Bangladesh journalist Tasneem Khalil arrested

• Men from an army intelligence unit were behind the arrest, Khalil's wife said
• The men took Khalil's passport, cell phones, documents, wife said
• Human Rights Watch's Asia director expresses extreme concern
• Khalil worked on HRW report last year about alleged torture by elite forces

(CNN) -- The Bangladeshi army arrested a Bangladesh journalist at his home early Friday for unknown reasons, according to his wife.

Tasneem Khalil writes for the Dhaka-based Daily Star and also works part-time for Human Rights Watch and as a stringer for several news organizations, including CNN.

Khalil's wife Sharmin Afsana Shuchi telephoned CNN to say that the men who arrested him were from an army intelligence unit.

In a statement, she said that four men in plainclothes identified themselves as belonging to "the joint task force." They refused to tell Khalil on what charges he was being arrested and cautioned him to be quiet "if you don't want anything else to happen," she said.

The men searched the house, took Khalil's passport and cell phones, two desktop computers and "all the documents, notepads, piles of paper, CDs and everything," she said. "They took it all away."

The men allegedly took Khalil to the Sangsad Bhavan army camp outside the parliament building in Dhaka.

The Bangladeshi army has detained thousands of people since declaring a state of emergency on January 11, Human Rights Watch said. Many of them have been tortured, the group said.

"We are extremely concerned about Tasneem Khalil's safety," said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. "He has been a prominent voice in Bangladesh for human rights and the rule of law and has been threatened because of that."

Khalil is a noted investigative journalist who has published several controversial exposes of official corruption and abuse, particularly by security forces. Last year, he assisted Human Rights Watch in research for a 2006 report about torture and extrajudicial killings by Bangladesh elite security forces, said HRW press director Emma Daly.

According to Bangladeshi human rights groups, the army has detained tens of thousands of people since a state of emergency was declared on January 11, 2007. A number of those detained are picked up in the middle of the night, as Khalil was, and then tortured.

In Bangladesh, security forces have long been implicated in torture and extrajudicial killings. The killings have been attributed to members of the army, the police, and the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), an elite anti-crime and anti-terrorism force. The Human Rights Watch report Khalil worked on, “Judge, Jury, and Executioner: Torture and Extrajudicial Killings by Bangladesh’s Elite Security Force,” focused on abuses by the RAB.

Killings in custody remain a persistent problem in Bangladesh. To date, no military personnel are known to have been held criminally responsible for any of the deaths.

Khalil was called in for questioning by military intelligence last week, apparently as part of the military’s campaign to intimidate independent journalists ahead of May 10, 2007, when the army’s three-month legal mandate for ruling under a state of emergency came to an end.

CNN and HRW have been in contact with Bangladesh's Special Envoy to the United States, Farook Sobhan, and other officials in attempts to find information about Khalil. Sobhan told CNN it was the first he'd heard about Khalil's arrest and promised to make inquiries. #

Judge, Jury, and Executioner: Torture and Extrajudicial Killings by Bangladesh’s Elite Security Force

POSTED: 1:10 a.m. EDT, May 11, 2007

Copyright 2007 CNN. All rights reserved.This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. Associated Press contributed to this report

Bangladesh State Emergency An Opportunity

PROFESSOR MAHFUZ R. CHOWDHURY

FROM a political point of view, Bangladesh is currently undergoing dramatic change. The present caretaker government, which came to power on January 12, 2007 with the backing of the army after a declaration of emergency, was quickly perceived to have saved the country from the grave consequences of hostilities between the country’s two major political parties. Those hostilities had driven the country of over 140 million people almost to the brink of anarchy. During the two months prior to the takeover, the country had experienced unending riots and widespread demonstrations in which more than 60 people lost their lives, millions of dollars in property was damaged, and the economic activities in the country came to a squealing halt.

After coming to power, the present government not only brought an end to the crisis, it promptly undertook a number of key initiatives that the country had failed to achieve during the 36 years since it gained independence. These initiatives include the badly needed restructuring of the anti-corruption commission, reorganization of the election commission, and establishment of the rule of law by making the judiciary free from the executive branch. Having initiated or achieved such long awaited and cherished measures, the government earned praise from its citizens and the world. By every account, the government has so far done an outstanding job in accomplishing the main objectives it had set out to accomplish, though not without glitches.

One of the critical problems that Bangladesh had faced was massive corruption at every level of government. The world is aware that Transparency International had ranked Bangladesh the most corrupt country in the world for five consecutive years since 2000. Having assumed authority, the caretaker government unleashed a massive campaign to confront corruption head on. It soon locked up a number of influential state ministers, members of parliament, top businessmen, and other high officials, who were known to have extorted enormous amount of money and land, and to have even expropriated vast amounts of relief materials intended for the poor. The government also succeeded in putting the son of the former Prime Minister, the alleged ring leader of the country’s organized crime, in jail. The government traced a huge amount of money that had been laundered through foreign banks, especially shocking to the world. Just imagine, while the country was supposedly receiving foreign aid to bolster its economy, its officials were engaged in illegally transferring money out of the country! Estimates of such laundered money are in the hundreds of millions of dollars.

The other contentious issue was how to set up an impartial and fair election process in the country. This challenge had earlier led the two leading parties to settle for a caretaker government that would oversee a period of three months leading up to an election. Yet this unprecedented deal failed to bring fairness to the political process because the party previously in power found ingenious ways to leave its many cronies in power to manipulate elections. This time, when the initial caretaker government’s decision to hold election under questionable circumstances led to a crisis, the President was obliged to declare an emergency and install a truly independent caretaker government.

Immediately after taking power, the present government pledged to bring necessary reforms to end the prevailing system in which politics is influenced not by the free will of the people, but by the manipulation of elections through money and muscle. The two major political parties, Awami League and Bangladesh Nationalist Party, remained the country’s key players in the political arena. Following the assassination of their former paramount leaders, the daughter and wife of those leaders were inducted to these parties’ leadership positions in order to contain feuding among party elders. Eventually, both women assumed autocratic power within their parties, and both also held state power at one time or another. But neither one’s administrative record is free from corruption or manipulation of political events. In fact, the present crisis in the country was indisputably caused by these two politically inept women. It is for this very reason that many believe that true political reforms would not be possible while they remained at the helm of their parties. Subscribing to such a theory, the current caretaker government seems to have taken an impromptu decision to exile them, thinking that it might be easier to send them abroad than to prosecute them for their alleged crimes. In the face of outside pressure, the government subsequently reversed its decision to exile them. But serious controversy over the future political roles of these two women lingers.

Contrary to popular belief, Bangladesh is a resource-rich country, and has remained so even after years of exploitation by a number of foreign powers, including the Mughals, the British, and the Pakistanis. The country is filled with rich coal and gas reserves, and it also has a competent workforce. After gaining independence, it has stayed poor and has failed to reach its potential mainly because of its corrupt political system. Even under such trying circumstances the country has achieved 5 percent annual economic growth during the past decade. This is precisely why a great sense of hope has prevailed in the country following the declaration of the state of emergency and the formation of the present caretaker government. Except for a small section of people who had plundered state wealth and are now facing justice, the general public is pleased with the turn of events in the country. Intellectuals both at home and abroad have described the current situation as a new opportunity for the country to cleanse its political system so that it can move forward.

Currently, under emergency rule all political activities in the country are banned, but pressure especially from outside is mounting to lift this ban, and at the same time to schedule a new election as soon as possible. The government has pledged to schedule the election by the end of 2008, or soon after election reform is completed. The country’s intellectuals and constitutional experts have supported the decision.

But the leaders of the two influential parties see this delay as a great danger for them, because the present government continues to investigate their past misdeeds. Their clamor for early election is not with the country’s best interests at heart, but in order to save themselves from ongoing investigations and further embarrassments. To bring progress to Bangladesh, the need for a fair election could not be overemphasized. But pressuring the government to schedule an early election without necessary election reform might bring more harm than good. Considering the ominous circumstances under which the present caretaker government was brought to power, the world should dismiss the idea of a snap election. An election without electoral reform would simply reestablish the old system where money and muscle once ruled. Such a system should neither be desirable nor acceptable to the democratic world.

Bangladesh is clearly at a crossroads. The world has a great responsibility to help it to choose and stay on the right track, and not create obstacles for its reform. If the country fails to move forward, the future of the country will be greatly jeopardized. The present caretaker government can use help and guidance in setting up proper reforms leading to a fair election, in bringing corrupt former officials to justice, and in recovering illegally laundered money from abroad. Help in these areas would go a long way toward establishing democracy and putting the country on the path to prosperity. A prosperous Bangladesh would be beneficial to the world. #

This article was published in American Chronicle, on May 8, 2007

Professor Chowdhury teaches Economics at C.W. Post Campus of Long Island University, USA. He has wide ranging experience in international business and commerce, and has written on failure of communism and problem with developing countries. He was born in Chittagong, Bangladesh and has written extensively on his home country. His book, "Economic Exploitation of Bangladesh", addresses the economics of developing countries, using Bangladesh as a case study. He could be reached Mahfuz.Chowdhury@liu.edu

Bangladesh Permits Ex-Premier to Return; Hasina face charges

NORA BOUSTANY

A defiant Sheikh Hasina, former prime minister of Bangladesh, arrived in the capital, Dhaka, on Monday after the government lifted an entry ban that had stranded her in London on her way home from the United States. She was greeted at the airport by thousands of well-wishers who ignored official orders against political rallies.

Hasina's longtime rival, Khaleda Zia, prime minister in the previous government, remained under house arrest after four weeks with no working telephone lines to her home, as the government of former central bank governor Fakhruddin Ahmed prepared summary trials of prominent political figures.

"No one can stop me," Hasina, head of the Awami League, told reporters at the airport, according to news service reports from Dhaka. "This is my country, they cannot keep me from coming back."

Hasina faces charges of extortion and supporting bloodletting during street scuffles between followers of the Awami League and activists loyal to Khaleda Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Hasina denies the charges.

On Monday, she declined to say whether she planned to run for office again.

As street violence mounted last winter, an interim government declared a state of emergency Jan. 11 and canceled parliamentary elections scheduled for Jan. 22, citing international concern over the validity of voter registration lists. With approval of the army, authorities have promised to clean up the political system, targeting political figures they accuse of corruption.

On Monday, Ahmed reaffirmed plans to hold elections before the end of next year and promised to ensure a free press. Some journalists and intellectuals in Bangladesh expressed skepticism that his military-backed government will carry out those promises.

It remains unclear who and which parties would take part in elections. Last Thursday, Grameen Bank founder and Nobel Peace laureate Muhammad Yunus announced he was abandoning plans to form a party and run for office, saying that individuals who had promised to support him had backed out.

One of the politicians arrested in sweeps that followed January's street violence is Mohiuddin Alamgir, 66, a former civil servant and Awami League member. The charges against him have changed from treason to extortion to corruption, according to his son Jalal Alamgir, a political science professor at the University of Massachusetts in Boston. The rights for bail and an appeal have been withdrawn, Jalal Alamgir said.

Mohiuddin Alamgir told his son by telephone in recent days that he was to be the first to appear in court on Wednesday and that he did not know whether his attorneys would be allowed to make a statement. It is the only conversation he has had with his father since his arrest in February, Jalal Alamgir said, and was due to the kindness of a police escort who offered the prisoner a cellphone.

"My biggest fear is that those will be kangaroo courts, since the government has another set of rules for these tribunals," said Jalal Alamgir. "The drive against corruption is legitimate, but it has also been used as a cover against people who may be vocal against military rule and an authoritarian takeover." #

This article was first published in the Washington Post, May 8, 2007; page A20

Facts vs Fads: Democracy and Economic Performance

ABDUL MOMEN

"THROUGH the 36 years after independence politicians gave us nothing good," declared Moeen U. Ahmed, the Army Chief, at a gathering in late March, 2007. It is fashionable in these days of disinformation and army-backed government to blame politicians for all evils. A section of the local intelligentsia is also happily endorsing such views of the interim government without question.

But the facts tell a different story. Read on, let the information sink in, and then ask: what is the ulterior motive in such a disinformation campaign?

The actual record of democracy
The table below compares the major macro-economic indicators of Bangladesh for its periods of authoritarian rule (1975-1990) and electoral democracy (1991-2005). Even with corruption and periodic political chaos due to polarization and rivalry between the two "Begums," democracy produced significantly better economic performance than what was generated by military rule.

Growth in per capita GDP during democracy (5.9 percent per annum) was a whopping 59 percent better than per capita GDP growth during civil-military authoritarianism (3.9 percent per annum). Overall GDP during democracy grew by 5.1 percent annually on average, but during authoritarian rule the growth rate was 3.2 percent.

The investment rate almost doubled during democracy vis-à-vis military rule. Even more prominently, the savings rate during democratic rule (37.5 percent) was more than triple of what the authoritarian rulers were able to achieve (11 percent).

During democracy, Bangladesh's exports grew much faster. And inflation, the main worry of poor people, was kept far better in check during democratic governance. The trend today is also consistent with this performance. Under authoritarian economic management now, inflation this year is expected to reach 10 percent.

Liberal policies and economic effects
The higher growth rates were achieved in part because of other liberal policies undertaken by political governments. A free press, private television channels like Channel I, ATN Bangla, and NTV, and the entire telecommunications revolution in Bangladesh made famous by GrameenPhone was spurred during democratic rule. The better flow of information and communication not only generated economic benefits, but also enhanced public consciousness dramatically, allowing the media to raise issues of accountability that we take for granted now.

Despite chaos, commerce flourished during democracy. Photo by Julien MaillerIn addition, the historic Ganges Water Treaty and the Chittagong Hill Tract Peace Deal were both completed by the Awami League government, producing significant economic benefits in the northwest and southeast regions of the country respectively. Authoritarian governments of Bangladesh had raised the Ganges water sharing issue even at the UN General Assembly, and spent tons of money on the Farakka issue both home and abroad, but with no avail.

In the last 36 years, non-democratic governments ran the affairs of Bangladesh for almost 16.5 consecutive years (the first 3.5 years can be considered a reconstruction period after a massive war). It is during this time that institutions of governance were destroyed, and corruption became a prominent part of the economy. There is no denying that both Major General Ziaur Rahman and Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad showed the path of corrupting the administration with their hand-picked cronies.

Beware the blame game
The record is very clear. Despite all the blame conveniently put on the politicians, they actually have performed far better than authoritarian rulers in improving the economic condition of the country. Just scapegoating politicians is a disservice and escapism. But worse, it is probably being done deliberately to hide the destruction to both the economy and the values of the country that were brought on by the military-led governments between 1975 and 1991. As we enter another authoritarian period, intelligent citizens must keep in mind the historical record, so that they do not fall prey to the blanket anti-politician propaganda being spread nowadays. #

Dr. Abdul Momen, a professor of economics and business management, Boston, USA

This article was first published in www.ProgressiveBangladesh.org on April 30, 2007

Don't Mess Up the Cleanup Job in Bangladesh

TERRENCE FRAZER

TO us foreign observers, the authoritarian takeover in Bangladesh seemed necessary. There was no other way to clamp down on corruption. Sheikh Hasina, the former prime minister from Awami League, herself noted that if elected to power, her party could not have done anything concrete against the influence peddlers of Hawa Bhaban.

Tools of the trade
The government’s success against the war of corruption has been based ultimately in two things that would be absent in a usual elected government.

First, a strong and visible military force backed it. Every high-profile arrest was done with precise choreography. Truckloads of soldiers surrounded the site of arrest, disconnected phones and lines, stayed up to 12 hours to “raid” and gather documents, and then apprehended and led away the suspects with calm determination.

Second, the government has been doing all this under a state of emergency with fundamental rights suspended. It is using the emergency as cover also to enact a series of laws to create a special legal environment to try the corruption suspects. As some commentators have noted, the goal seems to bypass due process so that guilty verdicts can be handed down quickly and easily while making it difficult for the defendants to prove innocence.

An inconvenient truth
Neither of these luxuries would be available easily to a normally elected government. But by relying so much on authoritarian methods, the government has been weakening its legitimacy, and many among foreign observers are now beginning to doubt its true motives.

On April 17, the US Under-secretary of State, Nicholas Burns, said, "The interim government in Bangladesh has become occupied with unnecessary issues although its prime business is holding a free and fair elections" and noted that such activities may become unacceptable to the international community.

In a press briefing on April 24, Sean McCormack, spokesperson of the US State Department voiced worries about the situation: "if the caretaker government doesn’t take the right decisions, then this — there is a real possibility that this can threaten Bangladeshi democracy."

The reason is not the anti-corruption drive, but the politicization of it. (In some ways perhaps that is expected -- most things in Bangladesh tend to become politicized quickly.) For savvy observers, a good indication of this is looking at the type of cases being filed.

For example, a surprise inclusion in the government's first round of corruption-related arrests was Dr. Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir, a former planning minister in Awami League’s administration who has a history of being vocal against authoritarian governments. The government filed sedition, not corruption, charges against him, probably to silence him by keeping him in jail.

The arrest of Moudud Ahmed also proceeded comically. Newspapers report that the initial charge brought against him is illegal possession of alcohol: 32 cans of beer and a few bottles of liquor.

Filing murder charges against Sheikh Hasina for violence that took place during a large political rally is equally ludicrous. The names listed on the murder charges were hurriedly “corrected” at the last minute, and her name was forcibly included.

Then the government barred her from returning to Bangladesh, but at the same time termed her a fugitive, fleeing from law. Within days, the government reversed its decision, and the police withdrew the charge sheet for further investigation. The only explanation for these shenanigans is political motive, not real charges.

By framing these far-fetched scenarios—treason, murder, drinking—the government is making a mockery of its real effort to fight corruption. Not only do these undermine the integrity of the much-needed cleanup effort, but these, along with the new laws to suppress due process, are also beginning to expose a more malicious intent of "political purging."

Forcing politicians out of politics
Aside from corruption charges and summary trials, intimidation is an additional method of forcing retirement on the old guard of politicians. I am told that Anwar Hossain Monju, a veteran politician has declared retirement from politics under threat. Such pressures have been created apparently on leaders from other parties too.

There can be only one goal for this purge: force existing politicians out of politics and then pick preferred candidates. When I asked a Bangladeshi historian about this, he laughed and agreed, noting that this was the same formula by which General Zia had created BNP and General Ershad had created Jatiya Party.

For this government, the preferred party is probably Nagorik Shakti, led by Professor Muhammad Yunus, the 2006 Nobel peace laureate. With its political purge, the government is basically trying to clear the field for him as much as possible. Faced with politicized cases and intimidation, the only way for veteran politicians to survive may be by joining Dr. Yunus’s party.

Stick to the job, please
Voters in Bangladesh, as well as those of us who analyze politics in South Asia, were no doubt fed up with the endemic corruption and political wrangling. So there is strong support for cracking down on corruption, but I believe there is little appetite for these types of political meddling. But that’s what the interim government is creating, by harassing and intimidating politicians on all sorts of questionable grounds.

In addition, if the interim government begins to favor newcomers, it runs the risk of losing popular support. When that happens, the fight against corruption will suffer a premature and tragic death.

So the government will be wise to just stick to its core tasks—getting the country ready for elections and getting well-known corrupt people to justice on the basis of sound and credible evidence. The more "political" the government becomes, the more it will mess up the clean up job, and eventually its own survival. #

Terrence Frazer analyses South Asian politics for a risk research organization. He resides in New York and Singapore, and travels frequently in South Asia. Views expressed here are his own

Islamist takeover stopped in Bangladesh?

RICHARD L. BENKIN

THREE and a half years ago, anti-jihadist Muslim Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury blew the lid off secret Islamist efforts to take over Bangladesh. He published his revelations in an article that, unfortunately, the Bangladeshi press refused to touch. But he persevered, and when "incubating ultra-radicalism" started appearing on websites, the government struck. Using a minor offense as a pretext to detain him, it held Choudhury under deplorable conditions. He was hauled in and out of court numerous times, always returned for "interrogation." That meant torture, which his openly Islamist captors applied in an attempt to extract a false confession that he was a spy for Israel.

Islamists had preparing to take Bangladesh for decades. They infiltrated Bangladeshi society, buying up print and broadcast media, banking, business, even the judiciary and police. Since 2001, they had been part of a coalition government with a stated policy of appeasement. But as of January, that government appears out of power for good, and the nation's current leaders have announced an "anti-radical" agenda. Were Islamists stopped in their attempt to take over the world's third-largest Muslim country? Maybe; and here's how.

The system that brought the Islamist fox into the government henhouse ended soon after 2007 began. I arrived in Bangladesh to extensive street violence with the center-left opposition calling for more. The ruling coalition had rigged the upcoming elections so transparently that every Western democracies urged that they not be held, an odd circumstance to be sure. With neither party offering a way out of the growing chaos, the interim government with military backing called a State of Emergency and canceled elections. Good thing, too, because almost every analyst predicted further Islamist gains were they held.

Except for some May Day bombs designed to make noise rather than cause damage, the Islamists have been silent. Three of their ilk have been executed and many arrested. Sources confirm further anti-Islamist action on the way. But to seal this victory, the government has to eradicate radical influence among the people. While the West stood by, Islamists capitalized on Bangladeshis' suffering and the country's massive corruption much as Hamas did in Gaza. A social service network where the price of a meal was continuous Islamist hate speech was just the beginning. Radical mosques were funded by notorious "charities." I witnessed that first-hand traveling incognito outside the capital – after the January events. My Bangaldeshi companion sneered at the streams of people we saw entering radical mosques and noted, "We give [them] a choice of that or being a bug."

Bangladesh's legendary corruption has also driven the people to the Islamists. It was so endemic that there was palpable joy in Dhaka when the country was named "only" the third-most corrupt on earth. By vigorously pursuing corruption and putting former corrupt leaders in prison, the government is beginning to restore the people's faith in traditional Bangladeshi values. It must finish the job and continue to arrest those who have plundered the nation for decades. Nor will it succeed without expelling its fifth column of Wahabi funded "charities." If, on the other hand, Dhaka takes the advice of groups like Human Rights Watch, which has complained to U.S. lawmakers about the arrests, the people will again look to the Islamists.
January also spelled the end of open appeasement in Dhaka with the Islamist-laced coalition's death. The government has jihadi organizations that bombed courtrooms, intimidated minorities and journalists, and promised the country Shariah law in its crosshairs. But Islamists and their toadies are still in key areas, especially the judiciary, according to on prominent member of the bar there. Capital charges of "sedition, treason and blasphemy" against Choudhury remain – charges that several officials of the last government admitted to me were maintained only to pacify radicals. Choudhury's attorney, professor Irwin Cotler, whose clients have included Nelson Mandela, Natan Sharansky and others, has identified eight violations of Bangladesh law in the prosecution. And the government recently received a congressional resolution demanding that they drop the charges "immediately." The government promised to do so. But will they? Because Choudhury went public with his pro-American and pro-Israeli stance, Islamists have made his case a centerpiece for intimidating Muslims who oppose them. Whether or not Dhaka follows through with its promises will indicate whether Islamist appeasement is really dead.

As I reported in WorldNetDaily last summer, a coalition of Nepalese Communists and Islamists cooperated in finding al-Qaida forces safe havens around Bangladesh after U.S. forces dislodged them from their Afghan strongholds. Despite their differences, the two groups are cooperating to replace the existing nation-states with their own internationalist ideologies. They remain in the area, although their plan to stuff Bangladeshi ballot boxes for Islamist candidates is now moot. They are also unsure now what sort of reception Dhaka's military might give them or what kind of clandestine support they have. This is quite a turn of events from those prevailing before January when the BNP certified phony voter lists that were tailor made for Islamist interlopers looking to cast illicit votes. Terrorist forces, however, remain in place waiting for a return to business as usual.

The New York Times called the current Dhaka government a "military dictatorship," comparing it to Pervez Musharraf's Pakistan, based on unreliable sources. If anything, paying heed to these unsubstantiated allegations threatens the demise of this nascent anti-Islamist victory. Sources inside Bangladesh suggest that some members of the government are looking to follow the Turkish model, in which a strong military guarantees a secular, pro-Western government. The Bangladeshis should proceed seriously with their anti-corruption and anti-Islamist campaigns and drop the charges against Choudhury, which were brought to mollify Islamists. In exchange, the U.S. and other anti-terrorist nations should acknowledge the significant events taking place in South Asia and provide assistance to those who are standing with us in our fight in the form of trade and business, as well as security cooperation to defeat our common enemy. #

Dr. Richard L. Benkin is the special adviser to the Intelligence Summit on Bangladeshi Affairs and a correspondent for Weekly Blitz and Amader Shomoy, both of Dhaka. Benkin also led the successful fight to free Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury from prison. His website is InterfaithStrength.com

Bangladesh among other undemocratic watch list failing on religious freedom

SALEEM SAMAD

THE United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) in 2007 report has included Bangladesh for the third consecutive year, along with seven other countries in the Watch List for appalling religious freedom situation.

The Commission’s Watch List includes Afghanistan, Belarus, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, and Nigeria and recommends to monitor those countries due to nature and extent of violations of religious freedom engaged or tolerated by the governments.

Launching of the religious freedom report at Washington on Wednesday, April 2 has expressed concern that the predators and perpetrators of repression and persecution have not been punished and the victims never received justice.

In October, the Commission held a public forum at Washington on the scheduled 2007 elections in Bangladesh and on promoting democracy and protecting rights in a Muslim-majority country.

The commission was also pressing for free and fair elections in Bangladesh and ensure the religious minorities vote without fear and intimidation.

Recommendation was made after the Commission’s visit to Bangladesh during February-March 2006. The Commission heard concerns that members of religious minority communities might be excluded from the voters lists, intimidated from voting, or targeted by anti-minority violence such as had followed the last national election in October 2001.

Bangladesh recently experienced major political and constitutional crisis, the resolution of which will determine whether religious freedom and other human rights will be protected by the rule of law or the country will continue on a downward spiral toward authoritarianism and intolerance.

In January 2007, a state of emergency was declared, normal political activities banned, and previously scheduled national elections indefinitely postponed. Recent deviations from democratic norms and reports of serious human rights abuses raise troubling questions about the future prospects for respect for a range of freedoms, including potentially freedom of religion or belief.

The Commission placed Bangladesh on its Watch List in 2005 due to a number of concerns about increasing Islamist radicalism and violence and the threatening conditions for and discrimination against religious minorities, specially Hindus, Christians, and Ahmadiyyas.

The failure to investigate and hold perpetrators to justice for violence and persecution against members of religious minorities. Inadequate police response to violent campaign against the minority Ahmadiyya Muslims;

Discrimination against members of religious minority communities in public employment and access to government services. Also repeated and sometimes fatal attacks against journalists, authors, and academics for debating sensitive social or political issues or otherwise expressing opinions deemed by militants to be offensive to Islam.

The Commission urges the United States government to pay particular attention to the poor situation for religious freedom in these countries, as the Commission itself will continue to do. #

Take the news of who did the bombings with a salt of grain

A.H. JAFFOR ULLAH

THERE is no denial of the fact that three simultaneous bombings took place in three railway stations, namely Dhaka, Chittagong, and Sylhet on May 1, 2007. The bombs were crudely made and lacked firepower to do extensive damage. One rickshawalla, however, was injured in Chittagong as per news report.

The press is trying to blame al-Qaeda right away. Some jihadi literature was found near the blast site. These are facts but how the press or law enforcement authorities came to their conclusion pronto that these bombings are the handiworks of religious zealots is not known. What is the basis for such early conclusion?

Ever since the leaders of the Islamist outfit of JMB were arrested, the incidence of bombings in Bangladesh stopped without further delay. There were no bombing incidents that took place after the caretaker government assumed power in late October 2006.

The military-backed interim government let the six JMB men walked the gallows not too long ago; however, the Islamists did not retaliate. The intelligence department expected some bombing in the aftermath of the hanging of JMB leaderships. But no such unpropitious incident took place. Consequently, our countrymen collectively heaved a sigh of relief. When the nation was going through a calm period, we heard the May Day bombing in three places.

Immediately, finger was pointed without spending any time towards Islamists having no hard evidence at hand. This is a fact that the culprit put some propaganda material adjacent to the bomb site. The crux of the matter is who planted the bomb? I am not convinced that Islamists struck this time. Could it be a copy cat bombing to divert attention from all the real problems that Bangladesh is facing now?

In English there is such a term call “red herring.” The term means - something that draws attention away from the central issue.

Anything is possible at this time in Bangladesh. The military-backed government is now passing through a tough time. Even though there is a ban on politics, but enough miasmas were created in the political landscape by government’s doltish policies to implement their “minus two” plan. Consequently, Sheikh Hasina received a worldwide publicity and the government buckled under world pressure. Khaleda’s luck also favored and she must have thanked Hasina from the bottom of her heart for all the help.

The caretaker government is now in disarray; therefore, the most vocal adviser, Mainul Hosein, said the day that the nation is going through a tough time. This spate of recent bombing will give the authorities a respite and breathing room they badly need.

I am inclined to think that we should not take any news coming out of Bangladesh at its face value. Superficially, it looks as if the bombings were done by the Islamists. But honestly, it could be staged by others rather facilely to draw the citizens’ attention away from the central problems such as inflation of common staples and foodstuffs, squishing of civil rights of citizens, uncertainty about the timing of the next parliamentary election, and lack of transparency in the governance by the interim government. The sooner the present oligarch (technocrats) holds the election and transfer the power to elected body, the better.

Dr. A.H. Jaffor Ullah, a researcher and columnist, writes from New Orleans, USA

BANGLADESH - Khaki politics in Dhaka

THE subterfuge is over. It has now become clear that Bangladesh is under the control of an autocratic military regime. After three months of pretending that it had little to do with the new interim government, set up in early January, the Bangladesh Army’s role in derailing an already shaky democratic process is now obvious. In early April, the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant-General Moeen U Ahmed, gave a speech on the need to design a new political system, his assertions eerily similar to the arguments for ‘Guided Democracy’ that Southasians have heard repeatedly from past dictators. There has been a clampdown on political activity and protests, with many leaders of both the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party arrested on grounds of corruption. Meanwhile, promises to hold elections ‘as soon as possible’ seem on their way to being conveniently forgotten.

The most recent move was the concerted attempt to push Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina Wajed into exile. These mutually antagonistic leaders, alternately presiding over the Dhaka durbar for the past 15 years, have certainly not been models of democratic governance. Both engaged in intense political bickering, looted from state coffers, encouraged a culture of street-lumpenism, and constricted the institutional development of Bangladesh’s democracy. But the one lesson that we have learned from the royal takeovers in Nepal, the military coups in Pakistan, and even the state of emergency in India, is that neat technocratic solutions, backed by the military baton, are almost always unstable – besides being inherently illiberal.

What is happening in Bangladesh follows a familiar script – in countries where democracy has not taken deep roots, the record of corrupt and irresponsible parties leads to public disillusionment with the system itself, and provides the opportunity for conservative rightwing elements to step in. There is initial euphoria among Bangladesh’s urban middle class, which is pleased to see the fear-induced efficiency in some government offices, as well as the protest-free streets. There is a rhetorical commitment to democracy, accompanied with pledges that the current situation is merely a temporary arrangement. But once they take over, military regimes do not withdraw voluntarily; often, a significantly messier campaign is needed to oust them.

Bangladeshis should know this better than most. They have lived under military rule, both before and after the War of Liberation in 1971. They have also watched the consequences of such regimes in Pakistan for six decades. Against this backdrop, it was surprising to see even liberal dailies and civil society in Dhaka welcome the army’s move in January. Only now are they waking up to the fact that this is not a temporary interlude that will teach the two parties to behave better; rather, it is the long haul of dictatorial rule that seems to be in the cards. The government’s decisions to send Khaleda Zia to Saudi Arabia, and prevent Sheikh Hasina from returning to Bangladesh from overseas, will have a disastrous long-term impact on democratic evolution in Bangladesh. The space for legitimate political protest and mechanisms to communicate grievances will shrink, further strengthening extremists.

The Bangladesh Army seems to have been inspired by General Pervez Musharraf in its use of the political tactic of exiling popular leaders. The brass has also learned to make the right noises in front of the international community. We have thus seen the swift execution of six ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ – as a sop to the Americans – as well as promises to create a more liberal investment atmosphere, which is music to Indian ears. While the agitation to send the generals back to the barracks will have to come from Bangladeshis themselves, international actors must not repeat the mistake they have made in innumerable past situations to prop up an autocracy. They must correct their pre-conceived disdain for political parties, which led the Western embassies to get behind the January putsch. The king’s disastrous rule in Nepal and Gen Musharraf’s current troubles in Pakistan should be enough proof that these arrangements are not sustainable. The focus, however, will be on domestic political players, who have an opportunity to shake the state structure and push the military back – as well as to create a more responsible and institutionalised form of democracy. The next people’s movement of Southasia we would wager will be in Bangladesh. #

This commentary was first published in HIMAL magazine, Nepal

http://www.himalmag.com/2007/may/commentary_bangladesh_hasina.htm

The Dhaka regime’s messy surgery

WITH the two major political parties forcibly sidelined, who is left to fix a broken polity? The fact that the writer of this article is compelled to remain anonymous is perhaps indicative of the sudden democracy deficit in Dhaka.

Bangladesh’s political orchestra is reaching a crescendo, at least for this passage. What comes next may be a long, deafening silence. As the two political dynasties were made to exit the country, the remonstrations of the two heads were heard far and wide. The military-backed interim government’s tackling of its envisioned ‘minus two’ rescue plan for the polity has been neither smooth nor discreet. Despite the noises made out of entrenched political camps, however, it has become clear that there is no turning back for Bangladesh. The tables have been turned.

In January, when the military-backed regime took power with an initial ‘emergency’ mandate of 120 days (which will end on 10 May), there was no timeframe in place for elections. Chief Adviser Fakhruddin Ahmed and his military backers provided such a timeline – elections by the end of 2008 – almost as a gift on the eve of the Bengali New Year. But even as the chief adviser was delivering his address to the nation on 13 April, rumours were already rife of plans to exile Begum Khaleda Zia, chair of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Talk of Sheikh Hasina Wajed, president of the Awami League, being barred from entering the country was also being heard. For most of April, Dhaka was a city of rumours.

With all forms of political activity banned, there was very little opposition to the action against the heads of the two main parties when it finally took place. With the anti-corruption dragnet picking up politicians from across the political divide, no one dared to speak out. There had been pressure on Khaleda Zia to leave the country since her son Tarique Rahman’s 7 March arrest. But it was not until her second son, Arafat Rahman, was picked up in a midnight raid at her residence that, on 17 April, she agreed to depart for Saudi Arabia with her immediate family. One down, another to go, it seemed.

The wait was not long. With no foreseeable obstacle to the plan, on 18 April a government press notice stated that Sheikh Hasina had become a “national-security risk”, and was therefore barred from returning to the country from a trip to the US. A day after Hasina had declared the interim government “unconstitutional” in an interview, the government publicised the corruption charges against her. Suddenly, the accusation of political murder was added – a charge that carried with it an arrest warrant. With the travel ban in place, Hasina made an attempt to return to Bangladesh, but was denied entry to an airplane in London on 22 April, the morning the warrant was issued.

Dangerous vacuum

While the attempt to cleanse the political culture overnight is a grand adventure worth applauding, trying to fill the vacuum left by such a sudden removal will not only be difficult, but dangerous. Politically, the first signs of cracks were seen immediately prior to Khaleda’s planned departure. Many mid- and senior-level BNP leaders had been lying low for fear of prosecution on corruption charges. On the evening of 20 April, they found an armyman-turned-BNP politician, retired Brigadier Hannan Shah, holding consultations with the party chairperson. (Khaleda had already been under house arrest for weeks.) With no one to vouch for or denounce his contention, Shah declared that Khaleda wished to reorganise the party and dissolve the existing committees. Some senior BNP leaders feared a split, while others pointed towards arm-twisting by the army to force-feed the party its agenda.

The Awami League is said to be going through similar gyrations. Both of the parties are showing the inherent weakness of an unyieldingly hierarchical political culture. Does this mean that the interim government should be cheered for dismantling them? Perhaps not. While the international community seemed to have given the military-backed government an initial nod, it appears that the announcement that national polls will be held by late 2008 (along with the Election Commission’s elaborate promises of national identity cards, a new voter roll and revamped election rules) might become a means to another end.

On 2 April, the army chief and de facto head of the country, General Moeen U Ahmed, announced: “The aspiring demo-cratic process of Bangladesh and the current transition period allows us an opportunity to develop a new concept, and find a new sense of direction to the future politics of Bangladesh.” This ‘new concept’, of course, may not necessarily refer to the traditional participatory electoral process known to Bangladesh’s electorate. Ahmed went on: “Bangladesh will have to construct its own brand of democracy, recognising its social, historical and cultural conditions, with religion being one of several components of its national identity.” This talk of a ‘new brand of democracy’ was widely and fervently discussed in Bangladesh for the better part of early April, and many political observers characterised it as the first public indication that the armed forces were to implement their own plans for the future of Bangladeshi politics.

However, like some of the other peoples of Southasia, Bangladeshis have seen previous military-backed governments with ‘unique plans’, and scepticism was in the air. By late April, there was already word of tension within the armed forces themselves. Ahmed’s term as army chief ends in June 2008, which is just prior to the currently stipulated timeframe to hold the national polls. General Masud Uddin Chowdhury, the key proponent in formulating the current emergency rule, is slated to be the next chief. While the actions taken by the interim government might have wide-scale popular support – as is believed in the absence of credible public opinion polls – senior army officials would be reluctant to return power to civilian hands without ensuring safeguards, for a backlash from political quarters that have come under the anti-corruption sweep is a certainty.

In the heady atmosphere of early 2007, many had initially thought of Nobel Prize winner Mohammad Yunus and his brand new political party Nagorik Shakti, born under the blanket of emergency rule, as a possible successor in the making. But with bitter reactions from various quarters, and given the current subdued state of politics, Yunus has kept relatively quiet. Many observers have also pointed out that, while the BNP has suffered severely in the recent anti-corruption drive, its chief ally, the Jamaat-e-Islami, remains unscathed, with no more than a few minor leaders behind bars. The place of the Islamist forces in the army’s radarscope will be something to watch. The execution in March of six activists of the militant Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh, convicted for the highly publicised serial bombings of 2005, might have brought to an end one chapter of Bangladeshi militancy. Nonetheless, the patronage received from the Jamaat and the complex web of Islamist sympathy towards such fundamentalists – including from within the army – remains to be probed.

Meanwhile, talk of the political ambitions of military leaders backing a transitional government will undoubtedly continue and progressively escalate until the brass returns to the barracks. But all the talk of establishing a new political party with army support, and of bringing together various splintered political entities, seems to be driven by uncertainty rather than intelligence. In a country that is in desperate need of a clear plan that leads back to the people’s mandate, uncertainty coupled with raw power can be a deadly mixture. Social, cultural, political and economic systems cannot be purged overnight by diktat, as the generals seem to think possible. In the meantime, the Dhaka intelligentsia is having second thoughts about this cleansing. #

This analysis was first published in HIMAL magazine, http://www.himalmag.com/2007/may/analysis_bangladesh.htm

Bangladesh: State in Decline

ANIRUDH SURI, JOSH KURLANTZICK

OVER the last two weeks, the streets of Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh--a country once touted as a model of moderate, Islamic democracy--looked more like Baghdad or Karachi. Thousands of protesters charged through Dhaka's alleys and tin-roofed slum dwellings. They attacked stores and clashed with riot police and thousands of soldiers, battling with stones and sticks until some demonstrators fled the scene, their faces bleeding and clothes ripped apart. In just three days last week, the violence escalated, leaving more than 100 people injured.

The riots cap years of turmoil and poisonous politics in Bangladesh, breeding the kind of chaos that is fostering Bangladeshi terrorist groups with links to Al Qaeda. Just since October, similar riots have killed more than 30 people in the country. Indeed, instead of developing into the next Turkey, once-secular Bangladesh may be headed toward becoming the next Afghanistan.

Ostensibly, the riots stemmed from a recent announcement by Bangladesh's opposition leader and former prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, that her 14-party opposition alliance, known as the Awami League, would boycott the January 22 elections. Hasina claims that an interim caretaker government responsible for organizing the polls is biased against her party and should implement several electoral reforms to level the playing field before the election. Seeking to show its power, Hasina's group called for supporters to shut down the capital and other parts of the country through protests and strikes. "Resist the vote thieves," Hasina told her supporters, according to several reports.

In response, Bangladesh's other main party, led by another former prime minister, Begum Khaleda Zia, accused the Awami League of paralyzing Bangladesh's already fragile economy and called for the polls to proceed on schedule, without the reforms.

The protests only reveal larger failures within the country. Bangladesh boasts an educated elite, a history of secularism and tolerance, a strong civil society, a vibrant intellectual life--and nascent interest by foreign investors, who see potential in one of the world's most populous Muslim nations. Dhaka hardly looks like Riyadh or pre-September 11 Kabul: Scantily clad Bollywood stars pose on advertising billboards at major intersections. Women, from Khaleda Zia and Hasina on down, play major roles in Bangladeshi government, business, and society.

But the country has not been well served by its politicians. In fact, in recent years, domestic politics has disintegrated into a blood feud between Khaleda Zia and Hasina, who hate each other. Too often, in a nation where unemployed young men are not hard to round up, this rivalry plays out in political violence on the streets, distracting from the process of governing. Time and again, whichever leader is not in power uses her time in opposition not to parry the government but to call her thugs into the streets and to shut down the economy.

With venomous mainstream politicians like Khaleda Zia and Hasina, and with Bangladeshi elections increasingly devalued, some young Bangladeshis appear to be turning to another alternative: Islamists. Once on the fringe of society, Islamist parties and terrorist organizations have gained prominence in recent years. One recent report by South Asia expert Selig Harrison said that the "growing Islamic fundamentalist movement linked to al-Qaeda and Pakistani intelligence agencies is steadily converting the strategically located nation of Bangladesh into a new regional hub for terrorist operations that reach into India and Southeast Asia." Former State Department terrorism coordinator Cofer Black has echoed that assessment, warning that Bangladesh could become a platform for terrorist groups.

The militants already have made headway. Several Islamist parties have sprung up, including many with strong ties to Bangladeshi militant groups, including Harkat ul Jihad al Islami, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh, and Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). In August 2005, the JMB claimed credit for more than 450 synchronized explosions across the country, and its operatives spread leaflets at the sites of the blasts calling for the establishment of Islamic law. One year earlier, a grenade attack on an Awami League rally killed over 20 people, and Islamist groups regularly attack prominent secular intellectuals and members of religious minorities, sometimes mutilating their bodies in the process. Both Hasina and Khaleda Zia have attempted to co-opt the Islamist parties toward moderation, with little success, and the weak Bangladeshi police force has little ability to crack down on terrorists.

Left unchecked, Bangladesh could become another Afghanistan--a base for regional terrorism--and damage America's growing relationship with South Asia. Yet the United States and other major powers are paying little attention to the crisis in Dhaka. Rather than pushing the caretaker government and the two parties toward a compromise that brings everyone to the polls, the U.S. Embassy in Dhaka has proved passive, merely issuing a statement that "our own support and observation missions will depend on [free and fair elections]." Unless the United States brokers a compromise, further political chaos and a meaningless election might overwhelm the fragile secular political system, leading to intervention by the Bangladeshi army or creating the kind of failed state that occurred in pre-September 11 Afghanistan.

To defuse the crisis, the United States could leverage the roughly $800 million that it gives every year to Bangladesh. Washington could also offer duty-free textile imports from Bangladesh as a carrot to induce compromise. In addition, the United States needs to team up with India to tackle potential terrorism emanating from Bangladesh. For too long, the United States has allowed Bangladeshi terrorist groups to disband only to reappear under different names in different countries.

International pressure and careful public shaming has worked in the past with Bangladesh. In 2001, it took a visit from former President Jimmy Carter before the elections and a public appeal urging the Awami League to accept the results of that year's election which was widely considered to be free and fair by international observers. On January 11, the resignation of Bangladesh's caretaker leader, Iajuddin Ahmed, who was not accepted by both political parties, possibly came due to persistent pressure from the international community, including the United States, the United Nations, and the European Union, among others. But the crisis isn't over yet--the country remains in a state of emergency. In the coming days, the United States might even consider sending diplomats from Washington, not just from the Dhaka embassy, to help stabilize the situation and ensure that free, fair, and credible elections are held with the participation of all political parties.

Thankfully, Bangladesh has not yet imploded. The majority of Bangladeshis remain moderate and secular, and the Islamist parties have never gained more than 10 percent of the total vote. But this once-promising country is heading down a steep slope, and an illegitimate election, followed by more violence, will only make matters worse. #

This article was first published in The New Republic (online), January 15, 2007

Joshua Kurlantzick is a special correspondent for The New Republic. Anirudh Suri is editor of South Asian Perspectives, a monthly publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

'Democra-tators' aim at journalists

Western war reporters hog the glory, but, as Marina Jimenez writes, local watchdogs face the greatest risk

MARINA JIMENEZ

SALEEM Samad, a genial refugee from Bangladesh, spends his days nabbing shoplifters and shushing disorderly customers as a security guard at a Chapters bookstore. But before he arrived in Toronto four years ago Mr. Samad, 55, was leading a very different kind of life.

A prominent journalist, Mr. Samad was forced to spend 55 days in a Dhaka prison, simply for having the audacity to criticize his own government.

The annual World Press Freedom Day, to be marked this Thursday, honours journalists who brave death or jail in pursuit of the truth.

Yet, all too often, the headlines focus on international stars such as Daniel Pearl, the Wall Street Journal reporter kidnapped and killed by extremists in Pakistan. In fact, far more tortured or slain journalists
are not war correspondents but locals such as Mr. Samad, attacked at home or in their newsrooms, often by agents of their own governments.

Often those governments are, like that of Bangladesh, nominally democratic, even members of the Commonwealth. But they are led by what Joel Simon of New York's Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ)
calls "democra-tators," elected leaders with authoritarian streaks such as Vladimir Putin in Russia and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.

These leaders have a deep mistrust for the institutions that limit their power, such as the judiciary and the press. Three journalists were killed in Russia last year, including Anna Politkovskaya, a Chechnya expert, last October.

In the case of Mr. Samad, he was behind bars from late November of 2002 until mid-January in 2003, and endured torture at the hands of military intelligence officers. When he asked his jailors what crime he had committed, they said he had smeared Bangladesh's good reputation with his exposes on Islamic terrorism, published locally and internationally, including in Time.

"They didn't like my writings on how the Bengali government was harbouring terrorists and jihadists," he says. "They wanted to know why I was trying to undermine a democratic government. They were trying to silence me."

Mr. Samad was lucky. He was released and in 2004 fled Bangladesh for a new life in Canada. Others are not so fortunate.

According to a report released last month by the Paris-based International News Safety Institute (INSI), the number of journalists killed on the job has escalated dramatically in recent years. In the past decade, more than a thousand media members have been slain, and in nine out of 10 cases, the perpetrators have never been prosecuted.

Reporters Without Borders tabulated the deaths of 81 journalists and 32 media assistants (drivers, translators, security and fixers) last year alone. It is the highest toll since 1994, when 103 died, half of
them in the Rwandan genocide. An additional 1,400 attacks or threats were carried out against journalists - many of them during election campaigns in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe. Another record.

That is why the focus for this year's World Press Freedom Day is impunity, and the need to bring to justice those who target and kill journalists.

"With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s and the return to democracy in Latin America, we saw an explosion of press freedom," notes Mr. Simon of the CPJ. "But, in this decade, there have been some losses."

Among them is Hrant Dink, editor of Turkey's only Armenian-language magazine and a well-known critic of the Turkish government's treatment of Armenians. He was shot in the street as he left his office on Jan. 19 of this year.

"In many countries, murder has become the easiest, cheapest and most effective way of silencing troublesome reporting and the more the killers get away with it, the more the spiral of death is forced upwards," INSI director Rodney Pinder said last month.

Not surprisingly, Iraq is the most dangerous place to report from.

The United Nations has become so concerned about the deliberate targeting of journalists that the Security Council even passed a special resolution on Dec. 23, 2006, condemning such attacks and reiterating the right of war correspondents to be treated as prisoners of war and accorded the rights of civilians under the Third Geneva Convention.

Many journalists, though, are killed not in war zones, but covering local politics or crime in countries such as Mexico, Russia, Iran and India. Marlene Garcia-Esperat lost her life for her articles documenting embezzlement and corruption in the local government in Tacurong, the Philippines. She was shot and killed in front of her two children on Easter weekend in 2005. Her bodyguards were off-duty.

Since most of these homicides are never resolved, the sense of impunity only encourages more killings, advocates say. There is also surprisingly little public sympathy for these cases, as though journalists somehow deserve to die for writing about the drug trade, or for criticizing an official state religion.

"There is a sense of complacency when a journalist and their family are killed or are under attack. The public finds it easier to support police officers or firefighters who die in the line of duty," notes Anne Game, executive director of the Toronto-based Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (CJFE). "But it's so important to try to protect journalists because they're really on the front line. Their freedom to speak enables others to."

Ross Howard, a journalism instructor at Vancouver's Langara College and president of Media and Democracy, a non-profit Canadian group, has crisscrossed the globe training journalists in the developing
world - only to see them targeted as they become less partisan and more professional.

"There is a tragic irony in post-conflict states in emerging democracies that the better the journalist gets, the more dangerous it becomes for him [or] her," he said.

"In countries such as Iran, Cuba or Pakistan, you cannot criticize the supreme leader, question the country's policies or even the economic corruption among the power-holders," notes Maryam Aghvami, an Iranian journalist who is now living in Toronto, where she heads the 70-member Journalists in Exile.

"If you are brave enough to do so, you are accused of acting against the country's national security, spreading lies and spying for Western powers."

Another key difference today is the erosion of the neutral-observer status that journalists used to enjoy. Radical or revolutionary groups no longer view journalists as conduits of information, but as lucrative
kidnapping targets.

Local columnists such as Saleem Samad are seen as "enemies of the state," and international correspondents as representatives of their own governments.

While there is no meaningful global data comparing journalists killed on the job with, for example, firefighters, Julie Payne, CJFE's manager, says the consequences are more profound. The killing of a journalist undermines one of the primary means of holding people accountable - and serves to silence others.

That is why advocacy organizations have begun funding legal cases overseas. CJFE, the CPJ and a number of other groups helped fund the case against Ms. Marlene Garcia-Esperat's killers. Three hit men were finally convicted and received life sentences in October, 2006, in Cebu - though the true power-holding authors of her death remain at large.

CJFE also manages the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), which issues daily alerts of threats and violations to journalists all over the world.

As for Mr. Samad, he, his wife and adult son were all granted asylum here. Today, in addition to working security at the local bookstore, he edits Durdesh.net, a news portal for the South Asian diaspora.

He also looks forward to a term this fall as a visiting scholar at the University of California at Berkeley's School of Journalism.

Mr. Samad remains thankful to have escaped with his life. After he was released from prison, his house was put under surveillance, his phone lines tapped and his wife continually harassed.

"I kept a small bag ready, sure they would come back and arrest me," he recalls. "I was mentally prepared to pay with my life for my profession." #

Marina Jimenez is a senior feature writer with The Globe and Mail

Article first published in The Globe and Mail, Canada, April 28, 2007 Saturday

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20070428.PRESS28/TPStory/Comment

What leads to campus violence, student or partisan politics?

ABM NASIR

BANNING culture is nothing new in Bangladesh. In 1964, Ayub regime banned “Tagore songs” from the public media to suppress and, eventually, cripple Bengali culture. But, not only did Ayub regime failed to do any damage to Bengali culture, but his attempt made “Tagore songs” as one of the symbols of Bengali Nationalism. The Pakistani regime simply didn’t understand the nucleus of the wrath of the Bengali populace. Failure to deal with the right issue such as discrimination against Bengalis, ultimately, forced the Pakistan regime to a disgraceful exit to the west once and for all.

Lately, the issue of “student politics” has re-surfaced in the media. Many are blaming “student politics” for campus violence and proposing a ban on “student politics.”

Indeed, entire premise of the on-going debate, if I may correctly translate it, that student politics breeds campus violence, campus violence shatters academic atmosphere, therefore, student politics must be banned, is based on fallacy.

On the contrary, the core problem in the public institutions is not the student politics but the partisan politics, greed for power and money that breed campus violence. We must recognize that student politics and partisan politics are completely two different aspects of politics. In an ideal situation, partisan politics serves the narrow ideological or political agenda of the political parties, while student politics embraces the greater interest of the students as well as campus community.

Proposing a ban simply skirts the real issue behind campus violence and is like sweeping dirt under the rug. With a simple blow of air, the real issue will re-emerge in different way.

Campus violence is a law and order issue. And, the wide prevalence of campus violence reflects the failure of our governments. In fact, all previous governments of Bangladesh did not only fail to ensure campus safety, but, in most cases, instigated campus violence, either directly, by patronizing student organizations, or indirectly, by appointing partisan vice-chancellors and unleashing police brutality.

In the early 1960s, Ayub Khan sowed the seed of campus violence by patronizing National Student Front (NSF) with two particular goals: to crush the movement of the nationalist and leftist student organizations; and, to use the NSF to promote his basic democracy agenda. In the post liberation era, the notorious seven-murder incidence, perpetrated by a faction of the ruling-party student wing, Bangladesh Student League (BCL), at the Mohsin Hall, Dhaka University, in 1974, marked the first major incidence of violence on campus. In the late 1970s, General Zia’s “Hizbul Bahar” experiment introduced the cadre based student politics and, for the first time, students were provided with arms to counter dissent voices at the academic institutions. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, many products of this experiment dominated campus violence which, in turn, led to loss of many lives. In the early mid 1980s, General Ershad tried to install his own brand of student politics through Notun Bangla Chhatra Samaj. Although failed to install his brand of politics in the academic institutions, Ershad's attempt also led to many violent clashes in campuses across the country. During the mid 1990s and 2005th, campus community experienced relatively fewer incidences of violence, mainly due to monopoly control of campuses by successive ruling-party student organizations. Since 1971, aside from ruling-party student organizations, student fronts of two opposition political parties, the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS) of radical Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Bangladesh Student League (BCL) of Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), dominated and perpetrated frequent campus violence to a large extent. After 1975, while JSD student front, failing to reap any benefit from the so called November revolution of 1975 and gain any governmental patronage, splintered into many factions and withered into an insignificant force in campuses, the ICS, continued to thrive and in many instances excelled in notoriety and its capacity to perpetrate violence against rival student groups. This dramatic rise of ICS can be ascribed to three important factors: the patronage of Ershad during early 1980s; support of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party; and, the failure of the Awami League government to take any action against the ICS’s violent activities during 1996-2001.

All the incidences illustrated above clearly show governments’ role in campus violence. Had government stayed away from campus politics and taken drastic measures to prevent campus violence, many worst form of campus violence could have been averted.

What motivates government to interfere with student politics and instigate campus violence? What incentives induce students to participate in partisan politics as well as to perpetrate campus violence?

Government’s motivation in dominating campus politics is rooted in its motivation of holding on to national power. Students are young, energetic, educated, and perhaps the most informed group in society. University campuses have always been the center of freedom of expression and the free flow of information. And students have always been the incorruptible voices of people in times of national crises and major threat to the very existence of any tyrannical government. Therefore, in an effort to suppress these dissent voices and put permanent hold on to power, government installs its cronies in the academic institutions.

In the process of enticing students into partisan politics, government provides them with a set of perverse incentives in exchange for students’ support. Students are provided with various benefits including opportunities of earnings from toll collections, holding onto seats in the residential halls, getting jobs, likelihood of future political appointments and, most importantly, getting away with committing crimes in campus. In return for these benefits, partisan student outfits counter any activities of the students’ organizations deemed threat to the existence of incumbent and the opposition political parties. Competition among various student groups for such benefits and attempt of rival student fronts to oust government beneficiaries lead to campus violence.

According to a report published in May 4, 2001, issue of the Daily Janakantha by Akhil Poddar, campus violence, over the three decades since country’s liberation in 1971, cost 118 lives with more than 10000 students, teachers, staffs and outsides injured. In addition to precious lives, campus violence also costs students lost academic years and the country more resources per student to make up for each year lost due to campus violence. Had there been no Ershad vocation, this author could have been graduated four years earlier from his alma mater, Dhaka University.

Such quid pro quo relationship between government and students must stop. As long as such status quo remains in place, government will keep meddling with student politics, students will get engaging in partisan politics, and campuses will get embroiled in violence.

Current trend in the student politics is the bi-product of the state of our national politics. As stated in the preceding paragraph, national politics and partisan politics on campuses maintain a symbiotic relationship. Proposing a wholesale ban on student politics while ignoring current state of the national politics is like a steering a ship into the wind, not knowing the direction. Failure of the past governments does not justify the use of undemocratic means to stop individuals’ rights to political discourse.

Alternatively, through constructive debate, the stakeholders can find solutions to campus violence. The solution shall include a positive set of incentives for both government and the opposition political parties so that they would be aversed to interfering with student politics and a set of incentives for students so that would be reluctant to invite ideologies that only serve interests of partisan politics.

If government upholds rules of law and guarantee students with quality of education, safe and quality campus environment, seats at the residential halls, merit based and non-discriminatory recruitment policies for jobs, only then will students shun destructive and partisan politics and campus violence will be the story of the yesteryear.

Laws that do not provide incentive based enforcement are meant to be broken. In the United States, a speeding ticket costs a violator his income in the form of court fees, fines and higher insurance premium for several years. And this monetary damage for traffic violation provides drivers with incentive not to speed. We, therefore, instead of proposing drastic measure to resolve a problem, must search for solutions that reward good deeds and penalize aberrant and destructive behaviours. #

ABM Nasir, Ph.D. is Assistant Professor and Lead Faculty of Economics, School of Business, North Carolina Central University, Durham, NC.
April 30, 2007