment or owned by a foreign investor. In practice few strikes followed legal requirements, which are cumbersome; strikes or walk-outs often occurred based on the spontaneous decisions of workers.

Throughout the year labor organizers reported acts of intimidation and abuse as well as increased scrutiny by security forces and the National Security Intelligence Agency. Sporadic labor unrest occurred throughout the country, particularly in the ready-made garment sector. Labor organizers reported frequent acts of intimidation and abuse, arbitrarily locking out, and firing employees, and increased scrutiny by security forces. Authorities sometimes arrested labor organizers in what some NGOs considered a crackdown on labor rights activists. In the face of frequent unrest and protests demanding outstanding wages, unpaid overtime, and decent working conditions, in December home minister advocate Sahara Khatun announced the government would create a 1,580-member "industrial police force" to target apparel sector workers and protect investors' assets.

The law established mechanisms for conciliation, arbitration, and labor court dispute resolution. Workers have the right to strike in the event of a failure to reach settlement. The government filed cases against some striking labor leaders and workers for destruction of property, blocking roads, or violation of the EPR provisions. In some cases, the appeals courts subsequently acquitted strikers.

Unions were highly politicized but were independent of the government and were strongest in state-owned enterprises, including jute mills, textile mills, chemical industries, and the government-run Port of Chittagong.

b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
The law protects the rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively without interference, but this right was not always effectively enforced. The BLA includes provisions protecting unions from employer interference in organizing activities, however, employers often sought to curtail this right, particularly in the ready-made garment industry. Implementation of these provisions was uneven and many private sector employers discouraged union activity. Some employers fired workers suspected of organizing or sympathizing with unions, placed informants in work areas, and intimidated workers with threats of violence.

The Director of Labor ruled on union-organizing discrimination complaints except in Export Processing Zones (EPZs). Throughout the year the Labor Court ordered reinstatement of workers who had been fired for union activities, but a large backlog of unresolved cases remained. The majority of workers in such cases, however, sought financial compensation rather than reinstatement. Increasingly, labor disputes were settled informally prior to scheduled hearing dates in the labor court.

Under the BLA, legally registered unions are entitled to bargain collectively with employers; however, this was rarely implemented in practice. The BLA simplified and clarified the procedure for selecting a collective bargaining agent and specified time limits for steps in the process. Labor organizations reported that in some companies, workers feared reprisals and did not exercise their collective bargaining rights.

Overall implementation of labor regulations in the EPZs was poor. A separate law, the EPZ Workers' Association and Industrial Relations Act (EWAIRA) specified association rights in EPZs. EPZ officials interpreted these regulations and applicable laws narrowly and claimed they were exempt from the broader labor law. Labor groups challenged this claim. EPZ-specific labor laws allowed workers to organize into "workers associations," which had the right to strike and could engage in collective bargaining. Many workers associations were not formally registered because employees attempting to organize associations faced difficulties from some factory owners. Some factory managers strongly discouraged workers from meeting outside labor groups and sometimes terminated workers who did. The challenges to EPZ officials were ongoing at year's end.

Federations of workers associations within the EPZ were permitted, but federations with enterprises in other EPZs or with enterprises outside EPZs were banned. As in previous years, the government did not establish an EPZ labor tribunal or an EPZ labor appellate tribunal as required by the EWAIRA. A 2008 ordinance promulgated by the caretaker government stated that labor courts would serve in place of tribunals for disputes in the EPZ. The new government did not pass this ordinance into law and this provision therefore remained unfulfilled. Workers in EPZs filed complaints in the national labor courts to enforce broader legal rights in the EPZs in addition to provisions of the EWAIRA.

Workers filed legal cases against EPZ factories that did not follow the BLA, and the courts made no decisions on this point. In May 2008, through an amendment of the BLA, the government declared that no trade union office can be established inside or within 200 meters of any industrial institution or group of institutions. Therefore, any trade union offices within these limits had to be moved within three months of the date that the amendment was implemented. In November the BLA was amended to reduce the penalty for persons who violate the provisions of the law. Labor activists protested this amendment alleging this had been made in favor of the employers, although there was no strict enforcement of the law.

c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The penal code prohibits forced or bonded labor; however, the prescribed penalty of imprisonment for up to one year or a fine was not sufficiently stringent to deter the offense, and the government did not enforce the prohibitions effectively. The BLA created inspection mechanisms to strengthen laws against forced labor, but these laws were not enforced.

Though relatively uncommon in urban areas, bonded labor remained common in rural areas and in domestic service. Faced with extreme poverty and unemployment, rural workers, including entire families, were engaged in bonded labor, often facing physical abuse and sometimes death.

d. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment
Under the law every child must attend school through grade five or the age of 10 years, but there is no effective legal mechanism to enforce this provision, and child labor is widespread. The BLA regulates child employment depending on the type of work and the child's age. In 2006 the International Labor Organization (ILO) released the 2005 Baseline Survey for Determining Hazardous Child Labor Sectors, which estimated that of the 2.2 million workers in 45 targeted hazardous sectors, 532,000 child workers ages five to 17 performed hazardous labor.

Children were found working in road transport, such as rickshaw pulling, automotive repair, and minibus assistance, in machine shops, salt and match factories, and tanneries, and in the manufacturing of bricks, cigarettes, dried fish, footwear, steel furniture, glass, textiles, garments, and soap. Children were engaged in the following hazardous activities: printing, fabrication, stone breaking, dyeing operations, blacksmith assistance, and construction. Children also worked in the service industry in hotels and restaurants. According to a government survey of urban areas, street children, mostly boys, engaged in various forms of work such as begging, portering, shining shoes, collecting paper, and selling flowers. Boys and girls, often those living on the streets, are exploited in illicit activities, including smuggling and trading arms and drugs.

Children routinely performed domestic work. The government occasionally brought criminal charges against employers who abused domestic servants. During the year, the ILO and the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics completed a baseline survey on commercial sexual exploitation of children. According to the survey, among 18,902 child victims of sexual exploitation, 83 percent were girls, 9 percent transgender children, and 8 percent boys. Forty percent of the girls and 53 percent of the boys were below the age of 16. Fourteen percent of the girls and 6 percent of the boys were trafficking victims.

There was little enforcement of child labor legislation outside the export garment sector. The BLA specifies penalties for child labor violations, typically nominal fines of less than 5,000 taka ($80). Agriculture and other informal sectors that had no government oversight employed large numbers of children.

In 2008 the government, with ILO support, established a child labor unit at the Ministry of Labor and Employment to coordinate planning and execution of all child-related labor interventions.

e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The National Minimum Wage Board (NMWB) announced the most recent national minimum monthly wage in 2007 for all economic sectors not covered by industry-specific wages to be 1,800 taka ($26.50). The NMWB convenes every five years in a tripartite forum to set wages and benefits industry by industry. In the garment industry, wages were sometimes higher than the minimum wage. Wages in the EPZs were typically higher than general national wage levels. None of the set minimum wages provided a sufficient standard of living. It was common practice for garment factories to force workers to work overtime, delay their pay for months, and deny full leave benefits. In May the government declared a minimum wage for shrimp sector workers. The minimum monthly wage was 2,510 taka ($35.85).

The BLA established occupational health and safety standards. Workers groups stated that legally established standards were sufficient, but they were rarely implemented. Workers may resort to legal action for enforcement of the law's provisions, but few cases were pursued legally. Enforcement by the Labor Ministry's industrial inspectors was weak, due to the low number of labor inspectors. Inspections were unannounced, but in many cases, labor groups alleged that factory owners were warned in advance and that the owners colluded with inspectors. There were 95 inspectors serving nationwide and 59 vacant positions. Many workers alleged there was systemic and endemic corruption and inefficiency among inspectors.

Because of high unemployment rates and inadequate enforcement of laws, workers demanding redress of dangerous working conditions or who refused to work under hazardous conditions risked losing their jobs. A standard workday is eight hours, but workers may work 10 hours a day in certain instances. Overtime is permitted, but the employer must pay double the basic wage and other allowances and ad hoc or interim wage for the overtime work. A standard workweek is 48 hours but can be extended up to 60 hours, subject to the payment of overtime allowances. By law, the average workweek should not exceed 56 hours. Workers must get one hour of rest if they work for more than six hours a day, a half-hour of rest for more than five hours a day, and one hour's rest at intervals for more than eight hours' work in a day. Factory workers receive one day off every week. Shop workers receive one and a half days off per week.

In practice, however, these legal limits were routinely violated and enforcement of these provisions was weak. On May 10, the National Labor Committee (NLC) released a report detailing its investigations in 2008, which uncovered abuses of workers in a Chittagong factory that produces jeans for leading international retailers. For example, the report notes that Bibi Kulsum Fatema, an 18-year-old worker, fainted due to overwork at her workplace and died after she was taken to a nearby hospital. According to the report her mother stated that she worked 13-15 hours at a stretch every day. The report also stated that many workers informed NLC investigators that the factory manager kicked a 17-year-old worker who had collapsed on the factory floor and that many workers are often beaten and forced to 20-hour shifts. The report noted that workers often have limited access to bathrooms and that factory fans were often kept switched off to save energy. The NLC report indicated that speaking in many factories was strictly prohibited.

The Bangladesh Garments Manufacturer and Exporters Association president stated that his organization sought to promote full compliance with of labor regulations and that the organization would reinvestigate all allegations of abuse. #

Published by BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES

Released on: March 11, 2010

NOTE: The report is published in full and unedited, except for correction of typographical mistakes

Saturday, February 27, 2010

Blow to Religion-Based Politics in Bangladesh

J. SRI RAMAN

HERE IS some disconcerting news for all disciples of neocon gurus, who had discovered Islam as the enemy of democracy and the successor to the "evil empire" of the cold war era. An Islamic country of 160 million people, under an elected government, is witnessing important but ill-noticed moves to abolish religion-based politics.

On February 2, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh struck down a nearly 11-year-old constitutional amendment that had allowed religion-based political parities to function and flourish in the country. The ruling had the effect of restoring the statutory secularism, which Bangladesh adopted in 1972 after liberation from Pakistan and lost five years later following a series of military coups.

It may also have the effect of inspiring at least a debate on the issues in Pakistan, the other Islamic country of South Asia. It may also have a ripple effect, helping to raise the issues subsequently in sections of the rest of the Islamic world.

This only carries forward an old battle. The logic of Bangladesh's liberation war itself led the nation's founder, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, to place its linguistic identity above the religious. The reverse of the same logic drove religion-based groups in the the pre-liberation East Pakistan to side with Islamabad in the war.

The first constitution of Bangladesh, under Article 38, placed a bar on religion-based parties and politics. Mujib, as he was popularly known, and most of his family were assassinated in a coup on August 25, 1975. A series of coups since then culminated in the country's takeover by Maj.-Gen. Ziaur Rahman in 1977. In April 1979, the Zia regime enacted the infamous Fifth Amendment to the constitution, paving the way for the return of religion-based parties and politics.

Article 38 of the original constitution proclaimed: "Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of morality or public order." But it clearly added: "Provided that no person shall have the right to form, or be a member or otherwise take part in the activities of, any communal or other association or union which in the name or on the basis of any religion has for its object, or pursues, a political purpose."

As revised under the Fifth Amendment, the Article said: "Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of public order or public health." The amendment scrapped the original Article 12, which enshrined "secularism" and "freedom of religion" in the supreme law of the land.

Earlier, by a proclamation, the martial law regime made other major changes in the constitution as well. The Preamble to the constitution was preceded by the religious invocation, "Bismillah-ar-Rahman-ar-Rahim" (in the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful). In the text of the Preamble, the words "a historic struggle for national liberation" were replaced with "a historic war for national independence." The phrase mentioning "nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism" as the "high ideals" in the second paragraph was replaced with "absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah, nationalism, democracy and socialism meaning economic and social justice."

Article 8 of the original constitution - laying down nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism as the four fundamental principles of state policy - was amended to omit "secularism" and replace it with "absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah." In repeated pronouncements, Zia also substituted "Bangladeshi nationalism" for the "Bengali nationalism" of the Mujib days that stressed a non-religious identity.

Lt.-Gen. Hussain Muhammad Ershad, who staged yet another coup and ruled Bangladesh during 1982-86, carried Zia's initiative forward by making Islam the "state religion" through the Eighth Amendment.

The battle between the secular and anti-secular camps continued through all this, and became more open after the country's return to democracy in 1991. The Awami League (AL), headed by Mujib's daughter Sheikh Hasina Wajed, has always fought for abrogation of the Fifth Amendment. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), founded by Zia and now led by his widow Begum Khaleda Zia, and its allies pursuing religion-based politics have remained uncompromising supporters of the amendment.

The AL and its allies scored a legal victory in August 2005, when the country's High Court held the amendment unconstitutional. The court said: "These changes (made by the Fifth Amendment) were fundamental in nature and changed the very basis of our war for liberation and also defaced the constitution altogether." It added that the amendment transformed secular Bangladesh into a "theocratic state" and "betrayed one of the dominant causes for the war of liberation."

The government in Dhaka, then a coalition of the BNP and the religion-based Jamaat-i-Islami (JeI), moved a petition in the Supreme Court against the ruling. The order was stayed and the issue of the amendment was put on the back burner, where it stayed for four years.

Then came a major political change. A year ago, on January 6, 2009, Hasina returned as prime minister after a landslide electoral victory. In early May 2009, the AL government withdrew the old, official petition for staying the 2005 court ruling. The BNP-JeI alliance was quick to react. BNP Secretary General Khondker Delwar Hossain and three lawyers from the JeI rushed to the Supreme Court with petitions seeking to protect the amendment. Their petitions have been thrown out.

The JeI and other religion-based groups did not endear themselves to the country, as the results of the last general election showed, with their violent activities. The serial bombing they carried out across Bangladesh in 2005, taking a heavy toll of human lives, did not help the BNP return to power through the ballot box. The period 2001-06, when the BNP-led alliance wielded power, witnessed "unprecedented" atrocities against religious and ethnic minorities, according to Bangladeshi rights activist Shahriar Kabir. The victims included Hindus, Ahmediyas and other communities and the atrocities ranged from killings and rapes to destruction and desecration of places of worship.

After the Supreme Court's verdict, Law Minister Shafique Ahmed has said that all religion-based parties should "drop the name of Islam from their name and stop using religion during campaigning." He has also announced that religion-based parties are going to be "banned." The government, however, has disavowed any intention to remove the Islamic invocation from the Preamble of the constitution.

All this has already drawn attention in Pakistan, which has continued to suffer from religion-based politics despite its popular rejection in successive elections. Veteran Pakistani columnist Babar Ayaz, in an article captioned "Amendments for a secular constitution" in the Lahore-based Daily Times, talks of the clauses in Pakistan's constitution, introduced by former dictator Zia ul-Haq "who considered himself a kind of religious guardian of the country."

Noting the moves in Bangladesh, Ayaz adds: "Pakistan may not be able to ban religion-based political parties in the near future, but it should move towards expunging the ridiculous constitutional clauses mentioned above ... It would be a long and hard struggle, but it is doable."

Bangladesh is in for a long and hard struggle, too. The BNP has threatened an agitation against the changes. It is likely to combine this with a campaign against India (under whose pressure Hasina is alleged to be acting), and New Delhi can be counted upon to keep providing grist to Khaleda's political mill with Big Brother-like actions widely resented in Bangladesh.

There are also limits to which a constitution alone can counter religion-based politics. The far right's activities in India, proud of its staunchly secular constitution, furnishes just one example.

The significance of what is happening in Bangladesh, however, cannot be belittled either. It demonstrates the far greater role popular will can play in combating religion-based politics than cluster bombs and drones. #

First published in TruthOut, February 05, 2010

Saturday, February 13, 2010

Enough is enough

ZAFAR SOBHAN

IF THE news of the past two weeks was not enough to persuade Bangladeshis that so-called student politics should be banned without further ado, I do not know what will.

First came the tragic story of Abubakr Siddique, a quiet third year Dhaka University student from an impoverished background, the first of his family to attend university.

Siddique died of head injuries last week after being caught in the midst of clashes between rival factions of the Chhatro League (student front of the ruling Awami League) and the police who had been called in to quell the violence at his hall of residence.

Now comes the sickening news from Rajshahi University, where Shibir (student front of Jamaat-e-Islami) activists went on a rampage this week that left one Chhatro League activist hacked to death, his body dumped down a man-hole, and scores more injured, included four who had had tendons in their hands and legs severed.

The reports coming from RU especially have turned the nation's stomach. We may have become a little jaded about campus violence over the years, but the brutality of the killing and maimings has shocked the nation.

Enough, surely, is enough.

When we live in a parliamentary democracy, there should be no need for political parties to rely on shock troops or for the issues of the day to be fought out on university campuses.

Of course, student cadres are like nuclear weapons. The other side has theirs, so you have to have yours. That is why simultaneous disarmament of all student front organisations is the only solution.

It is also true that student politics is only one piece of the greater problem of violence that is committed by political party cadres. As long as each political party keeps cadres of armed thugs as an integral part of maintaining its power and authority, the nation's political discourse will continue to be disfigured by violence.

But cleaning up the campuses is a good place to start. Turning our colleges and universities into politics-free zones is something which would be very popular with the public and would do more to benefit higher education in Bangladesh than any other measure.

There is no reason why we cannot make public colleges and universities safe for ordinary students and ban any political activity or organising on campus. Student politics is banned in private universities, without any ill-effects that I have noticed.

Let's get one thing straight. The political parties' student fronts are nothing more than criminal organisations. They illegally influence the admissions process, control the residence halls, and even corrupt the examination process.

It is a national disgrace that we have allowed so-called student politics to completely destroy the fabric of public education in this country.

Student politics, as it exists today, serves no useful purpose whatsoever. To the contrary, the corrosive impact it has had on our politics and our society, to say nothing of our higher education, is self-evident.

It is true that the Shibir are the most brutal of all the student front groups, with tendon severing a specialty of theirs, as they have amply demonstrated this past week.

But it would be quite incorrect to state that the other parties' student fronts are not also criminal organisations with an almost equally frightening record of violence.

Ultimately, it is the government which will benefit most from a ban on student politics. It will mean moving against its own student front organisations, which will not be easy.

But, in the first place, polls have shown that the rampant criminality of its student front organisations is the thing that the public faults the government for the most.

And the recent rout at RU has shown that when it comes to viciousness, the Chhatro League must still take a back seat to its rivals, specially the Shibir.

If the government were to ban student politics, clear out the musclemen and gangsters (almost all of whom are not even real students), and turn the campuses into a violence-free zone, it would, at a single stroke, solve the problem of its own unruly student factions, ensure that the opposition could not use the campuses to launch anti-government agitations, and take a strong first step towards fixing our broken universities.

Such a move would be enormously popular with the public, as well. It would be win-win-win-win. What's not to like? #

First published in Sunday Guardian, February 14, 2010

Zafar Sobhan is Editor, Editorial & Op-Ed, The Daily Star

Sunday, February 07, 2010

Bangladesh: Golden Hues of Hope in Sonar Bangla

Survey & Graphics: Courtesy Daily Star
MALOY KRISHNA DHAR

BANGLADESH HAS visibly crossed several crossroads. After thirty five years of the dastardly assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman by army rebels guided by plotters like Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmad, Ziaur Rahman justice has been meted out to five killers. They were hanged on January 28, 2010. The remaining seven killers are hiding abroad. Irrespective of their humanitarian considerations and aversion for death sentence these countries including Canada should repatriate the national criminals of Bangladesh. Only then, the cycle of justice would be completed. The hangings have sent a message to the butchers of democracy that Bangladesh was created by the visionaries who wanted separate cultural identity for the Bengali speaking people of Pakistan. Unfortunately, in Pakistan the killers of Z. A. Bhutto (judicial hanging) and Benazir Bhutto are yet to be brought to the books. Pakistan has emerged as a country where human lives are cheaper than foul and goat hawked in the market. A nation cannot maintain its entity if the killers, coup leaders and usurpers are not brought to justice.

Earlier in January 2009 dramatic changes took place in the political scenario of the struggling nation. Political developments during last decade had brought into sharp focus on the quantum of ideological chasm between the forces headed by pro-liberation and secular combine headed by Sheikh Hasina Wazed and the post-Mujib political usurpers, pro-Pakistani and Islamist conglomerate headed by Begum Khaleda Zia of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). If Ziaur Rahman was a part of the plot to kill Sheikh Mujib, how can his wife remain ignorant about that? She should be made to speak and disclose the truth and crimes committed against the people of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh was born out of the aspirations of the Bengali speaking people to achieve political, economic, and cultural freedom from the overwhelming alien ethnic forces represented by Punjabi dominated political, bureaucratic and military hegemony. The movements also aimed at restoration of the unique secular tradition of the Bengali speaking people-on either side of the geopolitical fence.

Violent changes imposed on the people of Bangladesh by the conspiratorial forces of Pakistan, USA; represented by the ISI and the CIA and the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami had tried to virtually negate the achievements of the liberation war. Mujib’s death and ultimate capture of power by Ziaur Rahman marked the stark dividing line between the forces of liberation, establishment of secular democratic forces represented by the Awami League and the pro-Pakistan, pro-Islamist non-secular forces represented by the BNP. The BNP was not only a political face of the military regime; it emerged as the umbrella for all non-secular Islamist anti-Indian forces and an echo pillar for the Pakistani conspirators. Common sensible people in Bangladesh call the BNP as Bangla Name Pakistan (Pakistan in the garb of Bangla political front).

This was proved beyond doubt when Ziaur Rahman allowed the Jamaat chief to return to Bangladesh and reopen the fundamentalist shop. Zia’s open collaboration with the CIA and the ISI resulted in recruitment of over 15, 000 Bangladeshis and Rohingyas for undergoing training in ISI, Al Qaeda and Afghan mujahideen camps and fighting against the USSR. Nearly 2000 Bangla jihadis were deputed to Bosnia, Chechnya and other theatres of jihad directly or indirectly sponsored by the USA, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Al Qaeda. Zia was responsible for Islamization of secular Bangladesh and dragging it closer to Pakistan.

After conclusion of the Afghan jihad 8000 odd jihadis returned to Bangladesh, who opened new jihadi outfits to Islamicise Bangladesh and remove the last vestiges of the secular identity of the Bangladeshi people. Since then the Jamaat and the jihadi forces did not have to look back. Islamization process, proliferation in activities of the jihadi groups and stranglehold of Pakistan and pumping in of Arab world fund for strengthening Islamic resurgence were given priority by the BNP and Jamaat coalition government. Between 1993 and 2003 over 36 jihadi tanzeems rooted in the country and over 8000 afghan war veterans opened new jihad accelerating bodies, started over 65 new madrasas and proclaimed that their objective was establishing Nizam-e-Mustafa in Bangladesh. The BNP/Jamaat government did everything possible to bury the name of Bangabandhu, arranged attempt on Sheikh Hasina’s life and closed eyes on the activities of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Harkat-ul-Jihad al Islami (HuJI), Bangla Bhai, Hizbut Tehrir, Ahl-e-Hadith and Allahar Dal etc armed terrorist movements. Pakistani jihadi tanjeems like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad etc also opened shop in Bangladesh and the ISI, in collaboration with the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) accelerated terrorist activities in India. It is needless to say that the pro-Pakistani tools of governance in Bangladesh were treated as the most trusted allies by the Indian ethnic insurgent groups.

However, oxidization of the golden hue dream of Sonar Bangla was abruptly checkmated with the landslide win of the Awami League headed by Sheikh Hasina in the last election and marginalization of BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami and other fanatic forces. The people of Bangladesh voted overwhelmingly for Sheikh Hasina to restore freedom of the country that was earned with blood of millions of Bangla citizens. However, this new earned freedom faced immediate threat in the form of bloodied revolt by the Bangladesh Rifles, a paramilitary force. Within two months of installation of the new government of liberation the Bangladesh Rifle officers and jawans staged a revolt in Dhaka and other detachment headquarters. The bloodied revolt, ostensively staged on certain grievances, there were informed opinions that political opponents and sections of the armed forces and the military intelligence, the DGFI, had motivated the revolt to get pro-democracy Army Chief General Moeen removed and bring about a army coup by dismissing the newly elected government. There were reports that BNP and Jamaat leaders were the main motivators. However, Sheikh Hasina tackled the national crisis with firm grit and determination and pragmatic approach.

It can be said that Hasina has succeeded to a great extent in defanging the DGFI and has established reasonable control on the armed forces by pushing aside the prominent BNP and Jamaat leaning senior army officers. To General Moeen goes the credit of helping the secular and democratic government.

After completion of one year in January 2010, despite several internal shortcomings, Hasina government has maintained reasonably high level of popularity. According to a study carried out recently by Daily Star newspaper of Bangladesh, the new government has suffered some erosion in popularity on certain fronts. But it maintained considerable popular support. In an impoverished country like Bangladesh it is not possible for any government to maintain 80% popularity. Drought, flood, cyclones and shortage of food, shelter and lack of employment opportunities obviously maintain high level of disapproval of any government in a struggling country like Bangladesh. Bangladesh depends heavily on manpower export to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Libya and the Gulf countries. After the global recession thousands of labour force working abroad returned home, putting pressure on the employment front. The youths are restive and they want the Dhaka government to negotiate with other countries to facilitate their job opportunities in foreign markets; mostly in semi-skilled labour sectors.

Government actions to ban jihadi entities like Ahl-e-Hadith, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, HuJI, Allahar Dal and hanging of three JMB criminals for serial bombings obviously irritated good number of fanatics, which constitute nearly 15%-20% population of the state. Large numbers of jihadi activists were arrested and are being tried. The discovery of huge arms and ammunition manufacturing facility at Bhola, an island, which was being run by a British national of Bangladesh origin, Faisal Mustafa under cover of Green Crescent madrasa, highlighted the determination of Hasina government to deal firmly with all terror breeding organizations.

The government also relentlessly pursued the illegal import of 10 trucks full of sophisticated weapons by the ULFA in collaboration with the National Security Intelligence (NSI) and the DGFI. The arms were imported by ULFA chief Paresh Barua in 2004. The BNP government winked at the induction of 10 trucks full of weapons for carrying out depredations in Assam and other places in northeast India. Only after the new government came to power several senior officers of the NSI and the DGFI and other accused persons related to BNP were arrested and brought up for trial.

These steps, coupled with the government decision to modernize madrasa education and streamlining religious education in co0nformity with the education policy of the country has angered the Maulvis and other streams of religious teachers. This class is not happy with government decision to overhaul rural primary education and to root out organized armed gangs dominating several educational institutions in the country.

Devastation caused by Cyclone Sidr in November 2005 and Cyclone Aila in May 2009 left hundreds of villages in ruins. The rural poor in the southern districts were most hard hit. Despite mobilization of internal and international help the government has not been able to restore normalcy. Economic recession accompanied by shortage of funds and other amenities have left thousands of families still uprooted and unsettled.

The government of Sheikh Hasina struggled to cope with natural disasters, challenges from the Islamist terrorists, pro-Pakistani political conspirators and global recession. In a politically volatile country economic depression and price rise and inflation add to restlessness and such opportunities are exploited by diversionary political elements like the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami and their cohorts. In the midst of such chaotic ambience Hasina completed her one year in power and the survey taken up by Daily Star indicate that despite several factors of dissatisfaction Hasina has maintained high degree of popularity.

There are few other reasons of dissatisfaction in several segments of the populace. Though violence was injected into the political and social souls of Bangladesh by the killers of Mujib and later military dictators, the people of Bangladesh have not succumbed to the culture of violence, as imbued by the Pakistani society, where religious banditry is passed as Islam. However, in Bangladesh the student’s movement has become the violent fringes of political ideology.

The student wing of Awami League, Chattra League, is a powerful institution. The League has firm stranglehold in most educational institutions and they are also known for interfering in local administration. Bangladesh politics is crucially dominated by students unions, mainly Chattra League (AL), Chattra Dal (BNP), Islamic Chattra Shibir (Jamaat-e- Islami), Islamic Student Movement of Bangladesh (want Khilafa), and Revolutionary Students Unity of Bangladesh (Left) etc. These students unions, aligned on political lines, often clash in the Universities and other educational institutions. They try to capture the university hostels and dictate terms on the authorities. During BNP/Jamaat rule the Chattra Dal and Chattra Shibir along with Islamic Student Movement of Bangladesh dominated the political scene, tender grabbing for government works, killing and maiming Chattra League activists and maiming the local administration.

Now that Awami League is in power the Chattra League is flexing muscles. Grabbing tenders for government works has become an issue of serious concern. There are frequent violent clashes between Chattra League, Chattra Dal and Islamic Chattra Shibir. In recent months there have been serious efforts by Chattra Dal and Shibir to capture political grassroots in different districts by violently dislodging the Chattra League. In January 2010 a combined group of Shibir and Chattra Dal carried out violent armed attack on a Dhaka university college.

Such clashes often result in killing of students and members of the faculty. Sheikh Hasina has several times tried to discipline the Chattra League leaders and party leaders who exercise control on CL in different districts. General public opinion is against such activism by the student unions of the political parties. However, there has been some qualitative difference this time. A number of Chattra League leaders have been booked under the law for criminal activities. The government does not want to come down heavily fearing upsurge of student unions owing allegiance to the opposition parties. Hasina has some tight rope warning ahead. She has to convert the dynamism of the students and youths to constructive activities for fighting fundamentalism, promote secularism and get them imbued with spirit of sacrifices committed by the leading freedom fighters. Mukti Juddha (freedom struggle) is still a vibrant dream in the minds of majority of Bangladeshi people. The students can help Hasina by harnessing these sentiments.

The other issue that agitates public minds is Cross Firing by Rapid Action Battalions (RAB). In Bangladesh Cross Fire means faked encounter. During BNP/Jamaat rule there were over 500 Cross Fire killings of criminals, political opponents and Marxist-Leninist and Maoist leaders and workers. In the western districts of Bangladesh the revolutionary Maoist left movement is quite strong. During last one year about 100 people have died in Cross Fire. This legacy of killing the people in the ruse of encounter allegedly helps the administration to avoid going through the encumbered hassles of legal prosecution. Only recently Hasina government has issued some directives to examine each and every case of Cross Fire death. Bangladesh Human Rights activists are also agitating against this legacy of the military rule and reckless rule by BNP/Jamaat.

The issue of security of the minorities (Hindu, Buddhists, Christians and peripheral Hindu tribals) is a burning issue. With the return of Sheikh Hasina the minorities had heaved a sigh of relief that they would no more be subjected to rioting, forcible eviction from their lands and homes, their women would be protected and their religious places would not be destroyed by the BNP, Jamaat and Jihadi groups. According available statistics during the BNP/Jamaat rule over 1500 homes of the minorities were forcibly occupied, about 1500 acres of land grabbed, 370 minority women were raped and about the same umber kidnapped, converted and married to Muslims. Besides such atrocities plundering of Hindu business establishments and killing of businessmen had become a common feature. The minority segments of the people, especially the huge tribal population of Chittagong Hill Tracts still feel insecure. Hasina government has taken some steps to ensure security of the minorities, but in a wild riverine country dictates of the law are often hijacked by the Islamists and minority baiters. Being the head of a secular and democratic government Sheikh Hasina has to perform better and bring in new legislation for constitutional protection of the minorities as prevalent in India. Bangladesh requires constitutional guarantees for their rights. This action would be the acid test of Bangladeshi secularism.

Bangladesh government has been cautioned against promulgating a law that would encourage land grabbers to illegally seize properties belonging to minority Hindus, accelerating a process that has been on since India’s partition in 1947. Human rights activists, lawyers and NGOs urged the government to scrap the proposed ‘Vested Property Verification, Selection and Settlement Ordinance, 2008′. They are of the view that ‘Vested Property Return Act 2001’ is good enough to resolve the land issue of the minority community (Hindu). This replaced a Pakistan era law enacted to deal with the ownership rights over the ‘enemy property’, left behind by millions of minority Hindus who migrated to India. It was either left to the care of relatives who chose to stay behind, or was grabbed, generating legal disputes. Studies have shown that this process continued after the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 and land-grabbing has been condoned by all political parties. The Awami League government was keen to introduce the new proposed law in the Parliament. However, under pressure from different lobbies the government has deferred the move. Some modifications have been suggested. This historic issue should be settled to the satisfaction of the minorities, otherwise Hasina government would lose popularity amongst the minority population. Surprisingly enough the government of India had not brought up this subject for bilateral discussion with the Bangladesh Prime Minister during her recent visit to Delhi. Sheikh Hasina must gather support to bring about a new law that would protect land, lives and dignity of the minorities, setting up a standard for all other Muslim majority countries.

Corruption and price rise in Bangladesh is rampant as in India and various parts of South Asia and South East Asia. Poverty is more acute in Bangladesh, particularly in the rural areas. High rise in consumer commodity prices during last one year has caused severe distress amongst the poor segments of the people. Observers opined that Hasina government is either unwilling or in collusion with the corrupt hoarders, speculators and price manipulators. This allegation is wild. She is personally honest, but it is not possible to inject honesty serum in all politicians and bureaucrats. India has miserably failed. Why bait Bangladesh alone?

Fish, a staple daily diet has become scarce. Bangladesh has to import fish from India though certain categories of fish are allowed to be exported to earn foreign exchange. Obviously, Bangladesh is heavily dependent on India for edible oils, pulses, condiments, sugar and other items of daily needs. Closure of legal or illegal trade with India for more than 15 days would create severe scarcity in Bangladesh, which is capable of provoking critical political crisis. With the improvement of bilateral relations border trading and regular export and import situation should improve. Hasina’s government has marginally succeeded in bringing down prices of essential commodities to some extent and the country gained bumper production in the wake of giving subsidy to agriculture inputs.

While the above narrated issues are responsible for dwindling popularity of Hasina government within a year of her thundering return to power she deserves applause on certain other scores. There cannot be exclusive black and white situation.

Her government has displayed that it is determined to root out jihadism and terrorism in any form. The interim government as well as the new elected government has started taking firm action against the major and minor Islamist, terrorist and jihadi organisations. The Ahl-e-Hadith Bangladesh, Harkat-ul-Jihad al Islami, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, Hizbut Tehrir and Allhar Dal etc virulently violent organisations have been banned. Several JMB activists, bomb specialists have been arrested and prosecuted. JMB is regarded as the affiliate of Taliban in Bangladesh, Its connectivity with al Qaeda is well proved. A special Bangladesh court sentenced three members of militant Islamic groups to death on in February2008 for involvement in a suicide bombing more than two years ago in which eight people were killed. Besides this the JMB was responsible for 49 serial bombing on a single day. Prime Minister Hasina made it clear in public speeches that Bangladesh would not be allowed to become a playground of jihadis and terrorists like Pakistan. Pakistan’s policy of creating and playing with terror groups has backfired on it. It is reeling under self-grown jihadist attacks.

The Supreme Court of Bangladesh upheld a 2005 ruling by the High Court throwing out the fifth amendment of the constitution, which had allowed religion-based politics to flourish in the country during the last three decades. But Begum Zia government did not implement it. Following the apex court order, dozens of Islamic political parties must drop Islam from their name and stop using religion during their election campaigns. Religion based politics was added to the constitution by the Fifth Amendment carried out during late president Ziaur Rahman’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government in 1979.This had allowed the religion-based political parties to play freely and added the Arabic “Bismillah-Ar-Rahman-Ar-Rahim” or in the name of God, the most merciful, benevolent in the preamble in the constitution. Some interpreters commented that the words “Bismillahir Rahman ar Rahim” in the preamble of the constitution would remain intact as the High Court verdict did not say anything about the words and those were part of the constitution’s preamble, not of the “main body”. The word “secularism” would automatically be restored in the constitution once the Court verdict is implemented. The latest order of Bangladesh Supreme Court confirming earlier order of the High Court that the regimes in Bangladesh after Mujib assassination to 1979 ascendance of usurper Ziaur Rahman has finally invalidated the 5th amendment to the Constitution. This is a big victory for the Bangladeshi freedom fighters. Perhaps Hasina government can now proceed to nullify various other orders perpetuated by Zia and his successor government for making Bangladesh an Islamic fundamentalist nation.

The fundamentalist and reactionary leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami, Islamic Chattra Shibir, Islamic Oikyo Jot, Khilafat Movement of Bangladesh and Ulema Council of Bangladesh had organized a gathering in front of Dhaka’s National Press Club and voiced protest against the Supreme Court verdict. These groups and other resurgent Islamic organisations are likely to link up with BNP and whip up protest in the ruse of Sheikh Hasina signing several agreements with India allegedly jeopardizing Bangladesh’s sovereignty and security. The pro-Pakistani and Islamist lobbies are on the verge of whipping up unrest to regain political toe hold after their humiliating defeat in last Parliamentary and local body elections. These pro-Pakistani forces, as a last resort, pick up the anti-India broom to clean up their own dirty homes.

Cracking down on organized crime, identifying and prosecuting corrupt politicians and bureaucrats, improving general law & order situation are some of other achievements of Hasina government. The U.S. government has dropped Bangladesh from its watch list following the improvement in the human rights scenario.

Despite global economic recession, the Bangladeshi economy did not suffer the way as feared by many economists and experts. The stimulus package announced by the government for vulnerable sectors helped a lot to keep the economy going. The country’s foreign exchange reserve exceeded 10 billion U.S. dollars, and inflation was pulled down to 4.69 percent in August 2009 from 10.11 percent when she formed the government on Jan. 6 last year. The flow of remittances has increased 22.4 percent from the previous year. The scenario of rural employment has improved significantly.

Another golden hue was added to the history of Bangladesh when the Bangla Supreme Court handed down death sentence on five former army officers for assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his other colleagues in and death warrant was issued against Lt. Col. Syed Farooq Rahman, Lt. Col. Sultan Sahriar Rashid Khan, Major Bazlul Huda, Maj. A. K. M. Mohiuddin Ahmed and Lt. Col Mohiuddin Ahmed. The process of prosecution had started in 1996. It took 13 years to conclude the proceedings of the most unfortunate crime committed by former army officers. The killers had enjoyed indemnity under Khondakar, Ziaur and Ershad regime. The development has, on the one hand buoyed up moral of the secular forces and on the other has set up an example to the erring army officers and pro-Pakistani forces. Several documents and evidences pointing finger at Ziaur Rahman being one of the background plotters of assassination of Mujib has embarrassed the BNP and lowered its image in public eye.

Sheikh Hasina’s recent visit to Delhi has resulted in mutually beneficial agreements. Several contentious issues have been sorted out. In the 50 point historic communiqué issued after the summit meeting at Hyderabad House, PM Hasina and PM Manmohon had pledged commitment to working positively for solving all issues with the spirit of mutual respect, understanding and cooperation. The Indian government has categorically committed that nothing that harms Bangladesh will be done at Tipaimukh hydro project. The PM's also vowed to work positively to reach an agreement regarding sharing of Teesta River water. The Joint River Commission (JRC) meeting is likely to meet soon to expedite this and also on issues related to Feni, Muhuri, Khowai, Dharala and Dudkumar rivers will be held at a convenient time in the current quarter of 2010. Actions on dredging of Ichamati River and protection of Mahananda, Karotoa, Nagar, Kulik, Atrai, Dharala and Feni rivers were also agreed to be worked out. India appreciated the urgency of Bangladesh government to regenerate required water flow in all rivers and agreed to support Bangladesh initiatives to dredge rivers for flood control, navigation and access to ports. India agreed to provide dredgers on urgent basis.

The two PM’s also agreed to resolve maritime boundary disputes through mutual discussions. They acknowledged the initiation of proceedings under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and in that context India welcomed a visit of a Bangladesh delegation. Issues related to land boundary disputes were agreed to be resolved keeping in view the spirit of 1974 Land Boundary agreement. It was agreed to convene Joint Boundary Working Group to address this issue.

Bangladesh agreed to let India, Nepal and Bhutan use Mongla and Chittagong port by rail and road for trading. It was also agreed that Rohanpur-Singabad broad gauge railway link will be available for Bangladesh for transit to Nepal. Bangladesh informed India of its intention to convert Radhikapur- Birol railway line into broad gauge and requested railway transit link to Bhutan as well. To facilitate smooth trading of goods, it was agreed that trucks from Bhutan and Nepal would be allowed to enter about 200 meters into the zero point at Banglabandha at Banglabandha-Phulbari land customs station. Necessary arrangements will be mutually agreed upon and put in place by both countries.

Countries agreed to jointly combat organized terrorism, insurgency and criminal activities. Countries earlier signed to exchange convicted criminals. PM’s assured each other that the territory of either will not be allowed for activities inimical to the other, and resolved not to allow their respective territories to be used for training, sanctuary and other operations by domestic or foreign terrorist/militant and insurgent organisations and their operatives. Both prime ministers agreed that the respective border guarding forces will exercise restraint, and underscored the importance of regular meetings between the two border security forces to curtail illegal cross border activities, and to prevent loss of lives.

Apart from above Bangladesh and India earlier signed three agreements and two MOUs. Bangladesh under power trading agreement will import about 250MW power from Indian eastern grid. The actions required for Grid connectivity will be completed soon. Power trading agreement is the stepping stone to set up regional power grid and energy ring.

Besides these agreements Bangladesh has shown goodwill by arresting and handing over to India important leaders of ULFA, NLFT and NDFB organizations. Paresh Barua the military commander of ULFA has now taken shelter in China. With the improved relationship India and Bangladesh can perhaps establish a common economic zone that would benefit both the countries. In case the present trend is sustained and Sheikh Hasina’s government gets a longer lease of life Bangladesh can make enormous progress and it can invite investment by foreign countries including India for rapid economic progress and improvement of its natural resources. Several Indian investors have expressed intention to invest in power, oil exploration and other industries in Bangladesh. Hopefully, at the bilateral level some positive structures can be worked out.
It may be recalled that India and Bangladesh now jointly stand as buffer between Islamist jihadism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Southern Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. If this buffer is allowed to strengthen, both the countries can become islands of democracy and secularism in South and South East Asia. As it appears, India is ready to walk alongside Bangladesh in this mission.

The people of Bangladesh has finally proved that despite hijacking of the polity and policies of secular Bangladesh by pro-Pakistani forces and attempted Islamisation of the country from1976 to 2006, the Bengali identity, cultural values, traditions of secularism and love for freedom and liberty remain the main building blocks of the nation. The dream of Mujib’s Sonar Bangla may not materialize but the present developments present a golden hue. However, the dark clouds of machinations by pro-Pakistani BNP and Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami jihadist forces are just hibernating. They have the capability of striking against the forces of secularism and freedom movement in collaboration with their foreign mentors and moneybags. #

First published in maloykrishnadhar.com, February 7, 2010

Maloy Krishna Dhar writes on security issues, a retired Indian intelligence officer and specialized in counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency and counter-intelligence operations

Friday, February 05, 2010

Religion in politics

Photo: Islamist rampage after deadline expires to implement Sharia law and also declare the 160 million secular nation as an Islamic state
IN A move aimed at reviving the spirit of Bangladesh’s original 1972 constitution which barred religion in politics, the Bangladesh Supreme Court recently lifted a four-year stay on an earlier ruling. As a result, the country’s dozens of Islamic political parties can no longer campaign under the banner of religion, and are likely to be forced to drop the religious reference from their names. The court declared as void ab initio the relevant fifth amendment to the constitution, which was carried out in 1979 during a Bangladesh Nationalist Party government. It allowed religion-based politics — which then flourished.

Given that Bangladesh has amongst the world’s largest Muslim populations, this is a quantum leap forward. The court decision, if upheld during appeals, will affect scores of powerful political parties and their voters, including the BNP now in the opposition. Yet it is worth noting that the verdict does not affect Islam’s constitutional status as the state religion or religious text that was incorporated in the constitution. Implicit, therefore, is the recognition that whatever the dominant religion, the business of the state and politics must be conducted independently; and that far from yielding benefits in terms of just and legitimate governance, the confluence of religion and politics can wreak havoc on a country’s political fabric.

Pakistan would do well to dwell on this. Religion, when enmeshed with politics, can deepen polarities and derail the examination of issues from the perspective of logic and the aggregate national benefit. We have seen, for example, how politics and state policies underpinned by religious diktat can lead to laws that are discriminatory and can be used as tools for victimisation. The Qisas and Diyat Act, the Hudood and the blasphemy laws are cases in point. At the very least, a political fabric woven from religion will either dismiss minorities and their rights, or polarise politics between dominant and minority religions. Pakistan made the state the custodian of religion through the 1949 Objectives Resolution, which was later made the preamble to the constitution by the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto government and added as an annex by Ziaul Haq. Although religious parties have not historically fared well in elections, Pakistan’s politics have, over successive decades, been coloured by religion. The separation of religion and politics will, of course, neither automatically ensure justice nor guard against the misuse of religion. But it can be a first step towards delineating the private and public spheres. This may be a good time to revisit Mr Jinnah’s 1947 address to Pakistan’s first constituent assembly, when he eloquently stated that religion had nothing to do with the business of the state. #

Editorial published in The Dawn, Pakistan, January 08, 2010

Thursday, February 04, 2010

A second Kaptai dam?

Photo: Kaptai Dam spillway in Bangladesh currency
KABITA CHAKMA

THE NEWS heading "Another Kaptai dam for power generation: Govt seeks US help," reported in *The Daily Star*, on Friday January 22, made me consciously question: Am I reading this correctly? Is it a hoax or a mistake? Or is it a joke?

The story that followed was: "The government sought assistance from the USA in power sector for building another Kaptai dam for doubling hydropower generation from the lake waters in Rangamati hill district."

Questions arise immediately: Why hasn't there been any information on this in any news media? Why haven't local communities been informed about such a large project?

Shortly after the news was released, phone calls, e-mails, poured in from many Jumma and some non-Jumma expressing grave concerns:

"Another dam in CHT ? Using US money at the expense of Jumma land? Who knows how much Jumma land will be grabbed and then the power will be used to run factories in the plain land?"

"I wonder whether the state minister for environment had any consultation with the people of CHT before requesting for help to US government?"

"If this proposal for a second Kaptai dam is a serious proposal -- it seems so preposterous, I still have trouble believing the government would propose such a thing."

"The last dam cost us very very dearly."

"We should act immediately before its too late."

We have since learnt that even local institutions, like the Rangamati District Council and the CHT Regional Council, are looking for information on the project proposal. It has been confirmed that not a line was ever published about the project until the government sought financial assistance from the US on January 22.

Does the government really believe that another Kaptai dam is a justified, viable, sustainable development proposal?

If the government believes in another Kaptai dam project, why has the government been clandestine about the project? Why hasn't the government discussed the project with either the locals or their representatives? Why hasn't the government discussed the project in any public forum?

The Bangladesh government, as a democratic constituency, has an obligation to inform its own people about any project, which will affect them directly. In turn, its people have the right to know what will happen to them, to their homesteads, farms, woods, lives and livelihoods if another lake is created for doubling of electricity production.

There are now more questions than answers, more distrust than trust in the government. One key question arises: is this another act of treachery against the indigenous Jumma of CHT by its own government?

Our memory of the existing Kaptai dam, built in the 1960s with the assistance of USAID, without public information and local consultation, has not been erased from Jumma's collective memory. It continues to haunt thousands of Jummas of different generations.

It made 100,000 people (more than a quarter of the Jumma population) homeless and jobless. It destroyed 40 per cent of the most valuable agricultural land of the CHT. It also triggered over two decades of undeclared war.

There remain ongoing issues regarding the economic injustices against the hill people as an outcome of the inequitable sharing of electricity from the first Kaptai dam. Only a tiny amount of the promised compensation for the first dam was ever delivered and even today, about 50 years later, nearly 95 per cent of the electricity produced by the Kaptai dam is used for the development of the plains, not the CHT where the electricity is produced. Hence, there is a substantial economic debt owed to the peoples of the CHT by the state.

For the near 50 years of the existence of the Kaptai dam the CHT has suffered from a lack of electrical power. One would justifiably think that CHT should have the first priority of use of the electricity of the Kaptai dam and the surplus should go to the national grid. But instead, electricity produced by the Kaptai dam is delivered directly to the national grid, while electricity is returned to CHT only through Hathazari, a station at Chittagong district.

A respectful relationship between the CHT people and the state will remain difficult without addressing the existing economic injustices involved in the unfair distribution of electricity production. Depriving the CHT of benefit of the electricity can only exacerbate the injustices against the CHT people.

If there were ever to be another dam in the CHT, two steps seem necessary:

Firstly the financial, moral and ethical injustices that arose from the first dam be made good.

Secondly, the local people, their institutions and representatives must be substantially (not tokenistically) involved in the inception, planning, decision-making levels of the project and in its delivery and in maintenance. #


First published in The Daily Star, Bangladesh, February 4, 2010

Kabita Chakma, formally trained as an architect, is the Coordinator of CHT Jumma Peoples Network of the Asia Pacific

Monday, February 01, 2010

A Chakma in Pakistan

Photo: President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with his entire cabinet received Raja Tridiv Roy on his return from United Nations in December 1972

NIRUPAMA SUBRAMANIAN


HE IS virtually unknown to the present generation of Pakistanis, and a fading memory for those old enough to know. But in the aftermath of 1971, when Bangladesh came into existence, Raja Tridiv Roy was quite the toast of Pakistan.

Then the titular chief of the Chittagong Hill Tract Chakmas, Mr. Roy was just one of two East Pakistan parliamentarians — Noor-ul-Amin was the other — to reject the new country, and throw in their lot with West Pakistan.

On the eve of the December 16 anniversary of the “Fall of Dhaka”, as the event is remembered in Pakistan, Mr. Roy told The Hindu in Islamabad that he has no regrets about that life-changing decision as his people continue to be discriminated against by Bangladesh.

“Chakma House”, as the small unassuming plaque on the gate says, in the leafy E-7 sector, is Mr. Roy’s home in the Pakistani capital. The coat of arms on it has dulled with time. Inside, the living room is furnished simply, and of the few paintings that adorn the walls, two are by a Bengali painter dated November 1971 portraying idyllic scenes of rural life in what was then East Pakistan.

“One of the chief reasons in my decision to support the Pakistani nation rather than the rebels in 1971 was that the people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts are not Bengalis, but unfortunately, the government of East Pakistan at that time was exploiting the area and the indigenous population,” said Mr. Roy.

The peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts felt more secure with the Pakistan central government, he said, even though they held it responsible for the large scale suffering of tens of thousands in the area displaced in 1960 by the building of the Kaptai Dam.

Referring to a report earlier this year by the International CHT Commission, Mr. Roy said the 1997 peace treaty between the people of the region and the Bangladesh government had yet to be implemented in letter and spirit.

“The feeling of being exploited is even more acute now,” he said, pointing to the changed demography of the region that had made the “son of the soil a minority in his own home.”

But Mr. Roy has studiously kept away from the Chakma issue over the last 38 years, and though he did not say why, one reason could be that he wanted to avoid embarrassment for Pakistan as it negotiated relations with the new Bangladesh.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto rewarded his decision to plump for Pakistan with a place in his 12-member cabinet, as minister for minority affairs, also holding the tourism portfolio. However, he never joined the Pakistan People’s Party, and even now, is not a member of any political party in this country. General Zia ul Haq sent him as envoy to Argentina, and after an unprecedented 15-year-stint in that country, Mr. Roy, who returned to Pakistan in 1996, remains a Federal Minister, but without portfolio.

In the early days, he had a reputation for his colourful personal life and the parties he threw at his home. But the 76-year-old is now a shadow of his former self. Seen at the occasional diplomatic reception, Mr. Roy cuts a lonely figure these days, though still a dapper one. He keeps a low profile, playing golf and bridge, travelling and working with Pakistan’s tiny Buddhist association.

“I’m concerned about the Chakmas, but not involved in any of the Chakma politics. I am not in touch with any of the groups, they do not seek my advice, nor do I advise any group on how they should conduct themselves,” he said.

“My overall advice is that that fight for your rights constitutionally, peacefully and do no go in for violence and killings amongst yourself and with others,” the 76-year-old Buddhist said.

He was, however, quite emphatic that he could have done nothing for his people had he chosen Bangladesh over Pakistan.

“If I had been there and not toed the government line, which I would not have been able to do,” he said, “I would have either been eliminated, put behind bars or silenced in one war or another. How would it have helped the Chakmas if I had been forced to become a stooge?”

Mr. Roy said he wanted to correct the popular impression that he ran away after the surrender of Pakistani forces on December 16. He left East Pakistan on November 11, much before the war began.

“The government of Pakistan [then led by General Yayha Khan] called me to represent the country as a special envoy, and my role was [to build international support] to prevent the impending war,” he said.

The fighting began on December 3, while he was still on a tour of south-east Asian countries. He recalled that he was in Bangkok on December 16, and returned to Pakistan on December 22. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had taken over the reins of the country by then, and asked him to join his cabinet.

Mr. Roy had been elected to the National Assembly in 1970 as the only independent candidate from the whole of East Pakistan, and with Noor-ul-Amin, was only one of two non-Awami League members in the East wing. A Buddhist, he was also the only non-Muslim in the parliament.

“He was a revered and respected head of his people. With him and Noor-ul-Amin, we were able to say that we were not without constituencies in East Pakistan,” recalled Mubashir Hassan, an associate of Bhutto and a senior cabinet colleague of Mr. Roy in that cabinet.

Bangladesh made early attempts to reclaim Mr. Roy. When the Chakma leader went to New York as leader of the Pakistani delegation in 1972, Sheikh Mujib sent his mother to persuade him to join Bangladesh, but he refused her entreaties. For this act of loyalty, he was feted by Bhutto on his return.

Most of Mr. Roy’s family, including his wife, remained behind in the new Bangladesh. Three children joined him later, but his eldest son, Debashis Roy, who remained behind with his mother and a sister, was anointed the new Chakma chief. He is a barrister in Dhaka and served in the recent interim government.

Mr. Roy, however, has never gone back to his home, Rangamati, in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, all these years, nor has he ever visited Bangladesh.

“Of course, I miss my people, my home, my community,” said the ageing raja, “but circumstances and history have played a great role in my life”.

Circumstances and history, says Raja Tridiv Roy, have played a great role in his life. #

Published in The Hindu, Chennai, India, December 16, 2009

Nirupama Subramanian, The Hindu’s correspondent in Pakistan, is an award winning journalist. She is specialist of Sri Lankan current affairs

Saturday, January 30, 2010

Bangladesh executions may force Canada not to deport Toronto suspect

Photograph by: Canwest News Service, Photo Handout
Dismissed Major Nur Chowdhury is wanted by Bangladesh for the assassination of the country's founder, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and the killing of 27 others in a military coup in 1975

RANDY BOSWELL


THURSDAY'S EXECUTION in Bangladesh of five men convicted of killing the country's "founding father" in 1975 may force Canada to reject calls to deport a Toronto resident also has been found guilty — and sentenced to hang — for his alleged role in the assassination plot.

Bangladeshi officials have been pressuring Canada to hand over Nur Chowdhury, a former army officer accused of firing the fatal shots in the August 1975 coup that left then-president Sheik Mujibur Rahman dead, along with a dozen others caught in the crossfire at the presidential compound in the capital Dhaka.

Chowdhury and several other suspects had left Bangladesh by the time the alleged plotters — some in custody, others deemed fugitives and living abroad — were convicted of the killings and sentenced to death in 1998.

Now living in Toronto, the 59-year-old Chowdhury has been challenging a Canadian deportation order on the grounds that he will be put to death if returned to Bangladesh.

Canada, which abolished capital punishment in 1976, requires foreign nations to guarantee that any suspect extradited or deported from this country will not be subject to the death penalty for alleged crimes committed abroad.

Last month, Citizenship and Immigration Canada told Canwest News Service that Chowdhury's fate would be determined in part by whether his deportation would result in certain death or only the "mere possibility" of a hanging.

But Thursday's executions of Chowdhury's alleged co-conspirators send a clear signal about the fate that could await him if he's sent back to his home country.

Bangladeshi Law Minister Shafique Ahmed visited Canada in November to push for Chowdhury's deportation. He vowed after Thursday's executions that all of those convicted of killing Rahman will be brought to justice eventually. He also told reporters in Dhaka that the Canadian government supports Chowdhury's deportation and that "only the legal formalities are pending now" before his return to Bangladesh.

But Ahmed added that Chowdhury and the others found guilty in the assassination case — all of whom were tried in absentia more than a decade ago — will have the opportunity to appeal their convictions.

The death penalty has been a contentious issue for Prime Minister Stephen Harper, whose government lost a Federal Court lawsuit last year over its refusal to seek clemency for Canadian-born killer Ronald Smith, now on death row in the U.S.

"In cases where the death penalty is a possibility, the government will seek assurances from the country to which the person is being returned that, if found guilty and convicted, the death penalty will not be imposed," a Citizenship and Immigration spokesperson told Canwest News Service in December.

Prevented by privacy rules from discussing details of Chowdhury's case — which the department has acknowledged involves a "complex" combination of immigration law and international diplomacy — a spokesperson explained at the time that a deportation review panel must assess "whether there is more than a mere possibility that the person will face the death penalty" before issuing a ruling.

On Thursday, CIC spokesperson Karen Shadd added that Canada's "pre-removal risk assessment" for potential deportees "evaluates whether a person would face persecution, torture, risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment" if sent to face charges in another country.

Apart from the fact that Chowdhury has already been convicted and sentenced to death for the 1975 killings, and that five executions have now been carried out in connection with the deaths, the case is further complicated by the fact Rahman's daughter is currently serving as Bangladesh's prime minister.

Sheik Hasina Wajed was visiting Europe 34 years ago when her father was assassinated and several other family members were killed in the coup d'etat. With Wajed now holding one of Bangladesh's most powerful political posts, Canada is in a particularly difficult position as it decides what to do with her father's alleged killer.

Bangladesh's high commissioner in Ottawa, Yakub Ali, said in December that Chowdhury "committed a heinous crime" and should be deported.

Chowdhury arrived in Canada in 1996 after a lengthy career as a Bangladeshi diplomat under the post-Rahman regime. He was granted visitor status on July 5, 1996, and soon after filed a refugee claim — the same year that Wajed first became prime minister of Bangladesh and vowed to bring her father's killers to justice.

Chowdhury's first refugee hearing was held in 1999, and he faced a string of defeats beginning in 2002, when his application was initially denied, court records show. He was again denied in 2004, 2005 and 2006.

But Chowdhury was not immediately sent back to Bangladesh by Canadian authorities because he faced the death penalty in his home country, according to a 2004 fax message sent by Interpol Ottawa to the Canada Border Services Agency.

The message, filed in Federal Court, said: "If there's a change of policy in Canada or Bangladesh regarding the sentencing, the subject may be extradited then." #

Syndicated by Canwest News Service©, Canada, January 28, 2010

A tale of two countries

Picture (by unknown photographer) of the founder of Bangladesh Shiekh Mujibur Rahman lying in a pool of blood in the stairwell was assassinated in a military putsch by a dozen military officers

ON AUGUST 15, 1975, the founder of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, was killed by a group of army officers. A total of 28 people were killed that day, including Mujib’s entire family and the domestic staff. He was survived by two daughters who were on a visit abroad at that time; one of them is the current premier of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina Wajid. After almost 35 years, Bangladesh hanged five men who were convicted for the crime. Six other convicted officers are living in exile abroad.

Mujib’s murder wreaked havoc in Bangladesh. The country was not even four years old when it had to face a military coup after the tragic incident. The perpetrators of this heinous crime were people from the Bangladeshi army who were wedded to the idea of a united Pakistan. They blamed Mujib for taking India’s help in fighting West Pakistan and virtually becoming an Indian colony in the aftermath of the fall of Dhaka in 1971. Whether Pakistan was responsible for Mujib’s assassination cannot be ascertained beyond reasonable doubt, but the military operation and the consequent atrocities committed by the Pakistan Army against the Bengalis cannot be denied. India supported the insurgency in East Pakistan, though it could be argued that given the radicalisation of Indian’s West Bengal and the Naxalite movement, the Indians did not want another radical movement on its hands in East Pakistan. When West Pakistan denied Mujib the right to form a government even after his Awami League got a majority of seats, the emergence of Bangladesh seemed all but inevitable.

There are many interesting parallels between Pakistan and Bangladesh. Two major political players of the 1970s — Zulfikar Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib — were killed by the military, be it in the form of the direct assassination of Mujib or the alleged judicial murder of Bhutto. Both countries have seen a lot of political unrest, resulting in a series of military coups. As far as democratically elected governments are concerned, a two-party system exists in both countries, resulting in a game of musical chairs between the PPP and the PML-N in Pakistan and Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League and Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in Bangladesh whenever democracy is restored. Dynastic politics, though seen to be relatively unstable, has also played an important role in the two countries. The Zia and Mujib families of Bangladesh and the Bhutto and Sharifs in Pakistan have all been extremely popular in spite of this brand of politics. Since democracy has finally been restored in Bangladesh and Pakistan after a long struggle, it is hoped that the two countries would also move away from this type of nepotistic politics sometime in the future.

Now that a violent chapter in Bangladesh’s history has been closed, Pakistan too is waiting for justice in Zulfikar Bhutto’s case. Senior Minister Raja Riaz of the PPP has demanded the reopening of Bhutto’s murder case and quoted the example of the recent execution of Mujib’s murderers. He demanded that the chief justice of Pakistan should also reopen the Bhutto case and hold the guilty accountable.

It cannot be gainsaid that democracy is vital to the people of both nations, thus we need to move forward to a credible democratic system. A strong democracy will close the doors for another military dictatorship. We no longer want to be governed by self-imposed rulers who boast of providing better opportunities for the nation, yet they only benefit themselves at the cost of public welfare. This trend must be reversed so as to make Pakistan and Bangladesh stronger, both politically and economically. #

The editorial was published in The Daily Times, Pakistan, January 30, 2010

Friday, January 29, 2010

Bitter legacy of Bangladeshi hero's killing

AP Photo/ Pavel Rahman: Supporters of country's independence leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman shout slogans as they carry a portrait of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, the eldest daughter of the independence hero, outside the Dhaka central jail in Dhaka, Bangladesh, early January 28, 2010.

MARK DUMMET

IN THE end, in the dead of night, it all happened very quickly.

Five former soldiers, convicted of the killing of Bangladesh's independence leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, were hanged just after midnight, hours after the Supreme Court had rejected their final appeal.

Their relatives were called in to Dhaka Central Jail for a last, rushed visit before the executions.

Later, they were allowed to collect the corpses and take them home in ambulances.

As the vehicles drove through the crowds, they were pelted with shoes, and some shouted that the bodies should not be buried on Bangladeshi soil.

Emotions are high. The supporters and surviving family members of the country's first prime minister, popularly known as Mujib, have had to wait a long time for this moment.

Life's mission
The coup leaders, a group of disillusioned, arrogant and ambitious junior officers, had him gunned down just before dawn on 15 August 1975.

They also killed his wife, three sons, two daughters-in-law and about 20 other relatives and supporters to prevent any of them from launching a counter-attack.

The military government they installed then gave them indemnity, some were later made diplomats, and the two ring leaders even formed their own political party and contested elections.

But Mujib's two daughters were out of the country at the time of the massacre and one of them, Sheikh Hasina, made it her life's mission to avenge the deaths.

She took on the reins of her father's Awami League party, and then became prime minister herself in 1996.

She had the killers living in Bangladesh arrested and put on trial. Six others remain in hiding abroad.

The men were found guilty of Mujib's murder, but Hasina lost the next elections.

And the next government, led by the party which had ultimately benefitted from the coup, did little to pursue the case.

The Awami League, still led by Hasina, returned to power in 2009, and kick-started the appeals process, which finally ended this week.

For many Bangladeshis, who remain loyal to the memory of the man who won the country's independence from Pakistan in 1971, the guilty verdict, and these executions, correct a massive injustice.

"I am satisfied that at the end of the day justice has been delivered," Anisul Haq, the state's main lawyer in the case told the BBC.

"This gives us the assurance that whatever be the crime, and whoever be the criminal, justice will prevail."

History rewritten
This case, however, is to do with a lot more than justice. It has also to do with how Bangladesh's history is remembered and who can claim legitimacy to govern it in the future.

While Mujib's killers walked free, his role as the independence leader was steadily downplayed, and he was almost written out of the history text books.

Bangladesh's other main party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, instead promoted its founder, Zia Rahman, as the genuine father of the nation.

He was number two in the army when Mujib was killed and later took over as dictator, before he too was assassinated.

His widow, Khaleda Zia, now leads the BNP.

As prime minister she, provocatively, would hold public celebrations for her birthday on 15 August, the day of Mujib's killing.

So, with the Awami League now back in power, the pendulum has swung and this time it is Zia's role which is under attack.

The text books have been rewritten and the Supreme Court ruled that no-one should contest that it was Mujib, rather than Zia, who declared independence.

Sections of the National Museum which dealt with Zia and the liberation war, in which he fought with distinction, were closed.

A mural of him at the main sports stadium was defaced, and the government announced plans to rename Dhaka's Zia International Airport.

Awami League supporters say that they are simply setting the record straight and that Mujib, who they call Bangabandhu - meaning friend of the Bengalis - is only now receiving the honours he deserved.

But this winner-takes-all approach means there is little room for a frank and honest debate of the past.

Divided culture
There is no mention, in public at least, of the fact that Mujib's government had become unpopular by the time of his death; accused of nepotism, corruption and tyranny.

Only those alive at the time remember those things, but most Bangladeshis were born afterwards and they get their history from whichever government is in power.

They certainly do not get it from the newspapers, which are close to the parties, and the best accounts of the periods are now out of print and only available in the second-hand book market.

Most Bangladeshis under the age of 40 are shockingly ill-informed about their country's past.

The coup plotters felt that Mujib had betrayed his people, but by killing him and his family they made things much worse.

The massacre plunged Bangladesh into a terrible cycle of coup and counter-coup which lasted for five years, and left the army in power until 1986.

It is partly thanks to them that Bangladesh has, to this day, such a poisonous and divided political culture.

So the execution of the five former officers might seem final, but the legacy of their appalling crimes remains very much alive today. #

First published in BBC NEWS online, 28 January 2010

Mark Dummet is with BBC News and based in Bangladesh capital Dhaka