Buy.com Monthly Coupon

Sunday, November 18, 2007

Dhaka in Decline

SUMIT GANGULY

IN September, Arifur Rahman, a cartoonist for a leading Bengali newspaper in Dhaka, was sacked, arrested and jailed for a month. His offence? He published a cartoon featuring a joke about the Prophet Mohammed. Readers who remember last year's Danish cartoon scandal may be forgiven for thinking that such a cartoon was bound to cause offence in a predominantly Muslim country.

Yet such an impression would be unwarranted -- Bangladesh wasn’t always so intolerant. Until recently, Bangladesh had a tradition of cultural and religious pluralism; a feisty and irreverent press; and an iconoclastic intellectual and literary tradition. No more. Since a military-backed government took power in January, these institutions have been systematically squeezed, leading to creeping Islamicization -- a worrying trend in a country of nearly 150 million.

The irony is that Bangladesh's intellectuals welcomed the coup. Squabbling between the leaders of the two major political parties, the Awami League's Sheikh Hasina Wajed and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s Begum Khaleda Zia, led to the postponement of elections for 18 months and the declaration of a state of emergency by a caretaker government. These moves were a clear violation of constitutional provisions, which call for elections to be held within 90 days of the expiry of a government's term. Yet the elites hoped the newly installed technocrats might tackle the country's economic and social pressures.

Instead, the caretaker regime, with the backing of the army, has proven to be no less arbitrary and callous than its predecessors. Headed by Fakhruddin Ahmed, the few checks that once existed on its actions have been effectively removed. An Emergency Powers Ordinance was passed, giving the state the right to set up special courts designed to try anyone under the terms of the state of emergency.

The regime then moved quickly to cripple the two major political parties. First, Ms. Hasina was arrested on extortion charges; then Ms. Zia, on corruption charges. Their families and key political supporters have also been jailed. Even the normally assertive press has been cowed. The caretaker government says national elections will be held at the end of next year, but there are no guarantees.

Meanwhile, the signs of creeping Hispanicization in Bangladesh are widespread. In April, attacks on Bengali new year celebrations by a militant Islamist group, Jam'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh, dampened what is usually a vibrant, shared cultural tradition between Muslims and Hindus. Nongovernmental organizations that promote women’s rights, based in cities near Dhaka, have been bombed. And one of the principal Islamist parties, Jamaat-i-Islami, declared earlier this year that it seeks to establish a Sharia-based state by overthrowing the existing order.

* * *
The potential for an Islamist government has always been present in Bangladesh. Since the country's uncertain transition to democracy in 1990, the presence of a loyal opposition, a sturdy respect for minority rights and opinions, an independent judiciary and a robust civil society have been slipping away. The recent political vacuum has only accelerated this trend.

This is partly due to the abject failure of a series of Bangladeshi regimes, both civilian and military, to provide the most basic services such as health care, primary education, housing and sanitation while systematically enriching themselves and their acolytes. These failures enabled religious zealots to make headway into the political arena by promising change.

As they gained power, the two major political parties -- especially the BNP -- started to rely on religious fanatics and their ability to organize street protests and shows of force to bolster their own electoral fortunes. In the last BNP-led regime, Jamaat-i-Islami was part of the ruling coalition. Even the nominally secular Awami League, fearing a loss of electoral support, started to nod and wink toward the activities of these religious fanatics.

Foreign governments played a role, too. In recent years, the mullahs have benefited significantly from both Pakistani and, more importantly, Wahabi Saudi largesse. Pakistani regimes have sought to make inroads into Bangladesh largely as a means to exploit existing political turmoil in India's northeastern states, which abut Bangladesh. The Saudis, on the other hand, have been willing to promote their ideological proclivities as part of their overall strategy to boost the appeal of Wahabi Islam.

Today, the military-backed government under Mr. Ahmed seems powerless to stop these trends. Minorities, especially the steadily dwindling Hindu population, are increasingly under assault from Muslim religious zealots. In January, Muslim zealots set fire to some 10 Hindu residences in the town of Habiganj, leaving more than 150 people homeless. In late June, a Christian community in Nilphamari district also incurred the wrath of local Islamists and were beaten with wooden clubs. Even small, heterodox Muslim communities such as the Ahmadiyyas are now treated as virtual apostates. Their mosques are periodically attacked.

The caretaker government hasn't commented much on these attacks, perhaps because the political influence of the Jamaat remains considerable. Jamaat leaders, for example, are allowed to travel abroad -- while members of other parties are not. Also, while the government has dealt with normal student activists and agitators with a firm hand, it granted considerable leeway to the activists of the Hizbut Tahrir, a radical Islamist organization with transnational links, during the agitation surrounding the recent cartoon controversy.

* * *
Bangladesh's relatively small economic impact on the global economy, its widespread poverty and its lack of any immediate strategic significance explains the paucity of attention that the United States and most Western powers have paid to its political future.

Such neglect, however, is exceedingly myopic. Bangladesh is home to over 100 million Muslims and abuts India, and the situation cries out for greater attention. Humanitarian concerns alone should justify increased focus on this country. Allowing Bangladesh to become a haven of Islamic extremism is not in America's or the world’s interest. The time to try to rescue the country from a pathway to perdition is at hand. #

First published on November 16, 2007

Sumit Ganguly is a professor of political science and the director of research at the Center on American and Global Security at Indiana University

Wednesday, November 14, 2007

Bangladesh The clean-up

The costs of fighting corruption

“THE problem is that the mafia in Bangladesh were the political parties,” correctly observes a political analyst stuck in one of Dhaka's notorious traffic jams. At the roadside, the billboards—once a thriving business run by Tarique Rahman, the elder son of Khaleda Zia, prime minister until October last year—are empty. The luxury cars that used to ply the streets carrying bodyguards protecting members of the former kleptocratic elite are nowhere to be seen. Ten months into Bangladesh's state of emergency, the army-backed government is making headway in its drive to crush the two patronage-based personality cults that used to constitute Bangladeshi politics.

Both the heads of the two main political dynasties, Mrs Zia of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Sheikh Hasina Wajed of the Awami League, are in detention, along with more than a dozen former cabinet ministers. The bosses of many big companies are also in the clink or on the run. Senior officials say that some 200 top-level targets are being prosecuted.

This week the president of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, in the course of a “listening tour” in South Asia, came to monitor progress in a country where, until recently, dishonesty in public life was so prevalent that Bangladesh regularly topped the world's corruption league tables. The institution Mr Zoellick heads is not well liked here. Economic nationalism is strong; the bashing of multilateral lenders is a hobby of the chattering classes. Even the country's foremost economist, a Nobel prize-winning microcredit pioneer, Mohammad Yunus, had few kind words for the bank. Following a meeting with Mr Zoellick, he told reporters that it should sharply increase the proportion of its total lending devoted to microcredit programmes. Mr Yunus also called for institutional reform of the bank, whose country offices “are working like post offices waiting for directives from headquarters”.

Despite all this, aid is piling in. Soon after “1/11”, as Bangladeshis call the declaration of a state of emergency on January 11th this year, donors saw a window of opportunity to speed up the process of turning impoverished Bangladesh into a middle-income country.

Just this week the Asian Development Bank approved a $150m loan for a good-governance programme. Much of the money will go towards strengthening one of the country's busiest institutions—the Anti-Corruption Commission. It is a race against time, says its head, Hasan Masud Chowdhury. According to its swanky new brochure, the commission aims to build a reputation of being able, like the Mounties, always to get its men. Since it is equipped with sweeping emergency powers to arrest, search and detain, there is little doubt that it will. Five special courts are not enough to deal with the flood of cases, and more are being created.

The politicians are due back in less than 12 months, by when the interim administration has promised to hold general elections. Shamsul Huda, who heads the election commission, insists that it will be ready. Progress has been made on creating a new voters' list (complete with photographs) of some 80.5m names. The commissioner wants the government to lift the state of emergency in January, two months before elections are scheduled for five municipal corporations (former “dens of corruption”, Mr Huda calls them).

Meanwhile, the negative short-term consequences of the anti-corruption drive have become apparent. Foreign and domestic investment has stalled. Garment exports have plummeted. Last week the central bank sold $80m of its foreign reserves to finance oil imports. Strong remittances keep the economy afloat. But inflation is at a ten-year high. Student-led riots flared in August. The next flashpoint may not be far off.

For the regime, the anti-graft drive has had some useful side-effects. The intelligence services are systematically acquiring shares in private media companies, by offering the release from detention of their owners in return. Mr Zoellick called for a transparent battle against corruption, consistent with the rule of law. That will be a long, hard struggle in Bangladesh. #

First published in The Economist, London on Nov 8th 2007

Tuesday, November 06, 2007

Justice After Genocide: Ways To Deal With The Past

Dr. ZIA UDDIN AHMED

Ms. Farida Banu, younger sister of Dhaka University teacher Mr. Giasuddin Ahmed filed a case with Ramna Police station on 24 September 1997, about kidnapping and killing of his brother. This case could very well be one of the routine FIR that Ramna police receives daily but in reality, it was not. A sister demanding justice for his slain brother filed it after long twenty-six years of the incident. Her brother was a victim of 1971 genocide. All over the country, still there are, like her, relatives of other three million or so similar victims of genocide, who are still waiting for acknowledgment and accounts.

The Criminal Investigation Department (CID), which swung into action immediately, believes he was killed "under the same blueprint" as all other intellectuals, at the fag end of the liberation war. The Investigators, according to press reports, have assumed Chowdhury Mueen Uddin, Ashrafuzzaman and others behind this killing. Chowdhury Mueen Uddin, whose picture was printed in the newspaper as the principal Al-Badar killer over Bangladesh after independence, was also investigated by the British television, Channel Four, in a program `War Crimes File' in 1995.

The German writer Jurgen Fuchs once said to Adam Michnik, a leader of the Polish opposition to communist rule about crimes committed during the communist regime in East Germany that "if we do not solve this problem in a definite way, it will haunt us." The past has a curious habit of coming back, again and again, if a proper strategy is not followed by the successor governments. In Bangladesh, past has never left even after its twenty-six years as the burden of the past could not be shaken off if no justice is done.

Tormented societies cannot forgive and forget and go on to the order of a new day unless ways are found to bring the society to come to terms. Filing of Ms. Banu's case and the police investigation exemplifies that in Bangladesh, past has, as yet, remained to be solved.

The purpose of this article is to find out the strategies, in general, for a nation to cope with its past. It then intents to examine the process adopted in Bangladesh to deal with the past, in this case, 1971 genocide. Finally, some conclusions to devise appropriate ways to live with the past will be made, which batters the society daily.

Criminal Prosecution:

By bringing action against perpetrators, their superiors and collaborators, a new regime can signal to victims and to the whole community that the state no longer considers the victims to be outcasts. The judicial process itself can also permit individual survivors and relatives and friends of victims to tell their stories, to document the torment and the suffering and to ventilate the feelings and emotions that have remained pent-up inside.

Another important reason for prosecuting those who commit and those who order genocide is that those who have been the direct victims will then see that justice has been done. For victims, seeing their tormentors brought to justice can have a strong therapeutic effect. Punishing the perpetrators of the old regime advances the cause of building or reconstructing a morally just society. Justice be done to put back in place the moral order that has broken down. Justice be done as a moral obligation to the victims of the repression. Post- genocide justice serves to heal the wounds and repair the private and public damage done. It also acts, as a sort of ritual cleansing process. A country in which such cleansing remains unfinished are plagued by continuous brooding and pondering.

Criminal prosecutions also strengthens fragile democracies. Survival of the successor regime depends on swift and firm action against the perpetrators and their following. If the prosecution issue remains untouched, other forms of social and political disturbance may be triggered, with perhaps a risk of vigilante justice with summery executions. It may also give birth to conspiracy theories in which the leaders of the successor regime are labeled as the hidden agents of the old order that they are treating in a too soft and ambiguous way.

Failure to prosecute may generate in the populace cynicism and distrust toward the political system. Unless the crimes of the defeated are investigated and punished, there can be no real growth of trust, no implanting of democratic norms in the society at large, and therefore no genuine consolidation of democracy. Prosecutions are seen as the most potent deterrent against future abuses of human rights. A civilized society must recognize the worth and dignity of those victimized by abuses of the past. This has been the official policy toward collaborators in all West European countries which, during World War II, were occupied by Germans.

After Hitler's occupation and genocide, the slogan in occupying countries were; "no place left for those who had betrayed their country." The number of unpatriotic citizens who suffered punishment in one or another form was about 100.000 in Belgium, 110.000 in The Netherlands, and 130.000 in France. The figure was remarkably high in Belgium and The Netherlands, which had in 1945, population of 8.3 and 8.8 million respectively. The number of death penalties was 6.763 in France, 2.940 in Belgium, and 152 in The Netherlands. Various prison sentences were awarded to 53.000 in Belgium, 49.000 in The Netherlands, and 40.000 in France. Imprisonment was almost always accompanied by other sanctions: a fine, confiscation of personal goods, police supervision after the end of the prison term, the obligation to reside in a specific town. In Belgium, damages had to be paid to the state, out of marital goods or from their heirs if necessary. Tens of thousands of Dutchmen suffered the loss of nationality. In Germany, international community put the principal perpetrators of holocaust on trial, and others were tried too.

Disqualification:

Disqualification of the perpetrators, of their agents or of other willing participants, is a second way to address the question. The idea being, those who have acted against the people or have collaborated, forfeited some of their rights, including political and civil rights, sometimes disqualification accompanies a criminal conviction, as occurred in post-war Belgium, France, and The Netherlands. These countries also introduced some form of `national indignity', which implied a series of civic disqualifications and a prohibition of some kinds of professional activity. In other instances, as in most of the post-communist countries of East and Central Europe, disqualification has been preferred as a way to sidestep criminal prosecution.

Amnesty:

Post-genocide traumatized society often has to make a dichotomous choice between two perilous options, should the perpetrators be prosecuted or should they be amnestied in the interests of national reconciliation? For purely politically motivated crimes, granting of unconditional amnesty could be an option. In some instances, the outgoing government unilaterally award themselves self-amnesty. In other instances impunity, is the outcome of negotiations between old and new leaders.

Amnesty endangers the inculcation of codes of conduct based on rule of law. It is discriminatory application of criminal law, privileging certain defendants, which bread cynicism toward the rule of law. Moreover, States have the duty to prosecute violations of international law like genocide. Such crimes cannot be unilaterally forgiven; even a victim society cannot forgive crimes against humanity.

Truth Commission:

Amnesty, but not amnesia, is the substance of the fourth strategy. The first goal of such a commission is to investigate the fates, under the occupying regime, of individuals and of the nation as a whole. A truth telling operation, including full disclosure of human rights abuses, ensure that "the facts" are not forgotten but remain alive in the memory.

The perpetrators come out openly, reveal all the facts and face the victims publicly and see the results of their actions. Recent examples are the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (1990), the United Nations sponsored Truth Commission in El Salvador and ongoing Truth Commission in South Africa. However, for some, general knowledge of the truth is not enough. An official recognition of the injustices that have been suffered is necessary.

Reparation:

For the families of victims and survivors, compensation serves as immediate public recognition of their pain and trauma. The most concrete form of reparation is monetary compensation. Financial constraints may not permit large-scale payments, but it is still important to provide financial compensation to the victim family either individually or the whole community. Examples are abound, Germany's reparation to Jews and Israel, Japan's to Korea.

Permanent Reminders:

Establishment of permanent reminders of the past, such as monuments, museums, public holidays, and ceremonies together with support group, provide a channel of non-violent _expression of pain, frustration and anger.

Public Airing Of Grievances:

The public airing of grievances in a non-criminal context could possibly promote an atmosphere in which some kind of national reconciliation would be feasible. Publicly acknowledging the torment and suffering of victims and survivors can help in the recovery of their social and political well being as it helps them psychologically and contributes to defusing potential cycles of revenge and victimization.

Documentation:

It is very important to establish a permanent historical record that would inform and educate future generations to prevent similar atrocities. Future generations must be taught about the dangers of repeating the past.

Thus, documentation of genocide and identification of the violators in some kind of public record at the national or at the international should be done. Oral histories of survivors and other witnesses can be collected. Testimonies of perpetrators and their superiors can be recorded. Findings of the Commissions, trial transcripts, or the perpetrators own documentations should be published.

Voices Of The Victims:

Another avenue of redress could be forums with opportunities for survivors in communicating their stories. First hand testimonies of survivors could be incorporated into programs in military and police courses, medical and law schools. Similarly, they could be invited to lecture in primary and secondary schools, in history and social studies classes, and in university in various relevant courses. In press and broadcasting, victims perspectives are particularly pertinent.

Bangladesh: Botched Strategies

Bangladesh had to deal with the aftermath of genocide soon after the perpetrator's defeat. It became an inescapable task for the new democracy. The incidents of private revenges began to be noticed, and the state quite rightly made choices to prosecute the perpetrators and the collaborators.

It was expected that by applying the law firmly and fairly, the state will avoid vigilantism. But the new government, it transpires, did not have a well thought out strategy to deal with the post-genocide society. In Bangladesh, the genocide was carried out by the Pakistani government and its army, alongside the war of occupation. In Pakistan, the leadership and the elites, mostly migrated from India, were essentially racist, held "superior race" view vis-à-vis Bangladeshis. This was epitomized by General Ayub Khan, when, as early as 1954, he jotted down his thoughts that Bangalees "have all the inhibitions of down-trodden races and have not yet found it possible to adjust psychologically to the requirements of the new-born freedom." (Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends No Masters: A Political Biography, 1967, page 187).

Pakistani leadership mixed racial chauvinism with religion, and the resultant cocktail was the basis of genocide. The politics just triggered off the genocide mechanism. Pakistanis were led to believe both by their political and religious leaders, about the "imported" nature of Islam in their part of Pakistan and as such "purer" than "converted" Bangladesh Muslims from lower caste Hindus.

In 1970, when the people of Bangladesh overwhelmingly voted for virtual autonomy to run their own affair and not to remain a market for overpriced Pakistani products and source of capital for Pakistan's development, Pakistani military and political elites jointly drew-up two plans, firstly, to unleash unimaginable terror, killings and destructions, to cow the people and then to "cleanse East Pakistan once and for all of the threat of secession" and planned to "kill off two million people and ruling the province as a colony for 30 years." The combination of racial hate, religion and politico-economic interests converged and formed classic background for a genocide. Hitler too believed Jews to be `unclean' plague and threat to German Aryan race. He was weary of Jews growing hold over economy who conspire against Germany. Pakistanis too never trusted Bangalees where it mattered most, in power. Bangalees fought back, first, in defense and then to get the country free from Pakistani occupation. The war started and the Pakistanis began a loosing battle. Pakistanis too, on one front, faced the valiant Freedom Fighters, guerrillas and regular sorts and on the other hand, meticulously carried out genocidal plan. The result: total destruction of infrastructure and economy of Bangladesh, ten million people driven out of the country, twenty million people internally displaced, fifteen million houses set ablaze, three hundred thousand women raped and three million killed. The new government, within six weeks of victory, introduced laws, the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order, 1972 (P.O.No.8 of 1972), to deal with the collaborators who had "participated with or aided or abetted the occupation army in maintaining, sustaining, strengthening, supporting or furthering the illegal occupation of Bangladesh by such army." The Collaborators Order did not contain punishment for planning or organizing genocide, which took over a year and half to produce.

In July,1973, the parliament passed the International Crimes Act (Tribunals) Act,1973 (Act No. XIX of 1973) to provide for detention, prosecution and punishment for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international law. The Act was to set-up a Tribunal with power "to try and punish any person irrespective of his nationality who, being a member of any armed, defense and auxiliary forces commits or has committed, in the territory of Bangladesh, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, genocide and war crimes, whether before or after the commencement of this Act." The law, at last, provided forums to prosecute the principal perpetrators and planners of genocide, the army and the members of paramilitary organizations like, the Razakars, Al-Badars, Al-Shams etc.

Thus, the government chose to put the collaborators, mainly the local people, who participated or aided the occupation army in maintaining illegal occupation, on trial first, instead of the principal planners and perpetrators of genocide. A number of them were picked up and faced the Special Tribunals. However, in November, 1973 the government decided to release, under an amnesty order, all those held and convicted under the Collaborators Order for national reconciliation. The amnesty was massively misconstrued and widely abused. In the end, all the collaborators of genocide were freed.

As the later events showed, not a single individual was finally prosecuted and tried for genocide in Bangladesh. The new elites this botched strategy of criminal prosecution for genocide failed. It did not do any justice to the victims who died, did not satisfy people like Ms. Farida Banu, immediate families of the victims. Finally, it failed to generate any reconciliation between the perpetrators and the victims because the government acted alone in deciding the strategy and then granting amnesty.

The victim families and the nation at large was not consulted in any manner. The high principles of rule of law was sacrificed. Questions began cropping up, if one was not punished for crime like genocide of three million, then what crime merited punishment?

Secondly, Bangladesh also tried "disqualification" strategy again not in any cohesive manner. Disqualification was not to be a part of criminal prosecution as there were not much prosecution to start with. Even disqualification was not practiced independently of criminal prosecution.

As such, the collaborators did not forfeit any civil or political rights despite their collaboration. No one was disqualified from exercising civil and political rights in a new country whose birth they opposed in participating in genocide.

The government, instead, prohibited politics based on religion. Article 12 of the newly adopted Constitution declared: "The principle of secularism shall be realized by elimination of (a) communalism in all its forms; (b) the granting by the State of political status in favor of any religion; (c) the abuse of religion for political purposes; (d) any discrimination against, or persecution of, persons practicing a particular religion." However, Article 12 of the Constitution of Bangladesh containing fundamental state principles of secularism was removed by General Ziaur Rahman through Martial Law Proclamation Order No. I of 1977.

Thus, however commendable, this strategy to deal with genocide failed too. Government's compensation scheme for the victim families has not worked either nor other attempts of reconciliation, rather the fault-line has expanded to divide the society right in the middle.

Ways Ahead:

Finally, Bangladesh must now devise appropriate strategy to deal with the past from various alternatives. The worst solution would be to try to ignore the problem; the cost of cover-up are simply too big as the last twenty-six years have demonstrated. But the leaders should never forget that the lack of political pressure to put these issues on the agenda does not mean that they are not boiling underground, waiting to erupt. They will come back to haunt. There are some who believe economic development will be the panacea. They are wrong. Developed countries like Germany, France, Germany are still struggling to come to term with the past despite building affluent societies. Social harmony, peace and human rights are necessary ingredients for human and economic development and without justice, there cannot be harmony, piece and human rights.

Reconciliation is seen as a crucial prerequisite for the consolidation of a young democracy. To some analysts, reconciliation can only be produced if the successor elite refrain from prosecuting the previous regime. Others, however, argue that impunity precludes the coming of reconciliation. In Bangladesh, lack of prosecution has failed to bring reconciliation or the strengthening of democracy.

In post-genocide Bangladesh, the religious fanaticism, extremism and fundamentalism have made solid inroad into the society. Successive governments have, for political convenience, compromised and on occasions cajoled Islamic fanatics. The Collaborators, even after amnesty, continued activities to throttle down the spirits of liberation, which has given rise to demands for new laws to curb the activities of Islamic fundamentalist and communal elements. These Islamic parties propagate same brand of Islam which resulted in genocide in 1971, the communal, sexist, hate and violence.

Hence, for justice and reconciliation, some prosecutions must go ahead. No new laws, however, are required. The Collaborators Order, though has since been repealed, the International Crimes Act,1973 still remains a valid law. The Act is a complete law in itself. It provides setting-up a Tribunal to try four specific offenses, namely, crimes against humanity and peace, genocide and war crime; with provisions for prosecution, investigation, procedure of trial and appeal. Under Section 21, a person convicted and sentenced shall can appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.

Under the Act, those who were members of the auxiliary forces in 1971, either structured or shadowy, should be investigated and then brought to justice. People like Mueen Uddin should be tried under International Crimes (Tribunals) Act,1973 for genocide and not under the conventional penal law. These people are not the usual criminals, but, planners and executioners of genocide and should, therefore, be punished for committing genocide. The investigators have reportedly said, they would try to deal with the killings of all the intellectuals as all of them were killed under the same blueprint by the same group. The blueprint was that of genocide and as such, the investigators should press charges under the International War Crimes Act.

Successive governments have also failed to obtain any reparation from Pakistan for genocide and destruction caused in 1971. No Pakistani leader has yet offered any apology to the people of Bangladesh. Even the Queen of The Netherlands has recently apologized to the people of Indonesia for the atrocities committed during the colonial period. So also the Japanese king and the President of Germany. Instead, the average Pakistanis are still being fed with concocted history. Few Pakistanis have any idea how their best army, composed of martial races, lost to ragtag irregular Freedom Fighters and to inferior Indian forces. The modern technology has offered us the opportunity to put our side of the story directly to Pakistani people via Internet, and create opinion based on true facts. Pakistani government is, under international law, obliged to try the war criminals and perpetrators of genocide, besides payments of compensation.

In 1971, the genocide, which was carried out while the war was on, also has international ramifications. The government of the United States of America was at the time helping the genocidal regime of Yahya Khan. It is, therefore, necessary to find out more of the official role of the United States government to determine how much US government was aware of genocidal plans and what, if any, was done to stop it. In this regard, a campaign for a US Congress hearing, in line with the Cambodian hearing, should be launched and the members of the Bangladesh community in United States could take lead in this matter.

As already observed, in Bangladesh, the liberation war and genocide have often been equated, though both occurred pari passu, liberation war and genocide were separate events. The fallen heroes of the liberation war are rightly honored when the nation ceremonially pays its respect on Independence and Victory days, but, three million victims of genocide are not remembered in the same fashion on a given day.

A day, on the other hand, is observed as "Buddhijibi Hotta Dibosh" in December to mark the killings of the intellectuals, which could easily be expanded to include all the victims of genocide and the day could be observed instead as "Gonohotta Dibosh," as a remembrance day of all the genocide victims. In fact, killings of the intellectuals was the final chapter of Pakistani genocidal plan to deprive the nation of its finest brains and thus, it became a total genocide.

When a regime ends violently because of war against an occupying army or a civil war or genocide, anomia is inescapable. But the duty of the successor government is to strike a balance and draw up the strategy that delivers justice. #

First published in the News From Bangladesh, October 27, 1997

Barrister Zia U. Ahmed is a faculty member in the Dept. of Jurisprudence at Catholic University, Brussels, Belgium. He manages Bangladesh Centre for Genocide Studies in Brussels and could be reached at zia.u.ahmed@gmail.com

Tuesday, October 30, 2007

War Criminals of 1971: Time to Take Action

Dr. ABDUL MOMEN

IT is highly misleading that Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman government pardoned all the war criminals and he did nothing during his ‘war ravaged reconstruction period’. The fact shows otherwise. In fact, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman government started prosecuting the perpetrators of 'crime against humanity' or ’war criminals’ immediately after independence and he also passed the Collaborators Act (1972) and the International Crime Act of 1973 that barred re-entry of any collaborators to Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujib promulgated the Special Tribunal Order on January 24, 1972 (PO No 8 of 1972) after 14 days of his return from Pakistani jail to try those Pakistani collaborators/Razakers/Al-Badrs and other stooges of the Pakistani army. Under this order he arrested 37,000 collaborators amidst of strong opposition by left-leaning journalist like Enayetullah Khan [see his write-up titled ’75 million Collaborators’, the Holiday, 1972]. Out of them as no grievous criminal charges were filed against 26,000, therefore they were pardoned and released in a general amnesty. However, nearly 800 cases were completed and given jail sentences. Another 11,000 were in jail including Nizami, Abbas Ali Khan of the Jamaat-e-Islam Party (JI), and their prosecution was at various stages of completion. In addition, those that were involved in ‘crime against humanity’ and against Bangladesh, they were denied of Bangladesh nationality and passport.

On November 4, 1972 all religion-based politics were abolished as per sections 12 and 38 of the Bangladesh Constitution of 1972.

Unfortunately, when General Ziaur Rahman, a valiant Muktijudda emerged as a ‘strong man’ in 1975, he abrogated the Collaborators Act and released all the prisoners including those that were sentenced. For political/ personal reasons he allowed religion-based parties to operate and started reinstating and rehabilitating them. No wonder, those who were guilty of ‘crime against humanity’ and collaboration with enemy (Pakistan) state started returning from abroad especially Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and they were given Bangladesh citizenship and passport. Example, Golam Azam of the JI Party.

On those days I was working with the Bangladesh government and many individuals and their relatives that had no Bangladesh passport approached us for consideration. However, once General Zia took over, all of them were issued Bangladesh passport or ‘travel documents’ to return to Bangladesh.
It is sad that few vested quarters including Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan, the ousted BNP Secretary General and current Law Advisor Barrister Moinul Hussein are misleading the public and the nation by stating that Sheikh Mujib pardoned them or shifting the responsibility by blaming why they did not prosecute them. In fact, Sheikh Mujib started the prosecution and he pardoned only those that did not have criminal cases against them. He did not pardon those (Razakars, Al-Badr or Al-Shams) that had ‘criminal cases’ and those that committed ‘crime against humanity or war criminals’ such as rape, murder, and the like. Thousands of criminals were in prison during his time; however, many were absconding abroad including Golam Azam, the leader of the JI party and they were involved in anti-state activities abroad. He did not get time to complete the prosecution because of abrupt massacre.

After the massacre of Sheikh Mujib and his family plus his closed associates; Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed, Acting President Syed Nazrul Islam, Secretary General AHM Qamruzzaman and Home Minister Monsur Ali, the founders of independent and sovereign Bangladesh in 1975, one after another civil-military-technocratic or cantonment-based governments ruled the country basically till 1996. In 1996, when pro-people and pro-liberation government of Sheikh Hasina came to power after 21 years with marginal votes; it neither could reinstate the Collaborators Act nor could revive the original constitution of 1972. Secondly, it followed ‘judicial process and rule of law’ and therefore, it did not set up any ‘kangaroo court or special tribunal’ to prosecute the criminals. One can debate that as a weakness of the Hasina government or not.

Therefore, it failed to punish the war criminals and the culprits. But that does not justify that the criminals of ‘crime against humanity’ or war criminals should not face justice. It would be unfair if they are allowed to go free or untouched. Fortunately, now is an opportune moment to revive the clause that ‘no religion-based political party can register or contest in Bangladesh election’ and those found guilty of ‘crime against humanity’ to be fully prosecuted. Unless the criminals and murderers are fully prosecuted, you can neither establish ‘rule of law’ nor can stop political killing in Bangladesh.

More importantly, the International Crime Act of 1973 of Bangladesh is still active and Article 47, Section 3 of the Act allows trial of war criminals. Therefore, the military-backed government of Fakhruddin Ahmed that has started many essential reforms can try the war criminals and punish them provided it has the mindset and commitment. It is unfortunate that its Law Advisor is trying to guillotine the golden opportunity.

Secondly, Islami activist S. A. Hannan, a retired bureaucrat following the JI party line of argument tried to mislead the public by stating that there was ‘no genocide’ in East Pakistan in 1971.

Genocide is the deliberate and systematic destruction of an ethnic, religious or national group. While precise definition varies among genocide scholars, the legal definition of it is found in the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG). Article 2 of the CPPCG defines genocide as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group."[1]

In 1971 the Pakistan occupation army plus their collaborators like the Jamaat-e-Islam, the Islami Chattra Sangha (currently renamed Islami Chattra Shibir) and their militant killing squads; the Al-Badr and the Al-Shams tried their utmost to apprehend and kill those that demand an ‘independent Bangladesh’. Since majority of Bengali speaking East Pakistanis (Sheikh Mujib got 167 out of 169 seats in East Pakistan) or ethnic group favoured an independent Bangladesh, they waged a war with intent to destroy that ethnic group. The Pak army systematically opened fire on un-armed masses of Bengali ethnic group on the midnight of March 25th 1971 indiscriminately resulting which, as per various reports 19,000 to 25,000 Bengali ethnic people died on that dark night alone and over a period of 10 months, 3 million reportedly killed, 30 million were dislodged from their homes and 10 million had to take refuge in neighbouring India due to cleansing operation, fear and repression. As per global ranking, Bangladesh genocide is second to that of Nazi genocide of Jews.

In order to cripple the whole ‘Bangalee nationalism and nationhood’ the Pak army in collaboration with the Jamaat-e-Islam and few other such parties and their affiliates systematically and calculatedly murder the Bengali intellectuals, writers, doctors, journalists, educators and their political leadership. In addition, in order to cleanse the society of Hindu population, the Pak army and its collaborators calculatedly killed and/or uprooted them. No wonder, over 10 million East Pakistanis (out of 75 million) mostly Hindu minority took shelter in the neighbouring India. When army captured me on April 20, 1971, they tested me whether I could recite ‘kalima’ (the 1st pillar of Muslim faith) and then they checked whether I had my circumcision, a symbol of being Muslim in the subcontinent. In addition, when the army forced us to lead them in their operations, they repeatedly asked two questions; find ‘Mukti’ (liberation fighter) and Hindu. If such are reported, they would immediately open their fire, weapons and mortars. Such is a testimony of cleansing of a religious group, a clear evidence of genocide. #

Abdul Momen, Boston, October 29, 2007

Saturday, October 27, 2007

No war criminals and anti-liberation in Bangladesh

RIPAN KUMAR BISWAS

WHAT is to prevent anyone from filing cases against someone else accused of collaborating with the Pakistani Army in 1971?

Is that the blanket amnesty issued by Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the first president of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, in January, 1972 due to the pressure from Islamic countries (including the OIC), chaotic internal situation, or the necessity to encourage peace and development steps to be considered for recognition and International Aid without which Bangladesh had the Famine of 1973-74? The general amnesty was the first among many political mistakes which opened the door for rehabilitation of the war criminals of 1971.

According to his recent comment in a meeting with the Election Commission (EC) of Bangladesh on electoral reforms on October 25, 2007, there are presently no war criminals in Bangladesh and in fact anti-liberation forces were never even existed.

Ali Ahsan Mujahidi, the Secretary General of the Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamic fundamentalist party in Bangladesh and the former social welfare minister from 2001-2006 in the last four-party alliance government, further denied his association against liberation of Bangladesh and added that late Sheikh Mujibur Rahman had declared only 195 Pakistani soldiers as war criminals in the liberation war of Bangladesh who later were pardoned and repatriated to Pakistan through Bhutto-Indira Simla pact.

In a similar remark in an interview with a Dhaka based Bengali daily newspaper on August 8, 2007, Matiur Rahman Nizami, chief of Jamaat-e-Islami and former Industrial Minister, blasted how could they be called or accused as war criminals whether none has even filed a general diary with the police against them.
.
Talking with this top two major identity and their association during the liberation war according to the various local or international reports, features, sources, speeches and statements of those accused of war crimes, and the finds of different probes including the People's Enquiry Commission, both of them, however, were not physically presence in the every killing-campaign proceedings, looting or raping but also were at the center-stage of the anti liberation campaign by helping and providing all necessaries to the Pakistan army with the leadership of Jamaat-e-Islami's student wing.

They and their Dhaka murderers in the Al-Badr and Al-Shams were directly involved of the killings of renowned academics, litterateurs, doctors, engineers, journalists and other eminent personalities with a view to leave the nation intellectually crippled on December 14, 2007.

There are much more evidence and allegations can be submitted including for the others senior Jamaat leaders Abdus Sobhan, Maulana Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, Abdul Kader Molla and Muhammad Kamaruzzaman who were in the delegation to the EC have been charged with war crimes. They all refused to accept that parties on the basis of religion and war criminals will be disqualified to do politics or to contest or even to cast vote in any national elections in Bangladesh. In addition, they reminded that the constitution of Bangladesh does not support the demand since Islam is the state religion and 90 percent of the populations are Muslims.

When a person or a group is involved against national, racial or religious groups to destroy their political and social institutions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, economic existence, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups, what left to mark them as criminals or war criminals? Anti liberation forces in Bangladesh were actively involved to destroy the essential foundations of Bangladesh, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.

The world has seen genocide, but the worst genocide in the annals of history, in 1971, could not have been carried out by the Pakistani army only. Local allies of the Pakistan army helped in the attempted extermination.

According to the July 30, 1971 of the New York Times issue, the Pakistani government recruited more than 22,000 Razakars of a planned force of 35,000. Politically Razakar were composed with the fundamentalist members and supporters from the whole country by the Pakistani military and they were the predecessors of today’s Taliban. Members of both the forces, Razakars and Taliban, were recruited, trained and inducted in the same process.

Jamaat had been constitutionally banned in Bangladesh up to 1976 since the independence of the country, until late president Ziaur Rahman, who was the chief martial law administrator at the time, reinstated it in mainstream politics despite their fundamentalist ideology. It has steadily rebuilt itself into a strong political force, and was often courted by other parties for support in elections and first came to share state power with BNP in 2001 as part of the immediate past ruling alliance.

The major political parties in the country Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jatiya Party (JP) or even the Awami League (AL), which is supposed to associate closely with the issues of liberation war and its spirit and aspirations of independence, freely did include, within their folds, persons with serious questionable roles in the liberation war. It is not the victory of such persons or religious based political groups rather than the failure of secular democratization when parties like AL need to sign a 5-point pact with Shaikhul Hadis Allama Azizul Haq, leader of Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish (BKH) on December 23, 2006.

No one has anything to say when election commissioner M Sakhawat Hussain suggested the Jatiya Party (Manju) delegation at the same dialog on electoral laws reforms to produce the list of convicted war criminals before demanding that they should be barred from contesting polls.

Meanwhile, a case was filed in the Federal Court of Australia on September 20, 2006 under the Genocide Conventions Act 1949 and War Crimes Act, alleged crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity during 1971 by the Pakistani Armed Forces and its collaborators. This is the first time in history that someone named Raymond F Solaiman is attending a court proceeding in relation to the crimes of Genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity during 1971.

Recently, United States Senate has adopted a legislation titled "Denying Safe Havens to International and War Criminals Act of 1999". In where for the first time, it has empowered the Attorney General, among others, to transfer international criminals in custody for prosecution. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of US is denying admission or removing aliens who have committed torture abroad.

To further consolidate their grip on the country, the defeated forces of the 1971 liberation war are now carrying out bomb attacks across Bangladesh. They don't believe in democracy, rather they use it as a way of surviving, and propagating their views. Their main aims are the destruction of democracy and the implantation of a totalitarian state based on Sharia law.

Although the leader of Jamaat-e-Islam Golam Azam's citizenship was revoked, the whole political scenario was changed after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. General Ziaur Rahman granted Golam-Azam Bangladeshi citizenship, released all the war criminals imprisoned on various criminal charges and by amending the constitution allowed them to be involved in politics. Many of them awarded and posted with high designation both nationally and internationally.

Earlier on March 27, 2007, when some freedom fighters at a tea party demanded that the war criminals be prosecuted, Chief of Army Staff Gen Moeen U Ahmed said he would bring up the issue at meetings with the government high-ups.

It’s not a time to be lenient towards war criminals as the crimes like genocides and the movements against humanity that can make Bangladesh to be an orthodox Islamic republic, negating the concept of secular Bengali nationhood, which was the basis of the liberation war, are not good. #

Ripan Kumar Biswas is a freelance writer based in New York and first published on October 26, 2007. He could be reached at: Ripan.Biswas@yahoo.com

Tuesday, October 23, 2007

General Moeen's mysterious Harvard seminar with Sajeeb Joy

WHEN Bangladeshi news media reported that the Bangladesh’s 1st four star general Gen. Moeen U. Ahmed would deliver a seminar at the prestigious Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government (KSG), we the Bangladeshi Diaspora were delighted. We were reported that the Harvard University invited our ‘strongman’ to deliver a historic speech ‘on crisis management of democracy’ that would be a model for nations to adopt. We echoed with General’s emotions that it would bring prestige to Bangladesh military and would build up our much needed image abroad. It would be historic event as the Harvard’s 1st women President Gilpin Drew Faust in her inaugural speech on October 12, 2007 launched many special initiatives for Asia and we were pleased that our General would lead the President’s Asian initiatives.

We were proud and happy at the news and therefore, we called the President’s Office to thank her. Unfortunately her office appears to have no knowledge of our General’s scheduled talk. Being frustrated, we contacted other offices of the KSG basically to get an invitation to listen to his historic speech. But to our dismay, we were told that the ‘Bangladesh general has no public forum or talk at the university’. We were further told that he might have been privately invited by a lecturer of the university for his class. The university administration has no knowledge of it.

Rumors spread quickly. Bangladeshi Diaspora of Boston reported that Professor S. Bose of the Harvard University belonging to West Bengal had requested another well liked Bengali educationist, Dr. Gowher Rizvi, Director of the Harvard’s Ash Center of Governance and Innovation to sponsor a public forum for the Bangladeshi General. Few months ago, he arranged a seminar for Professor Rehman Sobhan of Bangladesh. However, when we searched the Ash Center’s program events, we did not find any public seminar with General Moeen Ahmed. Instead we find that there was a seminar on ‘Muslims in America’ on October 17th. Our frustration prompted us to call the Center. They politely stated that no Bangladeshi general is their guest speaker at this time. We also inquired at the KSG but of no avail. The mystery intensified.

We were simply stunned at it. Our hopes and expectations got a jolt. How a set program could be so illusive? Following our national leaders especially our Law Advisor Moinul Hossain we immediately thought that there must be a ‘conspiracy’ to undermine Bangladesh and Islam. The RAW of India may be behind it!! Others quipped that the Bangladesh Embassy officials belonging to BNP-AL might have foiled his scheduled talk at the KSG. To justify our hunch we concocted arguments. When General Moeen arrived in Boston he was neither been accompanied by the Bangladesh Ambassador, nor the PR, nor the Consul General. Secondly, we thought since former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s son Sajeeb Wazed Joy is a student at the Kennedy School, he might have foiled it. However, his classmates reported that they were very busy with Mid-term exams. Third, the AL and the BNP supporters might have arranged a massive protest owing to which the Harvard University cancelled it. But fact of the matter is, there was no protest, no demonstrations. Interestingly, the local AL Vice President Abul Kalam Azad received Gen. Moeen at the airport. More importantly, we learned that in the 300 plus years history of the Harvard University they never ever withdraw any invitation once it was issued even against all odds and protests. Does it mean that the General’s much celebrated trip was a ‘hawk’ or a total lie?

We don’t know who tried to foil our General’s program or malign our General. Recently, three stories became public about Gen. Moeen. First one pertaining to his receiving loans of Tk99 lakh from the Trust Bank that is recorded in the Bank’s Audit statement submitted to the government, the Bangladesh Bank and the Security Exchange.

Second, the re-appointment of his elder brother at the Trust Bank of which he is the ex-officio Chairperson and Director thus violating the government regulation that no two family members could be appointed as Directors of the same bank. Third, his brother-in-law grabbed properties of few people in Maulvibazar by misusing his power. Are these true or manipulated? It is charged that Bangladesh officials that we trust often do manipulate things to meet the wishes of their boss, the rich and the powerful.

As per reports, he was invited by a Harvard lecturer who is rumored to be appointed as a Consultant in Bangladesh. The said lecturer is an authority on election reform and US congressional issues. He also takes classes of ‘freshman lawmakers’. It is reported that our General would attend one of his classes along with his students. Each teacher in American universities or colleges routinely invites guest speakers in his/her classes and Gen. Moeen might have got such an invitation. Who knows?
We also checked the KSG bulletin boards. The 2-days that our general would be around Harvard, the KSG will be hosting nearly 7 public seminars and none on issues relating to South Asia or Bangladesh. They had an event on Bangladesh on October 13, the Eid day--- a public lecture of Nobel Laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus.

Apparently General Moeen did not arrange any meeting with any leader of Massachusetts or of the U. S. Other than Congressman Crowley of New York, he has no appointments either with any U. S. Senators or US Congressmen/women, or with senior State Department officials. Nor there is any especial meeting with the Pentagon or with senior US Army officers as per media reports. He is visiting the U. S. at a time when nine U.S. lawmakers have placed a bill to allow tax-free imports from developing countries including Bangladesh and his courtesy meetings with the US lawmakers could help passing of such bill. However, he refrained from such lobbying. Then question is; why he made such a long trip to US when his each minute is so precious and crucial?

He had a ‘secret public appearance’ for nearly 50 minutes at a location in Holbrook a tiny town, away from Boston on October 21. The guests were instructed to maintain utmost secrecy of the event. The reason for such secrecy is reportedly due to their fear that if Bangladeshi Diaspora knows about the event, they would stage protest demonstrations as they did in Florida.

It was a private dinner party arranged by one Mr. Shaheen Khan, a convenience store owner and more importantly, Mr. Khan is a friend of General’s younger brother that lives in Florida. Reportedly this was arranged to thank the General as Mr. Khan’s uncle, Nurul Islam, a sacked Secretary to Begum Khaleda Zia has been reinstated. Other than family members, nearly 25/30 local people were invited at the dinner and everybody had to finish their eating before Gen. Moeen enters the venue at 9:15 PM. Private security was arranged by Mr. Khan. However, TV cameramen and selected journalists were invited at the event.

It is irony that General Moeen, the man who started jihad against corruption and corrupt people was welcomed at the dinner party by none other than a businessman who made his fortunate through bankruptcy and defrauding creditors. He was a real estate developer in 1980s and he collected millions of dollars from thousands of people including many Bangladeshis with the promise to double/triple their investments. Unfortunately, once funds were collected, he declared ‘bankruptcy’ and his Ivy Inc. was closed down. For nearly 12 years, he stayed away from public eyes. However, in recent days, he emerged and is currently a leader of the Bangladesh Islamic Society of New England. General Moeen might not know that the man who welcomed him and solicited his help for investment in Bangladesh once defrauded his customers, his bank, and his well wishers. Local TV and print media covered it widely when his lawyer was even jailed for fraud.

It is rumored that General’s mission to the U. S. is to meet Sheikh Hasina’s family members. He visited Florida where his only son, his younger brother and also Hasina’s daughter live. At Harvard, it is rumored that he wanted to meet Sajeeb Wajed Joy. It is rumored that instead of a private meeting Joy suggested an open meeting. The General, therefore, have reportedly invited all the 4 Bangladeshi students of the KSG to have luncheon with him on October 23, the day of his departure to China. It is believed that after this meeting, he would decide as to how to deal with Sheikh Hasina, the leader of the AL party now under detention. It may be mentioned that as per media reports, Joy met Indian Foreign Minister during his trip to New York few weeks ago and that might prompted General Moeen to have a face-to-face dialogue with Joy. Gen. Moeen while answering a question at the Holbrook private dinner jokingly stated that there could be many changes in the next 14 months….a king can die, even a hoarse can fly (something impossible). Now who knows what’s next. #

This commentary was contributed from Boston on October 23, 2007

Thursday, October 11, 2007

Unfair trial and continued imprisonment of former parliamentarian Sheikh Hasina

A case for intervention by the IPU
06 October 2007

I. Introduction
Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) appreciates the decision of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) to consider its request to explore the possibilities for intervention against the arrest, detention and continued imprisonment of former parliamentarian and former Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina since 16 July 2007. She is also the President of Awami League, one of the largest political parties in Bangladesh.

Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) has studied all the four complaints filed so far against Sheikh Hasina by three private individuals and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) of Bangladesh. A cursory reading of the cases reveals that these complaints are trumped up.

After having studied the complaints filed so far, ACHR can assert that complaints of alleged corruption, which could have been considered as alleged cases of bribery, have been turned into “extortion” cases – non- bailable offences - by the Caretaker government. In addition, three cases i.e. two complaints of extortion filed by Noor Ali and Azam J Chowdhury and one case of corruption filed by the ACC - have been brought under the Emergency Powers Rules (EPR) of 2007 in order to deny her bail indefinitely. These measures have been taken in order to prevent her from carrying out political activities which pose formidable challenge to the Care-taker government. A Care-taker government, which has no mandate of the people, by definition, must function within the ambits of the Constitution of Bangladesh and other national laws to facilitate installation of a government with people's mandate. The Care-taker government has not only set aside the Constitution of Bangladesh but has also assumed the role of the judiciary by retroactively applying the Emergency Powers Rules of 2007 which violates the basic tenets of fair trial and rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Bangladesh and international human rights law.

Asian Centre for Human Rights appeals to the Committee on Human Rights of Parliamentarians of the Inter-Parliamentary Union to take a decision at its 117th Assembly to be held in Geneva on 6 to 9 October 2007 to intervene with the government of Bangladesh for immediate release of Sheikh Hasina and ensure full respect for internationally accepted principles on the right to fair trial.

In this submission, ACHR provides (i) the briefs of the cases filed against Sheikh Hasina, (ii) issues of concerns for the Inter-Parliamentary Union and (iii) ACHR's requests for interventions.

II. Briefs of the cases filed against Sheikh Hasina
Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has so far been charged in four criminal cases – three relating to alleged bribery charges which have been turned into extortion charges - and one relating to alleged corruption filed by the Anti-Corruption Commission of Bangladesh which has been brought under the Emergency Powers Regulations of 2007.

Case No. 1: Complaint filed by Tajul Islam Farooq with Tejgaon Police Station, Dhaka
On 9 April 2007, one Tajul Islam Farook, Chairman of Westmont Power Company, filed a complaint (No.30) with Tejgaon Police Station against Sheikh Hasina for allegedly extorting Taka 30 million from him. The case was registered under Sections 385 (extortion), 386 (extortion by putting any person in fear of death or of grievous hurt) and 387 (extortion by threat of accusation of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life) of Bangladesh Penal Code. He claims to have taken Taka 30 million in one suit case to give them to Sheikh Hasina on 12 December 1998.

No evidence was provided by the complainant.

Case No. 2: Complaint filed by Noor Ali with the Tejgaon Police Station, Dhaka
On 13 June 2007, one Noor Ali, Managing Director of Unique Group of Companies filed a complaint (No 32) with the Tejgaon Police Station accusing Sheikh Hasina, her cousin Sheikh Helal and Helal's wife Rupa Chowdhury of extorting Taka 32 million from him for helping his firm win a power plant deal in 1997. In this complaint filed under Sections 385 (extortion) and 109 (abetment) of Bangladesh Penal Code, the complainant alleged that the money was paid between 8 June 1997 and 20 May 1999.

The signatures on the back side of the cheque which is mandatory for the withdrawal of the money from the Bank were reportedly neither of Sheikh Hasina nor of the other accused.

Though the case was filed under Bangladesh Penal Code, on 16 July 2007, the government decided to put the case under the Emergency Powers Rules of 2007.

In a related development, on 17 July 2007, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) asked Sheikh Hasina to declare her wealth within seven days.

On 29 July 2007, Sheikh Hasina has been shown arrested in the case filed by Noor Ali. [1] She has been in detention since 16 July 2007.

On 5 August 2007, Sheikh Hasina filed a writ petition with the High Court against the ACC's order asking her to declare her wealth.

On 7 August 2007, the High Court granted interim bail to Sheikh Hasina and ordered the government not to try her under the Emergency Powers Rules of 2007. The High Court also stayed the ACC's order asking Hasina to disclose her wealth. [2]

The government immediately moved the Supreme Court against the High Court's order. On 14 August 2007, the Supreme Court asked the government to file regular petitions to challenge the order. [3] On 27 August 2007, the Supreme Court stayed the High Court's order of 7 August 2007, thereby the Supreme Court sanctified her continued detention under the Emergency Powers Rules of 2007.

Earlier, on 14 August 2007, Dhaka Metropolitan Magistrate Mohammad Ashraf Uddin ordered the Officer-in-Charge of Tejgaon Police Station to submit the investigative report by 30 August 2007. [4] On 25 September 2007, Magistrate Mohammad Ashraf Uddin again ordered the Officer-in-Charge of Tejgaon Police Station to submit the probe report by 23 October 2007. [5]

Case No. 3: Complaint filed by Azam J Chowdhury with Gulshan Police Station, Dhaka
The third case was filed on 13 June 2007 by Azam J Chowdhury, Managing Director of East Coast Trading Private Ltd with Gulshan Police Station, Dhaka against Sheikh Hasina and her cousin, Sheikh Fazlul Karim Selim for allegedly extorting Taka 29.9 million from him for the work of Siddhirganj Power Plant in Narayanganj. [6] The case (No.34) was registered with the Gulshan Police Station under Sections 385 (extortion), and 109 (abetment)of Bangladesh Penal Code.

On 16 July 2007, Sheikh Hasina was arrested by the joint forces and imprisoned in a makeshift jail at the premises of the Parliament. On the same day, the Home Ministry issued an approval to bring the case under the Emergency Powers Rules, 2007 considering “public importance” of the case.

On 24 July 2007, Gulshan Police Station Officer-in-Charge, Obaidul Haq, who is also the Investigation Officer of the case, charge-sheeted Hasina along with her sister Sheikh Rehana and cousin Selim under Sections 385 (extortion), 109 (abetment) and section 34 (criminal liability) of the Bangladesh Penal Code. The charge-sheet stated that Selim confessed before the police that he had taken money from the businessman, Azam J Chowdhury on the direction of Sheikh Hasina and later gave Taka 10 million to Sheikh Rehana.

On 29 July 2007, Sheikh Hasina moved the High Court challenging the government's decision to bring Taka 29.9 million extortion case against her under the Emergency Powers Rules of 2007. [7]

On 30 July 2007, the High Court granted bail to Sheikh Hasina and ordered the government not to try her under the Emergency Powers Rules. [8]

The government immediately appealed before the Supreme Court against the High Court order. On 2 August 2007, the Supreme Court deferred the hearing till 14 August 2007.

On 27 August 2007, the Supreme Court stayed the High Court order of 30 July 2007 thereby denied her bail and brought the alleged charges under the Emergency Powers Rules of 2007. The Supreme Court also asked her to submit a statement disclosing her wealth to the Anti-Corruption Commission within a week. [9]

On 19 September 2007, Dhaka Metropolitan Magistrate KM Ruhul Amin set the next date of hearing on 4 October 2007 to decide as to whether or not to accept the charge sheet filed against Sheikh Hasina and others. [10]

Case No. 4: Complaint filed by ACC
The fourth complaint was filed by the Anti Corruption Commission on 2 September 2007 with the Tejgaon Police Station under the Anti Corruption Law against Sheikh Hasina and six others alleging that Sheikh Hasina, who was then the Prime Minister had received kickbacks worth Taka 30 million from the two power companies between 24 October 1996 and 24 November 1997 in exchange for favour.

On 19 September 2007, Sheikh Hasina was shown arrested in this case.

On 19 September 2007, the Anti-Corruption Commission also permitted the authorities to include the corruption case against Sheikh Hasina and six others under the Emergency Powers Rules of 2007. The case has been brought under Section 15 and Section 19(j) of EPR, 2007 following an application by the Investigation Officer of the case, Deputy Director of ACC, Morshed Alam. [11]

It is clear that ACC is acting as the judge and jury. None of the accused will be granted bail.

III. Issues of concerns for the IPU
Asian Centre for Human Rights strongly believes that the arrest of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has little or nothing to do with offences allegedly committed by her but more to do with silencing any opposition to the Care-taker government from the Awami League.

Asian Centre for Human Rights shares the following concerns:
First, the arrest of Sheikh Hasina violates the cardinal principles of administration of justice – the presumption of innocence until proven guilty as provided under Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Under the Criminal Procedure Code of Bangladesh, when complaints are filed by private individuals and not the State, the allegations made in the complaint must be first investigated by the police before making arrest, and the complainant has to mandatorily make out a prima facie case before the Court could take cognizance of an alleged crime. No such investigation was conducted before taking Sheikh Hasina into custody. The investigation started only after she was taken into custody on 16 July 2007.

Second, the complaints were filed under various sections of Bangladesh Penal Code. Be as it may, even if the allegations were true, these alleged offences should have been considered offences such as “corruption”, “abuse of official powers” etc but not “extortion”. The offence of “extortion” has been invoked to deny her bail.

Third, all the alleged offences took place prior to the Emergency Powers Rules, 2007 came into force. Under no circumstances, a law can be applied retroactively. Moreover as provided under Section 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights “No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed.”

Fourth, the Emergency Powers Rules of 2007 violates internationally accepted principles on the right to fair trial and allows the government to assume the role of the judiciary. Under Section 10(2) of the Emergency Powers Rules of 2007, “offences under these Rules are cognizable, non-compoundable and non-bailable”. Section 19(D) of the Emergency Powers Rules further provides that “While the Proclamation of Emergency remains in force, notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 497 and 498 of the CrPC, 1898 or any other law, a person accused of any offence under these Rules or under any of the laws referred to in Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules, 2007, may not submit a petition for bail before any Court or Tribunal pending enquiry, investigation or trial of such offence”.

It is for the judiciary to decide whether any accused should be given bail or not. However, as stated above, in Bangladesh, the Care-taker government has assumed the role of the judiciary under the Emergency Powers Rules of 2007 and no justice can be obtained as the judiciary has been reduced to a rubber stamp.

IV. ACHR's requests for interventions
On 30 July 2007, Sheikh Hasina was granted bail by the High Court into the complaint filed by Azam J Chowdhury, Managing Director of East Coast Trading Private Ltd with Gulshan Police Station. There is seldom any precedence for the government to appeal against such order of bail of the High Court before the Supreme Court. Bail can normally be cancelled by the bail granting court if any of the conditions of the bail are violated. But in case of Sheikh Hasina, the Care-taker government instantly filed an appeal to the Supreme Court against the order of the High Court and also simultaneously showed her arrested in another case under the Emergency Powers Rules 2007.

The order of the Supreme Court of 27 August 2007 staying the order of the High Court is also bad in law. Under the common law system of criminal jurisprudence, which Bangladesh follows, bail is also usually not denied so long there is no possibility of the accused disappearing after the grant of bail or interfering with the process of investigation. There is no possibility of Sheikh Hasina disappearing and it is the Care-taker government which did not want her to return to Bangladesh. Nor can she interfere with the process of investigation.

Sheikh Hasina continues to remain imprisoned simply because the alleged cases of bribery have been turned into “extortion” charges which are non-bailable offences and these alleged charges have further been brought under the Emergency Powers Rules of 2007. This has been done primarily because Sheikh Hasina has been challenging the Care-taker government which has been crossing its brief, among others, by acting as law unto itself and putting aside the Constitution of Bangladesh.

Considering the blatant violations of the internationally accepted principles on the right to fair trial and the lack of independence of judiciary through interference by the Care-taker government and the restrictions put by the Emergency Powers Rules of 2007 on the judiciary, the Inter-Parliamentary Union must consider intervening for the immediate release of Sheikh Hasina.

Asian Centre for Human Rights requests the Committee on Human Rights of Parliamentarians of the Inter-Parliamentary Union to take the following measures:

First, send a team of the Committee on Human Rights of Parliamentarians to Bangladesh to meet Sheikh Hasina and study the case/complaint documents and bring out a report which will, inter alia, examine whether the prosecution, trial and continued imprisonment of Sheikh Hasina meet internationally accepted principles on the right to fair trial and submit the same for consideration by the Assembly of the IPU;

Second, send a team of the Committee on Human Rights of Parliamentarians or international legal experts representing the IPU to observe the proceedings of the trials of Sheikh Hasina to monitor independence of judiciary and report to the Assembly of the IPU; and

Third, take any other measures that the IPU deems fit. #

Reference:
[1] . Hasina challenges extortion case at HC, The Daily Star, 30 July 2007
[2] . Hasina gets bail in another case, Daily Star, 8 August 2007
[3] . SC asks government to file regular petitions, The New Age, 15 August 2007
[4] . SC rejects govt plea for stay on Hasina's bail, The Daily Star, 15 August 2007
[5] . Cop asked for probe report on Hasina by Oct 23, Daily Star, 26 September 2007
[6] . Two more extortion cases against Hasina, The Daily Star, 14 June 2007
[7] . Hasina challenges extortion case at HC, The Daily Star, 30 July 2007
[8] . HC grants bail to Hasina, The Daily Star, 31 July 2007
[9] . Hasina's bail stayed, The Daily Star, 28 August 2007
[10] . Court now to decide on trial of case against Hasina Oct 4, The Daily Star, 20 September 2007
[11] . ACC okays bringing Hasina's Tk 3cr graft case under EPR, The Daily Star, 21 September 2007

Thursday, October 04, 2007

War on Rampant Graft Brings Pain, Promises

In Bangladesh, 'a Quiet Revolution'

EMILY WAX

DHAKA, Bangladesh -- It's been called Bangladesh's war on corruption, a revolution in this South Asian nation once persistently ranked as the most kleptocratic in the world. It's a place where extorting cash was so ingrained in the social fabric that even the Bureau of Anti-Corruption accepted a "ghoosh," or bribe.

Now, though, two former prime ministers -- rival politicians who have dominated this country's politics for 16 years - are behind bars, awaiting trial for allegedly siphoning off millions of dollars from the government. Also incarcerated on graft, tax-evasion and corruption charges are 170 members of the ruling elite, along with an estimated 15,000 political underbosses, local government officials and businessmen.

In one way or another, they are all alleged to have stolen from a population of 150 million people who have long languished in abject poverty.

The list of accused includes not only former prime ministers Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina but also Zia's eldest son, Tarique Rahman, who was known as "Mr. 10 Percent" until recently. Rahman skimmed close to $1 million from government coffers, according to Bangladesh's freshly mandated Independent Anti-Corruption Commission, and is now being called "Mr. 110 Percent."

Rahman, Zia and Hasina all deny wrongdoing.

The arrests this year are unprecedented for South Asia, a region with a reputation for widespread impunity when it comes to thievery in government. Corruption experts say bribes are routinely offered -- and taken -- to push forward a water project, a new road, a sari business or a passport application. Even relief funds for victims of cyclones and flooding have mysteriously disappeared. Since Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan in 1971, an estimated $40 billion in international aid has been stolen, analysts say.

"It's completely surreal and was unthinkable in South Asia that a country's demigods are now in jail, and that's what we are seeing here," said Iftekhar Zaman, executive director of the Bangladesh branch of Transparency International, a leading anti-corruption watchdog, which has its largest chapter in the world in Bangladesh. "For many people, what matters is daily life, and corruption was so deep-rooted here . . . that there has to be a painful transition. But in the long term, it has to happen."

The transition from a system in which corruption rules to one in which institutions do has indeed been difficult. Prices for daily essentials such as rice and fish, staples of the Bangladeshi diet, have increased. The reason, according to some analysts, is that businesses are finally paying taxes levied on their products and passing on the costs.

Bangladesh's military-backed government, which assumed power Jan. 11 following months of unrest, is responsible for the crackdown. It declared emergency rule, banning political activity and protests, and said it would root out corruption by any means necessary before allowing elections to be held in 2008.

Critics, who say the anti-corruption campaign has been taken too far, have called the government's takeover "Bangladesh's 1/11." Arrests are often made in the middle of the night, according to relatives of those charged.

"Since 1/11, we are passing sleepless nights," said Abu Motaleb of the Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry, which recently held a seminar advising business leaders on the crackdown.

Many business leaders say that what used to get through with a call to the right contact, a slap on the back and an envelope of cash now requires paperwork in triplicate and rounds of approvals. On Dhaka's traffic-clogged streets, fruit and fish dealers are learning about new tax codes and fees that need to be paid to get their products to market.

"This is all news to us," said Kazzim Uddin, 37, a father of four who swatted the flies away from his silver trays of sardines and white fish. "We don't have to pay bribes anymore. But we do notice the prices are so much higher. Long-term, it is so much better. But short-term, it hurts the family budget."

The interim government says these are normal growing pains, and the only way to change the system. For decades, a small elite has controlled scarce resources while the poor have suffered; that, the government says, must change.

"Even a little corruption is bad because it sets a tone that anything goes," said Hasan Mashhud Chowdhury, chairman of the Anti-Corruption Commission, which has replaced the now-defunct, and corrupt, Bureau of Anti-Corruption. "Corruption is tied to poverty. Africa has its Big Men, with their sycophants who benefited from their power. Well, Bangladesh has its Big Women and their blind followers. And why should we all be too afraid to take back what our citizens lost?" Zia and Hasina, both women, dominated politics here for years.

Some Bangladeshis say they are optimistic but cautiously so. They point to neighboring Pakistan, whose military-led anti-corruption drive in recent years ended with the military fixed in power.

Some in civil society say that there have been too many arrests and that those who have been arrested have not been provided with due process. Those are accusations that the interim government says are untrue and unfair.

"What about the rights of the Bangladeshi citizens that were stolen from and kept in terrible poverty? What is happening here is nothing short of a quiet revolution without violence," said Mainul Hosein, the caretaker government's key law and justice official. "At least we are trying to establish an honest government." #

This article was first published in the Washington Post, Washington, USA on Wednesday, October 3, 2007; in section A16

Wednesday, October 03, 2007

Pinprick cartoons & blasphemous cats

In Bangladesh, a cartoon controversy says more about the country's political polarisation than it does about religious offense

SHAMSUDDIN YUSUF


ANOTHER cartoon controversy has hit the Muslim world. But this time, it is not part of the European dynamic made familiar by the 2006 Denmark crisis and its lesser known Scandinavian cousin this year. This time the action is unfolding in Bangladesh, home to the world's fourth largest Muslim population (after Indonesia, Pakistan and India). And this time, it’s about more than blasphemy.

Last month, Bangladesh authorities arrested twenty year old cartoonist Arifur Rahman, on charges of blasphemy and sedition for a cartoon he drew in the satirical magazine Alpin ("pin prick"). In it, he depicts an imam telling a small boy that he should always add the prefix "Mohammed" before a name, which leads to the boy referring to the cat in his lap as "Mohammed Beral (cat)." Islamist parties quickly denounced the cartoon, the government arrested the hapless cartoonist, and the editor of Alpin was immediately fired.

Things might have rested there, but the intervention of smaller Islamist groups, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, led to demands that the parent newspaper of Alpin, Prothom Alo, be shut down, and its editor and publisher, Motiur Rahman and Mahfuz Anam, sacked. This was no insignificant demand - Prothom Alo is the largest circulation newspaper in the country, and Rahman and Anam two of Bangladesh's most powerful media personalities.

After Friday prayers, Hizb-ut-Tahrir activists burned copies of the newspaper, and clashed with police. Peace talks were brokered between Prothom Alo and religious leaders, leading to a public apology from Rahman to the khatib of the National Mosque. The uneasy calm that followed in Dhaka was threatened by the discovery of another allegedly blasphemous reference in a literary magazine published by Prothom Alo, Shaptahik 2000, by the exiled poet Daud Haider. Worried about fresh trouble, the magazine was instantly pulled from newsstands and banned. The issue is not over yet.

Bangladesh has a long history of blasphemy related controversies, starting the year after its independence from Pakistan in 1971. Cultural icons, practices, and language were key motifs in the country’s struggles against Pakistani rule (Bengali poets Rabindranath Tagore and Kazi Nazrul Islam were re-appropriated as "Hindu" and "Muslim" respectively). After Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan, the culture wars became a key dividing line between Islamist and "secular" (or religious freedom) politics. In this trajectory, controversies targeted blasphemous writings by Haider (exiled in Germany), Taslima Nasreen (subject of global attention after a fatwa and bounty, now exiled in India), Ahmad Sharif (prosecuted in court and forced to apologise) and Humayun Azad (nearly killed in a brutal machete attack, but succumbing to related injuries in Germany later on).

In all these cases, electoral politics are often a bigger factor than genuine, widespread religious sentiment. The country's largest Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami, has used blasphemy controversies to bring itself to national prominence, forcing governments to negotiate with them amidst the uproar. Even though Islamist politics were banned in the aftermath of the country’s independence – Jamaat supported Pakistan during the 1971 war and formed death squads targeting leading Bangladeshi professors and intellectuals – Jamaat has been able to rehabilitate itself through these kinds of mass mobilizations. By 2001, Jamaat entered the government for the first time, securing two powerful ministries. Since then, Jamaat has found itself benefiting politically from recurring blasphemy controversies that serve to stoke religious fervor in their political base.

In the latest controversy, similar motives may be at play. The current Information Minister, Mainul Hossein (who issued the arrest order), owns the daily Ittefaq, one of Prothom Alo's rivals. With Prothom Alo's critical stance against Islamists, it has garnered many sworn enemies.

Currently Bangladesh is under an army-backed caretaker government, with a promised transition to democracy in 2008 looking increasingly shaky and uncertain. The military has vowed to crush corruption, arresting the leaders of both main political parties, as well as numerous party bigwigs. But some complain that Jamaat-e-Islami has been left alone in the current anti-corruption drive, because of sympathy within the Army. The manner in which the government gave in to blasphemy demands, and the light touch given to cartoon demonstrators (even though all protests and rallies are supposed to be banned under a "state of emergency") seems to give further evidence of the caretaker government’s bias.

Recently, unrelated riots on national university campuses were sparked by altercations between students and the Army, resulting in a draconian crackdown and more power to military hardliners. The Prothom Alo controversy has to be seen and analyzed within that context. As with similar cases worldwide, these issues have little to do with piety or protecting the Prophet - and more to do with political maneuvers galvanised under the name of Islam. #

This article was first published in AltMuslim.com, October 1, 2007

Shamsuddin Yusuf is a writer and activist based in Dhaka, Bangladesh

Monday, October 01, 2007

Fakhruddin goes global: a non-leader in charge of a non-government

NM HARUN

By presenting a truncated as well as negative narrative of democratic struggle in our country, the chief adviser has wittingly or unwittingly presented a totally distorted view about Bangladesh as a pariah state where democracy failed to work

THE temporal distance from January 12 to September 27 is only eight and a half months. The spatial distance from Bangabhaban, Dhaka to United Nations Headquarters, New York, though about eight thousand miles, is also not much in this space age. But the time-space distance, from Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed taking oath as chief adviser to his addressing the UN General Assembly, is immense in the context of the democratic credentials of the country.

On January 12, the country was a struggling democracy. There was a nervous expectation that the Fakhruddin government would act as a facilitator in repairing the political hitch centring the election to the ninth parliament and the country would continue with democratic and constitutional governance. A domestic problem would be solved domestically.

On September 27, the chief adviser drew global attention to democracy deficiency in Bangladesh, as if our domestic problem is a matter of international concern.

In his 15-minute address to the UNGA session the chief adviser did not mention anything about the legacy of democracy in the country. There was not even a word about the glorious democratic struggles of the people in the pre-independence and post-independence days or about the victory of people’s struggles against the military dictatorships and quasi-military rules in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. But he made an unqualified denunciation of the post-‘90 political governments: ‘While Bangladesh has held three elections in the past two decades, our democracy has been brutally undermined by ruinous corruption.’ He also stated, ‘The fabric of our democracy had been torn apart by years of catastrophic corruption.’

Thus by presenting a truncated as well as negative narrative of democratic struggle in our country, the chief adviser has wittingly or unwittingly presented a totally distorted view about Bangladesh as a pariah state where democracy failed to work.

A metamorphosis that has not taken place: The problem with Fakhruddin seems to be that he has remained, essentially, what he had been all through his active life: a career bureaucrat. But he has desperately tried to metamorphose himself into a paramount leader of the eighth largest country of the world ever since he accidentally became the chief adviser on January 12.

In his university days, Fakhruddin had a bitter experience with elections. Never an activist, he was chosen by the National Students Federation (NSF), the student front of the Ayub-Monem regime, to contest for the post of vice-president of the SM Hall students’ union. He lost to one who was less brilliant than him as a student.

He does have a reputation as an efficient officer in the service of Pakistan and Bangladesh governments and as a World Bank bureaucrat. He earned respect as a governor of the Bangladesh Bank and chairman of the Palli Karma-Sahayak Foundation (PKSF), a micro-credit organisation.

But nothing in his past prepared Fakhruddin either to play the leadership role of a politician or put on the shoes of the head of the government.

So, when Fakhruddin tries to play the political-cum-government leader, he flip-flops. He announced in March that he would hold a series of ‘exchange of opinion meetings’ with local leaderships at various important places outside capital Dhaka. The purpose would be to know, first-hand, people’s views on vital national issues including, in particular, the holding of the general elections. Generals Ayub Khan, Ziaur Rahman and HM Ershad all held such meet-the-people programmes to build up their political props. The first such event took place in Chittagong on March 27 and the chief adviser announced a crusade against three Ms –– money, muscle and the misuse of power. He held several more meetings but the programme was discontinued later without any notice.

Secondly, the chief adviser made a mess while trying to handle the campus situation in August. Professor Zillur Rahman Siddiqui has recounted in his column in the daily Shamokal his experience with such an incident which took place in 1976. He was then vice-chancellor of the Jahangirnagar University. Army men were watching a football match of the students on the campus playground. As a sequel to an altercation, there was a clash between an army man and a student. The army man later brought in reinforcement from the adjacent Savar Cantonment and they beat up the students indiscriminately. Prof Siddiqui, who resided in Dhaka, was informed of the incident. He contacted General Ziaur Rahman, who immediately sent a colonel to the spot. Prof Siddiqui also rushed to the university. By the same evening, the dispute was ended and the parties reconciled.

Now, when the clash between the army men at the army camp at Dhaka University playground and the students of the Dhaka University took place on August 20, the situation was allowed to drag till August 21. Then, the chief adviser held a meeting of the council of advisers where the army chief and the acting vice-chancellor of the Dhaka University were invited. He publicly expressed regret at the incidents and also a decision was taken to wind up the army camp from the university campus. He thus helped to magnify a local matter into a national crisis.

But the decision of winding up the camp takes time to take effect. By this time agitation spread all over the country and took a violent turn, with political overtones. On August 22, curfew was imposed. Police started cases against 82 thousand persons –– almost all unidentified. The police arrested some university teachers and took them into remand and sent them to jail. The university teachers met the chief adviser and the army chief. Eventually, the chief adviser in his address to the nation on September 9 announced that cases only against 36 teachers and students out of the 82 thousand would start and none other would be implicated or harassed in these cases. Yet, the police later arrested two more persons from Dhaka and Chittagong in connection with the campus upsurge. So the after-effect of the August 20 incident will possibly haunt the campus so long as the cases are not settled.

Dr Fakhruddin, who fumbled in tackling a campus situation, will be called upon, as the head of the government, to carry on negotiations with the politicians if there has to be any election in the country. This is because the government will have to create a congenial environment for holding the elections. Let us keep our fingers crossed.

In his UN address, the chief adviser has said as a matter of fact: ‘As stipulated in our Constitution, the non-party caretaker administration acts as a bridge between successive political governments. Our task, first and foremost, is to ensure a free and fair election, and we are fully committed to that responsibility’. His mettle as a leader will be tested when the time will come for his government to redeem this pledge.

A government in a void: The potency or fragility of the Fakhruddin government itself will face a test when the question of electing a government will be on the agenda. Fakhruddin has made an extravagant statement in the UN address: ‘My government is fully committed to ensuring that our reform initiatives are comprehensive and irreversible.’ How will he or his government ensure this?

A person of Dr Fakhruddin’s calibre should not be unaware that he is running the show of a government which is operating in a virtual void. His caretaker government was not formed in conformity with the provisions of the constitution nor does it operate within the constitutional bounds. At the practical level, the mainstay of his government is the support of the military. The military is under the president. And chief adviser himself and his council of advisers as a body are responsible to the president.

The life line of the Fakhruddin government is the unique equation between the president and the military, established at the time of the promulgation of the emergency on January 11. The Fakhruddin government is the offspring of the January 11 development. It is a government the example of which one will not find either in any textbook or any other government in practice anywhere in the world. #

This article was first published in the New Age, Dhaka, Bangladesh, September 30, 2007

NM Harun is contributing editor of New Age. He can be reached at: badrun 123@dhaka.net